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Abstract 
This study explores the differences in expertise and investment philosophies among 
private and professional investors (mainly in Switzerland) in the management of their 
personal investment portfolios. It uses the valuable five-step adult skill acquisition model 
developed by Hubert L. Dreyfus (2004) to characterize the investment ‘experts’ and 
establishes key findings and suggestions from their investment behaviour, criteria and 
strategies for the ‘ordinary’ investor. The notion of what constitutes ‘expertise’ in general 
but especially in the area of financial investment (stock market) was found to be under-
researched.  
A comprehensive review of the existing literature was conducted to form the theoretical 
basis for the research and to establish an initial hypothesis. This conceptual framework 
defines the organization of the study and identifies its challenges, concepts and ideas.  A 
research design framework could then be developed to identify strategies for inquiry 
(research methodology) and data generation methods. These formed the basis for an 
extensive online questionnaire, which was answered by 550 participants. In regard to the 
three research questions developed, this survey was followed by diverse analyses and 
discussions that delivered key findings and answers for my research. 
One of the main foci and accomplished result of this research was to develop a method 
to identify and characterize the experts amongst the asset managers, institutional investors 
and private investors and to formulate their expert recommendations into a feasible 
investment process for the benefit of the ordinary investor. A key finding was that 
education, financial qualification and experience contribute significantly to informed 
investment decisions, i.e. diversification of assets, rebalancing of portfolios or passive 
investing. As hypothesized, the professional investors exhibit superior investment 
behaviour. However, every fourth private investor also demonstrated characteristics of an 
expert.   
A descriptive and statistical analysis of the expert group characterized them as highly 
educated, experienced, and diversified. They invest for more than 7 years in passive 
managed funds rather than single shares, with an expected average return of around 7%. 
Their preferred asset classes are shares, corporate bonds and commodities and they view 
the knowledge and size of a company as well as the industry as the most important 
IV 
investment criteria. In addition, they favour asset allocation, value investing and 
fundamental analysis as imperative investment strategies/applications.  
The main practical contribution of this study is the recommendations for general investors 
drawn from the experts’ knowledge and experience. These include: ‘educating oneself’ 
to become an informed investor or expert; qualification or re-qualification of financial 
advisers; knowing who you are by developing your risk-profile; investing for the long-
term if disposable funds are not needed for short or mid-term purchases within a well-
diversified portfolio; being wary of the cost, and thus reducing the total expense ratio as 
much as possible; not stock picking or timing the market; investing in passive funds 
within superior asset classes; controlling emotions when investing; rebalancing ones 
portfolio when required (keeping the asset class ratios in control) and continually 
investing additional disposable funds according to the concept of value averaging 
(increasing the value of your portfolio periodically).  The limitations of these findings are 
also discussed and the possible directions for future research is outlined. 
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1. Introduction    
1.1. Chapter Overview 
This thesis focuses on the differences in knowledge, experience and expertise between 
individual private and professional investors (primarily in Switzerland) in relation to 
investing in capital markets. This chapter illustrates my motivation for the research and 
presents the Dreyfus model of adult skill acquisition from novice to expertise. It also 
gives general background information about investing and the investor groups under 
discussion. It considers potential gaps in the literature, presents the aims of this thesis and 
outlines the resulting research questions. Key terms are also defined and the structure of 
the thesis outlined.  
1.2. Motivation for my research 
Stock or fund selection can be an overwhelming challenge for general investors. 
Choosing securities from the global marketplace and then analysing, evaluating and 
purchasing investment products for a well-diversified portfolio with a view to tracking 
and rebalancing those securities, is not something most non-professional investors are 
capable of or willing to do for themselves. A recent EU report concluded: ‘First, and 
perhaps most fundamentally, the sheer complexity of, and uncertainty associated with, 
investment products immediately poses the consumer substantial challenges. The 
difficulty is exacerbated further by the fact that many consumers are not confident with 
basic financial concepts and terminology. Second, most consumers will make major 
investment purchases only infrequently, such as signing up to a savings and investment 
plan, life insurance policy or a company pension scheme. Third, insofar as feedback is 
ever available about whether the consumer has made a good or poor choice, it is likely to 
be delayed and confounded with exogenous factors such as market conditions. Fourth, 
retail investment products are primarily sold and not bought. This is a market in which 
there is little independent ‘shopping around’ by consumers, and advice is ubiquitous’ 
(Charter, Huck, & Inderst, 2010). 
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As a result, many private individuals deposit their (hard-earned) money either with a retail 
bank, a private bank or with an asset management company, trusting that these 
organizations know better and will work solely in the client’s interest.  
 
While there are undoubtedly financial institutions that act for the benefit of their 
customers, the vast majority do not (Green, 2008; Schwanfelder, 2012; Hechler, 2013). 
In addition, there is a great variation in the levels of service and quality provided by all 
professional asset managers (banks, independent asset managers, insurances companies). 
This is for numerous reasons, such as a lack of professionalism, flawed customer and risk 
profiling, general erroneous decisions regarding investment strategies, or investment 
biases towards the bank’s own products or third-party products to generate kickbacks and 
retrocessions. These practices unfortunately often lead to underperforming portfolios and 
losses over time for the private individual who placed their trust in a professional’s 
support.  
 
Similarly, private investors who either want to invest themselves or who are not eligible 
for the services of private banks will also often lose money in the long term (Lowenstein, 
2000; Zweig, 2006; Browne 2015). This is, as I assume, a result of numerous factors such 
as lack of investment knowledge, overestimation of own talents, not knowing ‘who they 
are’ (risk tolerance/ability), following the herd or the desire to achieve ‘unrealistic 
returns’. The EU report quoted earlier, from the review of available data, concludes that:  
 
(1) A growing body of evidence shows that the ‘standard’ model of a rational self-
interested economic agent does not adequately describe human decision-making. 
 
(2) Features of the retail investment market may make consumer decisions 
particularly prone to biases and errors. 
 
(3) Consumers’ reliance on advice makes issues of trust and persuasion of key 
importance in the retail investment market. 
 
(4) In addition to the extensive review, the same team conducted an on-line survey 
involving 6,000 consumers. As a result of this activity, they further concluded: 
 
▪ Consumers are often confused about the true nature of their investment. 
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▪ Although investments are usually triggered by a change of life circumstances 
and not marketing, information search is very limited. 
▪ Advice is ubiquitous in the retail investment market. 
▪ Trust in advisers is high, but consumers are often unaware of potential 
conflicts of interest. 
 
However, for the many change of life circumstances such as financing a house, supporting 
a family, preparing for retirement or attempting to combat inflation, investing wisely is 
paramount for anybody who retains disposable income. While investing without taking 
risks is impossible, the key to minimizing these is to prevent these downsides as far as 
possible by educating yourself, learning from experts or by engaging a professional asset 
manager who offers reliable and sustainable support (authors comment).   
 
After having traded on the stock market myself for almost two decades and with relevant 
post-graduate studies in this area, I co-founded Sincera Asset Management in Switzerland 
in 2010. My business partner and I sought to establish a company that serves private 
clients who retain disposable income but would not qualify for the services of a retail or 
private bank. Banks ins Switzerland commonly demand a minimum investment of CHF 
250,000 to CHF 500,000 (£190,000 – £380,000, FX rate 2016); or would not receive 
individual, personalized investment consulting due to the banks’ overall cost structure 
and strategy.  
 
Our goal was to deliver the same or better quality professional service than the private or 
retail banks propose, but at lesser cost. We achieve this by being expert passive 
investment managers with a buy-and-hold strategy with periodical rebalancing, focusing 
on low cost investment products such as index certificates or exchange traded funds 
(ETFs) managed through low cost online-banks.  
 
Part of our core business is to analyse existing investment portfolios of potential 
customers in order to identify if these clients have invested sensibly and efficiently. When 
conducting such portfolio analysis, we mainly focus on diversification, total expenses 
(cost), asset classes and asset class allocation, risk profile, and the selected investment 
instruments (products).  
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Each of these focus areas receives a grading from low to medium to high, with respect to 
its optimization potential, and is crucial for investors who want to invest residual income, 
be it money saved or inherited, for the sustainable long-term. 
 
Almost all the client portfolios we analysed displayed medium or major flaws. The most 
common issues were mediocre asset class allocation, under-diversified portfolios, being 
unreasonably invested in banks’ own products, high portfolio turnover, too expensive 
(high management fees and transactions costs leading to a high Total Expense Ratio 
(TER), and inappropriate investments for an investor’s given risk profile. I highlight and 
describe the most vital shortcomings below.  
1.2.1. Common investment deficiencies 
 
Mediocre asset allocation  
Generally, investors were diversified to some degree having allocated to different asset 
classes, usually cash, equities (shares), government bonds, corporate and high yield 
bonds, structured products, real estate, commodities and hedge funds. 
 
Many portfolios also contained quite exotic and complex products such as cat bonds, 
convertible bonds, or costly asset classes such as high-yield bonds or fund of hedge funds. 
Repeatedly, these positions accounted for less than 3% of the portfolio worth, therefore 
offering no real positive impact but resulting in high costs while not delivering real 
diversification benefits. Although such products / asset classes can indeed deliver high 
returns, one needs to be aware of the potential down-side risk as higher premiums always 
come at a higher cost and significant losses are probable, especially in turbulent market 
environments with high volatility.  
 
On many occasions we observed that portfolios also contained direct investments in high-
profile companies such as Google, Amazon, Netflix or Uber or in highly promoted 
industries such generic pharma, agriculture, renewable energy (i.e. windmills, water, 
solar), where one needs to ask whether these are viable and sustainable investments.  
 
Another common issue was that portfolios were restricted to a single emerging market, 
i.e. Argentina, Brazil, Russia or South Africa, instead of investing into different funds 
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that allocate assets to multiple emerging market countries. Also common were allocations 
to money market funds (currency funds) whose yields (profits) are regularly lower than 
the management fees and expenses (TER) they accumulate, while posing substantial 
volatility risk inherent in currencies, therefore increasing portfolio risk unnecessarily.  
 
Under-diversified 
Most investors’ portfolios were diversified to some degree, nevertheless around half of 
all portfolios were lacking in ‘number’ of positions and/or contained various similar 
products; for example, shares in both Credit Suisse and UBS, or funds that held those 
same companies that the investor held directly.   
 
According to one’s risk-profile, a stable and ‘weatherproof’ portfolio should (in terms of 
investment theory) comprise equities from both developed and emerging markets, from 
small/medium and large capitalized companies, government bonds with different 
durations, commodities, real-estate, cash, and a gold position for further diversification 
reasons and as a hedge against inflation. Furthermore, a diversified portfolio should not 
contain as many instruments as possible but an ideal combination of them, so that they 
complement each other in various market environments.  
 
Unreasonably Invested in banks’ own products  
Almost all customer portfolios contained mutual funds either from the bank managing 
the clients’ money (repeatedly up to 60% of all products within their portfolios) or from 
a third-party fund provider. Given that the banks’ main goal should be to provide clients 
with the absolute ideal combination of products to suit their investment requirements and 
since there are thousands of different funds available, it was astonishing that the banks 
primarily selected their own products. Certainly, while it is possible that a bank may 
manage funds that are truly superior to all others available, the more likely conclusion is 
that the banks increase their revenues by selling their own products. Similarly, selling the 
products of amicable partner banks or fund issuers also generates additional revenue via 
the receipt of retrocessions and other forms of kick-backs, as opposed to simply selling 
low cost exchange traded funds. 
 
High portfolio turnover 
In many cases, especially with portfolios containing single share investments, the 
positions were turned over too frequently (constantly buying and selling positions), 
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therefore generating unnecessary transactions costs and commissions, ultimately carried 
by the client. Perhaps a simple buy-and-hold strategy with periodical rebalancing would 
be more beneficial.  
 
Too expensive – high total expense ratio (TER) 
Almost all portfolios exhibited high optimization potential with respect to the cost of 
constructing and managing the investment portfolio. While it is feasible that banks and 
asset managers require a fee for providing their investment advice and services, the 
differences in these charges were at times rather large. Furthermore, in most cases, 
portfolios would contain high cost products such as actively managed funds, structured 
products, hedge funds or funds of hedge funds. To illustrate this effect, an actively 
managed fund for instance costs 1.5 to 2.5% management fee per annum, plus often, 
particularly in the case of hedge funds, a 20% performance fee, and in addition, a 5% 
front-load fee when purchasing the fund and typically a 3% back-end load fee when 
selling the fund. To cover these excessive costs, the fund must generate a positive return 
that is at least 2 to 3% higher than the market average. For hedge funds and fund of hedge 
funds, the costs can even be higher.  
 
Inappropriate investments for a given risk profile 
Another common occurrence was the portfolio not reflecting the client’s risk profile. 
There was hardly a case where the portfolio was invested in a less risky manner when the 
profile would have allowed, but often riskier than required and contractually agreed. In 
other words, a client would be happy with a small annual profit of 1 to 2% but the portfolio 
would contain high-yield bonds or structured products that are very volatile and could 
quickly lose substantial value. For example, in one case, a very risk-averse customer was 
invested exclusively in a single currency fund. Similarly, if a risk-averse client would 
only hold a few single shares and if one of these companies would fold (e.g. Enron, Arthur 
Anderson, Swissair, American Airlines, WorldCom, Blockbuster, General Motors, etc.), 
the portfolio would incur a substantial loss due to the high concentration risk it assumed 
in a given name. 
 
In conclusion, we found that many portfolios did not seem to follow a clear asset 
allocation strategy, as products were mixed together unstrategically and were often 
‘exotic’. Some had a strong home-market bias, others contained hardly any Swiss Franc 
denominated products, and most contained actively managed funds that were either 
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issued by the same custodial bank holding the portfolio, or by an amicable third party 
financial institution from whom the custodial bank would receive commissions.  
 
The more portfolio checks we conducted, the more alarmed we became about their make-
up. We started to examine the rationale for private investors not questioning their banks’ 
actions or holding them more accountable for their performance and services delivered. 
That these clients are no investment experts is understandable, but that the professional 
investment advisers are not acting like experts and seemingly neglecting their obligation 
of professional duty to act in the best interests of their clients was bewildering.  
 
Of course, private banks, retail banks and asset managers alike need to generate profit in 
order to invest and grow. However, this should never be done at the cost of compromising 
a client’s portfolio (e.g. ‘Act in the best interests of your clients in seeking to extend and 
secure their financial wellbeing’ – AFA Code of Conduct). One would assume that by 
investing solely in the client’s best interest, the bank or asset manager would experience 
a high client retention rate and would increase their opportunities to conduct further 
business (for example, by selling the client loans, mortgages, brokerage services, etc.).  
 
In other fields, we fully depend on the expert’s knowledge and know-how. Curiously, 
within the field of financial investing, the variation in level of knowledge, expertise and 
advisory competencies seems to be particularly high. This prompted me to question what 
truly constitutes an expert financial investor. I came to realize that there is not much 
research-based or academic information available that actually provides a ‘description of 
experts’ or expert knowledge, as O’Leary, Fisher, Choy, Mengersen & Caley stated in 
2011. In 1993, Weinstein discussed the same dilemma and subsequently attempted to 
construct a useful description of an expert (generally speaking, not in terms of one in the 
field of financial investing). He distinguished between two kinds of experts; those whose 
expertise is a function of what they know (epistemic expertise) and those whose expertise 
is derived by what they do (performative expertise). He concluded that epistemic 
expertise is the capacity to provide strong justification for a range of propositions in a 
certain domain, while performative expertise is the capacity to perform a skill according 
to the rules and virtues of practice.  
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1.3. The Dreyfus adult skill acquisition model – from ‘novice’ to ‘expertise’ 
The most valuable insights into the definition of a general expert are provided by Hubert 
L. Dreyfus (1993) who developed a five-stage model of adult skill acquisition describing 
the stages one must master in order to gain expert knowledge. His brother, Stuart E. 
Dreyfus (2004) built on this model. Stuart Dreyfus (2004) used two examples to illustrate 
the knowledge adoption/ acquisition process: a student learning how to drive a car and a 
person striving to become an expert chess player. In this thesis, the example is of skill in 
investing in capital markets, and the same five stages are applied. 
1.3.1. Stage 1 - ‘novice’ 
This describes the instruction process that begins with the tutor decomposing the task 
environment into context free elements that the novice can identify without required 
skills. The beginner then is given rules to put information into action. Dreyfus states that 
merely following rules will produce inferior outcomes in the real world, hence the learner 
does not only require the facts but also an understanding of the context in which the 
information makes sense.   
1.3.2. Stage 2 -  ‘advanced beginner’ 
This illustrates that the novice, who is now coping with real situations, starts to develop 
an understanding of the relevant context and/or an instructor or lecturer points out 
perspicuous examples and important aspects about the situation at hand. After 
accomplishing an increasing number of comparable situations, the student starts to 
recognize these new aspects, based on his/her experiences. Dreyfus (2004) calls this stage 
a ‘maxim’, which differs from a rule, as it requires some understanding of the domain to 
which the maxim applies. Still, learning takes place in a detached analytical manner as 
the advanced beginner follow rules and is given examples.  
1.3.3. Stage 3 - ‘competence’ 
With more experience, the number of potentially relevant elements and procedures that 
the learner is able to distinguish and follow becomes overwhelming. Consequently, 
satisfying performance becomes problematic and exhausting at this point, as a sense of 
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what is important in a particular situation is missing. To manage this overload and to 
achieve competence, people learn through education or experience to develop a plan how 
to determine between the elements that are important and the ones that can be neglected; 
thus, understanding and decision-making becomes easier.  
 
The challenge is to master all subtle differences in a multitude of situations; hence the 
student must now figure out a plan of action and decisions him/herself, based on rules, 
examples, experiences and intuition. Dreyfus (2004) states that given this continuing 
uncertainty, copying becomes rather frightening, rather than merely exhausting, and the 
students become more and more emotionally involved to an extent that it would be 
difficult for them to just follow the detached-maxim approach of the advanced beginner. 
He determines that in this phase an emotional involvement is the key to advancing beyond 
competence, and that one who is seeking a safety net or rules will not improve and never 
become an expert. He concludes that the more the beginner is emotionally committed to 
learning the better, but that conversely, an expert should be coldly detached and rational 
in his/her practice.  
1.3.4. Stage 4 - ‘proficiency’ 
The continuous positive and negative experiences will reinforce successful perceptions 
and inhibit unsuccessful ones, and the learners existing practice stemming from rules and 
principles, will gradually be replaced by situational discrimination. With each entered 
situation, certain aspects stand out as important and plans evolve, without the learner 
standing back and choosing plans or deciding to adopt a particular perspective. The goal 
becomes simply obvious and there is less doubt that the respective actions and decisions 
are appropriate. However, at this stage, the particular actions are still hard to evaluate, as 
the proficient performer simply has not yet had sufficient experiences with the effects of 
the wide variety of probable responses to each of the situations. Hence, while seeing the 
topic and the important aspects spontaneously, s/he must still decide on what to do.  
1.3.5. Stage 5 - ‘expertise’ 
The skilful expert, immersed in the world of outcome and goal-oriented activity, sees 
what needs to be done but decides intuitively on how to achieve it, selecting from an 
immense collection of situational discriminations.  
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This is what distinguishes the expert from the proficient performer. The brain of the 
expert progressively decomposes classes of situations into subclasses, with each 
demanding an altered reaction. This permits for an instant intuitive situational response 
that is characteristic of expertise. S/he does not solve a challenge, s/he does not even 
think. S/he just does what usually works and, of course, it typically works.  
 
In conclusion, if the described Dreyfus model holds true, one could reasonably conclude 
that private investors need the support of professional advisers as most private investors 
would be ‘novice investors’ or ‘advanced beginners.’ They would have not progressed 
to, or beyond, the competence stage, as this would require learning from numerous 
different investment situations, hence having adequate experiences, and becoming 
emotionally attached to learning about investment. On the other hand, the question of 
whether all professional investors and asset managers are indeed emotionally involved 
and imbued with sufficient knowledge and experience to be able to intuitively make the 
right decisions in any given situation (proficiency, that is, to display expertise), becomes 
legitimate.  
1.4. Investing in capital markets 
One of the challenges facing anyone seeking expertise in investment is the availability of 
many different types of assets that might be selected. The focus here is on capital markets, 
rather than, say, art or antiquities. Investing in capital markets (shares, bonds, funds, etc.) 
belongs to the classical form of money investments. Such investments are important for 
everyone who wishes to build a healthy financial future. In Switzerland, it is essential for 
any person in paid employment, as almost the entire workforce is required to invest in 
pension plans, either directly if self-employed or indirectly through their employer. 
 
Pension plans have at their core investments on stock markets. Shares are the most widely 
held of the common types of capital investments and are sometimes referred to as ‘stocks’ 
or ‘equities’. They are commonly issued and traded either over-the-counter (OTC) or 
through stock exchanges such as the SIX Swiss Exchange, the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) or the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The stock market is also known as the 
equity market and is one of the most vibrant areas of the market economy (Hare & Davis, 
1997).  
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Equities provide investors the opportunity of ownership in a company as well as a 
platform for corporations to raise capital. Investors have the potential to make a profit if 
the share price rises and through dividend income. The main function of these investments 
is to make money, to provide a return on capital. There are many ways to achieve the goal 
of making money, of securing a return using capital markets.  
 
These different means have given rise to complexity in markets, in products, in choices 
and in advisory services. These complexities have led some to question the functioning 
overall of the market for investments, particularly for retail investors (those investing 
their personal wealth): ‘In particular, the 2010 EU Scoreboard showed that the market for 
‘investments, pensions and securities’ ranks worst out of fifty consumer markets for 
overall market performance; worst for ease of comparing products and services sold by 
different suppliers; worst in trust that suppliers will respect consumer protection rules; 
fourth worst in experiencing problems; and worst for overall satisfaction’ (European 
Commission, 2010). 
 
By 2016, the situation had improved but still: ‘The market for ‘investment products, 
private pensions and securities’ is the third worst assessed services market in terms of 
overall MPI [Market Performance Indicator, a composite ranking index for 42 EU 
markets]. The developments in this market are similar to those described for the 
mortgages market, resulting in a 4 four-point increase in MPI since 2013’ (European 
Commission, 2016). A similar situation was evidenced in Switzerland by the research 
organization, gfs.bern. They established that out of sixteen dominant institutions and 
media vehicles, only the ‘Internet’ and ‘political parties’ enjoyed a lesser amount of trust 
than ‘banks’ (gfs.bern, 2016).  
 
The poor functioning of these markets (also mirrored in jurisdictions other than the EU 
and Switzerland) has led to various forms of sub-optimal retail investor behaviour. For 
example, some people keep cash in ordinary bank accounts, making little or no interest, 
but believing their money to be held securely. The reality is that most of them do not 
consider that when the time value for money and therefore inflation is taken into 
consideration, they are actually losing money every day (Ellis, 2002). Certainly, since the 
subprime and financial crisis at the end of the last decade, inflation in Switzerland (and 
many other developed economies) has been very low, yet it was still around 0.23% per 
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annum throughout the last 10 years (2005 to 2015), while the long-term average inflation 
between 1998 and 2007 was around 1.8% (Inflation.eu, 2016).  
 
To illustrate this effect, a cash position of CHF 100,000, at an average inflation of 2%, 
will diminish to CHF 55,000 over a period of 30 years.  
 
In contrast, using excess cash and investing it sensibly in the stock market (e.g. in some 
sort of accord with rational investment choice models) can generate, depending on the 
risk you are able and willing to take, up to 6 to 7% per year (long term average 
performance of equities). Of course, these investments carry various risks but the risks 
can be managed and largely mitigated if they are understood. Investors therefore need to 
learn about the concept of unsystematic risk (overall market risk, recession, bear market, 
etc.), which is inherent when investing in the stock market and cannot be diversified 
away, and systematic risk (title risk) that can be diversified away by investing in different 
markets and products. To do this requires both investor knowledge and (reasonably) 
effective market functioning. 
 
Other forms of ‘indirect’ investing in the stock market might be through private pension 
plans, insurance solutions or by working for a corporation that partly remunerates its 
employees through allocation of shares or stock options. Further investments can be 
conducted through the stock markets in vehicles such as active managed funds, exchange 
traded funds (ETFs), government bonds, corporate bonds or high yield bonds, call or put 
options, futures, structured products, hedge funds, credit default swaps (CDS), mortgage-
backed securities (MBS), etc. Choosing the most appropriate product is complex for any 
given investor, retail or otherwise. 
 
As the economic picture remains bleak, investing wisely in the stock market is one of 
only a few methods to ensure a successful, secure future. Without investing, 
accomplishing a comfortable life and retirement is difficult. In response to the rise of 
complex equity and associated markets, economics has developed to offer a number of 
methods of rational evaluation to support investors. Modern Portfolio Theory is a major 
contribution to this area. 
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1.5. Modern portfolio theory  
In addition to diversifying the title risk through markets and products, we can achieve 
further differentiation by investing in the various asset classes, such as fixed income 
(bonds), shares, real estate, commodities etc. (Swensen, 2005). This can reduce the 
overall portfolio risk as the different asset classes advance at different rates. For example, 
in a bull (rising) market, share values will usually increase at a higher rate than that of 
governments bonds or gold, whereas in times of general market decline (bear market), 
the opposite will occur, as investors prioritize safety and stability.  
 
These differences are measured by the correlation coefficient describing how two asset 
classes or products move in relation to each other, by the measures, -1 (perfect negative 
correlation - outstanding) and +1 (perfect positive correlation - poor), in those situations 
where a balance of risk is being sought. For example, shares of a company producing 
sunglasses will positively correlate (near +1) with a company that produces sun cream. 
Conversely, the share price of a firm producing rain umbrellas will negatively correlate 
(near -1) with the previous ones. The chance of their share prices developing at the same 
rate is very low and therefore demonstrates an almost perfect (theoretical) diversification.  
 
Investors, who have put all their funds into the companies that sell either sunglasses or 
sun cream, would perform strongly when the sun is out and poorly when it rains. The 
reverse would occur if the investor were fully invested in a company producing umbrellas. 
In an ideal world, the investor would have shares in both the sunglasses / sun cream and 
the umbrella company.  In reality, perfectly correlated (negative and positive) equities are 
infrequent; nonetheless investors will find various shares and asset classes with some 
degree of correlation.  
 
The described phenomenon is part of the modern portfolio theory (MPT), developed by 
Nobel Prize winner, Harry Markowitz in 1952. He concluded that it is possible for 
investors to construct an efficient frontier of an optimal portfolio that offers the maximum 
expected return for a given level of risk. He proposed that it is not sufficient to look at the 
expected risks and return of one particular stock. It is also about choosing the right 
combination of stocks (Markowitz H. M., 1952).  
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Before and particularly since Markowitz, many studies  such as Graham, 1949; Fama, 
1970; Brinson, Hood & Beebower, 1986; Black & Litterman, 1991; Edleson, 1991; 
Sharp, 1994; Dreman, 1998; Ibbotson & Kaplan, 2000; Ellis, 2002; Glassmann, 2002; 
Schiller, 2003; Swensen, 2005; Ferri, 2006; Zweig, 2006; Goldie & Murray, 2010; 
Melton & Mackey, 2010; Woods & Urwin, 2010; Marston, 2011; Siegel 2013; Stammers, 
2015 have provided more in-depth knowledge and understanding about investing in the 
stock market. However, the controversy regarding the ideal and most profitable strategies 
is ongoing and will most likely continue. Alongside the variety of potential strategies, a 
further complication is variation in the nature of investors themselves and their 
requirements. 
1.6. Different investor types  
There are various types of investors, partly defined by their investment styles and their 
focus, e.g. technical analysis, fundamental analysis, value or growth investing, dividend 
investing or active or passive investing. They can be distinguished further by their 
investment nature, whether they invest for themselves (private investors) or 
professionally for clients; i.e. asset managers working for banks, independent asset 
managers, investment bankers focusing on merger and acquisitions, companies going 
public (IPO) or institutional investors concentrating on pension funds, single and multi-
family offices, foundations or international organizations.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis I first focus on groups differentiated by their investment 
nature, not investment style. Groups that invest professionally are mainly distinguished 
as asset managers (AM) or institutional investors (II), with private investors (PI) being 
the third group.  
1.7. Literature gaps 
Since Markowitz in 1952, most research in economics related to investment has focused 
on either confirming, disproving or further developing the Modern Portfolio Theory 
(MPT), for example, the Capital Asset Market Pricing model (CAPM), developed by 
William F. Sharp (1964) that describes the relationship between systematic risk (that 
cannot be diversified away) and expected return on assets, in particular shares.  
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Another extensive body of research has been dedicated to testing whether active fund 
managers are exceptionally skilled in achieving performance (portfolio return) that is 
essentially greater after cost than what the market itself delivers (e.g. exchange traded 
funds, index certificates) or whether their success is more reliant on luck (i.e. Sharpe, 
1991; Ellis, 2002; Hechler, 2013; Siegel, 2014).  
 
Other research has focused on the effectiveness of different investment strategies such as 
value investing, growth investing, dividend investing, technical or quantitative analysis 
(i.e. Lynch, 1993; Hunt, 2005; Faith, 2007; Gwilym, Clare, Seaton and Thomas, 2009; 
O’Neil, 2009; Schwager, 2014).  
 
Correspondingly, there are many ongoing deliberations, for example, as to which of 
technical analysis or fundamental analysis, as the two key types of approach, is a better 
investment approach. Different studies by both researchers and practitioners have yielded 
conflicting results. The majority of analysts and asset managers however tend to believe 
that the notion of fundamental investing enjoys more merit than technical analysis. 
 
Fundamental investing rests on consideration of the underlying nature of an asset and its 
relation to other assets that may be held within any given investment portfolio, as there is 
acceptance of the notion of spreading risk as a key determinant of portfolio performance. 
Many researchers and professional investors, i.e. Brinson, Singer and Beebower (1986), 
Stevens, Surz, and Wimer (1999), Ibbotson & Kaplan (2000) or Ferri (2006), show that 
the notion of both strategic and/or tactical asset allocation, of spreading the risk amongst 
various groups of investments, plays a significant role within sustainable investing. There 
is a widely spread consensus that efficient portfolios require diversification and should 
contain products from different asset and sub-asset classes such as shares, bonds, funds, 
real estate, commodities, gold, etc. which behave differently to one another in diverse 
market situations. Different asset classes in such portfolios therefore display little to 
medium intercorrelation.  
 
Unlike the above-mentioned subjects which focus on types of investments, the 
complement of types of investors has received little attention. The notion of differences 
in knowledge, experience, and investment approaches between private and professional 
investors as two major types has received scant attention.  
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In particular, with regard to Swiss investors, there have been only a few relevant studies, 
for example one by Birchler, Volkart, Ettlin & Hegglin (2010).  
 
Moreover, there are no studies (even more widely) that focus on exploring the actual 
investment expertise amongst both private and professional investors to characterize them 
as to their ability to support the decision-making process of the retail investor. The studies 
that are available focus on knowledge of investment strategies classified in various ways. 
One major concept available from the theoretical literature that is generally lacking from 
the knowledge base found in these studies is ‘value averaging’. It appears not to be really 
understood by many academics and investment practitioners, especially compared with 
other investment strategies and tactics identified in the various studies. 
 
Lastly, besides the Dreyfus model, there is little literature that elaborates on the notion of 
expertise or on the constitution of an expert. However, methods are known 
(apprenticeship, investment related courses, experience) that assist individuals to become 
a professional, or an academic to be perceived as an expert in the field of investment.  
1.8. Aim of this research  
The aim of this research is to test if there are differences between investors characterized 
as experts and those characterized as less informed (or uninformed) investors. This 
classification can then be used to examine investment practices for the (private) general 
investor, enabling them to invest more knowledgably and effectively, according to 
research and experience from expert investors.  
 
My overarching hypothesis is that professional investors, such as asset managers and 
institutional investors, possess superior investment knowledge and expertise compared to 
private investors. They should therefore be better informed and act more cautiously. They 
can be perceived as ‘experts’ and a paragon for private or general investors. I also believe 
that within the group of professional investors, the institutional investors will exhibit 
greater investment knowledge and expertise (given that their portfolios are likely to be of 
greater value) than the asset managers.  
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1.9. Research questions  
I intend to achieve the aim of this thesis by concentrating on the following research 
questions: 
1.9.1. Research question 1 (RQ1) 
How do private and professional investors differ (if at all) in terms of their knowledge, 
experience, and investment approaches (examining the first Dreyfus related categories)? 
1.9.2. Research question 2 (RQ2) 
Is it possible to determine probable differences in the investment approaches discernible 
between those now characterized as investment experts and those characterized as 
informed or uninformed investors (examining the second Dreyfus related categories)? 
1.9.3. Research question 3 (RQ3)  
How to characterize the investment experts and their investment behaviours, criteria and 
strategies in an attempt to examine the Dreyfus model category concerning expertise? 
1.10. Definition of key terms 
There are a number of key terms of importance in relation to the field of investment. 
Some terms have considerable legal importance and are therefore subject to extensive 
definition, which does vary by jurisdiction. The appendix offers definitions of these major 
key terms, such as investment products and investment strategies, or further relevant 
terms that are used throughout this study. The definitions used here were drawn from the 
CFA Institute, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or from 
Investopedia. Two examples of the types of term to be found given in the appendix are 
offered here to demonstrate the level of definition provided: 
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Active management 
Active management describes the notion of managers using analytical research, forecasts, 
their own judgement and experience to make decisions about which securities (shares, 
bonds, funds, etc.) to buy, hold or sell. The opposite of active management is passive 
management, also known as indexing. Active managers try to achieve higher portfolio 
return than the market would deliver.  
Asset allocation 
Asset allocation is an investment strategy that aims to balance risk and reward by dividing 
investments among different asset classes, i.e. shares, bonds, cash. The idea is to spread 
the portfolio risk among various groups of investments, which inherit different correlation 
co-efficients (move inversely to each other).  
 
The extensive list of all relevant key terms and their definitions is presented in the 
appendix. 
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1.11. Structure of thesis 
The diagram below displays the organization of this thesis including motivation for this 
research, the aims and research questions, the conceptual framework and research method 
selected, respective analysis and discussion, conclusion and recommendations, 
contribution to knowledge and areas for further research.  
 
 
Figure 1 – Structure of thesis 
 
 
 
01 
Introduction containing background 
information about investing in the stock 
market, my motivation for this research, 
the Dreyfus model, literature gaps, the 
aim and objectives, the definition of key 
terms and the structure of this thesis. 
 
Thorough narrative 
literature review in relation 
to the aim and research 
objectives; initial 
hypothesis. 
02 
 
05/06 
RQ1 – hypothesis, analysis 
and discussion of the 
information provided by 
the three investor groups - 
asset managers, 
institutional investors, 
private investors. 
 
 
 
Profiling investors to categorize 
them into ‘uninformed investors’, 
‘informed investors’ and ‘experts’ 
 
RQ2 – hypothesis, analysis and 
discussion of the information 
provided by the three newly 
established investor groups. 
07 
 
Conclusion and 
recommendations for the 
general investor, 
contribution to knowledge 
and suggestions for further 
research.  
09 
 
03 
Conceptual framework to 
organize the study, relevant 
theories, concepts and ideas. 
 
Research methodology and 
analysis, my philosophical 
worldview, definition of the 
method to successively 
conduct primary research, 
statistical analysis. 
04 
 
08 
RQ3 – hypothesis, analysis and 
discussion of the information 
focusing on the experts 
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1.12. Summary of this chapter  
This chapter presents a detailed description of my motivation for this research and 
introduces Dreyfus’ 5-stage adult skill acquisition model, from novice, to advanced 
beginner, to competent, to proficiency, to expertise, which will define the characteristics 
of the various investor groups and guide the subsequent analysis and discussions. It 
further offers an overview of the notion of investing in general and describes the history 
of investing, including a brief synopsis regarding the modern portfolio theory and the 
different investor types pertinent to this thesis. It illustrates the aim of this thesis and the 
three respective research questions. Lastly, literature gaps were established, the main key 
terms explained and the structure of the thesis outlined.  
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2. Literature review 
2.1. Chapter overview 
The extended literature review develops understanding of the theoretical and practical 
challenges in the field of finance, particularly in investment management. Identifying past 
and recent theories as well as possible shortfalls enables me to contribute to original 
academic theory and provide practical applications. The focus is partly on presenting a 
range of perspectives, for what is striking is the lack of an integrative, overarching 
perspective in the studies in general. This might be expected in relation to those 
practitioners whose purpose is as much advocacy as critique but is also prevalent in the 
academic literature. The starting point is consideration of the emergence of investment 
theory as a topic, and then its development by a number of individuals each offering a 
particular ‘style’ of investment ‘theory’. 
 
My review focuses foremost on the history of investing and the early works of various 
scholars and experts such as Louis Bachelier, Irving Fisher, John Burr Williams, David 
Dodd, Benjamin Graham, Harry Markowitz, Philipp Fisher, Franco Modigliani and 
Merton Miller, Myron Scholes and Fischer Black, James Tobin, William Sharp, John 
Lintner or Eugene Fama. Their insights and the theories that were built upon their work 
form my conceptual framework and the foundation of my research questionnaire, as well 
as guiding the discussion and exploration of my research questions. 
 
Alongside the works of these individuals, important lessons are also derived from major 
financial and investment related developments, such as the catastrophic crash of Long 
Term Capital Management (LTCM) that brought the notions and mechanics of hedge 
funds under scrutiny, and the bursting of the Internet bubble. I also consider more recent 
developments both theoretical and practical, such as the concept of behavioural finance 
and quantitative trading approaches. This is supported by reference to potential advances.  
 
Derived from this literature, I then explore the most common investment strategies 
employed today and the relevant investment criteria, concluding with their different 
means of application by both professional investment experts and private investors.  
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The review also considers what might be the characteristics of investment experts 
(knowledge, proficiency, behaviour) and develops a picture of a paragon of expertise, 
through investment related qualifications and the adult skill accusation model. From this, 
I then make inferences for the accomplishment of this thesis. First, I present contextual 
literature that helps set the scene for investment activities. 
2.2. Context information  
The context of money investment relevant to both private and professional investors is a 
very broad field including theories, practical applications and implications of investments 
in stocks, mutual funds, passive managed funds, pension funds and other investment 
products. I also discuss historic stock market returns as this delivers valuable information 
for my research questionnaire and the subsequent analysis and discussions.  
 
Sharpe (1991) believes there are not many investors that are skilled and capable enough 
to persisently perform better than the market, e.g. investors are better off buying the index 
when buying large company stocks such as the ones that comprise the Standard & Poors 
500. However, when investing in smaller companies, ‘you’re probably better off with an 
active manager than buying the market’ as the case for passive management rests only on 
complex and unrealistic theories of equilibrium in capital markets. Any graduate of the 
Business School should be able to beat the index fund over the course of a market cycle’ 
(Sharpe, 1991, p. 7-9).  
 
He concludes that such alarming messages can only be justified by assuming that the laws 
of arithmetic have been suspended for the convenience of those who choose to follow a 
career as active managers. ‘If active and passive management styles are defined in 
sensible ways, it must be the case that 1) before cost, the return on the average actively 
managed dollar will equal the return on the average passively managed dollar and 2) after 
cost, the return on the average actively managed dollar will be less than the retun on the 
average passively managed dollar. These assertions will hold for any time period.’ Hence, 
his projection that, when properly measured, the aggregation of all investors in the market 
must equal the performance of the market. However, when taking all the costs of an 
investment into consideration, the average investor must be underperforming the market 
on a cost-adjusted basis.  
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Sharpe showed conclusively that active management, stock picking and market timing 
are inferior methods of investment management. Nevertheless, there are those who 
continue to argue for ‘active’ investment styles (or trading concepts, to use the somewhat 
grandiose label used by some writers). This study therefore focuses (i.a.) on the active vs. 
passive fund management dispute and analyses whether direct investment (stock picking) 
is a suitable investment strategy. 
 
Brooks, Chow and Ward (2001) analyse whether it is possible to derive profitable trading 
strategies from investment best sellers such as ‘What Works on Wall Street’ by James P. 
O’Shaughnessy. They test whether his strategy in the UK context would have produced 
as spectacular a performance as it did in the US. As part of their investigation, they 
highlight a general methodology for determining whether the observed outperformance 
of a trading concept can be attributed in part or in entirety to data mining. They conclude 
that overall the O’Shaughnessy rule was successful and out-performed the FT All-Share 
index over the past 30 years, but compared with the results in the US, the O’Shaughnessy 
strategy was not nearly as successful.  
 
Brooks et al. also look at other investment novels and categorize them into ‘Structure of 
books reviewed’. Here they distinguish between ‘academic’ writers like Burton G. 
Malkiel and Jeremy Siegel and ‘professionals’ like James P. O’Shaughnessy and David 
Dreman. They further classify the professionals into those who applied statistical thinking 
and those exceptional practitioners such as Warren Buffett, Peter Lynch or William J. 
O’Neil who as Brooks et al. (2010) state, did ‘no research’ at all. Brooks et al. offer little 
in the way of analysis beyond their admittedly useful descriptive categorizations. 
 
In a similar vein, Schelauske (2001) provides a guide to explain the types and mechanics 
of investment funds and how to choose the most promising one from the universe of 
products by applying a three-step approach. He researches the current investment advice 
from a number of fund managers, elaborates on the chances and risks of such investment 
funds, how investors can determine their individual risk profile, the full range of fund 
types and lastly on the selection criterion. However, his work is directed more on the 
beginner investor (novice) than on seasoned well-informed stock market participants. 
Again, the perspective is largely descriptive, and there is a major omission from his 
considerations - he does not discuss the significant notion of cost to a satisfying extent.  
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Like most authors, he notes that one of the biggest advantages of funds is diversification, 
hence the risk can be reduced by investing in a fund that holds several titles than by 
holding one title only. Likewise, the investment duration is also vital to minimize risk and 
maximize return. Another central characteristic of funds is that investors can cover whole 
markets, countries or even the entire world by holding only few funds. He makes an 
interesting point that the timing of when to buy a fund is crucial but should take place in 
an upward market. Though these points are supported logically, he offers little empirical 
support. [Other advisers, (Ellis, 2002, Swensen, 2005) disagree with Schelauske’s point 
on timing, as timing the market (they suggest) is very difficult – but again, without 
coherent empirical support.] Schlelauske concludes by observing that banks are often not 
the best advisers in terms of choosing the right funds as they are biased, trying to market 
those products that produce high commissions vs. offering the best possible fund, that 
reflects an investor’s risk profile. 
 
One issue in defining the timing of purchase of investments relates to the notion of not 
investing all fund money at once but splitting it in various phases over a certain period to 
average the purchasing price. Again, this is a nostrum often advised for logical reasons, 
but lacks coherent theoretical and empirical justification. A further issue in studies of this 
subject is clearly the inability of researchers to command the sums that actual empirical 
testing would require. Research often utilizes the retrospective application of theoretical 
approaches using notional investment to known investment data sets, such as historical 
stock prices and market indices.  
 
Based on this type of descriptive evidence and theoretical musing, this thesis considers 
not only the important notions of diversification and the investors risk profile, but also 
elaborates on bias of banks or fund managers, the cost of purchase and the cost of 
managing funds. These topics have been introduced across a range of studies and have 
been shown to be capable of, or of actually influencing, investment outcomes. There is 
no comprehensive, coherent framework extant within which they have all been 
incorporated. Much of the extant work is retrospective, considering the known events and 
approaches that wider public opinion considers influential. 
 
Bernstein (2005) traces the origins of modern Wall Street, from the pioneering work of 
Markowitz referred to earlier, to Friedman and Tobin, to Modigliani and Miller, who 
became the originators of arbitrage in determining the value of securities, to Black and 
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Scholes, and Robert Merton, who laid the foundation of financial derivatives and Sharp 
whom, Bernstein suggests, was the single most influential authority in investment history. 
Bernstein states that Sharp’s achievement in combining theoretical innovations with 
practical applications have made him a hero in the world of investment professionals, 
particularly with his breakthrough in 1964, when he developed the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM). 
 
Bernstein also points out that the ‘Brownian motion’ evident in market prices came to be 
called the ‘random walk’ in the literature of finance. In financial theory, stock market 
prices progress according to a random walk and therefore cannot be predicted (Malkiel, 
1973), which is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970). 
 
Bernstein suggests that the stock market as a whole (particularly New York’s), is a vital 
and productive model for the rest of the world, including former socialist countries 
seeking the path to prosperity and freedom. He quotes John Maynard Keynes who 
remarked that the stock market is little more than a beauty contest and a curse to 
capitalism. Bernstein demurs and claims that ‘Wall Street shapes Main Street’. He argues 
that it transforms factories, department stores, banking assets, film producers, machinery, 
soft-drink bottlers, and power lines into something that can be easily convertible into 
money and into vehicles for diversifying risk. It converts such entities into assets that we 
can trade with anonymous buyers or sellers. It also makes hard assets liquid and it puts a 
price on those assets that promise that they will be put to their most productive users.  
 
Bernstein (2005) and his analysis offer both the history of money markets and advice for 
any investor and provides valuable information for my research questionnaire, analysis 
and discussion. Bernstein’s work however also displays those currents of advocacy that 
shape and bias works in particular directions. He again is largely descriptive and offers 
little to rebut the view of those whom he rejects, such as Keynes. The language is 
engaging, the narrative compelling, and in general the argument seems convincing – but 
it rests on a piecemeal approach to evidence gathering and evident selectivity in what he 
chooses to foreground. 
 
More context information is presented in the appendix. 
 
 
26 
 
2.3. Specific types of investment strategies and applications 
This section focuses on identifying the investment criteria, strategies and the investment 
processes that deliver key information for structuring my survey and the analysis and 
discussion derived from it. It draws on those themes that are recurrent in the literature, or 
frequently feature in prescriptions for ‘successful investing’. Again, even in this area, 
there is a reliance on utilizing the work or record of individuals who are perceived (often 
justifiably) as successful investors as exemplars of the stances and approaches used. 
Major questions are often ignored or side-stepped in the literature, or their intractable 
nature not recognized, as is the case in this first example, value investing. 
2.3.1. Value investing 
Greenwal, et. al (2001) define value investing as an investment strategy that describes the 
core of numerous renowned investors’ approaches. It is easier to understand than other 
investment strategies as it does not require extensive financial or investment experience 
or the knowledge and techniques required for analysing and interpreting charts and data. 
The goal is to identify investments that are undervalued and can therefore be bought at a 
bargain price. Buying shares at a price lower than their intrinsic value increases the 
investor’s chance of earning profits when they are sold and it makes them less likely to 
lose money (or a substantial amount of value) if they do not perform as anticipated – 
though what determines initial ‘intrinsic value’ remains a moot point.  
 
Greenwal, et al. (2001) base their work on the approach of Benjamin Graham, the ‘father’ 
of value investing and on the methods, techniques and success of Warren Buffett. In 
contrast to modern investment theory (MPT – Modern Portfolio Theory), they believe 
that markets are not efficient and that many possible investments that actually beat the 
market can be uncovered. They trust in value investing and stress that security prices 
move almost randomly and that current value of assets and earnings should be in focus. 
They determine that the value of a company is the discounted sum of all its future cash 
flows and that no individual knows the future, as expert as he or she may seem. Yet, value 
investors use indicators of fundamental value as investment guidelines and when the price 
falls below the fundamental value, the investment should be profitable. Hence, the past 
underperformers are the future’s rising stars and yesterday’s stars are tomorrow’s dogs 
(to borrow from the BCG matrix terminology).  
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Once more, as is common in this literature, we are offered a mirror to the past and a 
selective use of some data to support a position that remains firmly based on a supposition 
- the notion that the current value of a company can realistically be calculated. 
 
However, most investors may be speculators, paying more for a stock than its calculated 
(realistic) value, hoping that it can soon be sold for an even-higher price. This may be a 
common behavioural predisposition, related to the way people may often gamble. 
Another common pitfall is that we tend to remember the recent past better than the distant 
past, and then generalize about the few cases we remember, rather than taking the full 
body of available information into consideration.  
 
Greenwal et al. conclude that identifying undervalued companies is not sufficient. An 
investor needs to create a portfolio of stocks with sensible attention to risk and with a 
strategy of diversification. Modern portfolio theory holds that investors will not be 
compensated for risk if they only invest in one or a few, even closely related stocks. Value 
investors generally reject much of the MPT and its approach to diversification, yet they 
also do not put all their eggs in one basket.  
 
Town’s (2007) number one rule is simple: do not lose money. He claims that 15 minutes 
of time investment a week results in the possibility of earning 15% profit annually and 
quotes investors like Benjamin Graham and Warren Buffett who have beaten the market 
successfully over many decades. He does however refer to Malkiel, who in 1972 showed 
that even Warren Buffett did not achieve a higher return on his investments than a monkey 
would have done by throwing darts at a board with a selection of companies (investment 
opportunities). There is again however little consistent use of empirical data to support 
Town’s overall argument, rather a reliance on the achievements of a limited number of 
exceptional cases. 
 
His analogy to buy goods that are worth one dollar for 50 cents may seem too simple, but 
it is the underlying principle for value investors, who only buy a stock at a bargain price. 
His margin of safety (Graham, 1949) is at least 50%; hence, Town would not purchase a 
stock if it does not trade at minimum half of its real market value. Again, the issue of 
what constitutes ‘real market value’ is left under-supported. 
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He elaborates on the 10-10 rule, which holds that he would not want to own shares in a 
company for 10 minutes if he would not want to hold them for 10 years. This may simply 
be a restatement of the familiar ‘buy quality, hold for the long term’ approach favoured 
elsewhere. He further stipulates that any investment should inherit the four Ms: meaning 
(superior products, market position), most difficult to copy, (competitive advantage), 
management, and margin of safety (undervalued). Key performance indicators such as 
return on equity (ROE) or growth of free cash flow (FCF) help to determine the potential 
value of an investment and are easy to identify (financial reports, stock market websites) 
and to calculate. He too believes that the notion of technical analysis is a superior strategy 
to identify the perfect timing to buy a security.  
 
Marks (2011) is a lifetime value investor who offers ‘seasoned investment wisdom’ 
looking for different ways forward in today’s financial markets. He creates the notion of 
the ‘second-level’ investor, who is a stock market participant who is dissatisfied with 
buying an index but wants to beat the market. For Marks, investing is more an art than a 
science, as it requires intuitive and flexible approaches which produce outcomes and 
successes that can hardly be ‘routinized’. If one wants to beat the market averages, one 
must nurture superior insight (fundamental analysis) or what Benjamin Graham calls a 
‘trace of wisdom’. Hence a truthful estimation of intrinsic value is the indispensable 
starting point for successful investing. However, Marks suggests that most investors can 
be summed up as ‘trend followers’.  Again, the troublesome notion of ‘value’ at the base 
of his arguments leaves a great deal unsaid; perhaps the recognition of value hinges on 
superior insight, but that again is an idea that requires fuller exploration. 
 
He further holds that investment success does not come from buying good stocks, but 
from buying the stocks well, i.e. to buy more shares when markets are falling. He quotes 
John Maynard Keynes who points out that ‘the market can remain irrational longer than 
you can remain solvent’. Marks (2011) suggests that the ‘risk-is-gone’ myth is one of the 
most dangerous sources of risk and a major contributor to any bubble. Investors often feel 
over-confident and run with the herd instead of constantly analysing the markets and their 
portfolios and take appropriate unemotional actions when fundamentals change (though, 
of course some fundamentals are the product of the very market investors may be trying 
to out-perform).  
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He makes an interesting observation that worry and its relatives, distrust, skepticism and 
risk aversion, are essential and normal ingredients in a safe financial system. Hence, 
investing is never a safe and riskless bet but can be controlled and managed in a scientific 
and risk reducing manner. Furthermore, ignoring cycles and extrapolating trends are some 
of the most dangerous things investors can do. He believes risks come in two different 
forms: the risk of losing money, and the risk of missing opportunity. The desire to behave 
‘scientifically’ in an arena where he himself places worry, distrust and skepticism is a 
contradiction that is not fully explored.  
 
Sander (2012) suggests that successful investing requires a thoughtful investment process 
that should become habit-forming. He believes that people who make investing a habit, 
become consistent and comfortable with it, engaging in a familiar activity with a positive 
outcome. These habits are superior for long-term investing and produce cash, above-
average appreciation, and risk-averse growth, in alignment with the school of value 
investing, following the principles advanced by Benjamin Graham. Developing sound 
financial investment habits increases the chances of making profitable decisions. How 
such sound habits are to be identified, using what criteria, remains under-explored in his 
work – he presents a pre-selected list of plausible behaviour’s that may qualify as 
sensible. 
 
Sanders (2012) offers a list for the guidance for beginner investors who need a framework 
to navigate in today’s complex investment environment. He supports investors to decide 
which (of the predetermined) value-investing habits can help them to invest wisely, how 
to develop their own investment style and how to select individual stocks. Companies 
that market leading products that generate surplus cash, such as drug makers and Amazon, 
are (in Sanders’ view) typically a good bet – if they are using their cash wisely. Sanders’ 
further advices are:   
 
▪ To look at buying a stock like buying the entire company; think like their 
customer. 
▪ To fully understand the business you are buying, including examining a range of 
factors such as the management, brand awareness, financials, logistics - strong 
brands, market share, customer loyalty, R&D, he holds drive company 
profitability. 
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▪ To sell a stock when you find a superior substitute including liquidating and 
holding cash. 
▪ To determine and analyse the intangibles as these are primary indicators of a 
company’s future success as well as its current competitive edge. 
▪ To consider a stock’s P/E ratio to establish a target buying and selling price. 
▪ To continue doing the research into the companies within your portfolio in order 
to find out when to sell or to buy more shares. 
2.3.2. Growth investing 
Growth investors focus on investing in companies with a higher than market average 
potential for growth. Compared to value investors, growth investors would still buy 
shares of a company, even if they appear expensive in terms of measures such as the P/E 
or P/B ratio (price to book ratio). What determines the ‘market average potential for 
growth’ remains largely underspecified. 
 
Natale (2000) for example believes that successful investing is made possible by 
constructing a portfolio that consists of both companies that are just newly listed and 
stocks from small companies. He is very enthusiastic about ‘small caps’ (companies with 
lower market capitalization) as they offer the fastest possibility to create wealth. 
However, he acknowledges that these are risky investments that are vulnerable to 
distressing downturns and wealth-sapping manipulation. So, the core of his argument is 
a recognition that small companies, in general, have greater potential for higher rates of 
growth than existing large companies – which may be a truism, but only as it relates to 
potential. 
 
Natale (2000) elaborates on the importance of the investment duration and states that 
holding shares in small companies over a period of five years is not much riskier than 
owning stocks in general. He also has a controversial view about government bonds and 
treasury bills. He does not advocate holding these asset classes as they will ‘never make 
you rich’. He is also convinced that value beats growth over the long-term because 
investors systematically overestimate the growth of well-positioned companies in fast 
expanding industries. He trusts that the key to beating the market is making small sector 
bets and picking the right stocks within each industry; and to avoid betting on the big 
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losers. Stock picking in this way may be guided by some analysis, but the whole position 
relies more on an expression of faith than empirical analysis – which is problematic for 
those small companies with little history where there may well be a paucity of data. 
 
Hunt (2005) evaluates the feasibility of high growth investment strategies for ‘growth 
optimal portfolios’ (GOPs) applied to 30 stocks comprising the (US) Dow Jones 
Industrial Average. He uses a stochastic model with a Wiener process (equivalent to 
Brownian motion), coupled with ridge regression, in order to select Dow Jones stocks 
that would accomplish impressive growth rates. He researched over a 25-year period from 
1972 to 2002 and concluded that ‘regardless of their (GOPs) other properties and potential 
drawbacks, the portfolios designed for maximal growth did in fact produce quite 
remarkable rates of growth’ (p. 157). 
 
Interestingly, Hunt quotes Hakansson (1971) who proposed that GOPs dominate all other 
portfolios in the long run, but also Merton and Samuelson (1974) who discuss the 
misconception in this argument. He concludes that statistical investigation of the data 
provides no initial reason to be optimistic about the successful application of the growth 
techniques, as the underlying postulations of normality and stability were violated by the 
nature of the US data: ‘Returns on the 30 stocks were found to be skewed and leptokurtic 
and to have time-varying variances and covariances. The growth optimal techniques 
performed well, however, despite the assumptions’ not being met’ (p. 156). 
 
The growth optimal techniques delivered results up-to twice the growth rate of the 
benchmark, despite the assumptions not being met. He further illustrates that the secret 
of success lies in selecting a very small number of shares, which Ellis (2002) and Swensen 
(2005) conversely describe as market timing and stock picking, arguing that as techniques 
they prove to be unsuccessful over the long run. Hunt (2005) also states that even though 
the growth investment technique worked with this particular data set, it may be different 
or disadvantageous in markets over different time periods. It may well be that the first 
explanation for its over-performance was pure chance alone, but: ‘The second 
explanation is that the assumptions of normality and stability are not necessary to the 
success of the technique. While the model used in this paper assumes normality of the Itô 
process, it may be that growth investment strategy is equally efficacious under alternative 
stochastic processes that allow kurtosis.’ (p. 156). So, the possibility remains that the 
results obtained are no more than chance, rather than a robust underlying GOP procedure. 
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2.3.3. Growth at reasonable price (GARP) investing 
GARP-investors seek to identify companies that are (fairly) undervalued but provide 
robust sustainable potential for growth. Their stock selection must be based on very 
specific characteristics that need to be met. The forecasted growth rates need to be 
‘reasonable’, i.e. if they are too ambitious, then they are not suitable as they carry too 
much risk. Other criteria focus on the return on equity (ROE) indicator, positive cash-
flows or (at times) positive earnings.  
 
Lynch (1993) elaborates on his own investment strategies and offers advice to become an 
expert in assembling a successful portfolio by picking both winning stocks and mutual 
funds. One imperative in investing, he says, is never to forget that stocks are not lottery 
tickets. There is a company behind every stock and a reason companies, and consequently 
their stocks, perform the way they do. Lynch (1993) explains his step-by-step approach 
for picking stocks and describes how general investors can improve their investment 
performance. However, Lynch exhibits those same tendencies with which readers in this 
field become familiar: the presentation of a narrow range of selective examples, the 
prescription of what seem to be plausible ‘common-sense’ rules, and a recognition that 
past performance is no guarantee of continued achievement. 
2.3.4. Dividend investing  
Gwilym, Clare, Seaton and Thomas (2009) studied consistent dividend growth strategies, 
believing that dividend income and its reinvestment results in strong equity return and 
therefore increased wealth. They demonstrate that recent years have brought the 
emergence of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) in the United States consisting solely of 
equities with a history of consistent dividend growth. Such ETFs include the S&P 
Dividend Aristocrats requiring 25 years of consistent dividend increase for inclusion and 
the Merger Dividend Achievers that stipulate 10 years of constant growth. They report 
that not only have these ETFs outperformed contrasting benchmarks such as the S&P 
500, but they have also achieved this with lower volatility.  
 
Gwilym et al. (2009) recognize however, that in the US, the number of companies paying 
dividends decreased during the last quarter of the last century from 2/3rds in 1978 to just 
1/5th in 2000.  
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At first sight, this decline seems drastic, but DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2004) 
illustrate that dividend payments in real terms increased during the period of their study 
while many smaller firms, that formerly paid dividends, had been acquired or dropped 
out of the sample for other reasons.  
 
Gwilym et al.’s (2009) article investigates the effectiveness of investment strategies based 
on holding portfolios of U.K. stocks with a history of consistent dividend growth. They 
conclude that consistent dividend payers have outperformed the broader market on an 
equally weighted basis from 1986 to 2006, particularly when the minimum requirement 
is set at 10 years of permanent growth. In addition, these shares have a lower variance of 
returns and have suffered smaller drawbacks in difficult times. They present a case (based 
on selective data) that suggests, contrary to many prescriptions in this field, that consistent 
past performance may offer a guide to the medium-term future, at least in respect of 
dividend pay-outs. 
2.3.5. Technical analysis 
Lo and Hasanhodzic (2010) focus on the notion of technical analysis, which seeks to 
identify patterns like cycles or waves in the past market information in order to predict 
price movements. This method originated in Japan in the late 16th and early 17th 
centuries when the country’s rice exchanges emerged. In the late 19th century, Lo & 
Hasanhodzic say that in America, the stock ticker, the telegraph and the telephone 
transformed business on Wall Street. Charles Dow, the father of modern technical 
analysis, began publishing the Dow Jones Industrial Average. At its origin, this was the 
average prices of the 11 most active stocks on the New York Stock Exchange. Dow and 
his successors introduced more ‘scientific’ methods to data gathering, formal hypothesis 
testing and mathematical rigour to technical analysis (Rhea, 1994). However, the public 
did not trust these largely statistical methods. 
 
Dow’s theories try to explain how human thinking affected market behaviour (prices, 
trends). He describes his concept of the ‘trend’ as patterns in ‘successive highs and lows.’ 
He defines the notion of ‘relative strength’ as an assessment of how equities perform in 
comparison with stocks of other companies in the same industry. Also, that a ‘market 
cycle’ lasts for about 10 years, with five to six years of boom followed by a burst or down-
turn of about the same duration.  
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In addition, Dow suggests that the stock market follows a cyclical pattern, the ‘wave 
principle’, each cycle consisting in eight waves, five in one direction, trailed by three 
waves in the reverse direction.  
 
Yet, while fundamental analysis focuses on the real characteristics (industries, businesses, 
management, products/services, R&D, potential to innovate, financials, etc.) of a 
company to evaluate what they are worth at present and in the future, technical analysis 
is concerned with the motions in the market and tries to anticipate the directions of 
securities’ price movements by analysing statistics, such as past prices, trading volumes, 
buying and selling behaviours, trends and so forth. Technical analysts use charts, and 
numerous other tools, to detect patterns that should (according to adherents) reveal future 
directions of securities’ price movements.  
 
Bensignor (2000) is an advocate of technical analysis and illustrates the various trading 
models available to what he terms ‘astute investors’. He focuses on the notion of swing 
trading and therefore how these traders are able to pick more winners than losers and on 
the various other ‘technical’ methods such as the use of moving averages, candle charts 
or bar charts.  
 
He illustrates the two main movements in the investment environment, the fundamental 
method (of those such as Benjamin Graham, Warren Buffet) and the technical method 
(Curtis Faith). He states that technical analysis is not just the use of timing tools that help 
determining the price movements of securities, but it is also a method to regulate when 
the odds do not support trading at all.  
 
He quotes various technical analysis experts, including Linda Bradford Raschke, and 
explains that the more time a trader spends in the market, the more risk exposure there is, 
thus the main objective of swing trading is to try to capture the maximum gain in the 
minimum amount of time. He says that short-swing trading seeks to capitalize on the short 
and intermediate waves or price fluctuations that occur inside the longer major trends; it 
involves more work in exchange for more control and less risk.   
 
The Way of the Turtle (Faith, 2007) offers an investment concept (strategy), which in the 
1990s was taught to even inexperienced investors, who became commonly known as the 
‘turtles’. Faith became a ‘turtle’ after he started an investment program when he was 19. 
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In this later book, he elaborates on the rules, timing, risks, rewards, and secrets to his 
largest trades that enabled him to generate 100% annual return and how the general 
investor can apply ‘the turtle way’ to his/her own trades. The turtles’ strategy was 
considered a technical analysis and centered around position sizing (how much to buy or 
sell), entries (when to buy/sell), stops (when to get out of a losing position), exits (when 
to get out of a winning position) and tactics (how to buy or sell). Again, the evidence base 
is selective and the prescribed requirements a list of plausible rules. 
 
The key to execute the strategy successfully is consistency and discipline. ‘Almost 
anybody can make up a list of rules that are 80% as good as what we taught our people. 
What they couldn’t do is give them the confidence of stick to those rules even when things 
are going bad’ (p. 245).  
 
Faith stated that one of the main issues that caused many people to fail was that the turtle 
rules are very difficult to follow, as they depend on capturing relatively infrequent large 
trends. Hence, many months can pass between winning periods, at times even a year or 
two, and so it becomes easy to come up with reasons to doubt the system and to stop 
following the rules.  
 
Critics belittle technical analysis as it is based on intuitive pattern recognition, not 
statistical analytics. In addition, advocates of the efficient market theory do not trust that 
is possible to find exploitable patterns in historical market prices, and therefore dismiss 
the foundation of technical analysis all together. However, despite this, Lo & 
Hasanhodzic (2010) believe that investment strategies such as ‘the way of the turtle’ are 
more in tune with behavioural finance, which is about ‘social, cognitive and emotional 
factors to explain and predict market activity’. They claim that recent studies have 
provided new theoretical underpinnings and empirical validation for technical analysis.  
2.3.6. CANSLIM  
O’Neil (2009), is a respected stock picker whose research and analysis span decades. He 
tailored his strategy to choose single stock investments successfully. He studied data 
concerning the investment environment, the markets, the companies and their 
performances from 1880 to 2009.  
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He now teaches an alternative approach to value investing, based on his findings. His 
investment philosophy is one of a growth investor and a combination between 
fundamental and technical analysis. 
 
He developed a 7-step process, that he named CANSLIM, for minimizing risk (reducing 
potential losses) and maximizing profits. Following his lead, anyone would have the 
possibility to learn to invest wisely and effectively, even if they have never invested 
before. He offers techniques for finding the winning stocks (reading the daily financial 
pages, picking the top industry groups available, reading charts to improve stock selection 
and market timing) before their prices start to rise and guidance of picking the most 
promising mutual funds and ETFs as well as many charts that support investors to spot 
the most lucrative trends.  
 
O’Neal’s (2009) CANSLIM describes the following:  
 
▪ C – Current quarterly earnings. Earnings per share must have increased by at least 
25% from the same quarter’s earnings during the prior period.  
▪ A – Annual profits increased. Profits must have increased by a compound rate of 
more than 25% per annum over the last five years. 
▪ N – New management. The company is led by a new administration, and markets 
new products and achieves new price highs (the usual key indicators for fast 
growing companies). 
▪ S – Supply and demand. He favours small to midsize companies as these have 
less stock available in the market and therefore their prices move faster.  
▪ L – Leaders vs. laggards. He chooses the market leaders, the companies that 
consistently outperform the market, over the laggards, the underperformers.  
▪ I – Institutional ownership. O’Neil selects companies who are only partly owned 
by institutional asset managers as ‘underowned’ companies tend to be more 
attractive and offer greater potential for growth and success, until an increasing 
number of money managers discover these companies and buy-up shares.  
▪ M – Market direction. He trusts that market timing within periods of rising 
markets is the key to making investing more profitable. 
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Molvar (2014) critiques O’Neil (2009). Molvar argues that when he cross-examined 
O’Neill’s statements, statistics and calculations, he concluded that O’Neill’s claims of 
success of the CANSLIM system do not make any sense. Thus, Molvar contradicts the 
assertion that O’Neil’s system works. Molvar points out that, with a stated average return 
of 25% per annum for O’Neil, since O’Neil bought a seat on the New York Stock 
exchange in 1963, (which would have required an investment of at least $100,000), 
O’Neil should now be worth over $10 billion, but he is not visible on the Forbes list of 
billionaires.  
 
Using his CANSLIM strategy, O’Neil set-up another fund in 1992 (after the collapse of 
his original fund in 1975) which he co-managed with David Ryan. According to his own 
writing, Ryan had averaged profits of over 100% per year over a three-year period prior 
to co-managing O’Neil’s fund. Yet, the Los Angeles Times recognized that this fund only 
lasted for five years and underperformed the S&P 500 with a 66.8% total return vs. 71.4% 
return of the S&P 500. Despite their claims, these two managers together could only 
achieve 10.7% return per annum; their claims of high growth simply do not make sense. 
Swensen (2005), Ellis (2002), Zweig (2006), and many others would also disagree with 
O’Neil’s strategies.  
 
Molvar (2014) himself advises how to become financially independent by addressing how 
to build wealth over time with techniques for saving money and investing in stocks using 
fundamental stock investing strategies. He trusts that over the long run, stocks offer the 
biggest value and chance of success and lists the personal traits one has to inherit to stay 
successful. So, the approach once again rests on untestable propositions, but ones that are 
both plausible in respect of individuals and markets. Molvar (2014), like O’Neil and 
Lynch (1993) however believes that stock picking is superior to investments in funds.  
2.3.7. Hedge fund investing 
Amenc, Martellini and Vaissie (2003) in their paper, describe the benefits of hedge funds. 
This is in light of the fact that these alternative funds actually present real diversification 
benefits through exposure to risks other than market risks. They argue that a thorough 
understanding of hedge fund risk extends far beyond a straightforward measure of linear 
exposure to market risk.  
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It also requires a detailed analysis of how modern portfolio theory allows accounting for 
the existence of these additional sources of non-market risk when considering the 
performance of hedge fund managers.  
 
Ineichern (2007) predicts the future of the asset management industry and claims that the 
investment business has undergone a paradigm shift away from the traditional buy-and-
hold notion towards absolute return investing. He advocates high-risk, high-leverage 
hedge fund investing and refers to the equity market bubble of 1995 to 2000 as the most 
recent instance of large-scale market inefficiency. He explains in detail what absolute-
return investing is, why hedge funds and the search for asymmetric returns may represent 
the future of the asset management industry and how to think about risk in the context of 
this financial-industry revolution. (His view may now of course differ, after the financial 
collapse of 2008 and the various crises since). This illustrates, yet again, that the 
prescriptions initially offered rest on assumptions readily overturned by not uncommon 
events. 
 
Ineichern makes an interesting, yet debatable observation in that he believes that hedge 
fund risk management is more subjective and less transparent than risk control in 
traditional investing, and that therefore, investors need to balance their desire for 
transparency against the fund manager’s need for freedom of action. He further clarifies 
that the efficient market hypothesis and modern portfolio theory are just weak 
assumptions and that particularly skilled investment managers can discover and produce 
‘alpha’, or high-level returns. He ascertains that active managers use a broad set of skills 
to discover opportunities and manage risk but admits that these managers are rare. The 
skills come only with experience, therefore such managers and their funds are expensive. 
In identifying these characteristics, he of course moves little away from the flaws he 
identifies as the ‘weak assumptions’ that underpin alternative views. If his position were 
tenable, the hedge funds represent some sort of investment haven.  
 
On the other hand, examples of investments in hedge funds that turned sour are 
innumerable. One more recent case is described by the online service of the Economist 
(2015). The article details some of the consequences that arose for investors engaged in 
highly risky ventures, when the Swiss national bank (SNB) abandoned its peg against the 
euro on January 15, 2015. Within seven minutes of the announcement by the SNB, the 
Swiss franc rose 34 percent against the dollar.  
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The market movements were so intense that market stop-orders went unfilled. Some 
investors with only $10,000 exposed, but highly leveraged, lost about $345,000 (Browne, 
2015). Financial institutions with millions invested, such as Everest Capital's $850 
million Global Hedge Fund, had to file for bankruptcy (Reuters and Business Insider, 
2015). This demonstrates that establishing an accurate risk profile and acting accordingly 
is extremely important for any investor who wants to manage and increase wealth by the 
means of investing.  
 
Schwager (2014) discusses the many both sensible and senseless rules that relate to stock 
market investing, e.g. that an optimal portfolio should consist of around 10 products. He 
focuses too on the most typical investment mistakes that can quickly become very costly 
and explains why one should not trust company or fund ratings, nor the many risk 
parameters. Contrary to many other researchers, Schwager is convinced that the efficient 
market theory remains only a theory; it does not work in practice and a skilled investor 
can indeed ‘beat the market’. His reasoning is that stock market prices are based on both 
fundamental values but also on emotions. Once you do your research profoundly, avoid 
the typical investment mistakes and are able to master your investment biases, you 
achieve higher returns than the regular investor does. He too states that the past stock 
market happenings are no indicator for future directions of shares, bonds, funds, hedge 
funds, or other investment vehicles. Once again, though, his positions rests on a series of 
logically connected arguments and observation, but little in the way of empirical support. 
 
Schwager advocates hedge funds as an investment strategy and suggests that even 
investors with minimal funds should invest in these products. He blames their bad 
reputation as mainly a consequence of the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management 
(LTCM) in 1998. Then, that hedge fund, with previously an annualized return of almost 
40%, was leveraged 250 to 1, and it took on the ‘wrong bets’, loosing $1.9 billion in less 
than a month. Interestingly, in the board of directors at this time were famous investment 
researchers and Nobel prize winners Myron S. Scholes and Robert Carhart Merton.  
 
Despite this disaster, Schwager claims that hedge funds are indeed conservative 
investments with a lower volatility than shares. While this may be occasionally true, he 
neglects the excessive cost that hedge funds inherit and that thus the notion that any hedge 
fund manager must be able to beat the market by 3-5%, repeatedly. This alone shows that 
such investments are not a good fit for the general investor, as they are not only highly 
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risky, but also too expensive. Arguments again lack evidence in Schwager’s position, and 
reliance is placed on assertion and selective evidence gathering is present.  
2.3.8. Value averaging 
By applying a value averaging investment strategy, investors define a certain periodical 
growth target, thereafter, sporadically purchasing different quantities of additional shares, 
depending on the performance of the portfolio. The main goal thereby is to buy more 
shares, bonds, funds, etc. when prices are falling and fewer when they are rising. This 
will result in averaging the purchasing price and therefore more closely mirroring market 
movements. 
 
For example, you would start with a portfolio worth CHF 50,000 and define a growth 
target of CHF 500 per month. If the portfolio after one month were worth CHF 50,250, 
you would buy additional shares worth CHF 250 (CHF 50,500 – 50,250). Conversely, if 
the portfolio is worth CHF 49,600, you would buy shares for CHF 900 (CHF 50,500 – 
46,600).  
 
As with every investment strategy, investors have to consider that it can become quite 
costly in highly volatile markets and that the fees for constantly buying smaller number 
will add up, therefore decreasing the overall profit. Value averaging was developed and 
described as an investment approach by Edelson (1991) and later Marschall (2000). Their 
claims for its superiority over other methods of selecting investment amounts and timing 
was rejected, however, by Hayley (2013), who critiqued the earlier use of IRR (internal 
rate of return) as the investment yardstick. 
2.3.9. Quantitative investing  
Loistl and Zellner (2008) explain their ‘relative value strategy’ as a quantitative trading 
strategy aiming to take advantage of short-term market inefficiencies. When pairs of 
assets show a stationary pattern over a period of time but deviation occurs, the asset 
manager should take a long-term view of the undervalued asset and a short-term view of 
the overvalued one. They explain that a sample of the largest stocks included in the DJ 
Stoxx 600 needs to be pre-selected and suitable similar pairs of assets to be determined.  
41 
 
A trade should then take place when a price ratio is starting to deviate from its ‘normal 
behaviour’. The idea here is that a price ratio follows a mean-reversion process. In 
conclusion, the authors trust that in real markets, many arbitrage opportunities exist and 
integrated active management generates returns by exploiting these occasions. Yet again, 
the authors offer a logical proposition, but one that requires major assumptions by the 
investor as its basis concerning the fundamental characteristics of companies, and 
detailed knowledge of prior pricing history. 
 
Rishi (2013) explains the notions and mechanics of both quantitative trading and high-
frequency trading. He claims to expose many of the myths that surround quantitative 
trading, what many call ‘a black box’ and illustrates how ‘quants’ can add value to an 
investor’s portfolio. He believes that one of the main reasons why many researchers, 
academics and practitioners are opposed to quantitative strategies lies in the ‘generation’ 
– the younger and aspiring people are much more accepting than the traditional investors 
are. He holds that quantitative trading strategies are far easier to comprehend than the 
caprice inherent to most human decision making.  
 
He explains that ‘if both the questions of what positions to own and how much of each to 
own are usually answered systematically, that’s a quant. If either one is answered by a 
human, that is not a quant’ (p. 16). ‘Quant’ strategies are solely a systematic 
implementation of the kinds of things that human traders and investor have always done. 
Further, Rishi states that quantitative approaches to risk management is to put the power 
into the hands of the portfolio manager to make rational and deliberate decisions. ‘The 
work that a quant does is, in most ways, identical to the work that any portfolio manager, 
and CEO or any other allocator of resources must perform’ (p. 218).  
 
He concludes that most arguments against high-frequency trading are made by people 
who are ignorant of the facts or motivated by self-interest. However, ‘during 2012, I know 
billions of dollars allocated to quant funds specifically by pensions and large, traditional 
fund-of-funds who historically would have said, ‘we don’t invest in quants’ (p. 305). 
Again, there is assertion, selective reporting of cases and a desire to ‘hide’ in the technical 
aspects of particular algorithms evident in this type of literature. On the other hand, 
Marshall, Cahan and Cahan reported in 2007: ‘we do conclusively show that none of 
these rules beat the market any more than expected given random data variation’ 
(Marshall, Cahan, & Cahan, 2007). 
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Lewis reveals and critiques the mechanics and notion of the high frequency trading in 
particular (2014). He focuses on Brad Katsuyama, a former Royal Bank of Canada 
executive, who embarked on a resolute mission to ‘fight’ high-frequency trading. He 
presents and analyses an interview with Katsuyama and states how HFT affects stock 
markets, how the Royal Bank of Canada executive sought to prevent high frequency 
trading and opened an alternative exchange. 
 
After the 1987 market crash, financial institutions and their programmers started to 
develop software and algorithms that would manage more and more stock market 
functions, to an extent that now software intelligence is used to arbitrage trades within 
trades. In a nutshell, high frequency traders gain an information advantage through speed 
and optimize their cabling and switches to achieve tight time margins. Whenever possible, 
they place their supercomputers in stock exchange buildings to enable faster transmission.  
 
The principle is simple. Typical stock market trades can usually not be handled by a single 
stock exchange, which is why the whole order is split and placed amongst various stock 
exchanges. Thus, once the brokers have identified the required exchanges, they send their 
trades simultaneously to multiple stock exchanges. Despite this, the trades do not all 
arrive at the same time, but with tiny delays to some. 
 
High frequency traders, who have access to real time information and own highly 
optimized data infrastructure, play with these tiny time margins. Within milliseconds they 
realize that orders are split in different packages and send similar orders that arrive at the 
relevant stock exchanges before the original trades does. This notion changes the equity 
prices on the stock exchanges, so that the high frequency trader who sent off the trades 
with a delay can meet the obligations of the initial trade. The original trader cannot see 
what is going on in between and once the trades are completed the high frequency trader 
settles his positions (to zero). This results in a microscopic margin between the different 
buying/selling prices. Doing this thousands of times a day, over weeks and months, can 
generate substantial amounts. Goldman Sachs became the first financial institution to 
send the majority of its orders to the IEX (Investor Exchange). 
 
The book further illustrates that HFT is problematic as too many investors benefit from 
it and because regulations to eliminate unfair market behaviour often reveal exploitable 
loopholes.  
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Likewise, such software is dangerous as it can fail, just as it did in 2012, when Knight 
Capital lost $440m in 45 minutes, due to a software issue. Some critics of the book say 
that only looking through the Katsuyama lenses is too black and white, and not objective 
enough; others question parts of Lewis’ interpretation. Budish, Cramton and Shim (2015) 
reflect on the ‘arms race’ for millisecond advantage in HFT and conclude that ‘The high-
frequency trading arms race is a symptom of flawed market design’ (p.1547). Their 
analysis demonstrates that ‘competition has not affected the size or frequency of the 
arbitrage opportunities, it has only raised the bar for how fast one has to be to capture 
them’ (p.1547). To obviate this difficulty and the economic benefit conferred by 
asymmetric information or asymmetric serial processing they advocate a discrete time 
batch-auction approach for stock and other exchanges, removing HFT advantages 
completely. If trading advantage can be minimized in HFT, then attention turns to asset 
classes. 
2.3.10. Asset allocation 
Brinson, Hood and Beebower (1986) discuss the notion of asset classes and argue that 
asset allocation is highly important to achieve positive portfolio return. Within their 
research, they analyse the asset allocation, which is the implementation of an investment 
strategy, of 91 large pension funds and measure their performance for a 10-year period 
from 1974 to 1983. They substitute the pension organizations’ equity, bond and cash 
selection with respective market indices and found that the indexed three-monthly returns 
were greater than the pension funds real returns. Their study showed that using a 
combination of different asset classes achieves more profit than the active choices by the 
experts of and for the pension funds. One concern with the Brinson et al. study was that 
the cost factors were not fully discussed; the management fees were not entirely taken 
into consideration.  
 
A subsequent study by the same researchers in 1991 revealed a variance of 91.5%, thus 
the performance of a portfolio depends almost entirely on a clever mix of the asset classes. 
In fact, several later researchers and practitioners have confirmed that the asset class 
allocation drives 90% of the portfolio return (Brinson, Singer, & Beebower, 1991). 
Hence, an understanding of the different asset classes, i.e. cash, fixed income, equity, real 
estate, commodities, etc. and its appropriate mix (allocation) is imperative for any 
investor.  
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Ideally, the asset classes themselves should not correlate positively with each other. 
Shares will commonly behave differently to government bonds, and these two asset 
classes perform differently again to either gold or real estate.  
 
Surz, Stevens and Wimer (1999) provide an analysis on quarterly returns of 53 pension 
funds over the five-year period 1993 to 1998 and of 94 balanced mutual funds 
compositions and results over a 10-year period, ending 1998.  
 
The researchers address the impact the investment policy has on the total return of 
investment portfolios. They therefore measure the effect of the asset class allocation; the 
percentage of return is explained by calculating the ratio of the policy return to the total 
return. The policy return is the return generated if target policy applications are 
consistently followed and index funds are used for each asset class. Rebalancing for 
mutual funds was done monthly, and for pension funds three-monthly.  
 
Surz et al. (1999) found that the investment policy explains, on average (almost) 100% 
of the total return. However, if a portfolio manager succeeds in adding value, the 
percentage of return explained by the asset class mix drops to 85% when risk is not 
incorporated and to 75% on a risk-adjusted basis. If the asset manager fails to add value, 
the investment policy explains 135% and risk-adjusted 165% of total return. They further 
found that portfolio managers who solely time the market or solely select securities, 
succeed more frequently than those who do both - time the market and select securities. 
The overarching finding was that, on average, balanced mutual fund managers do not add 
value above their investment policies. Thus, the positive returns were purely the results 
of the asset class mix and had nothing to do with selecting the right funds.  
 
Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000) build on the study of Brinson, Hood and Beebower (1986). 
They determine that asset allocation is the ultimate key to investment success. Ibbotson 
and Kaplan address the general debate about asset allocation policy and conclude that the 
lack of conclusiveness stems from asking and answering different questions. For their 
research they use balanced mutual funds and pension fund data consisting of the total 
return for each fund in each time (a month or a quarter).  
 
They use 10 years of monthly returns for 94 US balanced funds. This represents all of the 
balanced funds of the Morningstar portfolio having at least 10 years of information 
45 
 
(ending March 31, 1998). In addition, policy weights for each fund were approximated 
by executing return-based style analysis over the entire 120-month period. The asset 
classes used were Large-cap US stocks, Small-cap US stocks, Non-US stocks, US bonds 
and Cash.  
 
They found, that 90% variability of returns in a typical fund across time is explained by 
asset allocation, but that this only explains around 40% of the variation of returns among 
funds. The most interesting conclusion, however, is that on average, pension funds and 
balanced mutual funds do not add value above the benchmark because of a mixture of 
market timing, security selection, management fees, and expenses.  
Darst (2008) presents a comprehensive guide to the principles of asset allocation and 
investment strategies that are suitable for any kind of markets. For decades, researchers, 
scholars and investment practitioners have analysed, studied and written about efficient 
market theory and the notion of diversification, i.e. ‘not putting all one’s eggs in one 
basket’. Yet few of them have actually suggested methods for how to apply diversification 
when constructing a widespread portfolio. This is because in Darst’s view, asset 
allocation is a science and its underlying principles are not immediately apparent.  
 
He illustrates that many investors have a tendency to overrate their investment knowledge 
and the accuracy of their forecasts, hence the probable values of investment outcomes. 
Thus, investors should be interested in developing a good understanding of the 
importance of asset allocation, the process of identifying portfolios of assets that are set 
to generate the highest possible returns for a certain level of risk. Also, they ought to 
understand the rates of return that the various asset classes yield and seek to identify assets 
with value or growth potential and acceptable prices. ‘In general, the soundness and 
attractiveness of an investment depend vitally on the overall health of a country’s society 
comprised of interdependent financial, economic, political and social factors, among 
other features’ (Darst, 2003, p. 310). 
 
Darst agrees with many other researchers, scholars and practitioners that according to 
contemporary portfolio theory, one of the most important goals of asset allocation is to 
minimize risk that is not compensated for through diversification. As with other 
commentators reviewed, Darst believes that the asset allocation process should always 
reflect the investors’ own profiles, i.e. their mentality, hopes, fears and financial position, 
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leading to a sound risk/return profile. He further lists some significant investment 
mistakes, i.e. time horizon blindness, failure to consider real value, incorrectly estimating 
risk tolerance, failure to consider total return, ignoring expenses (TER), and failure to 
diversify. Darst points out that an ETF based on the S&P500 diversifies only within this 
index, hence the same kind of companies – large capitalization stocks are always 
purchased. Thus, to truly diversify, investors have to construct a portfolio that also 
includes other asset classes, hence many different indices.  
2.4. Active vs. passive portfolio management 
Ellis (2002) endorses indexing, an investment implementation strategy whereby investors 
purchase index funds that replicate certain markets, i.e. the S&P 500, Dow Jones, FTSE 
100, DAX, SMI, as opposed to direct investments in shares or managed funds. Ellis 
(2002) states that 90% of all public trades at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) are 
completed by investment professionals and that 75% of all trades are executed by the 100 
largest institutions. It follows that almost every time an individual buys a share (stock 
picking), they are betting against the market of the ‘best and the brightest’ who are 
disciplined, rational and supplied with astonishing information by thousands of highly 
motivated, hard-working and very competitive analysts. 
 
Furthermore, Ellis (2002) evidences that total returns on shares in the past 75 years were 
accumulated in the best 60 months (i.e. in less than 7% of those 800 months). Therefore, 
lack of investment within a buy and hold strategy often leads to missing out on the best 
trading days.  
 
He states that performance investing has enjoyed a remarkably long-life cycle, but the 
costs of active investments are so high and the incremental returns so low that the money 
‘game’ is no longer a game worth playing for clients. He arrives at this conclusion by 
comparing the performance differences between active managed funds and low-fee 
indexing; the latter consistently delivers the market return at no more than the market 
level of risk and at low cost. To evidence this, he calculates the incremental fee for active 
management as a percentage of the incremental return after adjusting for risk. This results 
in a true charge of 75% of incremental return, before fees.  
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Because a majority of active managers now underperform the market, their incremental 
fees are over 100% of long-term incremental, risk-adjusted returns. 
 
However, Ellis (2002) states that for individuals one of the biggest challenges is not 
picking the right stock or trying to find the best fund manager or timing the market but is 
inflation. The corrosive power of inflation diminishes money if not properly invested. At 
3% inflation, the purchasing power of one’s money is cut in half over 24 years. At 5% 
inflation, it takes less than 15 years. It seems that money solely resting with a normal 
deposit account just wears away over time. 
 
Price, cited in Ellis (2002), confirms that a simple buy and hold strategy has positive 
returns; staying invested is superior than trying to time the market. He evidenced that $1 
invested in the S&P 500 that missed the 90 best trading days in the 10 years from June 
30, 1989, to June 30, 1999, would have lost 22 cents and would have made only 30 cents 
if it missed the worst 60 days. However, it would have made $5.59 by staying fully 
invested. Conversely, sidestepping the 90 worst trading days would have yielded $42.78. 
The authors assume that the fluctuation of these calculations depends on when a ‘sample 
cycle’ starts, in which market you measure and on the duration of that investment.  
 
Green (2008) is a research analyst and investment adviser who draws on portfolio 
management methods used by the world’s largest institutional investors. He uses leading 
figures in investing and portfolio management, such as Merton Miller, William Sharpe, 
and Harry Markowitz, whose wisdom he followed to build and illustrate the mechanics 
of his ‘gone fishing portfolio strategy’.  
 
He stresses that while no one knows the exact and ideal combination of asset classes in 
advance, everybody who can, should be smart, invest and not take chances with their own 
money. Save, and do not rely on the government, or anyone else, to manage assets. The 
current social security systems may help you to retire, but we probably cannot afford to 
live on the public pensions it will pay. Stockbrokers will not necessarily work in your 
favour as their goal is to earn commissions on the back of your investments; financial 
planners are also trying to earn fees.  
 
He emphasizes the basics, such as exhibiting financial discipline, saving awareness and 
costs.  
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He recommends an ideal portfolio as consisting entirely of low-cost vanguard mutual 
funds, mainly index products (ETFs). He suggests keeping 70% of the total portfolio 
worth in stocks and explains that while such a high equity loading may seem to be risky, 
historical and financial research demonstrates that, over time, stocks have been the most 
profitable asset class, even during detrimental periods like the great depression. He quotes 
the research of Ibbotson & Kaplan (2000) who evidenced that asset allocation explains 
90% of the total portfolio return. Green is however an advocate: he believes in a particular 
investment approach, and marshals’ evidence to support that approach. 
 
John C. Bogle, the originator of the Vanguard Group, is a respected index fund investor 
and the driving force leading the charge against their counterparts, the active managed 
funds. Bogle (2010) takes a critical look at the mutual fund industry and argues 
energetically for a low-cost investment approach. He supports investors in navigating 
through the overwhelming selection of investment alternatives available. He reasons that 
many people waste their time and money trying to beat the market and examines the 
fundamentals of mutual fund investing to offer advice in building a sustainable 
investment portfolio. 
 
Even though investing seems a daunting and complicated task, he is convinced (and 
indeed illustrates) that anybody with disposable income can easily let his or her money 
work for them by using common sense, understanding their personal tolerance for risk, 
investing in low cost, low complexity index funds within a broadly diversified portfolio. 
In doing so, even novice investors can outperform the majority of Wall Street 
professionals over the long-term, he avers. Bogle’s position is essentially conservative 
and has a longer-term perspective. There may be evidence to support it, but once again it 
is partial and biased, and lacks a thorough-going empirical basis. As with any 
recommendation for an investment strategy, the time period, selection of asset classes and 
location of the exercise profoundly influence outcomes. There is no available 
comprehensive study that is relatively broad in scope and extended in period. 
 
Sincera Asset Management (2011) advocates passive investing mostly through ETFs, 
focusing on asset allocation and a buy and hold strategy with periodical rebalancing. 
Similar to Price - cited in Ellis (2002) - Sincera Asset Management (2011) conducted a 
comparison and found that CHF 100,000 invested in 1996, within a buy and hold strategy, 
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resulted in CHF 254,000 by 2010. The same amount invested, but missing the 10 most 
lucrative trading days, resulted in only CHF 130,000.  
 
Conversely, missing the 10 worse trading days would have achieved CHF 470,000. The 
10 best and 10 worse trading days omitted would have resulted more or less at the same 
level as with the normal buy and hold strategy.  
 
Hechler (2013) also advocates that any investor is able to invest like a professional 
investment expert by the use of exchange traded funds (ETFs). While ETFs originally 
were rather designed for institutional investors, they more and more become the standard 
within the general investment community, even earlier ‘opponents’ are increasingly 
changing sides. Hence, ETFs are today generally seen as highly sensible investment 
vehicles, as they enable stock market participants to diversify their portfolio amongst 
various markets and sectors, are very low cost, especially in the light of active managed 
funds. Like many other researchers and writes, Hechler concludes that managers of 
mutual funds have no reliable way of beating the market year after year, but since they 
would make much less money for themselves with ETFs, they are opposed to them, and 
do not recommend these investment products. He therefore suggests basing one’s 
investment strategy and the constitution of a balanced portfolio based on the science of 
Markowitz’ efficient market theory (1952).  
 
Hechler advocates further benefits of ETFs, for example, investors are protected against 
possible default as money invested in ETFs (in Germany and Switzerland) is classified 
as ‘separate assets’ or ‘special property’. With mutual funds, investors could potentially 
lose everything. He also discusses other variations of index products, such as synthetic 
ETFs, which are based on swaps and more complex to comprehend. Even though ETFs 
are very cost effective already, Hechler (2013) suggests verifying their trading cost with 
both traditional banks and online brokers. The latter tend to be cheaper.  
 
Siegel (2014) draws on extensive research covering the past two hundred years and argues 
that that returns on equities outshine all other asset classes and that stock returns are safer 
and more foreseeable also within inflationary market environments. Siegel, like many 
others researchers and practitioners reviewed, is convinced that trying to beat the market 
leads to disastrous results, that we take far too many unnecessary risks, that our 
transaction costs are too high and that we often find ourselves falling into emotions of the 
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moment - pessimism when the market is down and optimism when the market is high. 
Our actions lead to considerably lower returns than can be achieved by just staying 
invested.  
 
He explains that positive long-term stock market returns are simple and available to all 
who seek gain through investing, if investors are following a number of his selected 
principles. 
2.5. Learning and expertise   
This part of the literature review lists the most common investment mistakes and focuses 
on the notions of both behavioural finance and expertise. The principles identify what 
constitutes an expert or a learner (or student) more generally. This synthesis is useful to 
support my research, in particular the construction of the questionnaires, as well as the 
analysis and discussion; and will enable me to compare expert knowledge and 
characteristics known (i.e. Dreyfus-model, education and qualification, credentials) with 
those of the experts identified within this research.  
2.5.1. Stuart E. and Hubert L. Dreyfus – adult skill acquisition model 
A powerful model with which to consider adult skill acquisition was provided by Stuart 
E. Dreyfus and Hubert L. Dreyfus  (1980) who presented a framework of how to obtain 
and master knowledge in order to become an expert.  
 
There work further developed to be applied in various situations, e.g. in the area of the 
computer (Mind Over machine: The Power of human Intuition and Expertise in the Era 
of the Computer, 1986) or elaborating on mastery in beyond expertise (2008). Their 
model consists of the following five stages: 
 
Stage 1 - ‘novice’. The beginner is given rules to put information with almost no 
knowledge into action resulting in inferior outcomes in the real world.  
 
Stage 2 - ‘advanced beginner’. This illustrates that the novice is now coping with real 
situations, starts to develop an understanding of the relevant context and starts to 
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recognize new aspects based on his/her experiences. However, learning takes place in a 
detached analytical manner as the advanced beginner continues to follow rules and is 
given examples.  
 
Stage 3 - ‘competence’. Due to an increasing number of situations encountered, 
potentially relevant elements and procedures, the learner can now recognize, to achieve 
additional learning becomes overwhelming, and reaching satisfactory outcomes becomes 
challenging. This overload needs to be managed by further education and learning in 
order to develop a plan to distinguish between the elements that are important and the 
ones that can be neglected; hence the student must now figure out a plan of action and 
decisions him/herself, based on rules, examples, experiences and intuition. Dreyfus 
concluded that in this phase, an emotional involvement is the key to advance beyond 
competence: ‘Only at the level of competence is there an emotional investment in the 
choice of action’.  
 
Stage 4 - ‘proficiency’. The learner’s existing practice stemming from rules and 
principles will progressively be replaced by situational discrimination. The goal becomes 
simply obvious and there is less doubt that the individual actions and decisions are 
appropriate. However, the particular actions are still hard to evaluate, s/he must still 
decide on what to do.  
 
Stage 5 - ‘expertise’. The learner acts in a purely goal oriented way and sees what needs 
to be done and decides habitually, intuitively. This is what distinguishes the expert from 
the proficient performer. S/he does not solve a challenge, s/he does not even think. He or 
she just does what usually works and of course, it typically does.  
 
In reaching this conclusion, Dreyfus was working towards what he termed a 
phenomenology of skill acquisition as the basis for a Merleau-Pontian non-
representationalist Cognitive Science. Dreyfus’ project was driven by his engagement 
with artificial intelligence and the nature of thinking machines, and, especially‚ what 
computers cannot do (1972). Other researchers, i.e. Gobet (2015), focus more on the 
actual attainment of knowledge and expertise; while Eriksen (2010) or Montero (2010) 
believe that intuition does not facilitate skilled performance. They argue that Dreyfus 
should have more accounted for how conscious and mindful activity can shape embodied 
routines through training and on-line performance.  
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2.5.2. Finance and investment education 
Clearly, one element significant in moving through the Dreyfus’ stages is the acquisition 
of increased knowledge, alongside experience. Investment knowledge, as with other 
professional fields, can be attested through qualification. Investors therefore might seek 
qualified professional advice. Jaffe (2010) describes the difficulty in finding the right 
(qualified, professional) financial adviser. He suggests you are likely to be better off with 
professional advice. This might mean that you choose to seek an expert who has 
appropriate credentials: someone who is a certified annuity specialist (CAS), chartered 
estate planner (CEP), chartered financial analyst (CFA), certified financial planner (CFP), 
chartered investment controller (CIC), certified public accountant (CPA) or an enrolled 
agent (EA).  
 
If such credentials are important to an investor, then the task of identifying a well-
educated, experienced, and sincere adviser becomes really daunting. There are more than 
100 professional designations to choose from. Of course, such credentials have to be 
earned, some of them by years of study time alongside a substantial financial investment. 
However, these credentials are also the way advisers market themselves.  The more letters 
they attach to their name, the more they can impress potential customers and the more 
diverse services they can offer (especially in jurisdictions where these types of activity 
are controlled and regulated).  
 
Jaffe (2010) explains that an ordinary financial planner with a customer base consisting 
mostly of people of the investor’s same age, assets and concerns, could most likely do the 
job without having a single advanced credential. As Jaffe suggests, people tend to short-
sell experience and put too much weight on the qualifications described above. However, 
Jaffe helpfully lists some of the most common designations (most internationally known) 
that might be useful when searching for financial advice, alongside their principal 
characteristics. These credentials are shown in the table below. 7 
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Table 1 – Investment management related credentials (Jaffe, 2010) 
Certified financial 
planners (CFP)
A CFP must meet experience and education requirements and pass a ten-hour exam 
administered by the certified financial planner board of standards. To maintain the 
qualification they must take a minimum of 30 hours continuing education classes every 
two years.
Certified fund 
specialist (CFS)
To become a CFS you are only required to have a bachelor's degree or one year of 
experience in financial services. You can then take the self-study course and pass an 
examination overseen by the institute of business & finance.    
Chartered financial 
consultant (CFC) 
A CFC is typically an insurance agent with several years of experience, who has conducted 
courses in financial planning from the American college. It is a prerequisite for an 
insurance agent who wants to branch into other types of financial planning; often agents 
achieve this in conjunction with the CLU credential.
Accredited estate 
planner (AEP)
The AEP designation requires the participants to have five years of estate planning 
experience. They must be an attorney or financial planner with appropriate credentials in 
that area. To maintain the credentials given by the national association of estate planners 
& councils, requires just two graduate level courses followed by 30 hours of coursework 
every two years.
Chartered financial 
analysts (CFA)
The CFA passes a demanding, three-level test on investment analysis, economics, 
portfolio theory, accounting, corporate finance, etc., administered by the CFA Institute 
(formerly the association for investment management and research). CFA holders must 
demonstrate expertise in a specialized area of investments.
Chartered life 
underwriter (CLU) 
The CLU is commonly considered the highest professional designation for life insurance 
consultants, who must meet extensive experience and education requirements, with the 
courses conducted by the American college.
The investment 
management 
consultants 
association (IMCA)
The IMCA, a trade group for advisers who concentrate on high net-worth clients and 
institutional investors, awards the certified investment management analyst credential 
to experienced consultants who complete a five-month study program at the University 
of Pennsylvania, the University of Chicago, or the University of California-Berkeley. 
Chartered mutual fund 
consultants (CMFC)
CMFC have accomplished a 72-hour self-study course on mutual funds. The course is 
administered by the college for financial planning and overseen by the investment 
company institute, which is the trade association for the mutual fund industry.
Certified public 
accountants (CPA)
CPAs are tax experts who must have a college degree, pass a stringent exam, and keep on 
top on modifications in tax law.
Personal financial 
specialists (PFS)
PFSs are CPAs who have met education and experience requirements and passed a 
comprehensive exam on financial planning. Because this credential is always linked to 
the CPA, holders usually list it as CPA/PFS. The holder is qualified to help a client with 
investment and tax issues. 
Chartered wealth 
managers (CWM)
CWM possess a minimum of three years' experience and usually an advanced degree. 
They complete coursework with the American academy of financial management. You can 
achieve similar competing credentials by becoming a certified wealth consultant (CWC).
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To conclude, the chartered financial analyst (CFA) is assuredly the most respected but 
also the most difficult credential to attain in the investment world, followed by the 
accreditation by the Investment Management Consultants Association (IMCA). 
Investment advisers who have become either chartered wealth managers, personal 
financial specialists, certified financial planners or chartered financial consultant are 
surely knowledgeable professionals too. In Switzerland, a finance and investment related 
qualification from the AZEK, the Swiss Training Centre for Investment Professionals is 
regarded as reputable but difficult to accomplish (AZEK, 2016). 
2.5.3. Behavioural finance  
Pompian (2006) writes a guide that he claims supports both private investors and 
professional advisers in identifying and controlling irrational emotions, in order to 
increase one’s position of wealth, and to build an optimal investment portfolio. He 
delivers a brief history of behavioural finance, and a detailed collection of noteworthy 
investor biases, including advice on how to manage them. He gives an indication of the 
possible direction of future research in the field. He states, ‘Investor irrationality has 
existed as long as the markets themselves’ (Pompian, 2006, p. 20). He also claims that 
‘There is a large body of evidence documenting that investors consistently overestimate 
the prospects of growth companies’ (Pompian, 2006, p. 12).  
 
As with other authors mentioned above, Pompian elaborates on the current research that 
is challenging the efficient market hypothesis. This long-held theory holds that well-
informed investors determine market changes by making rational choices and decisions. 
Hence, in an efficient market, securities prices allegedly reflect all relevant information 
so rapidly that no investor can expect to beat the majority of all other investors, who 
constitute the market. Even advocates of the efficient market hypothesis EMH, for 
example Swensen (2005), Bogle (2010) or Siegel (2014), recognize that stock market 
participants often react non-rationally, since various biases could influence the behaviour 
of investors.  
 
During the past two decades, research into psychological and emotional aspects of 
investing has shaped behavioural finance. Major studies include Kahnemann & Tversky 
(1979) Jinga, Haoa & Xiana (2013) or Shiv, Loewenstein & Bechara (2005). The research 
in general shows that investors are continuously subject to well-defined and often 
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predictable biases that lead them to make irrational decisions that damage their ‘financial 
health’. Asset managers and investment advisers alike may apply these insights by 
gathering complete information and bringing rationality to bear. Many assume that this 
could have a positive influence on how they serve their investing clientele and may help 
to prevent from making emotional choices.  
 
As Pompian (2006) writes, one of the major challenges is that stock market participants 
are often blinded by old views and habits and refuse to adapt to new information and 
circumstances. Likewise, for many investors, controlling their desire to spend money 
instead of saving is problematic. Pompian concludes that neuroeconomics, the study of 
brain anatomy and chemistry, could open new frontiers in the understanding of 
investment decisions.  
 
Pompian suggests, based on his extensive review of the literature, that the most serious 
biases discovered by researchers are: 
 
▪ Overconfidence: investors have too much faith in their ability to forecast events.  
▪ Representativeness: investors cling to long-held perceptions and habits and 
neglect those that genuinely reveal current true trends and not mere anomalies.  
▪ Anchoring and adjustment: some investors are arbitrarily fixed on certain 
numbers so that their buy-or-sell decision may be irrational because they have this 
particular number in mind.  
▪ Cognitive dissonance: investors avoid uncomfortable information and rationalize 
irrational decisions as they find colliding perceptions exceptionally unsettling. 
▪ Availability: people think shark attacks are likelier than pieces of airplanes falling 
from the sky. The contrary is accurate, but the availability of public information 
through the media gives the shark attacks more attention.  
▪ Self-attribution: this bias describes investors who generally take credit for their 
investment success. They show the tendency to blame others or external factors 
for market failure. 
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▪ Illusion of control: this predisposition holds that investors trust that they can 
apply power over uncontrollable forces; the same way as craps shooters 
irrationally throw the dice harder thinking that they roll high numbers.  
▪ Conservatism: people stick to old opinions and forecasts although the conditions 
and circumstances that have changed (unwarranted optimism or pessimism). 
▪ Optimism: investors are generally too positive, may overweigh their portfolios 
with particular companies’ stocks, overrate the relative value of their investments, 
pay too much attention to rosy looking business situations, and put too much 
confidence in their investing acumen. 
▪ Ambiguity aversion: some investors only want to buy/own what they are 
acquainted with; thus, they prefer certainty and clear risks over the unfamiliar.  
▪ Endowment: these investors would ask for a higher price for something they own 
than they would pay for the same stock if they would not own it; they overvalue 
what they have.  
▪ Mental accounting: this bias comes into play for investors who disregard total 
returns, total expense ratios, or correlations. As their wealth increases, they may 
take higher and unwarranted risks they cannot afford or cling on to investments 
that performed well in the past but recently ran sour so that rationality would 
suggest letting them go. 
▪ Confirmation: these investors pay attention merely to information that confirm 
their beliefs; they contempt opposing data. 
▪ Hindsight: investors trust that past events and trends were foreseeable; many state 
that they saw the burst of the Internet bubble coming at the change of the 
Millennium, yet their investment actions and behaviour suggested the opposite. 
▪ Loss aversion: people who are determined to make money with every single 
investment suffer from this bias.  
▪ Recency: this suggests that investors overrate recent and memorable events while 
lacking historical perspective.  
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▪ Regret aversion: this prejudice discourages critical behaviour and investors 
avoid decision making in an attempt to sidestep the consequences.  
▪ Framing: investors with a framing bias lean towards focusing on gain, on the 
elimination of risk. 
▪ Status quo: this bias leads investors to hold on to assets that are not appropriate 
for their situation or period of life. 
The list assumes that rationality is superior, in all respects, to the presence of bias – but 
bias would not persist if it served no purpose (rationally speaking). 
2.5.4. Common investment mistakes 
The CFA Institute (2008) is a global association of investment professionals that sets 
standards for professional conduct. It offers examinations and then provides credentials 
for successful candidates, who are known as ‘charter holders’. It conducted a survey in 
which it asked charter holders about the most common investment mistakes, hazards or 
missteps. Amid other outcomes, the responses led to the recognition that simply avoiding 
these common hazards is often the most important part of creating a successful investment 
strategy and portfolio. This outcome affirms the view that investing is not to be confused 
with gambling or speculation and should therefore not be treated as a set of hit-or-miss 
activities. The survey suggests that individual investors often prove to be their own worst 
enemies, as simple missteps can result in apparently dramatic impacts on overall portfolio 
return over time.  
 
The CFA Institute research shows that the most common hazards are:  
 
▪ No investment strategy.  
▪ Investing in individual stocks instead of a diversified portfolio of securities. 
▪ Investing in stocks instead of investing in companies.  
▪ Buying high and selling low. 
▪ Churning your investments (too much trading). 
▪ Acting on tips and soundbites. 
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▪ Paying too much in fees and commissions.  
▪ Decision making by tax-avoidance.  
▪ Unrealistic expectations. 
▪ Neglect (people fail to start investing because of lack of knowledge). 
▪ Not knowing your tolerance of risk. 
 
Stammers (2015), the CFA Institute director of investor education, builds on the CFA 
(2008) study and provides guidance to help avoid the top 20 common investment mistakes 
uncovered by the survey. He points out, for instance, that it is important not to expect too 
much, not to apply someone else’s predictions and that past performance is no indicator 
for future performance. Even if you invest for the long run with a well-diversified 
portfolio according to your risk profile, you cannot predict or control the returns the 
markets will finally yield. There are of course the long-term averages for asset classes, 
such as equities, government bonds, or cash as illustrated by Pictet (2015), but investors 
ought to be cautious when making predictions. Likewise, outsiders who have no 
understanding of an individual’s investment goals or asset allocation can never provide a 
justified reasonable rate of return because of their lack of knowledge of the investor.  
 
In Stammers’ experience, many investors themselves are also not clear about their 
investment goals or have none defined. The saying, ‘if you don’t know where you are 
going you will most likely end up somewhere else’ is almost certainly true for investing. 
Stammers suggests any investor’s portfolio should ultimately be a reflection of their risk 
profile and investment objectives and should not focus on recovering prior investment 
losses or short-term investment return.  
 
Stammers states that the only way to create a portfolio that delivers appropriate levels of 
risk and return in various market scenarios, is through adequate diversification. He 
illustrates that often investors want to maximize returns by taking large investment 
exposure in one security or sector but when the markets move against such a concentrated 
position, it can be catastrophic. On the other hand, if an investor over-diversifies, 
Stammers says this too can also negatively affect performance. He further illustrates the 
point that many investors focus on the wrong type of performance. Long-term investors, 
in particular, should not speculate on short-term performance as this could make them re-
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think their strategy and motivate short-term portfolio modification. They should rather 
pay attention to the factors that drive long-term performance. Similarly, contrary to the 
fundamental principles of investing, investors are often buying high and selling low. 
Investors may let fear and greed steer their behaviour and try to maximize short-term 
returns instead of focusing on long-term investment success. Concentrating on near-term 
returns leads to faulty investment decisions i.e. aiming at what is popular or has performed 
well in the near past.  
 
Stammers also identifies and confirms other common mistakes in trading too much and 
too often and paying too high fees and commissions. Trading a portfolio is expensive and 
diminishes returns and can also result in unanticipated and uncompensated risks. 
Sustainable investing requires patience, as it can take time to harness the benefits of 
investments and the asset allocation strategy. Investors, Stammers suggests, should 
always monitor their portfolio, reconfigure when necessary, and not push to trade.  
 
In addition, the kind of products an investor chooses is a highly complex task as the 
majority of investors are paying too much for high-cost funds, trading, advisory fees, etc. 
Even at first glance, insignificant fees negatively affect real portfolio return. As Ellis 
(2002) states, investors should be aware of all potential costs during every investment 
decision and look out for funds that charge sensible fees and investment advisers that 
deliver exceptional value for the fees paid. Equally, investors should not concentrate too 
much on taxes. They need to be ‘smart’ but make investments based on their merits and 
investment goals, rather than on potential tax consequences.  
 
Once a well-diversified portfolio is carefully planned and set-up, the general advice on 
investing is that holders need to monitor it on a regular basis, since individual stocks, 
shares, bonds, equities and other investment vehicles will fluctuate in price. In this way, 
it is suggested, investors can ensure that they do not ‘get too far off track’. Stammers says 
that this notion is regularly neglected and advises investors to monitor their portfolio at 
least once a year to check that the investments still make sense for the investor’s situation 
and that the portfolio does not need rebalancing. This adjustment of the ratios for the 
various investment products or asset classes (rebalancing) should always be in-line with 
the investor’s risk profile. Stammer suggests that unfortunately many investors do not 
know ‘who they are’ and take on too much risk in exchange for potential returns, while 
others are too careful when selecting securities or drafting a portfolio.  
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Investors consequently forego possible returns or do not achieve long-term investment 
goals. Therefore, they need to identify their financial and emotional ability to take risks 
and recognize the inherent investment hazards.  
 
Also, many people are not ‘on top of their investments’ (Stammers 2015, p. 2) and 
therefore do not know how their securities or portfolios have performed. They may know 
the headline result or how a few of their stocks have performed, but they rarely know it 
in the context of their overall portfolio. Investors need to understand their respective 
results and relate them to the investment goals originally defined. They can then verify 
whether they are on track after adjusting for costs and inflation. Likewise, reacting to the 
media and using the extensive information available on investment related news channels 
is a common mistake made by investors. By the time such information has become public, 
it has already been factored into the market pricing. ‘Seasoned’ investors understand how 
to derive valuable information from various independent sources and how to validate 
them to identify investment possibilities.   
 
Stammers (2015) continues that investors all too often chase unrealistic returns, as they 
are distracted by promising high yields. The truth is simple: past performance is no 
indication for future performance and the highest yields convey the highest risks. 
Investors need to focus on the whole picture and should not get distracted while ignoring 
the management of risks.  
 
Trying to be a ‘market timing genius’ is another common fault (Stammers, 2015, p. 2), 
While timing the market is extraordinary challenging for well-educated and experienced 
professional investors, it can be disastrous for untrained investors. Stammers (2015), 
similarly to Sincera (2001), illustrates that an investor who had missed the best 10 trading 
days for the S&P 500 from 1993 to 2013 would have yielded a 5.4% annualized return 
instead of 9.2% by staying fully invested. This disparity suggests that investors benefit 
much more from constantly contributing to their investment portfolio instead of 
attempting to time the market by trading in and out.  
 
In addition, investors often neglect the imperative due diligence process to verify the 
qualities and services of their investment adviser. By contacting relevant databases and 
asking for references, investors should check whether corresponding managers have the 
appropriate training, experience, and ethical standards.  
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The worst that can happen is that ‘you trade an afternoon of effort for a good night’s 
sleep’ and in so doing avoid getting caught in the next Madoff scheme (Stammers, 2015, 
p. 2). Ideally, the respective financial service provider not only has the ability to solve 
your challenges but also shares a similar philosophy about investing and even life in 
general. 
 
Two other major pitfalls are inflation and investors being steered by emotions. Investors 
should develop a discipline of focusing on what is really important and sound portfolio 
needs to be crafted, executed, and managed without letting emotions influence decisions. 
Stammers concludes that this may prove difficult when considering the vast amount of 
questions and feelings that surround any individual investor, but it is important to deal 
with those emotions as rationally as possible.   
 
The last common mistakes Stammers (2015) identifies is that investors often neglect or 
simply continue their investment program but forget to control of what they can. He 
explains that investors frequently fail to start an investment program because they lack a 
basic knowledge of where and how to begin. Similarly, periods of inactivity are often a 
result of lethargy or disappointment about previous losses on the stock market. For 
Stammers (2015), profitable investing is not difficult, but does demand continuous effort 
and analysis in order to be successful. Overall, Stammers provides what may be thought 
of as a reasoned summary of what is currently believed to be best advice for private 
investors.   
 
Since we cannot control what the markets will do, we can save more money by 
continuously investing capital over time, which is as Stammers suggests, the surest way 
to reach your financial goals. This contributes as much to the accumulation of wealth as 
it does to the return on investment.  
 
The remaining literature is presented in the appendix. 
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2.6. Summary of this chapter  
This chapter sought to establish and examine the available literature regarding the 
theoretical and practical challenges in the field of a particular notion of finance, 
investment management and stock market investing. It presents past and recent theories, 
as well as their possible shortcomings. This provides a grounding for the aim of this 
thesis, the approach taken and hopefully the contribution to both theory and practice to 
be made.  
 
Ground-breaking concepts were established by Dodd and Graham (1934) and later by 
Graham (1949), with the origination of value investing. Graham also differentiates 
between investors and speculators; most investors today are to be found within the latter 
group. One of the most significant and successful investors, Warren Buffet, first worked 
with Graham and later built his own theories and rests almost his entire business 
(Berkshire Hathaway) on this insight.  
 
Modern portfolio theory established by Markowitz in 1952, is possibly one of the more 
important investment theories developed. Since then, many researchers and pragmatists 
have built on that model either to advance (or contest) the theory or to practically establish 
asset management companies and other financial institutions that would design and 
market products on its merits.  
 
Certainly, there are numerous critics (i.e. Greenwal, 2001; Schwager, 2014) who 
proclaim that markets are indeed inefficient and that therefore Markowitz’ theory does 
not hold true. Yet the majority of the investment community understands that if there is 
such a thing as an ideal and sustainable portfolio, it would be based on the merits of 
modern portfolio theory. Thus, the notion and mechanics of the MPT as well as the 
opposing arguments serve to underscore the level of knowledge and expertise amongst 
investors. What is clear throughout much of the literature, though, is a strong streak of 
advocacy and the selective use of mainly historical evidence. 
 
Further valuable information originates from Pompian (2006) who studied the various 
investment biases and emotions (behavioural finance), which when controlled, can lead 
to an increase of wealth. Likewise, the CFA institute (2008) and Stammers (2015) 
elaborate on the most common investor mistakes that hinder investors from setting up a 
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sustainable and weatherproof investment portfolio – if, and only if, rationality is a 
worthwhile principle. 
 
This chapter examines these most common investment strategies and investment 
applications. It reveals a literature replete with studies of ‘hero’ investors (value adherents 
such as Buffet, Town, Marks, Sander or Grantham; value proponents Natale or Hunt; to 
GARP investors like Lynch or technical analysts such as Faith, Schwartz or Simons) with 
sometimes (ofttimes) dubious use of selective data and logical but empirically 
unsupported assertions. The passage of time has shown some of these heroes to have feet 
of clay.  
 
Investment strategies, such as those of the hedge fund, the use of quantitative techniques 
or high intensity trading, are much more technical than the types of strategies above (but 
their results are similarly debateable).  As such, they are much less accessible strategies 
to general investors. Increasing use of computing platforms has eased the difficulties for 
private investors, but the ‘arms race’ for more powerful algorithms, or reduced time-
cycles for HIT, still disadvantage the individual investor. 
 
What is lacking, in both the professional and academic literature, is a single, 
comprehensive, empirically-supported set of theoretical propositions concerning the best 
way to invest for increased wealth. The literature reveals a wide range of different 
investment strategies and a plethora of investment criteria. Nonetheless, there is no 
coherent view of which investment strategy is the most effective for a private or 
professional investor. It is challenging for any investor to derive an investment strategy 
that suits his or her risk profile best and that then supports those investors in generating 
wealth sustainably.  
 
In the light of the challenges described, valuable information for my research (and for 
any investor) is provided by Brinson, Hood and Beebower (1986), Ibbotson and Kaplan 
(2000) and Darst (2003), who are convinced that asset allocation, the division of 
investments among different asset classes, is the ultimate key to investment success, as it 
drives (their selective evidence suggests) 90% of portfolio return. Thus, picking the right 
stock or mutual fund, or timing the market, on the basis of any investment strategy 
becomes something to be ignored. 
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Another ongoing debate concerns how investment portfolios are actually implemented 
and managed. There are essentially two clusters, the one trusting in ‘active portfolio 
management’, mostly ‘stock pickers’, asset managers and mutual fund managers, and the 
ones who firmly believes in ‘passive portfolio management’. As one might come to 
expect in this field, there is no consensus, and the evidence adduced by each cluster tends 
to flatly contradict the other. 
 
Finally, the literature does reveal themes that play vital roles for investing in general; 
these themes will therefore guide my research. Amongst them are the concept of 
diversification, the importance of the investors risk profile, the investment duration or 
time horizon, the significant notion of rebalancing the investments and the reasons why 
investors change their bank or asset manager. Additional topics are asset classes, such as 
commodities or corporate bonds and the various investment vehicles such as shares, 
options, futures or structured products and their relevant fee structures. 
 
With such a wide and divergent set of principles on offer to be followed, many private 
investors might well seek professional advice. Key in selecting any professional adviser 
(lawyer, accountant or tennis coach) for many people is the notion of both credentials and 
experience. The Dreyfus brothers jointly initiate a strand of thinking that illuminates this 
topic. They consider both knowledge and experience. In contrast to the ‘super-rational’ 
position of many investment commentators, they began by asking, in general, what it is 
that computers cannot do that humans can. They studied what they identified as the 
‘under-researched’ notion of expertise and then developed the ‘adult skill acquisition 
model’ that describes the stages one has to master in order to become an expert; from 
novice, to advanced beginner, to competence, to proficiency to expertise.  
 
In looking at expertise, Jaffe (2010) describes the most important finance and investment 
related qualifications (which perhaps signify knowledge and expertise). Of these, the 
chartered financial analyst (CFA) designation seems to be the most respected, but also 
the most difficult to attain credential in the investment world, followed by the 
accreditation of the Investment Management Consultants Association (IMCA).  
 
The above literature analysis and discussion (and the literature gaps) provides for the 
formalization of my initial hypothesis (chapter 5): the more knowledgeable and 
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experienced an investor is, the more carefully s/he will invest and the superior their level 
of portfolio diversification, investment criteria and strategies.  
 
Based on the literature, this is what one would expect the investor’s increase in knowledge 
to lead to, as investors become better informed. This study concentrates on exploring how 
differences in knowledge and experience affect investment behaviour amongst private 
and professional investors. The literature review, across a range of ‘investment theories’, 
forms the skeleton and substructure of the conceptual framework (discussed in the next 
chapter).  
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3. Conceptual framework  
3.1. Chapter overview 
This chapter presents the conceptual framework that organizes and guides empirical 
research, connecting the research aim and objectives with the current literature.  It directs 
the generation and analysis of empirical data in the same way.  
3.2. Development approach 
The previous chapter analysed and discussed the relevant literature - available theories 
(such as they are) and insightful thinking in the related fields of finance and investment 
management. The level of knowledge and expertise of investors can be derived from 
either normative theories, such as the Dreyfus’ adult skill acquisitions model, or from 
positive theories, such as the syllabus content of the various examination bodies offering 
education/qualification, or the many existing occupational requirements. Taken together, 
these areas represent the current state of knowledge with respect to investment choices, 
methods and tools. 
 
Key among the authors that guide my research are: Graham & Dodd (1934), Graham 
(1949), Markowitz (1952), Fama (1970),  Brinson, Hood & Beebower (1986), Black & 
Litterman (1991), Sharp (1991), Dreyfus  (2004), Swensen (2005), Stammers (2015). 
 
These key authors (with others) provide the initial conceptual framework displayed in 
this chapter. This lends a context within which to understand how knowledge and wealth 
shape private and professional investors’ investment behaviour (criteria, strategies, 
applications).  
 
Investors themselves are presumed to differ, according to whether they are private or 
professional investors, based on perspectives in much of the literature which presents 
‘professional’ knowledge for the benefit of ‘amateur’ investors. The often-implicit 
assumption is that the professional is more ‘expert’ than the amateur, private investor.  
This assumption is driven by two strands related to ‘more’: more knowledge, certainly, 
but also more wealth.  
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Professionals are assumed to manage greater wealth more expertly than private investors. 
For this reason, the professional investors themselves are further sub-divided here into 
asset managers and institutional investors - occupational titles that commonly reflect the 
amount of wealth under management.  
 
In order to contextualize the focus of the research: ‘to examine investment practices for 
the general investor to enable them to invest more knowledgably and effectively’, six key 
themes within the existing body of literature were identified. They derive from the 
reviewed literature and are categorized as ‘related structures’ (RS 1 to 6). These structures 
are:  
1. Investors – their type  
2. Qualifications and knowledge – derived from study and familiarity with the 
literature 
3. Experience and expertise – arising from occupation, time in the field, and amounts 
under management 
4. Investment criteria – the bases for investment choice 
5. Investment strategies – the school or style of investment approach adopted 
6. Experts – those demonstrating long-term mastery in the field.  
 
Each related structure provides a corner-point for the conceptual framework below. These 
related structures are all closely interlinked, being both potentially dependent and 
independent variables. They exhibit reciprocal conceptual relationships between and 
across each structure, as displayed in the figure. 
 
The framework shows the investors (RS1); both private and professional) as the main 
dependent variables, to which the key independent variables like experience and expertise 
(RS1), qualification and knowledge (RS3), investment criteria (RS4) and investment 
strategies (RS5) relate. The experts (RS6) represent the conclusion of each combination, 
the supposed apogee of investment insight, a kind of authority, from whom relevant 
recommendations can be drawn for the benefit of the private investor. This type of 
understanding permeates much of the literature.   
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Figure 2 – First stage conceptual framework 
 
Some questions for inquiry evolve logically from the review of the literature: 
▪ What education, qualification and level of knowledge do the investors exhibit?  
▪ How experienced and expert are the investors?   
▪ Which investment criteria are selected to establish an investment portfolio? 
▪ Which investment strategies and applications are applied? 
▪ Who are the experts within the investment community (the investors)? 
▪ What characteristics in regard to investment acumen and behaviour do the experts 
exhibit? 
 
These related structures (RS), combined with data about individual investors, were used 
to see if different categories of investors could be adequately identified, using what the 
literature suggests were the necessary explanatory variables. Within this thesis, following 
the literature, the assumption was that the professional investors (asset managers and 
institutional investors) possess superior investment knowledge and expertise compared 
to private investors; they are the more expert. Within the group of professional investors, 
the institutional investors will exhibit greater investment knowledge and expertise (given 
that their portfolios are likely to be of greater value) than the asset managers.  
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However, categorization using this type of data alone proved impossible. Hence, it is not 
probable to read the theoretical structure into the actual knowledge and expertise 
displayed by the three investor types – private investors, professional asset managers and 
professional institutional investors. The requirement for a second version of the 
framework became apparent after the analysis of initial data failed to yield adequate 
differentiation between Dreyfus-model levels of expertise and related investor types, 
based on occupational category, professional qualifications and experience alone. In an 
attempt to better comprehend how the issues around knowledge, experience and insight 
impact on one another and how they are further related to the key topics and expressions 
from the literature, a second layer was added to the conceptual framework.  
 
The illustration below shows this additional layer. It explicitly adds the three initial 
investor types (private investors, asset managers and institutional investors) as well as the 
five distinct levels of the Dreyfus model of skill acquisition (novice, advanced beginners, 
competent, proficient, expert). The illustration also shows the presumed relationship 
between these two categorizations, derived from the two different sources.  
 
A key difference from the first version of the framework is that, here, the skill level of an 
investor is no longer assumed to derive solely from his or her occupational status, but 
result from explicit testing and profiling (though it remains true that the categories are 
expected to be in the relation suggested by the literature). The approach to profiling 
utilizes insight generated from a review of the literature and specific items present in the 
curricula of professional bodies. 
 
The profiling of respondents as uniformed investors (UIs), informed investors (IIs) or 
experts (EXPs), hinges on an individual’s response to a series of questions drawn from 
this knowledge-base, explicated in the literature and curricula. This version of the 
framework therefore incorporates a two-fold perspective, based not only on the presumed 
amount of wealth under management but also an investor’s actual knowledge.  
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Figure 3 – Second stage conceptual framework 
 
The two-layer illustration of the conceptual framework mirrors these expectations; it 
shows progression from left to right, as illustrated within the different strata; one 
concerning investment under management, the other expertise. Yet the lines indicating 
categories are not solid, but dashed instead; this indicates the possibility that there may 
not be a straightforward isomorphic mapping of one set of categories onto the other, or 
regularity of progression from one category in a stratum to the next (a result strongly 
suggested by the initial analysis, which failed to resolve the expected categories of 
investor).  
 
In addition, the framework shows, in relation to the Dreyfus model, that private investors 
are normatively either ‘novice’ or potentially ‘advanced beginners’, that most asset 
managers are to be found in the range of ‘advanced beginners’, ‘competent’ and 
‘proficient’, and the institutional investors within ‘proficient’ and ‘expert’.  
 
Following from the above, the initial null hypothesis (H0) became that the more 
knowledgeable and experienced an investor is, the more cautiously s/he will invest, and 
their level of portfolio diversification, choice of investment criteria and implementation 
of strategies will be superior to those with less knowledge. Based on the literature, this 
would be the expectation as to what possession of increased knowledge would lead to, as 
investors became less novice (more expert). 
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Figure 4 – Profiling investors 
 
To develop the profiles, firstly, relevant questions stemming from the analysis and results 
of research question 1 were selected. Secondly, a scoring system to allocate 0 - 5 scores 
to each of the answers for every profiling questions was developed, with a method to 
account for missing answers/values. Thirdly, a maximum score to identify the upper limit 
of the ‘uniformed investors’ (UI) category and a minimum score to identify the lower 
bound for ‘experts’ (EXP) were applied (the reminder scoring between these parameters 
constituting the ‘informed investors’ (II)). Lastly, the profiling question responses for an 
individual were run against the scoring system, in order to allocate each participant to one 
of the three newly created investor types. 
 
Consequently, the ultimate conceptual framework displays the shift from the initial, 
literature-based investor groups to the three empirically-determined investor types: UNI, 
INI, EXP. Its creation led to a re-analysis and discussion of the primary hypothesis. For 
research question one, I assumed that expert investors would show a preference for 
passive investing, apply a buy-and-hold strategy, use periodical rebalancing, be 
appropriately diversified, seek cost-effectiveness and have a long-term perspective.  
 
In relation to the Dreyfus-model, I hypothesized that the uninformed investors (UNIs) are 
either ‘novice’ or potentially ‘advanced beginner’, that most informed investors (INIs) 
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are to be found in the area of ‘advanced beginner’, ‘competent’ and ‘proficient’, and the 
experts (EXPs) within ‘proficient’ and ‘expert’.  
 
 
Figure 5 – Third stage conceptual framework 
3.3. Sub-level related topics 
To round out the conceptual framework, a number of topics that resurfaced with some 
regularity within the literature were considered. The topics relate to four broad themes: 
style of investment; portfolio perspectives; individual traits, preferences and behaviours; 
environmental factors. These topics concern styles of investing, the allocation of 
resources between different classes of assets and the often-expressed desirability of a 
diversified portfolio. Portfolio thinking appears often in the views and comments of a 
number of authors. This is presumably because the basis for thought is that of an 
individual with ‘substantial’ wealth to invest, which can be ‘spread’ across different 
classes of assets.  
 
▪ Style of investing 
o Active vs. passive investment management. 
o Long-term average returns 
o Risk vs. return (MPT). 
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▪ Portfolio Aspects 
o Asset allocation. 
o Asset classes. 
o Diversification. 
o Rebalancing. 
o Total expense ratio (TER). 
o Single stock investments vs. funds. 
▪ Individual Traits, Behaviours, Preferences 
o Behavioural finance / investor bias’. 
o Expected returns (profit) vs. tolerance for loss. 
o Finance and investment education.  
o Investment mistakes. 
o Skill vs. luck. 
▪ Environmental Factors 
o Lack of transparency / regulations.  
o Inflation.  
o Trust in financial institutions (banks, asset managers).   
 
Most of these items appear explicitly in ‘structured’ contributions to the literature, and in 
academic research papers. More frequently, they appear as desiderata or ‘things to 
consider’ in the normative literature that informs private investors of how they should 
proceed. Whatever their source, their presence in the background is so strong as not to be 
denied, and each therefore receives consideration here. 
3.4. Summary of this chapter 
This chapter illustrated the development and description of the conceptual framework, 
that serves as the skeleton and guideline for my entire research.  
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It connected the research aim and objectives with the relevant literature and served as a 
starting point to formalize my hypotheses. In considering these factors, it is pertinent to 
remind ourselves that the focus in this area is almost always on those with wealth and / 
or with high disposable income. Much less often explicitly considered is if and how this 
topic has relevance for those in society with less capital, and how, if at all, they might 
generate the capital to benefit personally from investment. 
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4. Research methodology and data analysis 
4.1. Chapter overview 
This chapter draws on the literature review and the subsequent conceptual framework. It 
describes my overall research design framework, my philosophical worldview, my role 
as the researcher and gives a brief overview of the traits of investment experts. It also 
illustrates the methodology and instrument chosen for data collection, the research 
approach and the piloting, sampling and distribution process and finally methods and 
tools chosen for the analysis of the data.   
4.2. Research design framework  
The framework below is a holistic portrayal of my worldview - the lens through which I 
look at this research. It depicts the background, situation and challenges of expertise and 
money investing, the literature review and subsequent research questions, the various 
strategies for inquiries and the methods available for data collection and analysis.  
 
 
 
Figure 6 – Research design framework: worldviews, strategies, data collection  
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An alternative approach is provided by Saunders et al. (2009), who illustrate research 
design within their ‘research process onion’, presenting the researcher’s philosophical 
standpoint, the two opposing research approaches, the different research strategies, and 
time horizon and data collation methods. Distinguishing between deductive and inductive 
reasoning, Saunders (2009) has offered an additional and valuable notion to my research 
process. 
 
  
Figure 7 – Research onion by Saunders et al. (2009) 
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4.3. Pragmatism 
Philosophical concepts and their influence shape and guide the researcher’s work, from 
the study of existing literature, to methodologies and strategies for the inquiries (methods) 
chosen, to data analysis and the subsequent presentation and discussion of the findings. 
However, as the notion and definition of the various ontologies (the form and nature of 
reality) and epistemologies (the nature of the relationship between the ‘knowers’ and 
‘reality’) have been described many times within other studies, research and theses, I have 
decided against repeating this content within my own study. The following authors, in 
what may now be a fairly standard way, have informed my view: Guba (1990), Guba and 
Lincoln (1994), Perry, Riege, & Brown (1999), Denzin & Lincoln (2000), Collis and 
Hussey (2003), Creswell (2007), Creswell (2009). 
 
Looking at the whole spectrum of philosophical perspectives and the particular research 
methodologies, methods and analyses, I realize that I tend to look at the world through a 
more positivist than an interpretivist lens. When studying the different worldviews, I 
came across the work of John Dewey (1925), who was influenced by other pragmatist 
philosophers such as Charles Sanders Peirce (1903/1992 & 1999) and William James 
(1907/1975). However, Dewey looked at things in a more concrete way than most other 
thinkers.  
 
According to Dewey (1925), philosophy only needs to make explicit the difference 
between events that challenge thought and events that have met that challenge and 
therefore possess meaning. One of his major insights was that the attainment of truth 
results from the development of complex and elaborate methods of searching. Methods, 
that are suitable in some ways, in many respects go against the human grain, so that they 
are adopted only after long punishment in a school of hard bumps.  
 
Contrary to other philosophers, he advocates that given to thought, the universal is known 
and the particular is already known and given to perception. Learning simply brings these 
two given forms into connection, so that what is discovered is the subsumption of the 
particular under the universal. This means that what we ought to learn is a result of what 
is given and the knowledge and experience we have instilled. Therefore, learning is the 
result of attaining knowledge, so there is no learning without knowledge and knowledge 
received.  
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Pragmatism is fundamentally a theory of learning; it unites a theory of knowledge 
development with education, links knowledge and experience. As such it frames well the 
view espoused here in relation to expertise. 
 
Dewey claims that the dialogue reasoning person is one who makes his/her intuitions 
more articulate and more deliverable in speech as an explicit sequence of initial premises, 
connections and conclusions. Likewise, he identifies that thinking and thought is radically 
different. Thought is acting upon experience, thinking then executing thought. Likewise, 
Dewey stresses the importance of communication and considers it to be the ‘most 
wonderful of all affairs’.  
 
The social participation affected by communication, through language and other tools, is 
the naturalistic link that stands against the often-alleged necessity of dividing the objects 
of experience into two worlds, one physical and one ideal.  
 
He illustrates that when communications occur, all natural events are subject to 
reconsideration and revision; they are readapted to meet the requirements of conversation, 
whether it be public speech or that preliminary discourse termed ‘thinking’. Where 
communication exists, things are acquiring meaning and implications, which are 
substantially more agreeable to management, are more permanent and more 
accommodating than events in their first state. He concludes, that every thinker puts some 
slice of an apparently stable world in peril and no one can wholly predict what will emerge 
in its place.  
 
We learn from our experiences, even in our subconscious human thinking. We constantly 
engage in an immense multitude of immediate organic selections, rejections, welcomings, 
appropriations, withdrawals, shrinkings, expansions, miseries, attacks, etc. We are not 
aware of the makings of many or most of these actions as we do not objectively 
differentiate and identify them. Yet, they exist as feeling qualities, and have a massive 
directive effect on our behaviour. The subconscious of a civilized adult reflects all the 
habits he or she has acquired.  
 
Dewey further stipulates that knowledge, however attained, characterizes intelligently 
directed experience, as distinct from mere casual and uncritical experience, which has 
been mostly systematically ignored by philosophy.  
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For him, the investigator assumes that experience, controlled in a specifiable way, is the 
avenue that leads to the facts and laws of nature; he uses reason and calculation freely 
and could not get along without them. 
 
He perceives reality as what we wish existence to be if our reasonably justified 
preferences were so completely established to exhaust and define our entire being and 
thereby rendering search and struggle unnecessary. He believes that the world is real and 
he counters traditional philosophies that have separated life from nature, mind from 
organic life, and thereby created mysteries. He determines that restoring the connection, 
and the problem of how a mysterious mind can know an external world or even know that 
there is such a thing, is like an animal eating things external to itself. 
 
Another challenging thought was that knowledge and action without purpose is not 
useful. He specified that modern science represents a generalized recognition of the useful 
arts, as it proceeds by employment of a similar operative technique of manipulation and 
reduction. Physical science would be impossible without the appliances and procedures 
of separation and the combinations of the industrial arts, making actions explicit and its 
consequences useful.   
 
Because of his thinking, John Dewey (1925.), along with Peirce and James became the 
originator of the pragmatist philosophy (Webb, 2007). Other more recent writers include 
Rorty (1990), Murphy (1990), Patton (1990), Putman (1994), Cherryholmes (1992), 
Misak (2007) and Malachowski (2013).  
 
Cherryholmes (1999), Morgan (2007) and Hookway (2015) condense the characteristics 
of pragmatist philosophy to the following:  
 
▪ The focus on epistemological inquiry should not be on showing how we can 
possess absolute certainty, instead we should focus on how we can possess 
methods of inquiry that contribute to making fallible progress. 
▪ Inquiry starts with defining a real problem as we are involved in an unknown 
situation that aims to find answers in a controlled and directed process to arrive at 
a unified whole. 
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▪ Pragmatism can be seen as a laboratory philosophy that tests theories by carrying 
out experiments.  
▪ Classic pragmatists identified beliefs and other mental states as habits that guide 
our desires and shape our actions. 
▪ The core of pragmatism is the pragmatist maxim, a rule for clarifying ideas, 
concepts and hypotheses by tracing their practical consequence. 
▪ The method for pragmatists is practical problem solving, - the scientific inquiry 
of common sense investigations of our surroundings. 
▪ Ppragmatists see themselves as providing responses to common sense and the 
facts of experience and, thus, rejecting a flawed philosophical heritage stemming 
from other philosophical thinkers. 
▪ The most influential application of the pragmatist maxim is the concept of truth, 
whereby the truth is whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief for 
definite assignable reasons. A true idea marries old facts to new ideas to provide 
a minimum of surprise and a maximum of continuity.  
▪ When we first face a problem, our initial task is to understand the problem through 
describing its elements and identifying its relations. The logical forms we use in 
the course of the inquiry are understood as ideal instruments, - tools that support 
us in transforming things and solving our problem. 
▪ Pragmatism is understood as a form of empiricism. Our ability to think about 
external things and to steadily improve our understanding of them rests on 
experience; consequently, experience provides the material for knowledge and 
conceptualization. 
▪ Knowers are agents who obtain empirical backing for their beliefs, by making 
experimental interventions in their environments and learning from the 
experiences that their actions produce. 
▪ Experience in turn, is a process through which we interact with our surroundings, 
gaining information that benefits us to meet our needs. 
▪ Pragmatists ought to propose new languages, - systems of classifications that 
enable us to achieve our goals. 
▪ Pragmatists further hold that shared inquiry directed at resolving social and 
political problems is key to the conception of a good life and real democracy. 
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Conclusions for those who are pragmatists: 
▪ Pragmatism is a worldview of a basic set of beliefs that guides my research and 
actions.  
▪ We pragmatists believe that the material world is true and that truth is constructed 
from experience. 
▪ We do not gain confidence from external values as we create values ourselves. 
▪ We consider experience as the source for attaining knowledge and investigational 
methods as the ideal means to accomplish understanding.   
▪ We are open to all kinds of methods to solve a problem; hence pragmatism does 
not require a particular method or method mix and does not exclude others. 
▪ We are convinced that our actions must follow a purpose and that findings must 
be useful. 
▪ We consciously challenge what we do and how we go about it, and we advocate 
social responsibility and the concept of untainted democracy. 
4.4. The role of the researcher 
As mentioned within the introduction, and as suggested by Creswell (2009) for 
transparency reasons, I want to re-state that I am an actively involved person within this 
field of study. Since 2010, I have worked for an asset management company (Sincera 
Asset Management) which I co-founded with others. It focuses on low cost indexing and 
well-diversified portfolios for the service of the ‘general investors’.  
 
These circumstances have clearly influenced the focus of my thesis as well as the design 
and content of the instrument (online questionnaire) but not the discussion and 
interpretation of the results and findings. The contrary is the case. When I decided to 
conduct a PhD, one of my personal goals was (but not to conflict with the aim of this 
research) that I wanted to challenge our business model in regard to identifying significant 
new research, information and concepts that would help us to optimize the way we work 
and invest for our clients. 
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4.5. Traits of the investment experts  
This section identifies the qualities of the investment experts. This overview of their 
characteristics directed the focus of the online questionnaire and the subsequent analysis 
and discussion.  
 
There is currently little literature available on the mechanisms and variables with which 
to distinguish experts in respect of investment or asset management. Jaffe (2010) lists 
many different curriculums and courses available that support learners to become i.e. a 
certified financial planner (CFP), an investment management consultants association 
(IMCA), a chartered mutual fund consultant (CMFC) or a chartered investment controller 
(CIC) but a concise description of ‘what actually constitutes an investment expert’ is not 
presented.  
 
The chartered financial analyst designations (CFA) is probably the most demanding and 
prestigious accreditation for investment professionals. Candidates have to pass a 
challenging, three-level test on investment analysis, economics, portfolio theory, 
accounting, corporate finance, etc., administered by the CFA Institute (formerly the 
Association for Investment Management and Research) that sets standards for excellence 
and integrity in the finance industry. CFA holders must also demonstrate expertise in 
specialized areas of investments (CFA Institute, 2017). 
 
An alternative means to identifying expert knowledge, or at least ascertain what an 
investment firm would expect from its specialists, is to evaluate job advertisements for 
asset managers, investment advisers, portfolio managers, wealth managers or similar 
positions. I conducted an analysis of 31 relevant Swiss job advertisements and categorize 
below the most common desired requirements into education and qualification, skills, 
experience, expertise and behaviour. These are:  
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Table 2 – Traits of investment experts 
 
Education and 
Qualification Skills Expertise Experience Behaviour
Banking apprenticeship. Analytically minded with 
strong problem-solving 
skills. 
Profound understanding 
of the asset 
management industry 
and investment funds. 
A minimum of 10 years’ 
experience in portfolio 
management, asset 
management, or wealth 
management.
Confident, enthusiastic, 
motivated, open and pro-
active team player.
A university 
degree/equivalent 
specialist qualification, 
or commercial training 
combined with higher 
education.
Advanced 
communication, 
presentation and 
organization skills. 
Thorough understanding 
of financial markets, 
investment 
management concepts. 
and best-in-class 
approaches in the 
investment 
management industry.
Several years of 
experience in sales or 
relationship 
management to 
institutional clients 
and/or UHNW clients 
and family offices.
Outstanding 
commitment and a 
highly solution-focused 
approach.
Excellent academic 
performance and 
demonstration of 
continuous learning.
Superior sales and 
client relationship skills.
Sound knowledge of all 
traditional and 
alternative asset 
classes including 
strategic and tactical 
asset allocation. 
Existing longstanding 
book of private banking 
clients, outstanding 
network. 
Positive, entrepreneur 
and ‘can-do’ attitude.
Solid education in 
financial markets and/or 
economics (university 
degree, CFA, CIPM, 
CIIA AZEK).
Confidence in dealing 
with senior 
management, both 
internal and client 
based.
Long-standing and 
successful track record 
of institutional 
investment 
management, covering 
due diligence and 
portfolio management.
An existing network of 
wealth management 
clients.
Ability to work 
independently in a 
dynamic, international 
environment.
Excellent command of 
English, German and 
French, other languages 
being desirable. 
Strong advisory, 
interpersonal, social 
and conviction skills.
A comprehensive 
understanding of the 
regulatory environment 
in the region.
A successful record in 
investment advice. 
Strong passion for 
financial markets, 
combined with a high 
degree of customer 
orientation.
Expert at building 
networks and 
connections (people 
want to know you).
Acquisition of 
institutional and private 
clients.
Determination to 
perform well in a 
competitive, highly-
demanding and 
dynamic environment.
Extremely organized, 
with great planning 
skills and efficient time 
management.
Active portfolio 
management of 
institutional clients.
High grade on flexibility 
and capability to work 
under pressure 
alongside attention to 
detail.
Ability to prioritize 
multiple responsibilities 
to meet deadlines.
Active adviser of wealth 
managers and special-
clients.
High service and result 
orientation 
Ability to perform and 
deliver high-end 
proactive service in a 
fast-paced work 
environment.
Investment control for 
chosen clients.
Sound methodical / 
quantitative skill set, 
including pertinent 
software know-how.
Administration of 
investment funds.
MS Office (Excel, 
Word, PowerPoint) and 
portfolio management 
systems skills. 
Leadership experience
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The above shows that the qualifications (job requirements) weigh severely on ‘general 
skill sets’ such as analytical, sound communication, presentation and organization skills 
and/or on ‘experience’. This might include several years in relationship management of 
institutional clients or administration of investment funds, and/or on ‘behaviours’ such as 
outstanding commitment and ‘can-do’ attitude, rather than on the notion of ‘expertise’.  
 
Profound expert knowledge i.e. the concept of asset allocation or rebalancing, or the 
mechanics of structured products or hedge funds, or industry- or company specific 
knowhow, as well as various investment strategies like buy-and hold, value investing, 
active vs. passive investing, value averaging, were not specified. One could assume that 
these imperative requirements are subsumed in ‘education and qualifications’, i.e. within 
a banking apprenticeship or in post-graduate course work such as the CFA, CIPM or 
CIIA.   
 
Research gap 
From the above discussion about the characteristics of ‘proficiency’, I conclude that 
‘expertise’ in general is an under-researched field and that this is particularly marked in 
the domain of investment management and asset management. Furthermore, it seems that 
private investors would usually not be experts, since most of them would not hold any of 
the mentioned credentials, and they are not working in the investment field (required by 
the Dreyfus model), or as determined by the EU study. Also, as Sincera (2011) 
established, the professional experts do not always act in an expert manner, as they 
regularly do not construct sustainable portfolios that reflect their clients’ best interests. 
This leaves a gap in knowledge, about both what constitutes expertise in this field and 
who might possess it, that my research seeks to answer. 
4.6. Research approach  
The research approach means selecting the most appropriate and logical process to arrive 
at conclusions from challenges formulated. The researcher needs to study and select from 
either inductive reasoning (from the specific to the general), deductive reasoning (from 
the general to the specific) or abductive reasoning (from an observation to a theory).  
Saunders et al. (2009) explain deductive reasoning (deductive logic) as the process of 
reasoning of one or more hypothesis to reach a logically certain conclusion.  
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This process follows from the general to the specific and holds that if all premises are 
true and the terms are clear, and the rules of deductive logic are followed, then the 
conclusion reached must be true. Deductive reasoning is commonly used, e.g., in applied 
social science, to test hypotheses, as hypotheses are usually developed from an existing 
theory.  
The opposite notion is inductive reasoning (inductive logic); data are collected and as a 
result of their analysis, a theory is developed. While the conclusion of a deductive 
argument is certain, the truth of the conclusion of an inductive argument is plausible, 
based upon evidence provided. The inductive reasoning process arrives at a conclusion 
by a flow that follows from the singular statement (the specific) to the universal (the 
general).  
Popper (2002) is opposed to this method of reasoning and asserts that it is generally 
flawed and its process and result inherently uncertain. He states that ‘it is far from 
obvious, from a logical point of view, that we justify in inferring universal statements 
from a singular one, not matter how numerous. For any conclusion drawn in this way, it 
may always turn out to be false: no matter how many instances of white swans we may 
have observed, this does not justify the conclusion that all swans are white’. 
Pragmatism introduces a third category of reasoning, that of the abductive which is 
concerned with how hypotheses are developed. Abduction is due to Peirce, rather than 
Dewey. Abduction introduces a context in which hypotheses are developed, by an 
inductive process, in a manner consistent with current conceptual contexts. 
Employing a substantially quantitative study and deductive reasoning process seems to 
me the appropriate choice for my data generation. It enables me to test my hypotheses 
and thus intend to discover answers to questions in ways that I may or may not have 
anticipated. Importantly though, the context for this study is one in which I am immersed, 
and this will undoubtedly have influenced the abductive process by which I generated the 
initial hypotheses. 
4.7. Methodology and method 
Owing to the nature of my research aim and objectives, and my philosophical standpoint 
as a pragmatist, I decide to employ a cross-sectional study and to design and conduct a 
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detailed online questionnaire (Thomas, 2009). The survey was open for data collection 
for a period of four months.  
 
Applying this method enabled me to contact several thousand potential participants and 
to receive 550 responses to analyse, discuss and from which to draw conclusions. Using 
an online format offered several advantages over paper-based questionnaires or 
interviews, i.e. giving the respondents the freedom to answer the questions within their 
own time schedule (with limitations), a higher response rate at lesser cost and the 
possibility to partly automate the analysis (Colorado State University, 2012).  
4.7.1. Online questionnaire  
The questions in the questionnaire evolved from the conceptual framework and therefore 
from the universe of available research and literature, as well as from my personal 
knowledge, experience and expertise.  
 
The relevant questions specified within my online questionnaire related to:  
 
a) the investor’s experiences, regarding: 
▪ Savings invested 
▪ Investment duration 
▪ Products invested in 
▪ Consequences from participating in the stock market  
▪ Asset management mandates 
▪ Banking services and satisfaction 
 
b) the investor’s knowledge, regarding: 
▪ Education 
▪ Qualifications 
▪ Self-rating 
▪ Asset classes 
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▪ Markets 
▪ Products 
▪ Fee structures 
▪ Risk willingness and ability (risk profile) 
▪ Factors that foster sustainable positive returns 
 
c) the investor’s investment approaches, regarding:  
▪ Single stocks vs. funds 
▪ Active vs. passive investing 
▪ Investment criteria 
▪ Investment strategies 
 
d) the characteristics and investment behaviours of experts 
 
The complete survey instrument, its questions and answer categories are presented in the 
appendix.   
4.7.2. Piloting for viability and reliability  
Pilot studies usually either refer to a ‘small scale version’ conducted in preparation for a 
major study; or a pre-testing of a particular research instrument (Baker, 1994). One of the 
main goals of testing interview questions or, in my case, the online questionnaire is that 
it provides advanced warning that the project at hand could fail, or that the instrument 
itself is inadequate, or too complicated; even that the questions and relevant answers are 
too difficult to understand.  
 
Peat et al.  (2002)  suggest that the ‘validity’ of a study can be improved by:  
▪ Asking the subjects for feedback to identify ambiguities and difficult questions.  
▪ Recording the time taken to complete the questionnaire; decide if it is reasonable. 
▪ Discarding all unnecessary, difficult or ambiguous questions. 
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▪ Assessing whether each question gives an adequate range of responses. 
▪ Establishing that replies can be interpreted in terms of the information that is 
required. 
▪ Checking that all questions are answered. 
▪ Re-wording or re-scaling any question/answer category that are not answered as 
expected. 
▪ Shortening, revising and if possible, piloting again. 
 
Gill and Johnson (2010) point out that a vital skill when undertaking a survey is the ability 
to structure, focus, phrase and ask sets of questions in a manner that is suitable for 
respondents. They also state that the questionnaire must be short, clear and precise and 
designed in a way that it takes care of the various biases, i.e. prestige bias - most people 
want to look good or to appear nice, rich, educated, ethical etc. Prior to distributing the 
survey, I ran an extensive pre-testing phase to pilot the questionnaire with a smaller 
number of both private and professional investors. This ensured reliability and construct 
validity and anticipated any problems of comprehension or other sources of confusion.  
 
To adhere to the suggestions of Peat et al. (2002), I completed five different testing 
phases.  
 
Phase 1 – Testing it myself 
I definitely wanted the first version of my survey to be extensive, containing all possible, 
even vague but relevant questions, to then analyse and discard the ones which I felt did 
not qualify or were unnecessary, difficult or ambiguous. Thus, my initial online 
questionnaire consisted of 52 questions with around 90 different sub-questions, in the 
main categories, ‘general information’, ‘knowledge/expertise’ and ‘experience’, and was 
written in German. I tested and corrected it in sections several times and the final version 
four times. One of the main issues was the time investment to thoroughly conduct the 
survey, which at the beginning was more than a half an hour, and around 20 minutes for 
the final version. I understood that the success and completion rate would increase with 
a shorter and more reasonable 10-12 minutes survey, so I distributed the ‘long’ 
questionnaire to my first external testing group, to receive objective feedback on the 
timing, but more importantly, on the validity of the questions.  
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Phase 2 – Investment experts 
The initial external testing group consisted of four professional investors. One works for 
a German retail bank, one for a Swiss based independent asset manager, another one 
works for an US head-quartered institutional asset manager in Switzerland, and one who 
is engaged in the merger and acquisition team (M&A) of an Australian firm; prior to that, 
he had gained investment experience as a broker for a UK-bank.   
 
Their feedback was as expected as far as the time required to answer the survey, and 
referred also to the quality of the questions, their wording, as well as to their order, and 
in particular to the multitude of answer possibilities (an extended range of response 
formats). The latter referred to the use of too many different ‘answering types’, i.e. 
descriptive text, multiple choice, matrix tables, sliders, ranked order, heat maps, that 
rather confused respondents. In addition, the question was raised if I should force the 
participants to choose to answer, or let them go on the next question without ‘ticking a 
box’. I decided against a forced answer, in order to minimize the ‘abandonment’ rate. I 
would rather have more users completing the survey but missing some answers, than have 
many partakers ‘giving up’, especially bearing in mind that the survey is quite a technical 
one that takes a lengthy amount of time to complete. 
 
The feedback was highly valuable and I therefore incorporated the recommendations 
from the initial respondents. I then retested the instrument myself and thereafter it was 
verified again by the same first external testing group. Subsequently I translated this 
revised version of my online questionnaire into English.  
 
Phase 3 – Friends and supervisors 
In this phase, I distributed the survey to the second group of external pilot testers. This 
time the instrument was taken by around 20 individuals whom I thought would have a 
certain level of investment knowledge and experience in investing. Besides my two thesis 
supervisors, there were friends and former colleagues living in Switzerland; a small 
number of them work in finance related professions, with a few occupying management 
positions, though the majority worked as employees in many different non-finance related 
industries.  
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Compared to phase two, the main goal was not to validate the questions but to test if the 
general ‘non-professional investor’ would comprehend the survey and conclude it within 
15 minutes.  
 
The feedback I received was mixed. It ranged from some individuals who seemed to ‘sail’ 
through the survey in the desired time frame, to some identifying the questions as being 
too ambiguous and difficult, or acronyms/abbreviations that were not explained or 
understood. There were yet others who took up to 30 minutes to complete the task. The 
English version also revealed grammar and spelling flaws. I analysed the feedback and 
implemented most of the elements mentioned, then tested it again myself before I re-sent 
it to the second group.   
 
Phase 4 – Final testing with two experts 
For the final piloting phase, I asked two of the experts from the first external testing 
group; one working for a German retail bank and the other as an independent asset 
manager. As well as their professional opinion, I particularly valued their input, as both 
have conducted related studies using similar instruments (interviews and questionnaires). 
 
The goal here was again carefully to analyse every single question and its wording, as 
well as the related answer categories. Next to re-testing the validity of my survey, the 
focus now was also on ensuring reliability. The survey should always yield the same 
results, with an acceptable margin of error. I wanted to make everything evidently clear 
and eliminate all potential biases (as far as possible).  
 
After they completed the survey, I interviewed both of them over the phone, discussing 
each question and feedback. After dealing with and implementing their comments, we all 
re-took the survey again for the last round of feedback. 
 
Phase 5 – Polishing the languages  
After I was content with the quality of the online questionnaire, I studied the questions 
and answers again carefully with the focus on identifying any last minor spelling and 
grammar mistakes. For the English version, I received support from an investment 
professional whose mother tongue is English.  
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My online questionnaire that was at first pretty extensive, was tested around 65-70 times 
within different phases. It finally read quite fluently and logically and was answered 
within 10-20 minutes. The careful and detailed planning and piloting was presumably one 
of the key factors that permitted me to receive 550 individual answers, from which almost 
a third were professional investors working as asset managers or institutional asset 
managers.  
4.8. Sampling  
The next section provides detailed descriptions of the data gathering method, the 
underlying sample process as well as the techniques and tools for analysing the data. 
 
Sampling is the process of choosing units of, for example, people, groups, or 
organizations, from a population of importance, so that by studying the sample we are 
able to generalize back to the overall population. For the purpose of this thesis, I am 
aiming to generalize back to all potential investors, mainly in Switzerland.  
 
Unfortunately, establishing the definite population of Swiss investors is not possible as 
such information is unavailable and has not been collected previously. Therefore, a 
distinction needs to be made between the theoretical population and the accessible 
population before the sampling frame can be established.  
4.8.1. Sampling frame 
The sampling frame, as described by Jessen (1978) and Salant and Dillman (1995), is the 
source material from which the sample is drawn, hence it is a list of all those within my 
accessible population who can be sampled. Jessen describes how the ideal sampling frame 
is one that: contains all units that can be found including their contact information, 
location and other relevant data; that all units have a logical, numerical identifier; that the 
frame is logical and systematically organised; that all the data in the frame is up-to-date.  
 
Kish (1995) describes the main problems inherent in a sampling frame, i.e. that some 
members of the population are not included in the frame, that non-members of the 
population are included, that a member of the population is surveyed more than once or 
that the frame lists groups instead of individuals.  
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The latter challenge can be excluded but the other issues can only be identified and 
mitigated by careful testing of the questionnaire and appropriate coding of respective 
answers.  
4.8.2. Sampling strategy 
After designing the questionnaire, the researcher needs to decide how to sample from the 
overall population in question, or the accessible population in particular. The researcher 
needs to develop a sampling strategy that closely relates to the validity of generated data 
(Saunders et al., 2005). Therefore, the selected sampling method needs to be able to 
reflect the population as closely as possible. There are manifold sampling methods 
available; the choice depends largely on factors such as the field of study, the nature of 
the population, the type of measurement used in the research and the resources available 
(Dillman et al., 2009). The larger the sample size (within limits), the lower the possible 
error when generalizing from the sample to the population. The sample size also depends 
on the variability in the population; thus, the higher the variability in the population, the 
larger the sample ought to be (Saunders et al., 2005). 
 
Saunders et al. note that either probability sampling or non-probability sampling can be 
applied in research. Probability sampling is mainly chosen when the probability of a unit 
to be selected is known and generally equal for all cases. Non-probability sampling does 
not involve random selection; hence the probability is not known and therefore 
generalization on a statistical basis is not (classically) possible. The challenge here is that 
we may or may not represent the population clearly and we often do not know how well 
we may have done so. This is why researchers typically prefer (quasi)random sampling 
methods such as simple random, systematic, stratified random or cluster methods, as these 
are more accurate (or precise in relation to parent population) and permit generalization 
(within limits) to their parent population. In applied social science however, there are 
circumstances where probability sampling is neither sensible nor practical. Accordingly, 
the researcher can choose from a wide range of non-probabilistic alternatives, i.e. quota, 
purposive, snowball, self-selection or convenience sampling (Saunders et al., 2005).  
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Figure 8 – Sampling approaches by Saunders et. al (2005) 
 
 
Trochim et al. (2016) divide non-probability sampling methods into two broad categories, 
‘accidental’ (haphazard and convenience) and ‘purposive sampling’. They elaborate that 
accidental sampling is choosing ‘the person on the street’ to be contacted for interview 
purposes, i.e. television news or a public opinion, or college students in psychological 
research or clients in clinical practice. There may, of course, be selection criteria 
employed in some forms of intercept sampling. The researcher is more or less asking for 
volunteers, which exemplifies one of the main issues with accidental or convenience 
sampling. With many of these types of samples, we have no evidence that they are 
representative of the population of which we are interested in generalizing.  
 
Purposive sampling is one of the most prominent methods used in social science, as we 
usually approach the sampling issue with a specific plan in mind. We are typically looking 
for one or more specific predefined groups, i.e. a researcher on the street is selecting 
Caucasian females between 30-40 years. Hence, s/he is trying to carefully select the 
respondents and would first verify if the participant meets all predefined criteria to fit into 
that defined category. Trochim et al. (2016) state that with purposive sampling, you are 
likely to get the opinion of your target population as we sample with a purpose. On the 
other hand, researchers need to be cautious not to overweight subgroups in the population 
that are more readily accessible.   
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Trochim et al. further define subgroups of purposive sampling, i.e. modal instance 
sampling (looking out for the most frequent or typical case), or quota sampling (selecting 
people nonrandomly according to some fixed quotas) or expert sampling that involves 
the assembling of people with knowledge, demonstrable experience or expertise in some 
area. There are generally two reasons why a researcher chooses the expert sampling 
method. First, because it would be the ideal way to examine the views of individuals who 
have specific expertise and experience in a certain field of research, as in my case of 
investment management. Second, to provide evidence for the validity of the sampling 
approach chosen.  
 
Since for this thesis, the population I am interested in are ‘mainly’ Swiss investors but 
the number of them are unknown, I have chosen to apply several non-probability 
sampling strategies.  
 
Convenience sampling (participants are available to the researcher by virtue of their 
accessibility) was employed to access the private investors and purposive sampling (using 
knowledge of the field of study and the population) to connect with the professional 
investors, the asset managers and institutional asset managers. The advantages are not 
only that these methods of sampling are cost effective and rapid; they also allow me to 
apply expert knowledge of the population and thus select a sample of participants in a 
deliberative non-random manner. On the other hand, such an approach may be more 
prone to biases than would perhaps be the case with probability sampling.  
4.9. Survey distribution 
No list or register of the population of all units in question was available so my sampling 
frame consisted of four different channels that allowed me to access and contact the 
desired population/sample. Hence, the questionnaire was distributed through/to:  
▪ My personal contact list: people I knew and from whom I had email addresses. I 
contacted around 450 potential participants. 
▪ Xing contacts: a prominent business social media platform with a focus on the 
German speaking countries. I individually contacted around 600 members and 
posted a query to participate within different finance related groups.  
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▪ LinkedIn contacts: an important business social media platform with a worldwide 
reach. I individually contacted approximately 200 members and posted a query to 
participate within different finance related groups.  
▪ IBM Switzerland contacts: I reached out to around 3,000 former work colleagues 
by email (not personalized). 
In total, I contacted a large sample of around 4,250 potential participants directly and an 
indefinite number through online posts.  
 
The criteria for the selection process of the private investors were that they: 
▪ Lived in Switzerland (predominantly). 
▪ Either spoke German or English (survey languages). 
▪ Had at least a first experience in investing money (stock markets) by themselves, 
or through their bank or asset manager. 
 
The criteria for the selection process of the professional investors were that they: 
▪ Lived in Switzerland (predominantly). 
▪ Either spoke German or English (survey languages). 
▪ Were either working as/in:  
- asset managers / investment managers for private or retail banks. 
- independent asset managers. 
- institutional asset managers / investment managers.  
- an asset management team / investment team of i.e. pension funds or 
family offices. 
▪ Were willing to answer the question with respect to their own money (vs. 
investing their client’s funds).  
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It is important to note that I made it explicit that participation in my survey was 
completely anonymous, especially due to the nature of the topic. I did however leave it 
to the participant whether they desired to leave their email address to receive the results 
of my study. 138 contributors did so. The principles of the Market Research Society 
(2016) guided the research process.  
4.10. Data analysis  
The majority of respondents lived in Switzerland and were to a lesser or greater extent 
knowledgeable investors investing their own wealth (as opposed to asset managers and 
institutional investors investing for their clients).  
 
However, I also distributed the questionnaire through the online business platforms XING 
and LinkedIn and so I did not exclude non-Swiss participants from the survey or analysis 
as there could have been valuable insight from foreign investors.  
 
As listed above, one of the selection criteria for a participant to be included for analysis 
and discussions was ‘first investment experience’, either by themselves or through a bank 
or an asset manager. Out of the 550 individuals that partook in my survey, 125 private 
investors showed no investment experience and were therefore excluded from the main 
part of the analysis.  
 
The data collected was then analysed by the use of a) frequency tables (XLS/Pivot) and 
description and b) by statistical analysis and its interpretation, using different tests, 
depending on the research question and responses received.  
4.10.1. Types of statistical analysis applied 
Research question 1 
▪ Frequency tables (XLS/Pivot, SPSS, Stata). 
▪ Description and interpretation. 
▪ Factor analysis for questions with a high loading on single factors, reducing 
dimensions/numbers of variables. 
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▪ Discriminant analysis to investigate whether private and professional investors 
can be distinguished by their knowledge, expertise and investment decisions. 
▪ Wilks’ Lambda to indicate if there is a statistical relevance of the responses to the 
questions about knowledge and expertise in the prediction of investor types. 
▪ Canonical correlation analysis as multivariate method to identify the strength of 
the relationships between the dependent and independent variables, to predict the 
investor types.  
▪ Box’s test of equality of covariance matrices to test that the observed covariance 
matrices of the dependent variables are equal across groups. 
▪ The Levene test to examine all single dependent variables; the same as with the 
Box test, the Levene test has to be not significant for any of the response variables. 
Research question 2 
▪ Frequency tables (XLS/Pivot, SPSS). 
▪ Description and interpretation. 
▪ Pearson Chi Squared-test to inspect and compare the expected frequencies with 
the observed frequencies. 
▪ Fisher’s exact test for frequencies of less than five. 
Research question 3 
▪ Frequency tables (XLS/Pivot). 
▪ Description and interpretation. 
4.11. Summary of this chapter 
To adhere to the aim and the research questions of this study and following the conceptual 
framework, this chapter was mainly concerned with the research design framework, the 
instrument chosen to conduct primary research (online questionnaire), the population 
(focus on Swiss investors) and the process of sampling (non-probability, sampling frame 
and strategy).  
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It further described the piloting phase of the instrument (its questions and answers) for 
validity and reliability, the distribution of the survey as well as the subsequent data 
analysis (and tools).  
 
This chapter also clarified my role as the researcher working within the field of study, 
detailed the desired traits of experts from a professional point of view, and my 
philosophical beliefs as a pragmatist and the consequential arguments for a deductive 
reasoning process.  
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5. Distinguishing private from professional investors (descriptive) 
5.1. Chapter overview – Research question 1 
The next two chapters (descriptive and statistical nature) seek to present the results, 
analysis and discussion to answer RQ1:  
 
How do private and professional investors differ (if at all) in terms of their 
knowledge, experience, and investment approaches (examining the first Dreyfus 
related categories)? 
 
Following my research aim, the literature (and its gaps) and the conceptual framework, 
my initial null hypothesis was that the more knowledgeable and experienced an investor 
is, the more cautiously s/he will invest and the superior their level of portfolio 
diversification, investment criteria and strategies. Based on the literature, this is the 
expectation, as to where increased knowledge would lead as investors became less of a 
novice. In my belief, the more knowledgeable investors would invest passively, within a 
buy-and-hold strategy, be appropriately diversified, seek cost-efficiency, apply periodical 
rebalancing while taking a long-term view.  
In relation to the Dreyfus-model, I would thus (a priori) hypothesize that the private 
investors are either ‘novice’ or potentially ‘advanced beginners’; that asset managers are 
to be found in the range of ‘competent’ and ‘proficient,’ and the institutional investors 
within ‘proficient’ and ‘expertise’.  
I assume that the institutional investors, because they deal mainly with professional 
clientele (pension funds, family offices, trusts, private and retail banks), must be highly 
educated and highly experienced in investing. They would therefore possess superior 
investment acumen, in comparison to asset managers who are mostly handling private 
client’s money. This is because the value of investments held by institutions tends to out-
run that of private individuals. I do not doubt however, that there are many asset managers 
who are as well educated, experienced and handle their investing clientele’s money with 
profound care.  
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In the following, if there are only the percentages displayed, then they are always in 
alphabetical order from ‘asset managers’, to ‘institutional investors’ to ‘private investors’. 
5.2. Results for initial investor groups 
In total, 550 participants completed the survey, yet 125 of them had never invested in the 
stock market. Another 49 participants did not answer at least 50% of the survey questions, 
which is why I excluded them from the analysis, as were the ‘non-investors’ revealed by 
the preliminary investigation. 376 participants were therefore included in the main part 
of the initial analysis. 
5.2.1. Demographics  
Of the 550 initial respondents, more than 61% were private investors, 22.5% had never 
invested in shares, bonds, funds, etc., and about 8% were asset managers or institutional 
investors. After deducting the non-investors and the ones who did not qualify for the 
analysis, almost 80% were private investors, 11% were asset managers, and just under 
10% were institutional investors. Hence, 21% were professional investors.  
 
The female to male ratio of the respondents was 16% vs. 84%, and the main age group 
was from 35 to 44 years (40%) followed by 45 to 54 years with 29%. 
 
The survey was mainly targeted at investors living in Switzerland, which is why 322 
participants (out 376) were from there, followed by 21 respondents from Germany and 
12 from Australia; the remaining 21 contributors were from 10 further countries. The 
overall Swiss vs. ‘global’ population ratio was 86% to 14%. 
 
More than 48% of the replies confirmed that their highest education was a university 
degree, a masters or higher degree, followed by almost 18% who held a Swiss federal 
diploma. Only 5%, after their compulsory schooling or apprenticeship, had not engaged 
in higher education.  
 
15% of all respondents held a master of finance and 7% a qualification as a chartered 
financial analyst (CFA).  
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The professionally qualified accountant (CPA) formed with 5% the third largest group of 
investors who had completed a financial, accounting or investment related qualifications. 
Eight investors actually held two of those credentials.  
 
The majority of repliers earned between CHF 120,000 to 160,000 (27.7%) and 29% 
generated an income > CHF 200,000.  
 
 
Investor distribution Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Asset Managers 47 8,5 8,5 
Institutional Investor 43 7,8 7,8 
Private Investors 336 61,18 61,1 
I have never invested (stock market) 124 22,5 22,4 
Total 550 100,0 100 
Table 3 – Distribution by original investor type – all repliers 
Investor types Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent  
Asset Manager 43 11.4 11.4 
Institutional Investor 35 9.3 9.3 
Private Investor 298 79.3 79.3 
Total 376 100.0 100 
Table 4 – Distribution by original investor type – after data reduction process 
Gender Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Male 314 83.5 83.5 
Female 62 16.5 16.5 
Total 376 100 100 
Table 5 – Gender distribution 
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Age groups Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
16 – 24 4 1,1 1,1 
25 – 34 76 20,2 20,2 
35 – 44 149 39,6 39,6 
45 – 54 110 29,3 29,3 
55 – 64 30 8,0 8,0 
65 – 74 7 1,9 1,9 
Total 376 100,0 100,0  
Table 6 – Age distribution 
Country Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Australia 12 3,2 3,2 
Austria 4 1,1 1,1 
France 1 0,3 0,3 
Germany 21 5,6 5,6 
India 1 0,3 0,3 
Liechtenstein 2 0,5 0,5 
Norway 1 0,3 0,3 
Romania 1 0,3 0,3 
Singapore 1 0,3 0,3 
Switzerland 322 85,6 85,6 
Thailand 1 0,3 0,3 
UK 2 0,5 0,5 
USA 7 1,9 1,9 
Total 376 100,0 100,0 
Table 7 – Country distribution 
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Education Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Compulsory school 2 0,5 0,5 
Secondary school 2 0,5 0,5 
Trade school 16 4,3 4,3 
Trade school incl. 'Maturität' 8 2,1 2,1 
Bachelor (BA/BS) 38 10,1 10,1 
Swiss Federal Diploma (eidg. Dipl.) 67 17,8 17,8 
University/ETH//Masters 156 41,5 41,5 
Doctorate (PhD/DBA) 25 6,6 6,6 
University of Applied Science 62 16,5 16,5 
Total 376 100,0 100 
Table 8 – Education distribution  
Financial qualification Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) 26 6,9 6,9 
Certified Financial Planner (CFP) 6 1,6 1,6 
Master of Finance (or similar) 58 15,4 15,4 
Master of Investment Management (or 
similar) 
6 1,6 1,6 
Professionally Qualified Accountant (e.g. CPA) 19 5,1 5,1 
None of the above 269 71,5 71,5 
Total financial qualifications 384 102,1 102,1 
Double degrees -8 -2,1  0,0 
Total investors with financial qualification 376 100,0  102,1 
Table 9 – Financial qualification  
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Income Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
- 60'000 16 4,3 4,3 
60'001 - 80'000 11 2,9 2,9 
80'001 - 100'000 35 9,3 9,3 
100'001 - 120'000 34 9,0 9,0 
120'001 - 140'000 50 13,3 13,3 
140'001 - 160'000 54 14,4 14,4 
160'001 - 180'000 36 9,6 9,6 
180'001 - 200'000 32 8,5 8,5 
200'001 - 220'000 24 6,4 6,4 
220'001 - 240'000 13 3,5 3,5 
> 240'000 71 18,9 18,9 
Total 376 100,0 100,0 
Table 10 – Income distribution 
5.2.2. Investment expertise of private and professional investors    
The survey showed that for private investors and the asset managers, the majority of 
investors possessed 10 to 15 years of experience in investing, while 37% of the 
institutional participants formed the longest-investing group with > 20 years of practice.  
More than 51% of all asset managers rated their investment knowledge as excellent, 
whereas 32% of the institutional and only 6% of the private investors believed that their 
investment familiarity was of the same standard. The private investors showed by far the 
highest percentage of basic knowledge (PI 25.7%; II 7.0%, AM 8.8%).  
 
53% of all private investors, 61% of the asset managers and 68% of the institutional 
investors decided how and where to invest for themselves without consulting anybody; 
only every third private investor sought support from friends, relatives or an adviser. Less 
than < 6% of the private investors entrusted a bank or asset manager to handle their funds.  
 
60% of the private investors and 63% of the institutional investors disagreed or strongly 
disagreed when asked if they had changed their investment manager or bank because they 
had lost trust in them. For the asset managers it is even more, as > 83% had not done so. 
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However, 19% of the private investors changed their adviser. Fewer professional 
investors had done the same, as they managed their personal funds themselves more often 
than the private investors. 
 
More than 15% of the private investors changed their bank (or investment manager) 
because they invested their money mainly in that bank’s own products. Such a situation 
arises, I assume, as banks generate higher fees and commissions for themselves from 
clients by selling ‘internal’ products. 11.7% of the asset managers had done so too, as 
well as 18.8% of the institutional investors. Conversely, around 60% of the private 
investors and asset managers as well as 53.1% of the institutional investors stayed with 
their current bank/adviser.  
 
Years’ experience in investing in the stock 
market 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
None 0.0% 8.6% 4.0% 
1 – 3 4.7% 0.0% 9.4% 
3 - 6  2.3% 14.3% 12.4% 
6 – 10 14.0% 20.0% 20.1% 
10 – 15 34.9% 5.7% 23.2% 
15 – 20 23.3% 14.3% 14.4% 
> 20 20.9% 37.1% 16.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 11 – Years’ experience by original investor type  
 
Figure 9 – Years’ experience investing in the stock market 
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Self-rating of financial investment knowledge 
(shares, bonds, funds, etc.) 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
No knowledge 0.0% 2.9% 2.0% 
Basic knowledge 7.0% 8.8% 25.7% 
Average knowledge 2.3% 8.8% 33.8% 
Good knowledge 39.5% 47.1% 32.8% 
Excellent knowledge 51.2% 32.4% 5.7% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 12 – Self-rating of financial investment knowledge   
 
Figure 10 – Self-rating of financial investment knowledge 
How investors make their investment 
decisions 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
I decide myself without consulting anyone 61.0% 67.6% 52.7% 
I decide myself after discussions with friends 
or relatives 12.2% 11.8% 17.1% 
I decide myself after consulting with an 
investment adviser from my bank 9.8% 8.8% 18.1% 
The bank or asset manager decides for me 4.9% 8.8% 5.7% 
Other 12.2% 2.9% 6.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 13 – How investors make their investment decisions 
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Figure 11 – How investors make their investment decisions 
Change of bank/asset manager due to lost 
trust 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 50.0% 34.4% 34.7% 
Disagree 33.3% 28.1% 25.3% 
Neutral 9.5% 25.0% 21.1% 
Agree 4.8% 6.3% 11.9% 
Strongly agree 2.4% 6.3% 7.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 14 – Change of bank/asset manager due to lost trust 
 
Figure 12 – Change of bank/asset manager due to lost trust 
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Change of bank/asset manager due to 
investments into own funds 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 34.9% 28.1% 31.7% 
Disagree 37.2% 25.0% 28.8% 
Neutral 16.3% 28.1% 24.2% 
Agree 4.7% 18.8% 8.2% 
Strongly agree 7.0% 0.0% 7.1% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 15 – Change of bank/asset manager due to investments into own funds 
 
Figure 13 – Change of bank/asset manager due to investments into own funds 
5.2.3. Risk profile questions for private and professional investors   
69% of the asset managers were willing to take higher risks for potential higher or 
superior returns, whereas the institutional investors (53%) were more conservative and 
the private investors the most risk averse (47%).   
 
30% of all asset managers, 29% of the institutional investors and 35% of the private 
investors had never worried about generating a risk profile. 35% and 40% of the 
professional investors had developed such a profile themselves, as did 23% of the private 
investors. On the other hand, 35%, 31% and 42% of the investors had a risk profile 
developed by either a private bank, a retail bank or an asset management company.  
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40% of all asset managers, 28% institutional investors and 57% private investors held 
only 1 to 7 positions in their portfolio, whereas 32 %, 48% and 22% were well diversified. 
 
When asked about how much of an individual’s savings (excess money) was invested, 
60% of the asset managers, 56% of the institutional investors and 41% of all private 
investors had invested more than 50% of their funds. Conversely, none of the professional 
investors and only 1% of the private investors had invested all their money.  
 
Almost 46% of the institutional investors invested for the long-term (> 10 years) while 
most of the private investors participated for 7 to 10 years and > 50% of the asset 
managers for 2 to 10 years. On the contrary, 19%, 9% and 11% of the investors showed 
an investment horizon of less than 2 years.  
 
45% of the asset managers, 34% of the institutional investors and 31% of all private 
investors expected a return on their investment of 4 to 6%. 25%, 34% and 19% of all 
investors wanted to achieve an annual profit of 6 to 8%, while 5%, 16% and 17% 
anticipated 8 to 10% in return. 10% of all asset managers and 8% private investors, but 
none of the institutional investors were eager to achieve 12 to ≥ 30%.  
 
The most frequent answer for tolerance for loss was 20% for both the asset managers and 
private investors and 25% for the institutional investors. The majority, however, was 
willing to lose 5 to 10% in a bad year (asset managers 29%, institutional investors 36% 
and private investors 27%). Some (5%, 17% and 11%) were prepared to lose 50% or more 
in an unfortunate investment year.  
 
Investor's risk profile 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
I am a risk-averse investor whose main 
priority is safety 11.9% 2.9% 12.7% 
I am rather risk-averse but expect an 
attractive return on my investment 9.5% 38.2% 34.4% 
I am not risk averse nor am I a risk taker. I am 
happy if my amount of money stays the same 9.5% 5.9% 13.4% 
For higher potential returns I am willing to 
accept higher levels of risk 50.0% 35.3% 31.3% 
I am a risk taker but expect superior returns 19.0% 17.6% 8.2% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 16 – Risk profile by investor type 
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Figure 14 – Risk profile by investor type 
Who has developed a risk profile for me 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
A private bank 7,5% 2,9% 8,7% 
A retail bank 15,0% 14,3% 21,3% 
An asset management company 12,5% 14,3% 12,2% 
I did it myself 35,0% 40,0% 23,1% 
Nobody 30,0% 28,6% 34,6% 
Total 100,0% 100,00% 100,00% 
Table 17 – Risk profile development  
 
Figure 15 – Risk profile development  
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In how many products invested 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
1 - 3 20,0% 10,3% 26,8% 
4 - 7 20,0% 17,2% 29,9% 
8 - 11 27,5% 24,1% 21,1% 
12 - 15 12,5% 13,8% 8,8% 
16 - 20 12,5% 17,2% 4,6% 
> 20 7,5% 17,2% 8,8% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 18 – In how many products invested 
 
Figure 16 – In how many products invested 
Proportion of savings invested 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut.  
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
10,0% 9,5% 3,1% 18,1% 
20,0% 4,8% 9,4% 15,1% 
30,0% 7,1% 25,0% 15,9% 
40,0% 19,0% 6,3% 10,0% 
50,0% 14,3% 21,9% 13,3% 
60,0% 9,5% 6,3% 8,5% 
70,0% 16,7% 6,3% 7,7% 
80,0% 11,9% 3,1% 8,1% 
90,0% 7,1% 18,8% 2,2% 
100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 1,1% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 19 – Proportion of savings invested 
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Figure 17 – Proportion of savings invested 
Investment duration 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
< 1 year 7,1% 2,9% 3,4% 
1 - 2 years 11,9% 5,7% 7,2% 
2 - 4 years 16,7% 14,3% 26,1% 
4 - 7 years 11,9% 14,3% 17,2% 
7 - 10 years 23,8% 17,1% 26,5% 
10 - 15 years 19,0% 22,9% 12,4% 
> 15 years 9,5% 22,9% 7,2% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 20 – Investment duration 
 
Figure 18 – Investment duration 
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Expected annual return 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
1 - 2% 2,5% 0,0% 3,0% 
2 - 4% 10,0% 6,3% 16,5% 
4 - 6% 45,0% 34,4% 30,5% 
6 - 8% 25,0% 34,4% 18,8% 
8 - 10% 5,0% 15,6% 16,5% 
10 - 12% 2,5% 9,4% 6,4% 
12 - 14% 5,0% 0,0% 1,1% 
14 - 16% 0,0% 0,0% 2,6% 
18 - 20% 2,5% 0,0% 1,5% 
20 - 25% 0,0% 0,0% 1,5% 
25 -  30% 0,0% 0,0% 0,8% 
> 30% 2,5% 0,0% 0,8% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 21 – Expected annual return 
 
Figure 19 – Expected annual return 
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Tolerance for loss in a bad year 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
0% 2,4% 0,0% 2,8% 
5% 12,2% 16,7% 9,1% 
10% 17,1% 20,0% 18,1% 
15% 9,8% 6,7% 13,0% 
20% 34,1% 13,3% 25,6% 
25% 19,5% 26,7% 20,9% 
50% 4,9% 10,0% 5,1% 
> 50% 0,0% 6,7% 5,5% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 22 – Tolerance for loss in a bad year 
 
Figure 20 – Tolerance for loss in a bad year 
5.2.4. Knowledge and expertise of private and professional investors    
Ability to explain asset classes, vehicle types, terminologies 
The professional investors (81% asset managers and 63% institutional investors) 
understood the notion of an asset class very well, whereas only 31% of the private 
investors strongly agreed to the statement as to whether they could explain that concept. 
The same is true when it came to explain a coupon (77%, 60%, 34%) or an option (70%, 
56%, 31%). The differences were more diverse when asking the participants about futures 
(65%, 54%, 25%) or the P/E ratio (70%, 51%, 27%).  
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The variances were largest in terms of rebalancing and structured products. Only 70% of 
the asset managers, 53% institutional investors and 16% of all private investors strongly 
agreed that they could define rebalancing very well. For structured products, the figures 
were 65%, 51% and 22%.  
 
Overall, the asset managers were the most knowledgeable group in terms of explaining 
the selected investment themes, while the private investors possessed the least 
understanding, especially when it came to more technical and complex topics such as 
structured products (18%), rebalancing (41%) or the PE/Ratio (26%).  
 
I can explain what an asset class is 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 0,0% 0,0% 6,4% 
Disagree 0,0% 5,7% 9,1% 
Neutral 2,3% 0,0% 9,5% 
Agree 16,3% 31,4% 43,9% 
Strongly agree 81,4% 62,9% 31,1% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 23 – Ability to explain asset classes 
 
Figure 21 – Ability to explain what an asset class is 
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I can explain what a coupon is 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 0,0% 0,0% 4,4% 
Disagree 0,0% 2,9% 10,9% 
Neutral 7,0% 5,7% 8,2% 
Agree 16,3% 31,4% 42,5% 
Strongly agree 76,7% 60,0% 34,0% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 24 – Ability to explain what a coupon is 
 
Figure 22 – Ability to explain what a coupon is 
I can explain what futures are 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 0,0% 0,0% 2,4% 
Disagree 2,3% 2,9% 13,2% 
Neutral 4,7% 2,9% 14,5% 
Agree 27,9% 40,0% 44,6% 
Strongly agree 65,1% 54,3% 25,3% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 25 – Ability to explain what futures are 
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Figure 23 – Ability to explain what futures are 
I can explain what options are 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 0,0% 0,0% 1,7% 
Disagree 0,0% 2,9% 6,7% 
Neutral 2,3% 8,8% 10,1% 
Agree 27,9% 32,4% 50,8% 
Strongly agree 69,8% 55,9% 30,6% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 26 – Ability to explain what options are 
 
Figure 24 – Ability to explain what options are 
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I can explain what the P/E Ratio is 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 2,3% 8,6% 6,4% 
Disagree 0,0% 8,6% 19,3% 
Neutral 7,0% 2,9% 8,8% 
Agree 20,9% 28,6% 37,8% 
Strongly agree 69,8% 51,4% 27,7% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 27 – Ability to explain what the P/E Ratio is 
 
Figure 25 – Ability to explain what the P/E-Ratio is 
I can explain what rebalancing is 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 2,3% 2,9% 10,8% 
Disagree 4,7% 5,7% 30,2% 
Neutral 4,7% 2,9% 13,9% 
Agree 18,6% 31,4% 26,8% 
Strongly agree 69,8% 57,1% 18,3% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 28 – Ability to explain what rebalancing is 
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Figure 26 – Ability to explain what rebalancing is 
I can explain what structured products are 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut.  
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 0,0% 0,0% 4,1% 
Disagree 2,3% 0,0% 13,9% 
Neutral 2,3% 14,3% 16,9% 
Agree 30,2% 34,3% 43,4% 
Strongly agree 65,1% 51,4% 21,7% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 29 – Ability to explain what structured products are 
 
Figure 27 – Ability to explain what structured products are 
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Ability to explain the fee structure of active/passive funds, shares  
67% of the asset managers, 43% of all institutional investors but only 12% of the private 
investors could offer a detailed explanation of the fee structure of an active managed fund. 
The numbers for passive managed funds were similar (65%, 43%, 13%). The ratios 
improved when asked about shares/stocks (67%, 51%, 21%). 
 
On the other hand, more than half of all private investors could not explain described fees 
structures well or were neutral about it (active managed funds – 50%, passive managed 
funds – 51%, shares – 24%). The numbers for the professional investors were between 
0% and 20%.  
 
I can explain the fee structure of an active 
managed fund 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 2,3% 5,7% 9,1% 
Disagree 0,0% 2,9% 21,8% 
Neutral 2,3% 14,3% 19,1% 
Agree 27,9% 34,3% 37,6% 
Strongly agree 67,4% 42,9% 12,4% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 30 – Ability to explain the fee structure of an active managed fund 
 
Figure 28 – Ability to explain the fee structure of an active managed fund 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Strong. disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree
I can explain the fee structure of an active managed fund
Asset Manager Institutional Investor Private Investor
121 
 
I can explain the fee structure of a passive 
managed funds 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 2,3% 5,7% 9,4% 
Disagree 0,0% 2,9% 22,1% 
Neutral 2,3% 11,4% 19,8% 
Agree 30,2% 37,1% 35,6% 
Strongly agree 65,1% 42,9% 13,1% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 31 – Ability to explain the fee structure of a passive managed fund 
 
Figure 29 – Ability to explain the fee structure of a passive managed fund 
I can explain the fees structure of 
shares/stocks 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 0,0% 2,9% 5,7% 
Disagree 0,0% 2,9% 8,7% 
Neutral 0,0% 17,1% 9,1% 
Agree 33,3% 25,7% 55,7% 
Strongly agree 66,7% 51,4% 20,8% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 32 – Ability to explain the fee structure of shares/stocks 
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Figure 30 – Ability to explain the fee structure of shares/stocks 
Since there are mainly the results in percentages displayed, I moved the remainder of my 
initial outcomes, which is presented and described in the same manner as above, to the 
appendix. 
5.3. Discussion of the results for RQ1 – Descriptive Analysis 
The previous sections present a summary of the survey data. It shows the differences 
between asset managers, institutional investors and private investors, in terms of their 
experience, knowledge and investment approaches. This section proceeds with the 
discussion of these findings in the light of the research questions and hypotheses initially 
proposed, and the relevant literature. It elaborates on the implications of the results for 
both theory and practice and identifies possible suggestions and guidance for the retail 
investor.  
 
My initial hypothesis was that increased knowledge and expertise leads to superior and 
more risk-averse investment decisions (passive, buy-and-hold, appropriately diversified 
periodical rebalancing, cost-efficient and long-term), and that generally asset managers 
and institutional investors act more knowledgably and cautiously than private investors. 
In relation to the Dreyfus-model, the private investors are initially thought to be either 
‘novice’ or potentially ‘advanced beginners’; asset managers are to be found in the range 
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of ‘competent’ and ‘proficient’, whereas the institutional investors should be within the 
level of ‘proficient’ and ‘expertise’.  
 
First, the education, knowledge and experience level of the private investors is compared 
to the professional investors and then an understanding of what investment criteria and 
investment strategies they apply to invest in certain asset classes, markets and products is 
established. This permits an initial consideration of the ‘fit’ of the Dreyfus model to this 
field, or reconsideration of the nature of the initial hypothesis. I can also (more 
confidently) draw conclusions aiming to support the everyday investor with sustaining or 
increasing wealth by investing in the stock market.  
 
The first section of the discussion will be descriptive and based on the frequency 
breakdown (XLS/Pivot) from the initial analysis, in relation to existing literature and 
practice. For every question discussed, I will determine which investor group 
demonstrates the superior knowledge, set against a ‘benchmark’ derived from the 
literature, best practice and my own knowledge. The one-point scores are then summed 
across all groups to give an overall score, which is then cast as a percentage of the points 
available. 
 
The second section (within the following chapter) will be statistical, investigating 
relevant dependencies between important variables. 
5.3.1. Self-rating of investment knowledge vs. experience  
These questions focused on the participant’s self-rating of financial investment 
knowledge and how many years’ experience they possessed in stock market investing 
(buying/selling/holding shares, bonds, funds, etc.).  
 
91% of the asset managers and 80% of all institutional investors rated their financial 
knowledge as good or excellent, the remainder as basic or average. 28% of all private 
investors however, invested their money in the stock market with either no financial 
investment related knowledge or just by understanding the basics. Only 38% trusted that 
their investment knowledge was good or excellent. 
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Looking at the knowledge self-rating at 1 to 3 years’ experience by private investors only, 
almost 70% stated that they possessed basic knowledge. Yet, nearly 30% displayed an 
average or good investment knowledge, which could lead to the conclusion that even with 
little actual experience, investors can obtain the necessary knowledge to actively 
influence positive investment outcomes or at least the sentiment to understand this notion. 
This is in line with Sander (2012) who holds that the investment process and continuous 
learning should become habit-forming or with Town (2007) who claims that 15 minutes 
of time investment a week would result in a positive portfolio return.  
 
When contrasting 1 to 10 years’ experience, the level of knowledge was roughly evenly 
distributed amongst the three investor groups, but looking at greater than 10 years’ 
experience, the results showed a direct and positive correlation between years of 
experience and self-rating of financial investment knowledge.  
 
One can see that investors with a longer experience in investing seem to develop superior 
knowledge regarding the topic at hand, which would be in-line with Dreyfus’ theory. 
However, the results of the ‘self-rating investment knowledge question’ have to be treated 
with caution, as many participants may not have possessed a real benchmark to measure 
their knowledge against and because there is possibly a tendency to over-rate their own 
expertise.  
 
Thus, in regard to the Dreyfus model, a novice could view himself/herself as an advanced 
beginner, and the advanced beginners as being competent or even proficient (Dreyfus, 
2004).  
 
For these questions, the benchmark for successful investing were the asset managers. 
 
125 
 
 
Figure 31 – PIs self-rating of financial investment knowledge 1–3 years’ experience 
 
Figure 32 – Self-rating of financial investment knowledge 1-10 years’ experience 
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Figure 33 – Self-rating of financial investment knowledge > 10 years’ experience 
5.3.2. How investors make their investment decisions  
This question asked how investors usually make their investment decisions (buying/ 
selling shares, bonds, funds, etc.).  
 
My assumption was that most investors would make up their own mind about investments 
in the stock market, with more professional than private investors deciding themselves 
without consulting anyone. The analysis actually revealed that a large portion of the 
private investors decided for themselves, after discussions with family members and 
friends, but two-thirds of the professional investors and just over half of all private 
investors decided themselves without consulting anyone.  
 
The above analysis and discussion about knowledge and investment experience exposed 
that private investors in particular possess only basic or no knowledge at 1-3 years’ 
experience, yet most of them make up their own mind about buying/selling shares, bonds, 
funds and other investment products.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors.  
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Figure 34 – Contrasting 1-3 y. of experience vs. making own investment decisions 
5.3.3. Change of asset manager: loss of trust / investments into own funds  
These questions asked if investors have changed their bank or asset manager because they 
lost trust in them, or because managers invested investors’ money into ‘captive’ funds 
belonging to their employers.  
 
The analysis showed that fewer than one-fifth of all three investors groups have changed 
their banks or asset managers due to either loss of trust, or because they invested the 
participant’s assets mainly into ‘captive’ managed funds, for which they would usually 
receive kick-backs, retrocessions or other kinds of commissions.  
 
However, when it comes to investing in commission-linked products, the institutional 
investors are, with 18.9%, the group most likely to change investment managers.  
 
For these questions, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors.  
5.3.4. The risk profile that best describes the investors 
This question asked which risk profile, in terms of the investor’s financial investments 
(buying/holding/selling shares, bonds, funds, etc.), describes them best.  
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The results of the analysis showed that, in terms of taking higher risks for potential higher 
returns, the private investors with 40%, were clearly the group with the lowest numbers 
of risk takers, vs. 69% for the asset managers and 53% for the institutional investors. 
Conversely, the asset managers, with 21%, were the group with the lowest number of 
risk-averse investors; 41% for the institutional and 47% for the private investors. 
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors.  
5.3.5. Development of an investor’s risk profile 
This question asked if an investor had ever created a risk profile themselves or through a 
third party. 
 
30% of all asset managers, 29% institutional investors and 35% of the private investors 
had never worried about generating a risk profile. 35% and 40% of the professional 
investors had developed such a profile themselves as had 23% of the private investors. 
On the other hand, 35%, 31% and 42%, respectively, had developed a risk profile by 
either a private bank, a retail bank or an asset management firm.  
 
It is interesting to recognize that 70% of the asset managers, 71% of the institutional 
investors and 65% of all private investors had either developed a risk profile themselves 
or through the support of an investment adviser. However, around a third of all investors 
had never worried about it.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors.  
5.3.6. How many products within an investor’s portfolio 
This question asked in how many products (shares, managed funds, bonds, ETFs, etc.) 
respondents were invested in (e.g. 1 share, 1 ETF, 1 fund, etc. equals 1 product). 
 
The analysis showed 20% of all asset managers, 10% of all institutional investors and 
27% of all private investors were invested in 1 to 3 products only. Another 20%, 17% and 
29%, respectively, hold 4 to 7 products, which is still at the lower end of a well-diversified 
portfolio, depending on investment goals and strategies.  
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On the other hand, 7 to 17% across the investor groups could be over-diversified, holding 
more than 20 products within their portfolios. The question specifically asked about the 
number of products they were invested in while a product could be a single share or a 
single fund.  
 
Birchler et al. (2010) arrived at an analogous conclusion, as they found that the average 
Swiss investor holds shares in five different companies, but 46% of all investors, only in 
one or two. They further established that merely around 10% of all shareholders distribute 
their funds over more than 10 products, which is in contrast to this study that revealed 
that 21% to 48% of the three investor groups hold more than 11 products.    
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors.  
5.3.7. Proportion of savings invested  
This question asked about the proportion of savings a participant had invested in shares, 
bonds, funds, etc.  
 
40% of the asset managers, 44% of the institutional investors, but 59% of the private 
investors had invested ≤ 40% of their savings in the stock market. On the other hand, 
45%, 35% and only 28% respectively of each of the investor groups had invested ≥ 60 to 
100%.  
 
Some literature (Ellis, 2002; Swensen, 2005) holds that because of inflation, investors 
should always be fully invested with surplus funds, having only a small percentage in 
cash. Even in low inflationary environments, cash positions will lose in value over time. 
As a rule of thumb, at 2% inflation, one’s cash value will decrease by 45% over 30 years. 
Likewise, many studies have shown (i.e. Sincera, 2010) that missing the most lucrative 
trading days (when not invested) leads to underperforming portfolios; especially when 
the poorest trading days are not missed.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the private investors. 
 
130 
 
5.3.8. Investment duration  
This question asked about an investor’s investment horizon (in years).  
 
28% of the asset managers, 46% of the institutional investors and only 20% of the private 
investors invested for more than 10 years. The largest groups among asset managers 
(41%) and private investors (53%) thought in 4 to 10-year terms. Looking at 1 to 4 years, 
the results showed 29%, 20%, 33% in each group; 7%, 3%, and 3% in each group 
respectively for less than 1 year. The study undertaken by Birchler, Volkart, Ettlin and 
Hegglin (2010) generally confirmed these outcomes across all investor types as 8% of all 
investors invested for less than 1 year, 17% for 1 to 3 years, 40% for 3 to 8 years and 35% 
for over 8 years.  
 
The long investment period for the institutional investors (46% over 10 years), could have 
been a result of their professional life, as their clients (pension funds, family offices and 
UHNWI, etc.) usually invest for the long-term. On the other hand, a third of the asset 
managers turned over their portfolio after less than 4 years.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors. 
5.3.9. Expected annual return and tolerance for loss  
The next two questions asked about the investors’ expected annual return and tolerance 
for stock market loss in a bad year (e.g. bear market year). 
 
Almost half of the asset managers and approximately a third of the institutional investors 
and private investors expected an annual return of 4 to 6% on their investment, which is 
comparable with the long-term average of the last 200 years (Siegel, 2013) or with what 
Pictet (2015) established for the years from 1925 to 2014. Overall, the institutional 
investors were the most realistic group, expecting between 4 to 8% return (69%) with no 
one expecting a profit greater than 12%. On the other hand, 10% of the asset managers 
and 9% of the private investors wanted to achieve 12 to ≥ 30%. The latter was only 
possible if they would accept greater risk and therefore expect to incur higher losses.  
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As for the tolerance for loss, the answers were commonly as anticipated as the majority 
of investors (29% of the asset managers, 36% of the institutional investors and 27% of 
the private investors) were willing to lose 5 to 10% in an unfortunate investment year. 
Conversely, it was notable to see that 5% of the asset managers, 17% of the institutional 
investors and 11% of the private investors were even prepared to lose 50% or more during 
a disastrous year. They either purposefully executed an aggressive investment strategy or 
they could lack knowledge, as such an excessive loss does not need to be endured when 
invested sensibly.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors. 
5.3.10. Ability to explain investment topics and fee structures of vehicles  
These questions asked about the participants’ ability to explain investment topics such as 
asset classes, coupon, future, options, P/E Ratio, rebalancing or structured products, as 
well as the fee structures of active managed funds, passive managed funds and shares. 
These results contributed to my RQ1 as they show that the level of knowledge and 
expertise clearly influenced investors’ investment decisions.  
 
I was surprised that generally across all investor groups, the meaning and mechanism of 
options (265%), or futures (252%) could be explained better then asset classes (246%), 
coupons (244%), or even the fee structure of shares (233%). Other more technical features 
like structured products (226%) and the P/E Ratio (191%) were ranked in the middle.  
 
At the low end were the fee structures of passive and active managed funds (182%; 181%) 
as well as the important concept of rebalancing (165%). 
Ability to explain the notion of asset classes 
In terms of asset classes, the professional investors (81% of the asset managers and 63% 
of the institutional investors) understood the notion of an asset class very well, whereas 
only 31% of the private investors strongly agreed. On the contrary, 16% of the private 
investors but also 6% of the institutional investors could not explain these clusters of 
securities.  
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In the literature (viz. Stevens, Surz and Wimer, 1999; Ibbotson and Kaplan, 2000; 
Swensen, 2005; Ferri, 2006; Ashby, Williams & Stinson, 2010), the various asset classes, 
and even more so the asset class allocation, are important for any reasonable investor as 
they have different inherent risk and return profiles and specific advantages and 
disadvantages  
 
Thus, a thorough understanding of asset classes would (almost certainly) be beneficial.   
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the asset managers. 
Ability to explain the notions of options, futures, structured products 
Options, futures and structured products are highly technical and complex investment 
vehicles, but the majority of investors seem to comprehend them better than the simple 
fee structures of shares or funds.  
 
Certainly, some knowledgeable and supposedly skilled investors focused on investment 
strategies that allowed for trading call/put options or the different variations of futures or 
structured products, as Assogbavi and Fagnissè (2009) promote. Whether they were 
‘sustainably’ successful is another matter.  
 
As expected, the private investors had the least understanding about these rather technical 
investment vehicles. 
 
For these questions, the benchmark for superior investing was both, the asset managers 
and the institutional investors. 
Ability to explain the notion of coupons and the P/E ratio  
The professional investors understood the notion of coupons very well (93%, 91%) but 
the private investors also showed a good understanding of this concept (77%). This is 
important since regular, periodical payments and their reinvestments play a vital role in 
sustainable investing and increasing wealth. This is especially true when talking about 
coupon earnings from government bonds (Melton and Mackey, 2010) that averaged real 
returns of 243% during the last 90 years (Pictet, 2015.). 
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The picture looked different regarding the investors’ ability to explain the P/E ratio, as 
around every fifth professional investor and more than every forth private investor did 
not comprehend the concept.  
 
Indisputably, the P/E ratio is not an investment strategy but certainly, for many an 
important indicator about the potential future performance of an investment. Other key 
performance indicators to be aware of are for example the price to book ratio (P/B ratio), 
the return on equity (ROE) or the return on assets ratio (ROA). 
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the asset managers. 
Ability to explain the fee structures of shares, active and passive funds 
As evidenced by Fama and French (2010) or Ellis (2002), the fee structures of investment 
vehicles are paramount in order to maximize investment returns. It is therefore 
unfortunate that almost a third of all private investors do not apprehend it, except for 
shares. If the neutral answers were included, more than 50% did not apprehend it. 
 
The same is true for the professional investors as 5% of the asset managers and 23% of 
the institutional investors could not accurately explain these fee structures (incl. neutrals).  
 
To illustrate this effect, an active managed fund is usually 1 to 2% more expensive (TER) 
than its passive counterparts, and every per cent paid in excess on fees will greatly harm 
the return of a portfolio over time (Ellis, 2002; Bogle, 2007).  
 
If the active fund costs 2% more per annum, which is often the case, the difference in 
returns between active and passive funds is $29,000 over 10 years, $52,000 for 15 years 
and $84,000 over a period of 20 years on an initial investment of $100,000. Given these 
figures, it remains surprising that the participants understood the notion of complex 
investment vehicles like options, futures and structured products better than the fee 
structures of passive and active managed funds.  
 
For these questions, the benchmark for superior investing was the asset managers. 
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Ability to explain the notion of rebalancing 
Finally, the important concept of rebalancing was not understood by over 50% of the 
private investors. Fortunately, most professional investors had a good appreciation of it. 
70%, 57% and 18% respectively, fully comprehended it. 
 
As shown in the literature review (Ellis, 2002; Swensen, 2002; Goldie and Murray, 2010), 
adjusting the asset class ratios (products) according to an investor’s risk profile 
(rebalancing) is of utmost importance, as an investor will otherwise find his/her portfolio 
out of balance with an increased weighting of some asset classes over others. In other 
words, if investors fail to counter market moves by making rebalance trades, a passive 
drift away from the desired risk profiles occurs.  
 
Therefore, an investor could end up with e.g. fewer government bonds, but with a larger 
portion of assets invested in shares instead. In this way, the share quota rises above target 
level and consequently increases the overall risk of his/her portfolio (and vice versa). 
Thus, the initially identified return/risk profile of a portfolio starts to deviate, which can 
easily be managed if rebalancing takes place. The rebalancing investor often acts in a 
contrarian way (usually taking a market position ‘against the herd’) and keeps the ratio 
of the products within his/her portfolio in balance.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the asset managers. 
 
Overall, private investors possessed the least knowledge about the investment topics in 
question and how the fees for buying/holding/selling funds and shares are structured. The 
asset managers on the other hand were the most knowledgeable group here, as the 
institutional investors answered only the questions about futures and rebalancing more 
accurately.  
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Table 33 – Ability to explain various investment topics  
 
 
Figure 35 – Ability to explain various investment topics 
5.3.11. Factors that contribute to an outperformance of market benchmarks  
These questions were about the importance of factors contributing to the achievement of 
a performance (profit/gain) that is higher and more sustainable than the market average.  
 
Most of the results contribute to my RQ1 as they demonstrate that the level of knowledge 
and expertise influence investors’ investment decisions.  
 
Asset 
Managers
Institut. 
Investors
Private 
Investors Total
Asset 
Managers
Institut. 
Investors
Private 
Investors
Option 97.7% 88.3% 81.4% 256.0% 0.0% 2.9% 8.4%
Future 93.0% 94.3% 69.9% 252.1% 2.3% 2.9% 15,6%
Asset Class 97.7% 94.3% 75.0% 245.7% 0.0% 5.7% 15.5%
Coupon 93.0% 91.4% 76.5% 242.8% 0.0% 2.9% 15.3%
Fee of shares 100.0% 77.1% 76.5% 233.4% 0.0% 5.8% 14.4%
Structured Product 95.3% 85.7% 65.1% 225.9% 2.3% 0.0% 18.0%
PE/Ratio 90.7% 80.0% 65.5% 191.0% 2.3% 17.2% 25.7%
Fees of passive funds 95.3% 80.0% 48.7% 181.6% 2.3% 8.6% 31.5%
Fees of active funds 95.3% 77.2% 50.0% 180.8% 2.3% 8.6% 30.9%
Rebalancing 88.4% 88.5% 45.1% 165.4% 7.0% 8.6% 41.0%
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After subtracting the percentages of the unimportant answers from the important answers 
(table 33), the analysis has shown that the three most significant contributors for a 
sustainable performance above the benchmarks were the asset class allocation (246%), 
the investment duration (235%) and the product choice (231%).  
 
The next noteworthy influences were reducing TER (189%), rebalancing (166%), the 
choice of active managed funds vs. passive managed funds (154%), the buying price of a 
vehicle (154%), re-investing dividends (143%) and reducing retrocessions (90%).  
 
The bank holding the portfolio (-9%) and the institution issuing ETFs (-29%) were 
considered least important.  
The importance of the asset class allocation 
This question referred to the importance of the asset class allocation to achieve a 
performance that is higher and more sustainable than the market average. 
 
Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000) state that asset allocation is the ultimate key to investment 
success. They found that 90% of the variability of returns of a typical fund across time is 
explained by asset allocation. Brinson, Hood and Beebower (1986) identified the same. 
This importance seems to be widely known by both professional investor groups, yet only 
63% of the private investors opted for this answer, while 5% actually believed that the 
asset class choice plays no important role when investing.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the asset managers. 
The importance of the investment duration 
This question referred to the importance of the investment duration to achieve a 
performance that is higher and more sustainable than the market average. 
 
95% of the asset managers, 81% of the institutional investors and 79% of the private 
investors found, in-line with Ellis (2002), Swensen (2005) and Ferri (2006), that the 
investment duration was paramount to achieve a higher and more sustainable return than 
the market.  
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These results were as expected as the asset managers and institutional investors in 
particular would, within their professional - but most probably also with their private 
investments - take a long-term view. However, since the literature (but also the long-term 
data on average returns on e.g. equity or governments bonds) suggests an extensive 
investment duration, it is surprising that 16% of the intuitional investors were still of the 
opposite belief (2% of the asset managers; 2% of the private investors). 
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the asset managers. 
The importance of the product choice 
This question referred to the importance of the product choice to achieve a performance 
that is higher and more sustainable than the market average. 
 
I imagined that this would only be an important factor for the private investors as most of 
them would comprehend actual products better than asset classes, i.e. shares, bonds, 
funds, real-estate, gold, etc., and the professional investors would put a much higher focus 
on the asset class choice (Goldie and Murray, 2010). However, the results showed that 
all three investor groups found the product choice important or very important (90% asset 
manager, 74% institutional investors and 79% private investors), yet almost 10% of the 
institutional investors were in disagreement.  
 
While the asset allocation is most important, the product choice on its own is too, as once 
the asset classes are selected, the products need to be chosen.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the asset managers. 
The importance of reducing TER and retrocessions 
These questions referred to the importance of reducing the TER as well as retrocessions 
to achieve a performance that is higher and more sustainable than the market average.  
 
The asset managers answered the TER question as I would have predicted - 83% in 
favour. According to the literature and as demonstrated above, every basis point saved on 
expenses positively contributes to the performance of an investor’s portfolio.  
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This is even more marked if you factor in compound interest (Bogle, 2009; Clare, Seaton 
and Thomas, 2009; Gwilym, et al., 2010). Consequently, it is surprising that only two-
thirds of the institutional and private investors voted for it. In fact, a total of 13% of the 
institutional investors, 3% private investors and 5% of all asset managers found it to be 
unimportant.  
 
Since reducing cost is imperative, it is astonishing that reducing retrocession was 
generally seen as rather insignificant as only 45%, 41% and 50% supported it. Even 17% 
of the asset managers as well as 22% institutional investors and 12% of all private 
investors thought it to be unimportant. One could assume that this is perhaps not in the 
professional investors interests, as they would have to forgo part of their charges to clients 
if they followed the policy themselves.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the asset managers. 
The importance of rebalancing  
This question referred to the importance of rebalancing to achieve a performance that 
is higher and more sustainable than the market average. 
 
Rebalancing was also found (83%, 56%, 56%) to be a significant factor contributing to a 
positive and sustainable portfolio return. Yet some investors (8% of the asset managers, 
16% of the institutional investors and 6% of the private investors) disagreed that this is a 
vital concept. These answers were in-line with the previous questions regarding the 
investors’ ability to explain the notion of rebalancing. 
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the asset managers. 
The importance of the choice between active vs. passive funds 
This question referred to the importance of the choice between active managed funds and 
passive managed funds to achieve a performance that is higher and more sustainable than 
the market average. 
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There was agreement by 63% of the professional investors, but just under 50% of the 
private investors, that the differences between active and passive management was 
important. On the contrary, 10% of the asset managers but only 3% of the institutional 
investors and 6% of the private investors disagreed. Surprisingly, 6% of the institutional 
investors and 13% of the private investors did not seem to worry about it, or may not have 
known the distinction.  
 
Several studies confirm that only a very few active managers outperform their respective 
indices over the long run. For example, Bogle (2010), who listed the 10 best US fund 
managers in the three-year period of 1997 to 1999 and then compared them with the 
following three-year period of 2000 to 2002, in which none of the previous top 10 funds 
was ranked within the first 790 funds in the subsequent period.  
 
It follows that it is very challenging, if not impossible, for any qualified investor to find, 
out of the 10,000s of specialists, those very few fund managers who in fact outperform 
the individual indices in the long run (Ellis, 2002; Goldie and Murray, 2010).  
 
Balling, Gnan and Lubochinsky (2008), on the other hand, would disagree, stating that 
there are in fact many arbitrage opportunities that can be exploited by active managers. 
Yet, if an investor really were to find that individual, would s/he know that this manager 
continues to manage that very fund, or if s/he has left that organization in the meantime 
to pursue other opportunities.  
 
The evidence seems to suggest that passive managed funds are the more profitable and 
sustainable way of investing, which is ultimately due to fee structure. Passive funds are 
typically 1.5% to 2% cheaper per annum than actively managed funds.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors. 
The importance of the purchasing price 
This question referred to the importance of the purchasing price of shares, bonds, funds, 
etc. to achieve a performance that is higher and more sustainable than the market average. 
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The purchasing price of an investment product is important for around two-thirds of the 
investors. However, it is not important for 20% of the asset managers, for 13% of the 
institutional investors or for 8% of the private investors.  
 
As of the literature, the purchasing price of an investment product is more or less 
important depending on which investment strategies one favours. If one, for example, 
follows a stock picking or day trading strategy, the price s/he pays is highly relevant. On 
the contrary, if one invests passively for the long-term, the price becomes less important. 
Therefore, it cannot be said whether the private or professional investor’s voting is 
superior since this question was not presented in relation to relevant strategies or other 
investment criteria. However, there seems to be a disconnection between the 2nd ranked 
contributor - the investment duration as described above, and the highly rated importance 
of the purchasing price that would call for further examination.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the asset managers. 
The importance of re-investing dividends 
This question referred to the importance of re-investing dividends to achieve a 
performance that is higher and more sustainable than the market average. 
 
When it comes to re-investing dividends, 70% of the asset managers found it important 
but only 50% of the institutional and 48% of the private investors. On the contrary, 3% 
AMs, 9% IIs and only 14% PIs found it unimportant. 
 
These are rather unexpected results as re-investing dividends (or coupons) lead to higher 
profit over the years. For instance, an investment of 1’000 shares at $75 per share, with 
an annual dividend paid of 2.5% and an annual increase of the dividend paid by 5%, 
results in $168,390 over 20 years. The same number of shares, but with a quarterly paid 
and re-invested dividend, achieves $174,754 over the same period. Without any dividend 
invested, the value remains at $75,000. It follows, that if an investor does not re-invest 
dividends, such compounding of interest does not take place, hence they are disregarding 
the chance to accomplish higher than the market average returns. 
 
141 
 
However, one could argue that without the concept of compounding interest, re-investing 
dividends is only important to increase savings and wealth, not to achieve higher returns. 
This argument though would be faulty, as every additional investment into a portfolio has 
the chance to earn profits, therefore increasing the overall return of an investor’s portfolio 
Gwilym, et al., (2009).  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the asset managers. 
The choice of bank (custodian) and the institution issuing ETFs 
These questions referred to the importance of the bank holding an investor’s portfolio and 
to the institutions issuing ETFs, to achieve a performance that is higher and more 
sustainable than the market average. 
 
Neither professional investor group (40%, 41%) considered the choice of the bank 
holding an investor’s portfolio to be important whereas the private investors were of the 
opposite belief (35% vs. 26%). The same was true when asked about the importance of 
the organization issuing ETFs. 40% of the asset managers and 41% of the institutional 
investors found it unimportant, but as with the previous question, 30% of the private 
investors voted for and 21% against it. It may be that the professionals trust that there are 
many other more important aspects that influence profitable and sustainable investing.  
 
For these questions, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors. 
Change to an online asset manager to save cost 
This question asked if investors, if the quality and products were the same, would change 
to an ‘online asset manager’ if they could save 25% of the annual asset management fee, 
or once they could save 50% of the annual asset management fee respectively.  
 
Surprisingly, 41% of the asset managers, 31% of the institutional asset managers and 28% 
of the private investors would not change to an online asset manager at 25% savings; 
41%, 56% and 55%, respectively, would. Yet, if the saving rate were increased to 50% 
per annum, another 57% of the initially remaining asset managers and institutional 
investors and 55% additional private investors would move on.   
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It appears that the majority of investors are aware of the impact of fees on investment 
return.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors. 
 
 
Table 34 – Important factors to achieve a higher than market average return 
 
 
 
Figure 36 – Important factors to achieve a higher than market average return 
 
Asset 
Managers
Institut. 
Investors
Private 
Investors
Total
Asset 
Managers
Institut. 
Investors
Private 
Investors
1 Choice of asset class 100.0% 87.5% 62.9% 245.7% 0.0% 0.0% 4.6%
2 Investment duration 95.0% 81.3% 78.6% 234.6% 2.5% 15.6% 2.1%
3 Choice of products 90.0% 74.2% 78.5% 230.5% 0.0% 9.7% 2.5%
4 Reducing TER 82.5% 64.5% 62.6% 188.5% 5.0% 12.9% 3.2%
5 Rebalancing 82.5% 56.3% 56.5% 166.0% 7.5% 15.6% 6.1%
6 Active/passive funds 62.5% 62.5% 48.9% 154.4% 10.0% 3.1% 6.4%
7 Purchasing price 57.5% 68.8% 68.1% 153.6% 20.0% 12.5% 8.2%
8 Re-investing dividends 70.0% 50.0% 48.2% 142.8% 2.5% 9.4% 13.6%
9 Reducing retrocessions 50.0% 40.6% 50.0% 89.5% 17.5% 21.9% 11.8%
10 Bank holding portfolio 37.5% 25.0% 35.1% -9.2% 40.0% 40.6% 26.2%
11 ETF issuing Institution 20.0% 21.9% 30.1% -29.1% 40.0% 40.6% 20.4%
Important to achieve higher and        
more sustainable profit
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5.3.12. Significant investment perceptions 
These questions were primarily proposed to verify knowledge and experience levels. 
They therefore support the answers of my first research question but also validate some 
of the prior answers to important questions in the survey.  
Extent of focus on diversification 
This question asked if the investors now pay more attention to diversification. 
 
As expected, and as previously demonstrated by Markowitz (1952), Statman (1987), 
Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) and many others, diversification was seen by 75% of the 
asset managers, 77% of the institutional investors and 62% of the private investors as 
imperative, in order to spread the risk of an investor’s portfolio and optimize return. 
However, 26%, 23% and 38%, respectively, were neutral or disagreed.  
 
It seems that over a third of the private investors and a large number of professionals did 
not comprehend the notion of diversification or believed that having only a limited 
number of products within their portfolio was a superior investment approach. This is in 
accordance with the previous question regarding the number of products within an 
investor’s portfolio; 40% of the AMs, 28% of the IIs and 57% of the PI trusted in only 1 
to 7 products; 20%, 10% and 27% were even only invested in 1 to 3 products.  
 
When looking at the distribution of participants, in light of their beliefs about 
diversification, while holding merely 1 to 7 products within their portfolio, the results 
showed that the ones who disagreed that diversification was a vital concept were mainly 
the private investors with 21% (and 6% of the asset managers).  
 
There were also institutional investors with a restricted portfolio, yet they either agreed 
or strongly agreed to ‘now’ paying more attention to diversification.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors. 
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Figure 37 – Believes in diversification by portfolios consisting of 1-7 products 
Investing for the short-term or long-term 
This question asked if investors currently preferred to invest for the short-term as the 
long-term is uncertain.       
 
As expected, 71% of the asset managers, 62% of the institutional investors and 56% of 
the private investors disagreed with the statement that they are investing for the short-
term as the long-term is unsure; 19%, 15% and 25%, respectively, agreed.  
 
This could be due to multiple reasons, i.e. the investor believes that markets are generally 
overheated or needs to have capital accessible for planned investments (buying a car, 
property, etc.) or simply because investors are not cognisant that betting for the short-
term (i.e. stock picking, market timing) often carries higher risks. 
 
The literature holds, if one does not have any short-term obligations, one should always 
have a long-term focus, independent of your age. Even investors of senior age do not need 
to invest for the short-term if they do not require their funds immediately, as their assets 
one day will be handed-over to children, relatives, friends or maybe to non-profit 
organizations or other beneficiaries (Swensen, 2002). 
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the asset managers. 
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Investing in single shares of funds 
 
This question asked if investors would currently prefer to invest in single shares than in 
funds.  
 
14% more asset managers (46% vs. 32%) and 17% more institutional investors (43% vs. 
26%) advocated for funds over single shares. 7% of the private investors, however, trusted 
that investments in single sharers were superior (36% vs. 43%).  
 
These answers were unexpected, as I believed that the professional investors in particular 
would mainly opt for funds, as investments in single shares are too risky. Unless of 
course, they fostered a stock picking investment strategy or if that professional investor 
managed such large sums (assets under management) that they could replicate an index 
themselves by buying relevant stocks. The same would be true if the portfolio consisted 
30+ companies with low correlation coefficients. Usually that is not the case, as the cost 
for managing these investments (i.e. research cost and trading fees) is too high or higher 
than buying a respective fund altogether. 
 
Of course, many professional investors possess superior knowledge and employ the best 
analysts and portfolio managers, who have real-time access to financial information 
providers such as Bloomberg or Reuters. Yet, the past has shown that, despite the amount 
of information or advantages investors might have, companies do fold. Examples are 
manifold and include companies like Swissair, Enron, Arthur Anderson, Delta Airlines, 
Global Crossing, WorldCom, Lehman Brothers, Parmalat, General Motors, and Chrysler.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors. 
Investing without emotions  
This question asked if investors increasingly invest without letting emotions influence 
their investment decisions. 
 
Surprisingly, 42% of the asset managers, 37% of the institutional investors and 56% of 
the private investors’ investment decisions (incl. neutrals) were influenced by their 
emotions.  
146 
 
Omitting neutrals, the least emotional group was the institutional investors with 9% vs. 
26% and 24% for the other two groups. On the positive side, almost two thirds of the 
professional investors (58% and 63%) agreed or strongly agreed that emotions were an 
inferior conception when it came to financial investing; yet only 44% of the private 
investors believed the same.  
 
Robbins (2014), Siegel (2014), Stanyer (2010) and Stammers (2015) hold that investment 
decisions ought to be made based on facts and free from any emotions (assuming that 
‘facts’ are devoid of emotional content). There are many who hold to this ‘super-
rationalist’ perspective, who ignore, perhaps, the benefit of emotions, or other ‘non-
rational’ elements in thinking, such as ethically-based investment. 
 
One of the many examples when emotions are in play is when employees working for 
public companies, such as Lindt and Sprüngli, Swatch, UBS, etc., and exhibit an 
emotional attachment that is positive on the one hand but creates emotional bias on the 
other (see Stammers, 2015). They often hold stocks of their company, which they buy 
themselves and are further invested through shares or stock options plans. In addition, 
they increase their dependability on that company as they not only rely on their employer 
for their salary but also in regard to their pension money as part of their remuneration 
package. Overall, such trusted employees could end up with an overly-large portion of 
their income/wealth being invested in one company.  
 
Another example are investors who are ‘betting’ on shares that are ‘hyped’, as described 
by Graham as early as 1949, when he illustrated the tremendous stock market loss of the 
brilliant Isaac Newton, or as later evidenced during the start-up/Internet rush when 
innumerable investors lost enormous sums (Vickers & Weiss, 2000).  
 
Similarly, colleagues, friends or family members who have made profitable investments 
and talk or even brag about them, pose another prominent bias as one will never know 
for certain how these profits were obtained. Maybe they took on great risks. Generally, 
investors prefer to talk about their winners rather than their losers (Ellis, 2014).  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors. 
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5.3.13. Considerations of investments in various asset classes  
Shares/stocks 
This question asked about the investors’ opinion of the asset class shares/stocks as being 
a good investment.  
 
Shares or stocks are the dominant asset class overall. 91% of the asset managers, 91% of 
the institutional investors and 86% of the private investors believed in this vehicle type.  
 
When dealing with shares, most people think that an increase in the share price will 
generate profits but tend to forget, or are not aware of, that the share price itself is only 
one part of the equation. Equally important can be the dividends one may receive from 
holding stakes in a company, be it through direct investments or through funds (Gwilym, 
et al., 2010). As noted previously, re-investing dividends evidently leads to a more 
sustainable investment and to higher profit over the years, which is also attributed to the 
power of compounding interest (Bogle, 2009).  
 
In addition, by buying shares of a public or private company, investors obtain the right to 
have a say in that company, which for many shareholders is a good enough reason for a 
direct investment. In Switzerland, this has a long tradition. It also has a social focus, when 
shareholders attend annual meetings and welcome the opportunity to network and to be 
entertained (Kuhn-Spogat, 2006).  
 
Shares inherit negative characteristics too, as they are generally a relatively volatile asset 
class. This is especially true when compared to cash or fixed income investments in 
government bonds or US treasury securities, which provide a steady income (Ferri, 2006). 
However, if one invests wisely, the fluctuating share prices can be anticipated and should 
therefore not prevent investors from sleeping at night.  
 
Furthermore, when shares are bought OTC (over the counter) and not on a stock 
exchange, buyers also face additional counterparty risk. For multiple reasons, a company, 
could cease trading or even to exist (Zweig, 2006).  
 
148 
 
However, and as explained earlier, shares in whatever form or shape are a key asset class 
for any astute investor, driving the potential profits of a diversified portfolio.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors. 
Corporate bonds 
This question asked about the investors’ opinion of the asset class corporate bonds as 
being a good investment. 
 
Corporate bonds are the second most favourable asset class as 83% of the asset managers, 
80% institutional investors and 60% of the private investors opted for it.  
 
These are somewhat unexpected results as corporate bonds, on the one hand, inherit 
various risks investors must be wary about, and on the other hand, show similar 
characteristics as shares. They in essence add to the equity quota of a portfolio.  
 
Companies usually issue corporate bonds to raise funds for all kind of strategic or 
operational activities. They typically come as investment grade or high yield bonds that 
differ in the percentage of the coupons paid to investors, and consequently, in the risk 
inherent in that bond/company. Corporate bond prices move inversely with interest rates, 
as they become less attractive when interest rates rise, and more attractive when interest 
rates fall. This is because the coupon payment stays the same but substitute funds can be 
attained cheaper/more expensively.  
 
They do offer some valuable advantages such as a stable and predictable income stream 
through periodical coupon payments that are usually higher than the coupons received 
from government bonds and often higher than dividend payments expected from common 
shares. On the other hand, they bear risks that some investors might not be aware of. 
 
As they pay higher premiums than government bonds, corporate bonds often possess a 
call provision that allows the issuer to pay back the underlying principal (the funds the 
company loaned from the investors) before the official maturity date of the bond.  
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This typically happens when interest rates change, making the bonds unfavourable for the 
company. For the astute long-term investor, this poses an unnecessary uncertainty (re-
investment risk) as they could be forced to find a new place for their funds. This could be 
of less value than initially anticipated when buying that corporate bond, constructing the 
portfolio respectively.  
 
Corporate bonds also bear volatility risk, as credit rating agencies such as Standard and 
Poor’s or Moody’s constantly up and downgrade companies’ credit ratings. This does not 
affect the interest payments but does affect the market price of the bonds. An unforeseen 
downgrade will cause the bond price to fall, affecting the bonds’ liquidity (some investors 
might be forced to sell) and making it unattractive for other investors. Another main 
disadvantage is undoubtedly the credit risk, as bondholders could lose much of their 
funds, or even the entire investment, if the company becomes insolvent.  
 
Swensen (2005) argues that if investors would receive a generous premium to compensate 
for credit risk, callability and illiquidity, then corporate bonds might earn a place in an 
investor’s portfolio. However, as this is commonly not the case, corporate bonds actually 
provide less return than government bonds, when considering all risk factors. 
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the private investors.  
Real estate  
This question asked about the investors’ opinion of the asset class real estate as being a 
good investment. 
 
The survey showed that only 49% of the asset managers were in favour of real estate, 
whereas 68% of the institutional investors and 61% of the private investors viewed it as 
a valuable asset class.  
 
Real estate was the third most favoured asset class, which is approximately what I 
expected; yet, I was surprised that not more of the asset managers saw it the same way. 
Investments in real estate (rental apartments, office locations, retail stores, logistics 
properties, senior residences, hotels, etc.), whether through a managed fund or an ETF, 
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offer great value for any investor’s portfolio and many advantages, especially in a low-
interest rate market environment (Swensen, 2005).  
 
As stated in the literature review, one of the main benefits is the low correlation with 
other asset classes like shares or bonds, which particularly holds true for direct 
investments in real estate, i.e. non-listed real estate funds, real estate foundations and 
direct mortgages. Those, unfortunately, are most often not accessible for the general 
investor. However, real estate investment trusts (REITs), to a greater extent than direct 
investments, are available for any investor and still add to diversification, as the value for 
property prices tends to fall and rise more slowly than share and bond prices.  
 
Other advantages of investing in real estate, especially in REITs, are that 90% of the 
profits generated every year have to be paid out as dividends to the investors. 
Furthermore, non-direct real estate investments profit from high liquidity and are 
consequently tradable at the time when needed. Also, real estates are directly linked to 
the payments from tenants and tend to increase in inflationary environments.  
They also act as a hedge against inflation.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors.  
Commodities  
This question asked about the investors’ opinion of the asset class commodities as being 
a good investment. 
 
When it comes to investments in commodities, the opinions varied more. 62% of the asset 
managers (much more than 46% of the institutional investors and 52% of the private 
investors) believed that commodities were vital for a portfolio.  
 
As of the literature, commodities are also an important asset class in order to diversify an 
investor’s portfolio beyond shares and bonds. Commodities exist in many different forms 
but are generally raw material used to produce innumerable goods. Examples of 
commodities are industrial metals - copper, lead, zinc, aluminium or tin, precious metals 
like gold, silver, platinum or palladium; energy commodities - oil, natural gas, and heating 
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oil, or agricultural products - wheat, cocoa, sugar, oat or soybean, but also livestock such 
as cattle or hogs.  
 
There are many different ways for investors to obtain commodities. They can buy them 
on the future market by engaging in a contract to buy or sell a specific quantity to an 
agreed price fixed now - but in the future, through direct investments into commodity 
stocks or through ETFs or managed funds.  
 
Buying futures is a risky undertaking for general investors, even for the professional ones, 
as this market is very volatile. Futures were invented in the 1840s for farmers (who would 
sell) and dealers (who would buy) to commit to future exchanges of grain for cash. These 
deals worked for both, as the farmers knew in advance how much they would get paid 
and the dealers what cost would be incurred.  
 
Further down the line, these contracts were sold off to other parties if a dealer did not 
want that grain anymore or if a farmer did not want to deliver anymore. The prices would 
therefore rise and fall depending on the supply and demand within the wheat market. 
Today, most buyers and sellers of commodities have no intention of producing or selling 
the actual product, they just speculate, hoping to buy low and sell high.  
  
If investors want to diversify their portfolios, direct investments in commodities are 
another option, as they are less prone to price swings than futures.  
 
A feasible way for the general investor to make use of commodities for diversification 
purposes is through ETFs, as they track the prices of certain commodities or groups of 
commodities without the investor investing ‘directly’ or through futures (Swensen, 2005). 
The buyer can therefor obtain a broad range of companies specializing in i.e. agriculture, 
metals or livestock at very low cost. On the contrary, commodity investments, through 
active managed funds, are the alternative, which come at higher cost but with the 
possibility that those active managers will pick the winners.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the asset managers.   
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Gold  
This question asked about the investors’ opinion of the asset class gold as being a good 
investment. 
 
Concerning gold, investors seemed to be more cautious. 63% of the asset managers and 
47% of the private investors, but only 37% of the institutional investors saw gold as a 
valuable asset class.  
 
This is perhaps due to the fact that gold has only been on the rise for the past 10 years 
(the last cycle: up to April 2013, the time the survey was taken) so investors may have 
thought that the upper boundary has been reached. Looking at the following two years 
(May 2013 – April 2015), this may hold true as gold devalued around 25%. Yet, one 
could argue that the price for shares has only been on the rise as well, yet almost all 
investors during the last years were in favour of that asset class. Why is this?  
 
Do investors simply have a better understanding of investments in shares than in gold? 
On closer inspection, that argument is invalid as shares during the subprime and financial 
crisis took an enormous hit while gold increased by more than 90% between 2008 and 
2011, and much more until 2013. Gold preserves wealth, which is one reason why the 
international monetary fund (IMF) holds about 20% of all gold reserves, whereas many 
other central banks also stocked up their reserves during the past years (IMF, 2015). 
 
Gold is simple to obtain as one can either buy physical gold, or purchase shares or ETFs 
that are invested in this precious metal. One of the many advantages of gold is that it 
generally correlates negatively with other asset classes like shares, real estate, etc., and 
therefore serves against currency devaluation but also as a hedge against a rising inflation 
when investors are realizing that their purchasing power decreases.  
 
In other words, if the majority of investors believe that equities are over-inflated, or 
worse, a severe economic crisis would materialise as happened several times in Argentina 
in the 1970s, 1980s and 2001 (The Economist, 2014) or in some of the European countries 
like the PIICS states (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain) since 2009, we would 
subsequently find gold prices on the rise again. 
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One of the few disadvantages of gold is that such investments do not pay any dividends 
or coupons and that the gold price is very difficult to predict, as are prices for other asset 
classes and products.  
 
Considering the above, gold is a viable asset class, especially in stressed markets, a 
meaningful protection against an overall loss of confidence in the monetary system 
(Mercer, 2011).  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the asset managers.   
Cash 
This question asked about the investors’ opinion of the asset class cash as being a good 
investment. 
 
Surprisingly, 56% of the asset managers, 57% of the institutional investors and 41% of 
the private investors trusted that cash was a vital asset class.  
 
Certainly, the news is constantly talking about interest rate issues, stimulus programmes 
that could end (USA) or will be enhanced (Europe), overheated stock markets or 
worldwide economic and political uncertainties that could steer investors to keep money 
as cash. There are viable advantages, as cash is a way to preserve capital, especially in 
downturn markets and it also offers the benefit of financial liquidity and is therefore 
quickly assessable. As long as inflation is near zero, the damage to an investor’s cash 
position is minimal. 
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the asset managers. 
High yield bonds 
This question asked about the investors’ opinion of the asset class high yield bonds as 
being a good investment.  
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High yield bonds were not favoured by most of the investors as only 51% of the asset 
managers, 38% of the institutional investors and 32% of the private investors placed faith 
in this asset class. 
 
The SEC (Security Exchange Commission, 2013) defines high yield bonds as a type of 
corporate bond that offers a higher rate of interest because of its higher risk of default. 
When companies with a greater estimated default risk issue bonds, they may be unable to 
obtain an investment-grade bond credit rating. As a result, they typically issue bonds with 
higher interest rates in order to entice investors and compensate them for this higher risk. 
In other words, high yield bonds are also called junk or below-investment grade bonds. 
They are debt obligations with a ranking that is according to the rating agency Standard 
and Poor’s, BB or lower, or Ba or lower on the Moody’s scale. Investments in such 
vehicles are remunerated with a higher premium (coupon) that ought to compensate 
investors for the additional risk they are infusing into their portfolios.  
 
One could argue that high yield bonds have their place within an investor’s portfolio, i.e. 
due to their usually higher yields, as they are less affected by interest rates shifts and 
therefore do not precisely correlate with shares or investment grade bonds, hence adding 
value to a diversified portfolio. In addition, should a company that has issued high yield 
debt obligations become insolvent, bond holders would enjoy higher priority than equity 
holders and therefore get paid first.  
 
The literature shows that the offered premium is rarely justified or high enough as the 
disadvantages are just too manifold and often underestimated. Investors must withstand 
higher volatility than with other asset classes but most of all the risk of a company 
defaulting on their obligations, which is true for almost 3% of all companies (The 
Economist, 2013).  
 
In addition, as with corporate bonds, most high yield bonds have a call option attached to 
them that permits the issuing company to refund the debt prematurely. In other words, if 
market conditions or interest rates change in favour of the debt issuer, they will want to 
re-issue their bonds at lower interest rates, leaving the investors trying to find another 
feasible investment opportunity much sooner than planned, and most likely to inferior 
conditions.  
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High yields on junk bonds on the outset seem to be attractive for investors, especially in 
the current low-interest rate environment, but as soon as interest rates are on the rise 
again, or if an economy slips into a recession, those investors might find themselves in a 
doomed situation.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the private investors. 
Government bonds  
This question asked about the investors’ opinion of the asset class government bonds as 
being a good investment. 
 
Government bonds were the second least favourable asset class with around 40% of the 
professional investors and 47% of the private investors considering them as an 
investment.  
 
The SEC (Security Exchange Commission, 2014) describes government bonds as a debt 
obligation where investors are lending money to a government, municipality, or a federal 
agency known as the issuer. In return for the loan, the issuer promises to pay investors a 
specified rate of interest during the life of the bond and to repay the face value of the bond 
(the principal) when it matures or is due. In contrast to shareholders, bondholders do not 
own a part of the institution that is issuing the bond.  
 
Generally, bond prices decrease when bond rates increase, which results in investors 
making bets on interest rate expectations. To continuously determine interest rate 
changes, and therefore ideal bond prices or the perfect timing to invest in bonds, is 
impossible for the experienced investor, and certainly unlikely for the general investor.  
 
While it is true that Swiss government bonds currently yield almost no or even negative 
return and pose downside risk on the principal as soon as interest rates start to increase, 
these bonds are still vital for a well-diversified portfolio as they function as a safety net 
(excellent diversifier with low risk, higher return than cash and high liquidity) if share 
markets and other negatively correlated asset classes decrease.  
 
156 
 
In Europe particularly, where many economies are still struggling and where the 
European Central Bank (ECB) in March 2015 has started to buy governments bonds 
worth 60 billion Euros every month until September 2016, investors do not yet need to 
worry too much about substantial increases of interest and bond rates. The same is true 
for Switzerland, which is not only highly dependent on the European markets but fears a 
recession due to the rising Swiss Franc against the Euro (as of June 2015). Many 
industries, such as export and tourism, dread losses of revenues and profits. This is still 
true as of August 2017. 
 
To weaken the Swiss Franc, and to foster inflation, at the end of 2014 the Swiss National 
Bank, has enforced a penalty on institutions holding Swiss deposits (The Guardian, 2014). 
It became the first national bank in history to sell a 10-year bond at a negative interest 
rate of -0.055% (Financial Times, 2015), and is thinking to further increase negative 
interest rates from - 0.75% to - 1.50% (Reuters, 2015).  
 
Thus, the question will be as to what portion of a well-diversified portfolio needs to be 
invested in government bonds and with which durations; and if there are feasible 
alternatives that provide similar characteristics but generate positive returns, i.e. Swiss 
covered bonds, medium-term notes or deposit funds of cooperatives (Depositenkassen 
von Genossenschaften).  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the private investors. 
Hedge funds 
This question asked about the investors’ opinions of the asset class hedge funds as being 
a good investment. 
 
As expected, 38% of the asset managers, 34% of the institutional investors and 48% of 
the private investors disagreed with the statement that hedge funds are a beneficial 
investment. Only 20% of the private investors, 21% of the institutional investors and 41% 
of the asset managers believed in this asset class. 
 
The SEC (Security Exchange Commission, 2012) describes hedge funds as funds that 
pool investors’ money to apply flexible investment strategies, like borrowing to increase 
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investment exposure and therefore risk, short-selling and other speculative investment 
practices, in an effort to achieve extraordinary returns (The Economist, 2014). 
 
There is significant consensus that hedge funds are a positive influence on the 
diversification effect of investment portfolios, as they show low correlation with most 
other asset classes (Amenc, Martellini and Vaissie, 2003). On the other hand, they are 
generally seen as aggressive investment options, trying to generate above-market average 
returns while inheriting multiple risks.  
 
Next to the fact that hedge funds are not subject to regulations that are enacted to protect 
investors, one of the major drawbacks of hedge funds are the excessive costs investors 
have to pay, even more so for fund of hedge funds. Usually, they charge a high 
management fee at around 2% per annum, but on top of that, a performance fee that is 
typically 20% of whatever the fund earns per year. They often charge other administration 
fees as well (Ellis, 2002; Swensen, 2005).  
 
Not only must hedge fund managers therefore achieve returns that are at least so high that 
they can make up for those fees, but they also often find themselves investing very 
aggressively in order to leverage on the performance fee. Moreover, there is stark 
empirical evidence, that, in line with the mutual fund managers, there are only a very few 
hedge fund specialists who are capable of beating the market consistently.  
 
There is also an on-going debate as to whether their success is attributed to their skills or 
just luck. Hence, most hedge fund managers, and therefore their clients, lose money (The 
Economist, 2014). Likewise, research by Grecu, Burton, Malkiel and Saha (2006) 
concludes, that hedge funds very often fail within their first years or cease reporting their 
performances at a later stage. Not, as some would argue, because they are too successful 
and therefore do not require additional funds anymore, but simply because they just fail.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the private investors. 
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Table 35 – The investors’ opinions about investing in certain asset classes 
 
Figure 38 – The investors’ opinions about investing in certain asset classes 
5.3.14. Considerations of investments in various markets  
All investors 
These questions asked about the investors’ opinions of investments in various markets.  
 
Overall, investments in emerging markets (247%) were most favoured amongst the three 
investor groups, followed by investments in Switzerland (240%). Germany (175%) and 
the US markets (163%) with around 25% less support ranks third and fourth.  
Asset 
Managers
Institut. 
Investors
Private 
Investors
Total
Asset 
Managers
Institut. 
Investors
Private 
Investors
1 Shares/stocks 90.5% 91.2% 86.0% 256.4% 4.8% 2.9% 3.5%
2 Corporate bonds 83.3% 79.4% 59.5% 194.5% 4.8% 11.8% 11.3%
3 Real estate 48.8% 67.6% 61.4% 137.0% 14.6% 11.8% 14.4%
4 Commodities 61.9% 45.7% 52.1% 104.4% 19.0% 17.1% 19.1%
5 Gold 63.4% 37.1% 47.4% 95.8% 12.2% 22.9% 17.1%
6 Cash 56.1% 57.1% 40.7% 80.6% 19.5% 20.0% 33.8%
7 High yield bonds 51.2% 38.2% 31.8% 36.2% 19.5% 32.4% 33.2%
8 Government bonds 40.5% 40.0% 46.7% 31.6% 45.2% 28.6% 21.8%
9 Hedge funds 41.0% 20.6% 19.6% -49.2% 38.5% 44.1% 47.8%
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With the latter, only half of the private investors thought that the US was worth investing, 
vs. 76% of the asset managers and 66% of all institutional investors. When it comes to 
Europe (144%), the private investors were even less convinced (46% v. 63%, 68%). The 
numbers further decreased for Australia / New Zeeland (96%) and the UK market (74%). 
Amongst every market in discussion, the private investors were the group with the highest 
proportion opposing an investment.  
 
The questions, however, did not ask how much of a portfolio would be placed in the 
various markets. Nevertheless, it is surprising that emerging markets were favoured so 
strongly, as those markets, besides offering interesting possibilities, are rather volatile 
and bear various hazards like currency, liquidity or interest rate risks and certainly the 
possibility to default on obligations. It is controversial whether investors are adequately 
compensated for the risk they are taking (Vandersteel, 2010). It is further interesting that 
investors trusted the US rather than the general European or UK markets.  
 
For a well-balanced portfolio, a wide range of equities within applicable asset classes are 
important but also diversification through currencies, e.g. Euro, UK pound or US Dollars, 
with the largest part invested in the base currency, e.g. Swiss franc for investors living in 
Switzerland. From this point of view, the investors showed a good understanding voting 
not only for the Swiss markets. Conversely, a study by Birchler, Volkart, Ettlin, and 
Hegglin (2010) showed that the majority of Swiss investors only invest in the Swiss 
market, which indicates a home bias.  
 
The above analysis was a result of all participants, regardless of their residence. 
Consequently, this portrays a misleading picture as the base currency varied from country 
to country and 54 of the 376 participants lived in 12 additional countries. The following 
analysis will only encompass investors living in Switzerland and investors from 
Germany, the second largest participants group.  
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Table 36 – The investors’ opinions about certain markets – all investors 
 
Figure 39 – The investors’ opinions about certain markets – All investors 
Switzerland and Germany based investors 
As assumed, when discounting the non-Swiss investors, investments in the home market 
were top ranked (248%), yet still emerging markets followed second (243%) while 
investments in the other markets remained more or less the same.  
 
It is surprising to see that there were some asset managers and private investors who 
would not place any capital into the Swiss market at all.  
 
Asset 
Managers
Institut. 
Investors
Private 
Investors Total
Asset 
Managers
Institut. 
Investors
Private 
Investors
1 Emerging countries 90.2% 81.8% 81.7% 246.4% 0.0% 3.0% 4.3%
2 Swiss 82.9% 84.8% 81.4% 239.8% 2.4% 3.0% 3.9%
3 German 67.5% 71.4% 56.6% 174.9% 7.5% 2.9% 10.2%
4 United States 75.6% 65.7% 52.5% 163.1% 9.8% 5.7% 15.2%
5 Europe 63.4% 67.6% 45.7% 143.9% 4.9% 8.8% 19.1%
6 United Kingdom 48.8% 42.4% 37.2% 96.2% 12.2% 6.1% 14.0%
7 Australien / NZ 45.0% 51.5% 25.5% 73.8% 12.5% 9.1% 26.6%
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Table 37 – Swiss based investors’ opinions about certain markets – Swiss investors 
 
 
Figure 40 – The investors’ opinions about certain markets – Swiss investors 
Looking at the German participants only, the picture did not look as expected, as 
investments in emerging markets (273%) were most favourable, followed by their home 
market (260%). The difference was marginal and most likely explained by the smaller 
number of participants. It is interesting though (but assumed) that this group was placing 
higher emphasis on the general European market (220%) as these investments are too in 
their home currency.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was both the asset managers and 
the institutional investors. 
 
Asset 
Managers
Institut. 
Investors
Private 
Investors
Total
Asset 
Managers
Institut. 
Investors
Private 
Investors
1 Switzerland 83.8% 86.2% 83.8% 248.6% 2.7% 0.0% 2.5%
2 Emerging countries 91.9% 78.6% 80.5% 243.2% 0.0% 3.6% 4.2%
3 Germany 66.7% 70.0% 55.1% 169.4% 8.3% 3.3% 10.7%
4 United States 75.7% 63.3% 51.5% 161.0% 10.8% 3.3% 15.4%
5 Europe 62.2% 65.5% 45.0% 138.2% 5.4% 10.3% 18.8%
6 Australian / NZ 45.9% 39.3% 34.0% 84.9% 13.5% 7.1% 13.7%
7 United Kingdom 41.7% 51.7% 25.4% 76.5% 13.9% 3.4% 25.0%
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Table 38 – The investors’ opinions about certain markets – German investors 
 
Figure 41 – The investors’ opinions about certain markets – German investors  
5.3.15. Importance of various investment criteria 
The next set of questions sought to identify differences amongst the asset managers, 
institutional investors and private investors with respect to a series of seven factors 
identified as major investment criteria in the literature. 
Investors’ knowledge of a company 
This question asked about the investor’s knowledge of a company they wanted to invest 
in as being a valuable investment criterion. 
Asset 
Managers
Institut. 
Investors
Private 
Investors Total
Asset 
Managers
Institut. 
Investors
Private 
Investors
1 Emerging countries 100.0% 100.0% 86.7% 273.3% 0.0% 0.0% 13.3%
2 German 100.0% 66.7% 93.3% 260.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
3 Europe 100.0% 66.7% 60.0% 220.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.7%
4 Swiss 100.0% 66.7% 84.6% 202.6% 0.0% 33.3% 15.4%
5 United States 100.0% 66.7% 38.5% 141.0% 0.0% 33.3% 30.8%
6 Australien / NZ 100.0% 33.3% 15.4% 110.3% 0.0% 0.0% 38.5%
7 United Kingdom 100.0% 33.3% 7.7% 28.2% 0.0% 66.7% 46.2%
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The analysis unexpectedly showed that 75% of the asset managers, 84% of the 
institutional investors and 83% of the private investors found their knowledge of a 
company to be the most important investment criterion (221%). This translated to 
investors most likely following a single share investment strategy over funds. The issue 
otherwise would be, that if one buys an index like the Euro Stoxx 50 or the S&P 500, one 
could never have sufficient knowledge about all relevant firms represented by that index.  
 
In addition, an outsider would most probably never have adequate knowledge of a firm 
that would give them a clear indication about the company’s future earnings and share 
prices. Even employees in top management positions within public traded firms cannot 
foresee what is going to happen, as the share price depends on numerous other internal 
and external dynamics, like the success of a newly launched product, probable litigations, 
the state of the economy, their industry, interest rates, possible investments or divestments 
and so forth. Even if you were to know everything possible, obvious physical growth 
(expansion, merger, acquisition, revenue) does not automatically translate into profits for 
investors, especially when earnings are not in-line with analysts’ expectations (Graham, 
1949). 
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the asset managers. 
The dividend rate 
This question asked about the dividend rate as being a valuable investment criterion. 
 
The dividend rate was voted as the second most important investment criteria with a 
combined result of 172%. Breaking it down, 63% of the asset managers, 69% of the 
institutional investors and 67% of the private investors opted for it. This factor has 20% 
less support than the knowledge of the firm. The dividend rate is crucial as wealth can 
easily and truly increase if investors constantly earn and re-invest dividends stemming 
from either single share investments or funds (Hubble, 2013).  
 
To illustrate this, Gwilym, et al., (2009) studied consistent dividend growth strategies, as 
they believe, that dividend income, and its reinvestment, result in strong equity return and 
therefore in increased wealth. They refer to a Barclay study cited by Bond and Brask 
(2005) that exemplifies if £100 had been invested in UK shares in 1899, and all dividends 
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paid re-invested, it would be worth £13,311 in real terms in 2006. The same £100 without 
re-investments of dividends would be worth just £213. Similarly, as previously stated, 
Bogle (2010) points to compound interest as one of most advantageous elements in 
investing, which in essence translates to re-investing dividends yielded. 
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors. 
Past performance 
This question asked about past performance being a valuable investment criterion. 
 
Past performance was the third most important investment criterion (142.5) with 58% of 
the asset managers, 56% of the institutional investors and 75% of the private investors 
trusting in it. However, 20%, 19% and 8%, respectively were of the opinion that past 
performance was no indicator of future outcomes, which is also what most mutual funds 
declare (or some variation of it).  
 
Looking at historical performance might provide an idea of how successfully a company 
conducted business in the past and what could happen to the price of a security, ceteris 
paribus. However, many academics and professionals (Graham, 1949; Ellis, 2002; 
Swensen, 2005; Stanyer, 2010; Indexology, 2014) declare that this criterion is not 
material and that it does not play a vital role for sustainable long-lasting investments. 
Many companies have evidenced this – one needs to look only, for example, at the share 
prices of Swiss blue-chip companies over the last decade (Swissquote, 2015).  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors.  
A low P/E ratio 
This question asked about the P/E ratio as being a valuable investment criterion. 
 
A low P/E ratio is important (124%), but most investors (50% asset managers, 52% 
institutional investors and 46% private investors) were neutral about it. This may be either 
because many investors do not understand this ratio, or others are largely indifferent to it. 
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Calculating a company’s P/E ratio, it is supposed to tell investors how many years that 
company has to produce current earnings to arrive at its current market share value. In 
other words, generally, the lower a P/E ratio, the less expensive and more attractive the 
stock, the higher the P/E value, the more expensive it is.  
 
The price-earnings ratio has been a long-time measure and indicator by financial analysts, 
who trust that a low P/E ratio tends to be followed by fast growth in a share price, or that 
sectors or markets with a high P/E ratio are overheated. For instance, the long-term price-
earning average of the S&P 500 is 17; and when it reaches ≥ 19, analysts tend to believe 
that the market is over-priced and under-priced at ≤ 15 (Allen, 2015). 
 
As the above is widely argued, I am listing two examples that show that the P/E ratio is 
not the only truth when it comes to choosing an investment. As of May 15, 2015, Netflix 
showed a P/E ratio of 159 (Nasdaq, 2015), which would be a clear indicator that this share 
price is highly inflated and investors should stay away. Yet, they do not, and trading 
volumes are still very high (as of 2017). IBM on the other hand, had a P/E ratio of 10 
while trading volumes tend to stay the same. Hence, every investor should jump in and 
buy, but they do not as multiple other factors need to be taken into consideration when 
buying a share e.g. the industry, sector, investment in R&D, management, growth 
potential and so forth.  
 
Therefore, while the P/E ratio is an easily understood metric for investors to form an 
opinion about a stock, one need to be cautious of its shortcomings. No single ratio can 
tell investors all they need to know about a stock (Siegel, 2014).  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors. 
The industry the company is in and the size of the firm 
These questions asked about the industry of the company and about the size of the firm 
(large-cap) as being a valuable investment criterion. 
 
In the middle of the investment criteria ranking was the industry the company is in, with 
91% (36% of the asset managers, 75% of the institutional investors and 58% of the private 
investors) and the importance as to whether a company is a large enterprise, (measured 
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by market capitalization) with 80% (31%, 48% and 53%, respectively). With both criteria, 
it is interesting to see that the asset managers in particular (33%, 28%) disagreed with the 
statement.  
 
These results certainly leave room for interpretation, as the questions did not relate to 
possible investment strategies, for example. If an investor only focuses on small-
capitalized firms then the first criterion has no merit. Likewise, if investors are only 
focusing on certain industries, then the industry criterion is highly important.  
 
Thus, both criteria are important if one has, along with other principles, superior 
knowledge of an industry (against Graham, 1949) or fully comprehends large-cap 
companies and its respective rewards and risks.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the asset managers. 
Passive or active managed funds 
These questions asked about the importance of active vs. passive managed funds as being 
valuable investment criterion. 
 
When it comes to investing in either passive or active managed funds, the answers are 
generally neutral with a plus on the passive side (27%) and a minus on the active side (-
3.9%). Only 39% of the asset managers, 31% of the institutional investors and 25% of 
the private investors voted for active managed funds and 33%, 30% and 33%, 
respectively, for passive products.  
 
There is a long-lasting and on-going debate as to which method of fund investing is more 
sensible. It should only be the ‘customer investor’ for whom the active vs. passive choice 
needs to make sense. On the one hand, there are numerous retail and investment banks, 
asset managers, and other organizations constructing active managed funds to be sold to 
professional and private investors, with a promise, that these products would be special 
and outperform others and the market (Balling, et al., 2008).  
 
On the other hand, there is a vast number of academics and experts (Ellis 2002; Swensen, 
2002; Zweig, 2006; Bogle, 2007; Goldie and Murray, 2010) who have found that only a 
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very limited number of fund managers, if any - were it possible to consider all time 
periods and managers - who actually outperform the market in the long-run.  
 
Therefore, amongst other reasons, the number of ETFs available (Aggarwal and 
Schofield, 2012) as well as the money invested in ETFs and other indexing products keeps 
increasing fast (Oyedele, 2015). The literature holds, that one of the main reasons why 
active managed funds still form the larger portion (vs. passive indexing) are the fees that 
banks, asset and fund managers can charge their clients for such products. 
 
Typically, an active fund costs 3 to 5% in ‘issuing fees’, 1 to 3% per annum for managing 
the fund and at times another 1.5 to 2% of the final amount when selling it. This is in 
contrast to ETFs, for example, which only cost 0.2 to 0.6% for the management fee. As a 
result, the general fund manager has not only to beat the market, hence an ETF, but has 
to be over and above the market in order to recover all expenses. In other words, an active 
fund manager needs to be around 2.7% better than the market average when holding a 
respective fund for five years, and around 3.7% when holding a fund for three years. This 
seems to be impossible as several studies mentioned above have found. Ellis (2002) 
illustrates the logical reason behind this.  
 
Imagine you had the necessary capital to employ the top experts in the investment field, 
such as the best analysts, the chief quant physicists and the most skilled portfolio 
managers who would have real-time access to Bloomberg and Reuters, and who were 
talking to the top-management of all significant firms around the globe. What in essence 
would you accomplish? You would have employed the market - because all these 
professionals are in fact the market. Consequently, it would be more sensible buy the 
market in the form of an ETF or index and to pay much less than trying to find an 
expensive fund manager who may beat it.  
 
As expected, the asset managers were the investor group that favoured active products 
the most. As mentioned, prior, this could be due to their business model that centres on 
receiving commissions in form of retrocessions (kickbacks) for products they sell, as 
opposed to really identifying the products that most benefit the clients. 
 
For these questions, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors 
for passive management and the private investors for active management.  
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Location and social responsibility as investment criteria 
These questions asked about the importance of the company invested in being Swiss and 
socially responsible investing as being valuable investment criteria. 
 
The conditions whether the company invested in is Swiss (20%) or ethical aspects/green 
investing (-19%) are overall not important investment criteria. Yet, as expected, both 
criteria found more support within the private investor group. Indeed, whether the 
company is Swiss does not really seem to be too relevant, as a sustainable diversified 
portfolio rather requires investments in multiple asset classes and currencies (Brinson, 
Hood and Beebower (1986); Ibbotson and Kaplan, 2000). 
 
Sustainable and responsible investing (SRI), on the other hand, finds more and more 
support by the general investment community (Simpson, 2014). The private investors 
may opt for it because of an emotional bias (they want to do something good). However, 
many investors, especially the professional ones, may have a real interest in investing in 
companies or indices that specifically exclude firms that focus on producing or trading 
goods such as alcohol, tobacco, weapons, pornography or on countries that disregard 
human rights.  
 
For these questions, the benchmark for superior investing was the asset managers for the 
company being Swiss and the institutional investors for ethical aspects. 
 
 
Table 39 – The importance of various investment criteria 
Asset 
Managers
Institut. 
Investors
Private 
Investors
Total
Asset 
Managers
Institut. 
Investors
Private 
Investors
1 Knowledge of company 75.0% 84.4% 82.6% 220.7% 12.5% 6.3% 2.5%
2 Expected dividend rate 62.5% 68.8% 66.7% 171.7% 10.0% 9.4% 6.9%
3 Past performance 57.5% 56.3% 75.1% 142.5% 20.0% 18.8% 7.6%
4 Low P/E ratio 50.0% 51.6% 45.6% 123.8% 7.5% 6.5% 9.5%
5 Industry of company 35.9% 75.0% 58.2% 91.4% 33.3% 15.6% 28.7%
6 Large cap company 30.8% 48.4% 53.3% 80.0% 28.2% 9.7% 14.5%
7 Product is passive fund 32.5% 30.0% 33.3% 26.5% 32.5% 13.3% 23.5%
8 Company is Swiss 30.0% 37.5% 41.4% 20.0% 42.5% 21.9% 24.5%
9 Product is active fund 38.5% 31.3% 24.6% -3.9% 35.9% 25.0% 37.3%
10 Ethical aspects 27.5% 15.6% 39.2% -18.9% 40.0% 37.5% 23.7%
Vote for it Vote against it
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Figure 42 – The importance of various investment criteria 
5.3.16. Importance of various investment strategies and applications 
Finally, the last part of the initial inquiry sets out to discuss investment strategies that 
were applied by the three investor groups, in order to identify the differences amongst the 
asset managers, institutional investors and private investors and the main investment 
approaches by these market participants. 
Asset allocation 
This question asked about the asset allocation as being a valuable investment strategy / 
application. 
 
The analysis showed that 87% of the asset managers, 71% of the institutional investors 
and 61% of the private investors favoured asset allocation as the most viable investment 
strategy / application (198%). 
 
These results were expected as there is convincing evidence (Brinson, Hood and 
Beebower, 1986; Black and Litterman, 1991; Sharpe, 1991; Ibbotson and Kaplan, 2000; 
Ellis, 2002; Swensen, 2005; Ferri, 2006; Marston, 2011; Schlachter, 2013) that 
understanding and choosing the various asset classes (shares, government bonds, real 
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estate, gold, etc.) to subsequently allocate funds, is one of the prime investment activities 
investors should engage in and master.  
 
The professional investors shared these views, but not all private investors did fully 
comprehend the notion of asset allocation. This might be the reason, why this 
strategy/application ranked only fifth amongst the private investors and why more than a 
third of them were neutral about it. However, the challenging question is, which asset 
classes to select for which respective risk profile.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the asset managers. 
Fundamental analysis  
This question asked about fundamental analysis as being a valuable investment strategy. 
 
Fundamental analysis was rated as the second most important investment strategy (175%) 
with 66% of the asset managers, 76% of the institutional investors and 63% of the private 
investors opting for it. I had suspected that (overall) investors would judge value investing 
or dividend investing as being more important. There is only so much you can find out 
about any company (balance sheet, P&L, various ratios, quality of management, other 
qualitative aspects, etc.) but dividends and P/E ratios, for example, of all listed companies, 
can be established without diving into details. 
 
Looking at it in a more holistic way, the literature holds that fundamental analysis is one 
of the cornerstones of investing as it is not only companies that can be profoundly 
evaluated, but also industries and economies as a whole.  
 
On a company level, there are a number of fundamental questions that require answers 
concerning growth potential; whether it actually generates profits, if its position is so 
strong that it can outperform competitors in the long-run, if it’s able to repay its debts or 
to finance its research and development or expansion and if the management is trying to 
steer the company too much in their own favourable direction. On a broader scope, 
important aspects are the direction an entire industry is taking, the innovation power of 
that industry and on an even larger scale, if certain markets as a whole are worth investing 
(maturity, political stability/turmoil, growth potential, risk and reward, etc.).  
171 
 
Therefore, engaging in fundamental research most likely results in better informed 
investment decisions (Thomsett, 2000).  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors. 
Value investing  
This question asked about value investing as being a valuable investment strategy. 
 
As anticipated, value investing next to asset allocation and fundamental analysis, drew 
most attention (170%) with 69% of the asset managers, 72% of the institutional investors 
and 53% of the private investors in favour of it. It also showed the second lowest number 
in opposition (6%, 7% and 12%, respectively).  
 
Value investing is at the core of many famous investors e.g. Benjamin Graham, who was 
also the mentor of Irving Kahn, or Philip Carret, John Templeton, Warren Buffett, David 
Dreman (Bernstein, 2005; Town, 2007; Lowenstein, 2008) or John Neff who over three 
decades at Vanguard Windsor and Gemini funds, realized a 5600% return (Rediff, 2010). 
Jeremy Grantham who was one of the three founders of GMO is another example of a 
successful value investor (author’s comment).  
 
Buying shares at a price lower than their intrinsic value increases the investor’s chance 
of earning profits when they are sold and it makes them less likely to lose money (or a 
substantial amount of value) if they do not perform as anticipated.  
 
Unlike other investment strategies, value investing is fairly easy to understand, as it does 
not require extensive experience in finance nor, for example, the knowledge and 
techniques as to how charts can be analysed and interpreted. It ‘only’ really requires the 
readiness to do some reading, an understanding of how to calculate and interpret company 
data, money to invest and patience.  
 
Value investing is something most people do on a regular basis without knowing. For 
instance, when they know the true value of something but only buy things when they are 
on sale (clothing, holidays). The prime difference is that consumer goods are often on 
sale during the same period each year, making them quite predictable.  
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On the contrary, shares are not, but if one is willing to find the secret sale, shares can be 
bought at a bargain price too. Buying shares ‘on sale’ increases the investors’ chance of 
earning profits later when they sell them and it makes them less likely to lose money if 
they don’t perform as anticipated. 
  
This key principle to successful value investing is called ‘the margin of safety’ and was 
first introduced by Graham (1949), who is said to be the father of value investing. He 
would only buy shares when they were valued at two-thirds or less of their intrinsic value. 
Yet, as stated within the literature review, what determines initial ‘intrinsic value’ remains 
a moot point. This was the margin of safety that he felt was essential to earn the best 
returns while minimizing investment risk. His two other rules were to profit from 
volatility and to know yourself (suppress emotions). Much of Buffett’s success can be 
attributed to those three principles too. 
 
Value investors like Graham or Buffett do not necessarily believe in the efficient-market 
hypothesis, which stipulates that share prices take all information about a company into 
account (Markowitz, 1952). Instead, they trust that shares are frequently overpriced, i.e. 
because investors have become overly excited about a new technology or company (i.e. 
Uber, Netflix) or under-priced, when the economy as a whole, or an industry, is 
performing poorly. Investors then panic and sell off their shares (great depression, internet 
bubble, subprime and financial crisis). Another successful value investor, as referred to 
by Templeton and Phillips (2008), was John Templeton, who became famous for 
investing at the maximum time of pessimism. When other investors thought that a certain 
country or company was hopeless, he was just getting interested.  
 
The consequence of value investing was also demonstrated by Dreman (1998). He 
analysed stocks returns from 1970 to 1996 and found that shares with a price-earnings 
ratio (P/E ratio) in the bottom quintile (rather under-priced) yielded 19 percent per annum, 
while those in the highest quintile (rather over-priced) returned only 12.3%. Besides 
buying low and selling high, other typical characteristics of value investors are that they 
are contrarians as they do not follow the herd and they believe in a companies’ recovery, 
as long as they are offering valuable consumer products while their fundamentals remain 
strong. They think about buying shares for what they actually are - a percentage of 
ownership in companies.  
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For the above reasons, it is surprising, that only half of all private investors understand 
value investing as a viable investment strategy.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors. 
Dividend investing  
This question asked about dividend investing as being a valuable investment strategy. 
 
An investment strategy that focuses on dividend yields and its re-investment was popular 
amongst 59% of the asset managers, 66% of the institutional investors and 66% of the 
private investors.  
 
Dividend investors value the advantage of receiving steady payments from companies 
they invested in and the prospect to re-invest those payments to purchase additional 
shares. Such companies usually enjoy the reputation of being financially healthy and 
stable and correspond with Grahams view, stated by Zweig (2006), that the most 
persuasive test of high quality companies is an uninterrupted record of dividend payments 
going back over many years. Moreover, those companies also often increase, not only 
their dividend payments, but also their share-price, adding to the positive returns for 
investors.  
 
While dividend payments are not guaranteed, such companies will work hard not to 
disappoint their shareholders. In addition, since dividend-paying companies are typically 
less risky and less volatile, they offer possibilities for people who want to generate income 
over the long run or i.e. for investors approaching retirement to generate a superannuation 
income. Another benefit proves valuable even if a company’s share price declines, as the 
dividend yield inversely corresponds with that share price. Hence, if the share price drops, 
the percentage of dividend yielded increases. On the negative side, investors ought to be 
aware and cautious about companies paying high or very high dividends as these 
consequently bear higher risks.  
 
It is interesting to see that of the three investor groups, the asset managers showed the 
least support for dividend investing but the highest percentage (11%) in opposition, 
especially since knowledgeable investors would appreciate the notion of both investing 
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dividends and compounding interest. This could be another indication, as mentioned 
prior, that asset managers would rather focus on actively managing portfolios to generate 
profits from selling and trading assets.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors. 
Growth investing 
This question asked about growth investing as being a valuable investment strategy. 
 
Growth investing ranks in the middle of all the investment strategies in question, with 
56% of the asset managers, 53% of the institutional investors and 64% of the private 
investors voting for it. 
 
Growth investors invest in companies with a higher than market average potential for 
growth. Compared to value investors, growth investors would still buy shares of a 
company, even if they appear expensive in terms of measures such as the P/E or P/B ratio 
(price to book ratio).  
 
Buffett once concluded that there is not much difference between value and growth 
investing as both investment styles are joined at the hip and focus on the intrinsic values 
of companies. However, a Dreman and Berry (1995) study showed, that value stocks 
decline less with bad news but react more favourably to earnings surprises than growth 
stocks do. If this holds true, and since such surprises occur frequently, these differences 
are substantial over the long run. Nonetheless, it seems that Buffett was correct, as 
Skinner and Sloan (2000) evidenced, that the phenomenon described by Dreman and 
Berry (1995) can be explained by a large and asymmetric response to negative earnings 
surprises for growth stocks.  
 
The literature holds that assessing companies regarding their growth potential is not an 
easy task, as one really needs to study all fundamental available information and compare 
it to other companies and their relevant industries.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors. 
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Stock picking 
This question asked about stock picking as being a valuable investment strategy. 
 
It is surprising (given the weight of contrary evidence available) that more than half of 
all professional investors (50% asset managers, 53% institutional investors) and 64% of 
the private investors believed that picking individual shares was a superior investment 
strategy. Likewise, only 16% of the asset managers and 14% of the private investors but 
22% of the institutional investors were opposed to it.  
 
As stated, Ellis (2002) identified that investment professionals execute 90% of all public 
trades at the NYSE, and that the 100 largest institutions conduct 75% of all trades. It 
follows, that almost every time an individual buys a share (stock picking), they are betting 
against the ‘best and the brightest’, most disciplined and rational, supplied with valuable 
information by thousands of analysts who are highly motivated, hard-working and very 
competitive. Conclusively, as of Ellis (2002), Swensen (2005) and many other academics 
and professionals, stock picking (or timing the market) is a mediocre investment strategy 
– at least if one wants to invest successfully and sustainably.  
 
There are undoubtedly some exceptional investors such as Lynch, Buffett or Soros who 
take risky bets, but the vast majority of investors are ineffective at picking the right stocks. 
Even Robertson, one of the most successful hedge fund managers, suffered from 
enormous losses at the end of the 90s, due to poor stock picking (Karchmer, 2000). 
 
For the above reasons, trying to pick the winners is very challenging. The best one would 
hope to achieve over the long run is 50% wins and 50% losses, resulting in continuous 
losses, due to the cost for trading and holding the portfolio.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors. 
Active investing vs. passive investing 
These questions asked about active fund management vs. passive fund management 
(indexing) as being valuable investment strategies. 
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Regarding investments in active managed funds, the support was as strong as anticipated 
as 60% of the asset managers, 58% of the institutional investors and 52% of the private 
investors opted for it. 16%, 18% and 19%, respectively were not in favour. Passive 
investing on the other hand enjoyed less support with only 51% of the asset managers; 
55% of the institutional investors and just 40% of the private investors being in favour. 
27%, 7% and 22%, respectively, were against it.   
 
Generally, these results are not surprising as the previous numbers showed strong support 
for asset allocation, value or dividend investing but also for stock picking. However, 
active investing won over passive investing.  
 
The literature (and experience) states that during the last decades, as described previously, 
the business models of many professional investors fostered active management. There 
was simply more money to be made through obtaining retrocessions or other forms of 
kick-backs (commissions), paid by the investment firms launching and managing funds. 
For the issuing firms, active (mutual) funds are also very lucrative, as they not only 
request a management fee of 1.5 to 2.5% per annum, but often a up to 20% performance 
fee from the achieved portfolio return. In addition, investors commonly pay a front-end 
load fee (sales fee) of 3.5 to 5% and regularly another ‘sales fee’ (back-end load) at the 
point of redemption.  
 
To illustrate this, the fund issuer, Ahead Wealth Solutions AG, charges 7.61% per annum 
for their ‘Dorico Equity Fund R’ (Morningstar, 2015). This fund was incorporated in 
January 2015 and lost 25% in the first year, while the MSCI World index for instance 
gained more than 10%. To recoup this 25% will take years of stable performance if 
invested wisely. Another example is the ‘Global Gold & Silver Mining Fund’ by BFC 
Fund Management AG that charges a staggering 9.3% per annum and has lost 65% since 
2014 (Morningstar, 2015). The latter has disappeared in the meantime, as of July 2017. 
 
On the contrary, no fees have to be paid by obtaining and redeeming passive vehicles 
such as index funds or exchange traded funds (ETFs), and no money (retrocessions) is to 
be gained by asset managers and banks trading with such products. Consequently, it is 
not in the nature of an asset manager or a bank to market low cost and low-income 
products. 
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The accumulation of above-mentioned fees for active managed funds results in a total 
expense ratio (TER) of around 2-3% per year. As a consequence, the investors (banks, 
asset managers, private investors) need to perform the equivalent of the TER better than 
the market, hence better than the average investor. This may be possible for a year or two 
but usually (and as evidenced) not in the long run.   
 
Nowadays, at least in Switzerland, generating money through retrocessions is forbidden 
as the high court in 2012 ruled (Giroud & Nadelhofer, 2015) that such commissions 
belong to the investor and not to the asset manager. Not surprisingly, it did not take long 
until asset managers and banks, on the one hand increased their overall management fees, 
but on the other hand, invented new costs to compensate for the missing revenue streams.   
 
Therefore, the vast majority of asset managers and banks still promote active managed 
funds as they generate more revenue, compared to selling passive products. However, 
numerous studies, by both scholars and practitioners as mentioned above, paint a different 
picture and determine that almost no active manager outperforms the respective index in 
the long-run. If this holds true, the question then becomes: which type of fund would 
banks and asset managers recommend/market if the commission for selling active and 
passive funds were equivalent?  
 
For these questions, the benchmark for superior investing was the institutional investors 
for passive management and the private investors for active management.  
Buy and hold  
This question asked about buy and hold as being a valuable investment strategy. 
 
It is surprising that, next to passive investing, the buy and hold strategy also ranks within 
the bottom 30% of all investment strategies in question. Only 49% asset managers, 52% 
of the institutional investors and 58% of the private investors believed in it. 27%, 13% 
and 11%, respectively, were in opposition.  
 
Buy and hold is a passive strategy whereby an investor buys shares, bonds, funds, etc. 
and holds them for a long time. Such investors typically do not worry about short-term 
price movements but rather focus, after a careful selection, on long-term profitability.  
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Many private investors unknowingly engage in this strategy, as they purchase a few 
shares at one time and then more or less forget about them, leaving their portfolio 
untouched. Typical buy and hold investors were/are Graham, Buffett, Munger, Bogle and 
Templeton. Glassmann (2002) cited Carett, Buffett and many others as some of the 
greatest investors in history, whose fortunes were made by sitting on good securities for 
years, rather than by active trading. 
 
A comparison conducted by Sincera Asset Management (2011) found that CHF 100,000 
invested in Swiss Market Index Total Return (SMI TR) in 1996, within a buy and hold 
strategy, resulted in CHF 254,000 by 2010. The same amount invested, but missing the 
10 most lucrative trading days, resulted in only CHF 130,000. Conversely, missing the 
10 worst trading days would have achieved an astounding CHF 470,000. However, 
omitting the 10 best and 10 worst trading days would have resulted in more or less the 
same amount as a normal buy and hold strategy would have yielded. 
 
Likewise, Price, cited in Ellis (2002), evidenced that $1 invested in the S&P 500 that 
missed the 90 best trading days in the 10 years from June 30, 1989, to June 30, 1999, 
would have lost 22 cents and would have made only 30 cents if it missed the worst 60 
days – but would have made $5.59 by staying fully invested. Conversely, sidestepping 
the 90 worst trading days would have yielded $42.78. 
 
As before, the asset manager group formed the biggest group in opposition. Again, one 
could conclude that a simple buy and hold strategy, even if proven successful, does not 
support the business models of banks and asset managers.  
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the private investors. 
Technical analysis 
This question asked about technical analysis as being a valuable investment strategy. 
 
Technical analysis, often contrasted with fundamental analysis, ranked in the bottom 
quintile of the survey, with only 30% of the asset managers, 35% of the institutional 
investors and 31% of the private investors approving of it. Roughly, the same numbers 
did not trust that technical analysis was a viable strategy.   
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Fundamental analysis focuses on the real characteristics (industries, businesses, 
management, products/services, R&D, potential to innovate, financials, etc.) of a 
company to evaluate what they are worth at present and in the future. Technical analysis, 
on the other hand, is concerned with the emotions of the market and tries to anticipate the 
directions of securities by analysing statistics, such as past prices, trading volumes, 
buying and selling behaviours, trends and so forth. Technical analysts use charts, and 
numerous other tools, to detect patterns that should reveal future directions of securities. 
 
Famous technical investors were/are Dalio, Schwartz, Sperandeo, Simons, Cohen or  
Seykota; while Seykota was too one of the pioneers of computerized trading. Even though 
some investors are successful with this strategy, most of them are not (Birinyi, 2013).   
 
Companies may collapse for a variety of reasons, e.g. if the management or any employee 
has falsified the company’s financial statements. This is something one cannot anticipate 
by the means of technical analysis. Of course, this is difficult for any investor to pick up, 
but at least the fundamentalists have a bigger chance of finding out prior to an investment, 
or at least before it is too late. Conclusively, some fundamental analysis will also fail to 
spot such companies (bad investments) but certainly all (due to their means of analysing 
and investing) all technical experts will (Lo & Hasanhodzic, 2009).  
 
Text and news analytics for investing is a new way for analysts and investors trying to 
identify signals that deliver them an advantage on the stock market. The concept is to 
track and analyse news flows and text sentiments in large, unstructured datasets, thereby 
mining data in a split second for investment-related information. Usually, the goal is to 
incorporate findings into trading strategies and algorithms, to back-test investment theses, 
or to improve risk-monitoring activities. Finding such information of interest in large, 
textual databases is becoming easier as semantic analytics technologies mature (Rhea, 
2015). 
 
For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the asset managers. 
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Value averaging  
This question asked about value averaging as being a valuable investment strategy. 
 
Value averaging was classified as the least favoured investment strategy as only 13% of 
the asset managers, 20% of the institutional investors and 18% of the private investors 
supported it. The majority of investors were neutral about it and 26%, 40% and 32%, 
respectively, labelled it as a poor or very poor way to invest money.  
 
I presumed that value averaging would rank within the top third of all investment 
strategies and was therefore astounded by the results. I can only assume that the vast 
majority of investors, both private and professional, simply possessed no knowledge 
about it or identified too many disadvantages with this concept.  
 
Value averaging is a method in which investors define a certain periodical growth target, 
therefore sporadically purchasing different quantities of additional shares, bonds, funds, 
etc. depending on the performance of the portfolio. For example, you start with a portfolio 
worth CHF 50,000 and define a growth target of CHF 500 per month. If the portfolio after 
one month is worth CHF 50,250, you would buy additional i.e. shares worth CHF 250 
(CHF 50,500 – 50,250). Conversely, if the portfolio is worth CHF 49,600, you would buy 
shares for CHF 900 (CHF 50,500 – 46,600).  
 
It works in a similar way to the dollar cost averaging strategy (DCA), but with periodical 
adjustments instead of steady purchases (Marschall, 2000). The main goal of value 
averaging is to buy more shares, bonds, funds, etc. when prices are falling and less when 
they are rising. By doing this, an investor’s portfolio will quite closely resemble average 
market returns. Edleson (1991) described the simple rule of value averaging in making 
the value (not the market price) of your stock go up by a fixed sum each month or period. 
 
To my understanding, there are only two downfalls to value averaging. Firstly, it can 
become costly in highly volatile markets and secondly, the fees for often buying smaller 
numbers of shares or ETFs, for example, will add up, hence decreasing the overall profit.  
To combat the potentially negative aspects, one could set realistic growth goals 
(incremental adjustments), find a custodian (broker/bank) that offers the investment 
products for the smallest fees, and adjust maybe quarterly instead of monthly.  
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For this question, the benchmark for superior investing was the asset managers. 
 
 
Table 40 – The importance of various investment strategies 
 
Figure 43 – The importance of various investment strategies 
The first section of this descriptive analysis (frequency tables) and discussion (based on 
the frequency breakdown in relation to existing literature and practice), led to suggestions 
regarding the ‘benchmark investor group’ for each question. This is summarised below 
within the scoring table. The one-point scores are summed across all categories to provide 
an overall score, which is then cast as a percentage of the points available. 
Asset 
Managers
Institut. 
Investors
Private 
Investors
Total
Asset 
Managers
Institut. 
Investors
Private 
Investors
1 Asset allocation 86.8% 71.0% 60.9% 198.4% 2.6% 12.9% 4.8%
2 Fundamental analysis 65.7% 75.9% 63.4% 175.4% 8.6% 10.3% 10.7%
3 Value investing 68.6% 72.4% 53.4% 169.8% 5.7% 6.9% 12.0%
4 Dividend investing 59.5% 65.6% 65.8% 163.7% 10.8% 6.3% 10.1%
5 Growth investing 55.6% 53.3% 63.6% 144.5% 8.3% 10.0% 9.7%
6 Stock picking 50.0% 53.1% 63.7% 115.2% 15.8% 21.9% 13.9%
7 Active investing 59.5% 57.6% 51.7% 115.3% 16.2% 18.2% 19.1%
8 Buy and hold 48.6% 51.6% 57.7% 107.1% 27.0% 12.9% 10.9%
9 Passive investing 51.4% 55.2% 40.2% 91.4% 27.0% 6.9% 21.5%
10 Technical analysis 30.6% 34.5% 30.8% -8.9% 36.1% 37.9% 30.8%
11 Value averaging 12.9% 20.0% 17.9% -47.1% 25.8% 40.0% 32.1%
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5.3.17. Scoring results by initial investor type 
 
 
Survey question
Asset 
manager
Institut. 
investor
Private 
Investor
Self-rating of investment knowledge in correlation with experience 1
How investors make their investment decisions 1
Change of asset manager due to loss of trust or investments into own funds 1
Risk profile that suits the investors best 1 1 1
How many products within an investor’s portfolio 1
How much of ones savings is invested 1
Investment duration 1
Expected return 1
Tolerance for loss 1
I can explain what an option is 1
I can explain what an asset class is 1
I can explain what a coupon is 1
I can explain what a future is 1
I can explain the fee structure of shares 1
I can explain what a structured procucts is 1
I can explain what the P/E ratio is 1
I can explain the fee structure of passive managed funds 1
I can explain what rebalancing is 1
I can explain the fee structure of active managed funds 1
The importance of asset allocation 1
The importance of the investment duration 1
The importance of the product choice 1
The importance of reducing TER 1
The importance of reducing retrocessions 1
The importance of the product choice 1
The importance of rebalacing 1
The importance of the active versus passive choice 1
The importance of the purchasing price 1
The importance of re-investing dividends 1
The importance of the bank holding the portfolio 1
The importance of the institution issuing ETFs 1
At 25% fee reduction, an investor would change to an online assset manager 1
At 50% fee reduction, an investor would change to an online assset manager 1
I now pay more attention to diversification 1
I now rather invest for the short-term as the  long-run ist uncertain 1
I now rather invest in single shares than in funds 1
I now rather invest without letting emotions influence my decision 1
Consideration of investing in the asset class shares 1
Consideration of investing in the asset class corporate bonds 1
Consideration of investing in the asset class real estate 1
Consideration of investing in the asset class commodities 1
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Table 41 – Score for superior investment acumen  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Survey question
Asset 
manager
Institut. 
investor
Private 
Investor
Consideration of investing in the asset class gold 1
Consideration of investing in the asset class cash 1
Consideration of investing in the asset class high yield bonds 1
Consideration of investing in the asset class government bonds 1
Consideration of investing in the asset class hedge funds 1
Investing in various markets 1 1
An investor's knowledge of a company as an important investment criteria 1
The dividend rate as an important investment criteria 1
The past performance as an important investment criteria 1
The P/E ratio as an important investment criteria 1
The industry of the company as an important investment criteria 1
The size of the company (large-cap) as an important investment criteria 1
Passive fund management as an important investment criteria 1
Active fund management as an important investment criteria 1
The company being Swiss as an important investment criteria 1
Sustainable investing as an important investment criteria 1
Asset allocation as an important investment strategy 1
Fundamental analysis as an important investment strategy 1
Value investing as an important investment strategy 1
Dividend investing as an important investment strategy 1
Growth investing as an important investment strategy 1
Stock picking as an important investment strategy 1
Acitve fund management as an important investment strategy 1
Passive fund selection as an important investment strategy 1
Buy and hold as an important investment strategy 1
Technical analysis as an important investment strategy 1
Value averaging as an important investment strategy 1
Total score for superior investments in absolute numbers 28 32 11
Total score for superior investments in percent 39.44% 45.07% 15.49%
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6. Distinguishing private from professional investors (statistics) 
6.1. Statistical analysis Research Question 1 
This chapter investigates the statistical nature and dependencies amongst important 
variables for RQ1: 
 
How do private and professional investors differ (if at all) in terms of their 
knowledge, experience, and investment approaches (investigating the first Dreyfus 
related categories)? 
 
It is divided into two segments. The first one focuses on the general knowledge base and 
experience (independent variables Q13, 14, 15, 16) in relation to the dependent variables 
(primary investor groups). The second segment focuses on both the investment criteria 
and strategies (independent variables Q17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32). Most 
of the broad questions have a number of subsidiary elements, as is shown in the table 
below.  
 
The following table shows a list of the independent variables in discussion. 
 
Q13  My increasing investment knowledge influences my investment decisions. 
Q14-1 I now pay more attention to diversification of my financial investments. 
Q14-2 I now rather invest for the short-term as the long-run is uncertain.  
Q14-3 I now rather invest in Single Stocks/Shares than in Funds.  
Q14-4 I now rather invest without emotions influencing my investment decisions.  
Q14-5 I changed my money manager because I lost trust in them/him. 
Q14-6 I changed my bank because they mostly suggested high commission / own funds. 
Q15-1 I can explain Asset classes. 
Q15-2 I can explain Coupons. 
Q15-3 I can explain Futures. 
Q15-4 I can explain Options. 
Q15-5 I can explain PE/Ratio. 
Q15-6 I can explain Rebalancing.  
Q15-7 I can explain Structured products. 
Q16-1 I can explain the fee structure of active manged funds.  
Q16-2 I can explain the fee structure of passive managed funds.  
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Q16-3 I can explain the fee structure of shares/stocks. 
Q17-1 I believe in an investment in Cash. 
Q17-2 I believe in an investment in Commodities. 
Q17-3 I believe in an investment in Corporate bonds. 
Q17-4 I believe in an investment in Gold. 
Q17-5 I believe in an investment in Government bonds. 
Q17-6 I believe in an investment in Hedge funds. 
Q17-7 I believe in an investment in High yield bonds. 
Q17-8 I believe in an investment in Shares/stocks. 
Q17-9 I believe in an investment in Real estate. 
Q18-1 I believe in investing in Australia / NZ. 
Q18-2 I believe in investing in Emerging markets. 
Q18-3 I believe in investing in Europe (general). 
Q18-4 I believe in investing in Germany. 
Q18-5 I believe in investing in Switzerland. 
Q18-6 I believe in investing in UK. 
Q18-7 I believe in investing in USA. 
Q20-1 I am a risk-averse investor whose main priority is safety. 
Q20-2 I am rather risk-averse but expect an attractive return on my investment. 
Q20-3 I am not risk averse nor a risk taker; I am happy if my wealth stays the same. 
Q20-4 For higher potential returns, I am willing to accept higher levels of risk. 
Q20-5 I am a risk taker but expect superior returns. 
Q24-1 I favour Active investing. 
Q24-2 I favour Asset allocation. 
Q24-3 I favour Buy and hold. 
Q24-4 I favour Dividend investing. 
Q24-5 I favour Fundamental analysis. 
Q24-6 I favour Growth investing. 
Q24-7 I favour Passive investing. 
Q24-8 I favour Stock picking. 
Q24-9 I favour Technical analysis. 
Q24-10 I favour Value averaging. 
Q24-11 I favour Value investing. 
Q29  I would change to an Online Asset Manager to save 25% TER. 
Q30  I would change to an Online Asset Manager to save 50% TER. 
Q31-1 This is an important investment criterion: Company is a large-cap. 
Q31-2 This is an important investment criterion: Swiss company. 
Q31-3 This is an important investment criterion: Ethical aspects. 
Q31-4 This is an important investment criterion: Expected dividend. 
Q31-5 This is an important investment criterion: Knowledge of company. 
186 
 
Q31-6 This is an important investment criterion: Past performance. 
Q31-7 This is an important investment criterion: Active managed fund. 
Q31-8 This is an important investment criterion: Passive managed fund. 
Q31-9 This is an important investment criterion: Low PE/Ratio. 
Q31-10 This is an important investment criterion: Industry the company is in. 
Q32-1 This is an important outperformance criterion: Rebalancing. 
Q32-2 This is an important outperformance criterion: Reducing retrocessions. 
Q32-3 This is an important outperformance criterion: Re-investing dividends. 
Q32-4 This is an important outperformance criterion: Active vs. passive funds. 
Q32-5 This is an important outperformance criterion: the choice of Asset classes. 
Q32-6 This is an important outperformance criterion: the choice of Products. 
Q32-7 This is an important outperformance criterion: the bank holding the portfolio. 
Q32-8 This is an important outperformance criterion: the purchasing price. 
Q32-9 This is an important outperformance criterion: the duration of the investment. 
Q32-10 This is an important outperformance criterion: the TER (Total expense ratio). 
Q32-11 This is an important outperformance criterion: the company issuing ETFs. 
Table 42 – List of statistical variables  
 
 
 
Figure 44 – Investor type vs. variables 13-16_3 
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Figure 45 – Investor type vs. variables 17-24_12 
 
Figure 46 – Investor type vs. variables 29-32_11 
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patterns can be better understood and interpreted (Field, 2009). The resulting factors are 
used in addition to Q13 and Q15 to conduct a discriminant analysis in order to distinguish 
private and professional investors, based on knowledge, experience and expertise. 
 
I used the principal component analysis as an extraction method to find a shared term for 
variables with high loadings on single factors and to reduce the dimension/number of 
variables. As Field (2005) suggests, the number of components can be determined on the 
basis of Eigenvalues. Thus, Eigenvalues are calculated for all components. The higher 
the Eigenvalue of a component, the higher is the proportion of explained variance of the 
original variables through this component. Components with an Eigenvalue < 1 will be 
dropped, as this is the usually-employed statistical threshold for the creation of factors. 
According to the Eigenvalues in the table below, three components should be used, which 
explain 69% of the variance. 
 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 1,757 29,288 29,288 
2 1,294 21,565 50,854 
3 1,117 18,623 69,476 
4 ,878 14,637 84,113 
5 ,664 11,068 95,181 
6 ,289 4,819 100,000 
Table 43 – Eigenvalues factor analysis Q14 
Field (2009) holds that a rotation of loadings can be useful if variables have a similar 
loading on different components. A rotation maximizes the high item loadings and 
minimizes the low item loading on the other factors. A promax rotation with Kaiser 
Normalization, which allows for correlated components, is applied to gain more diverse 
loadings and results are shown the table below. However, after the review, I decided to 
use only components 1 and 3 for the discriminant analysis; the pre/post-rotation loadings 
for component 2 were too dissimilar. Thus, variables of component 2 (Q14_1 and Q14_3) 
are included in their original form.  
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Table 44 – Component matrix of factor analysis Q14 
 
The factor analysis for questions Q16_1 to Q16_3 (Appendix) displays that just one 
component explains 85.8% of the variance. Since the Eigenvalue of component 1 is larger 
than one, only this component is used in the discriminant analysis. 
6.1.2. Discriminant analysis – knowledge and expertise 
For the discriminant analysis, with the type of investor as the dependent variable, the 
following independent variables were included: component 1 and 3 from factor analysis 
for Q14, component 1 from factor analysis for Q16; Q13, Q14_1, Q14_3, Q15_1- Q15_7. 
 
A discriminant analysis is applied to investigate whether private and professional 
investors can be distinguished by their knowledge, expertise and their investment 
approaches. Therefore, the independent variables are taken to predict the type of investor. 
Subsequently, the prediction can be compared with the true group membership. 
 
Field (2009) says that discriminant analysis is sensitive to missing values. For this reason, 
only cases with complete data on the relevant variables are here taken into account.  
 Component 
1 3 2 
Rate the following statement from 'Strongly disagree - to Strongly 
agree’ - I now pay more attention to diversification of my financial 
investments. 
  -,647 
Rate the following statement from 'Strongly disagree - to Strongly 
agree’ - I now rather invest for the short-term as the long-run is 
uncertain. 
 ,630  
Rate the following statement from 'Strongly disagree - to Strongly 
agree’ - I now rather invest in Single Stocks/Shares than in Funds. 
  ,770 
Rate the following statement from 'Strongly disagree - to Strongly 
agree’ - I now rather invest without letting emotions influencing my 
investment decisions. 
 ,641  
Rate the following statement from 'Strongly disagree - to Strongly 
agree’ - I changed my bank/Investment manager because I lost trust 
in them/him. 
,901   
Rate the following statement from 'Strongly disagree - to Strongly 
agree’ - I changed my investment manager because they invested my 
money into their own products/in products they earn more fees 
from. 
,894   
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Only 58% of the total number of 550 cases are valid. 20% of the cases show at least one 
missing discriminating variable and 22% of the cases have a missing group code and at 
the same time at least one missing discrimination variable. The ones with a missing group 
code are the excluded survey participants, as they have never invested in the stock market. 
 
The test of equality of group means verifies the hypothesis that there are differences in 
group means for the independent variables (Field, 2009). A p-value (column ‘Sig.’ in the 
table below) of less than 0.05 means that the difference between private and professional 
investors is of statistical relevance and not random. In this example, the null hypothesis 
of equality of group means cannot be rejected for component 1 (Q14_5 and Q14_6), 
leading to the assumption that for all other independent variables in the analysis, there is 
a significant difference concerning the dependent variable of investor types in question.  
 
 Wilks' 
Lambda 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
My increasing knowledge and expertise in financial 
investments (shares, bonds, funds, etc.) over the years are 
influencing my investment decisions (stock/share market). 
,939 20,429 1 317 ,000 
Factor:  Q14_5 und Q14_6. ,993 2,193 1 317 ,140 
Rate the following statement from 'Strongly disagree - to 
Strongly agree’ - I now pay more attention to 
diversification of my financial investments. 
,985 4,703 1 317 ,031 
Rate the following statement from 'Strongly disagree - to 
Strongly agree’ - I now rather invest in Single 
Stocks/Shares than in Funds. 
,973 8,643 1 317 ,004 
Factor:  Q14_2 and Q14_4. ,971 9,316 1 317 ,002 
I can explain what the following investment product or 
term is - Asset class. 
,920 27,504 1 317 ,000 
I can explain what the following investment product or 
terms is – Coupon. 
,932 23,228 1 317 ,000 
I can explain what the following investment product or 
term is – Futures. 
,913 30,394 1 317 ,000 
I can explain what the following investment product or 
term is - Options (calls/puts). 
,939 20,544 1 317 ,000 
I can explain what the following investment product or 
term is - P/E Ratio. 
,934 22,500 1 317 ,000 
I can explain what the following investment product or 
term is – Rebalancing. 
,830 65,065 1 317 ,000 
I can explain what the following investment product or 
term is - Structured products. 
,884 41,473 1 317 ,000 
Factor:  Q16. ,860 51,669 1 317 ,000 
Table 45 – Tests of equality of group means (RQ1-1) 
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Field (2009) explains that the Eigenvalue specifies how good the estimated prediction of 
the dependent variables is; here the investor types can be predicted on the basis of the 
analysis conducted. An Eigenvalue of 1 would constitute a perfect prediction but is clearly 
not feasible (normally). The table below shows an Eigenvalue of 0,314, which is not very 
high, but is still capable of delivering some information. All interpretations from here on 
ought to be seen in the context of this value.  
 
Function Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative % Canonical 
Correlation 
1 ,314a 100,0 100,0 ,489 
a. First 1 canonical discriminant functions were used in the analysis. 
Table 46 – Eigenvalues (RQ1-1) 
 
Following Field (2009), another suitable tool to use in evaluating  RQ1, is Wilks’ Lambda 
(table below). This indicates, if significant, that there is a statistical relevance of the 
responses to the questions about knowledge and expertise in the prediction of investor 
types. Thus, Wilks’ Lambda should be close to 0 and significant (p < .05) if there is a 
relevant prediction of investor types in the data. For RQ1, it is 0,761 and can be 
interpreted as weak. 
 
Test of Function(s) Wilks' Lambda Chi-square Df Sig. 
1 ,761 84,678 13 ,000 
Table 47 – Wilks’ Lambda (RQ1-1) 
 
When inserting the observed values for the original variables and the factor for the 
components, one can predict the investors type (private or professional). The resulting 
value is not exactly 1 or 2 but can be assigned to one group by means of a transformation 
which uses the group centroids. In the table below, hence, the farther apart the means are, 
the less error there will be in classification (Field, 2009). With this information, it is 
possible to group every single respondent into either private or professional investor.  
 
Investor Function 
1 
Private -,277 
professional 1,125 
Table 48 – Functions at Group Centroids (RQ1-1) 
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As Knapp (1979) shows, the canonical correlation is a multivariate analysis and measures 
the correlation coefficient of the strength of association between two canonical variates. 
It analyses multiple X and multiple Y correlation(s), whereby the canonical variate (CV) 
is the product of the weighed sum of the variables in the analysis. Hence, it compares the 
effects of variables; in my case, the prediction of investor type by different independent 
variables.  
 
The highest coefficient of 0.583 can be found for Q15_6, followed by the component for 
Q16, meaning that these variables have the greatest possibility to predict the dependent 
variable (type of investor). All other variables (around .0) can be interpreted as almost 
irrelevant to the classification of investor types. As Field (2009) shows, all values, 
especially negative ones, must be assumed to be all linked together to the ‘functions at 
group centroids’.  
 
With all individual data about the independent variables, positive values tend to generate 
the final function value which is positive, which means that they incline to categorize the 
respondent as professional (because of the positive group centroid of 1.125). Negative 
values of standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients decrease the final 
result of group centroids, meaning the lower value predict the private investors. As a 
result, the more someone e.g. agrees on factor ‘Q14_2 and Q14_4’ and the more someone 
can explain P/E Ratio and Coupon, and the more someone invests in single stocks/shares, 
the more s/he is seen as a private investor. 
 
On the contrary, the more a respondent can explain structured products and futures, and 
the more individual knowledge influences investment decisions, the more that respondent 
is categorized as a professional investor. Besides these results, the influence of factor 16, 
the ability to explain the fee structure, and explaining rebalancing are most important. 
Thus, the more someone can explain the fees which are incurred from buying active and 
passive managed funds or shares/stocks and the more someone can explain rebalancing, 
the more (strongly) these individuals are categorized as a professional investor.  
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 Function 
1 
Factor:  Q14_2 und Q14_4. -0,262 
I can explain what the following investment product or term is - P/E Ratio. -0,232 
I can explain what the following investment product or terms is - Coupon. -0,156 
Rate the following statement from 'Strongly disagree - to Strongly agree'. - I now 
rather invest in Single Stocks/Shares than in Funds. 
-0,131 
I can explain what the following investment product or terms is - Asset class. -0,091 
I can explain what the following investment product or terms is - Options 
(calls/puts). 
-0,091 
factor:  Q14_5 und Q14_6. -0,03 
Rate the following statement from 'Strongly disagree - to Strongly agree’ - I now 
pay more attention to diversification of my financial investments. 
0,042 
My increasing knowledge and expertise in financial investments (shares, bonds, 
funds, etc.) over the years are influencing my investment decisions (stock/share 
market). 
0,1 
I can explain what the following investment product or terms is - Structured 
products. 
0,248 
I can explain what the following investment product or terms is - Futures. 0,29 
Factor:  Q16 0,424 
I can explain what the following investment product or terms is - Rebalancing. 0,583 
Table 49 – Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients (RQ1-1) 
The table Classification Results illustrates that 75% of all private investors and 84% of 
the professional investors can be predicted accurately with only the independent variables 
considered. This effect is validated by the measure Phi that is significant at a value of 
0.493 and shows that there is a medium accordance between the investor type and the 
predicted investor type (77% of the original grouped cases correctly classified). 
 
  
Investor 
Predicted Group Membership 
Total 
  private professional 
Original 
Count 
private 193 63 256 
professional 10 53 63 
% 
private 75,4 24,6 100,0 
professional 15,9 84,1 100,0 
Table 50 – Classification Results (RQ1-1) 
 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi ,493 ,000 
N of Valid Cases 319  
Table 51 – Symmetric Measures (RQ1-1) 
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6.1.3. Factor analysis – Area 2 (investment criteria, strategies) 
The factor analysis for Area 2 comprised the questions Q17_1 to Q17_9. The table below 
shows that according to the Eigenvalue criteria, three components, which explain a total 
of 52,3% of the variance, should be used (though component 4 almost reaches the 
criterion Eigenvalue). 
 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2,132 23,687 23,687 
2 1,350 15,004 38,691 
3 1,228 13,642 52,333 
4 ,993 11,033 63,366 
5 ,864 9,600 72,966 
6 ,810 9,004 81,971 
7 ,608 6,757 88,727 
8 ,571 6,344 95,071 
9 ,444 4,929 100,000 
Table 52 – Total Variance Explained (RQ1-1) 
 
As for Area 1 (knowledge, expertise), the promax rotation with Kaiser Normalization is 
applied to attain more diverse loadings. After review, I decided to use only component 
one in the corresponding table below since the other asset classes are too dissimilar in 
terms of their characteristics; thus Q17_6 and Q17_7 are mutual to one component. The 
other variables are included in the discriminant analysis in their original form. 
 
 
  
Component 
1 2 3 
I believe it is a good idea to invest in the following asset class – Cash.       
I believe it is a good idea to invest in the following asset class - 
Commodities (Oil, Wheat, Sugar, Copper...). 
    ,781 
I believe it is a good idea to invest in the following asset class - Corporate 
bonds. 
  ,670   
I believe it is a good idea to invest in the following asset class – Gold.     ,808 
I believe it is a good idea to invest in the following asset class - Government 
bonds. 
  ,778   
I believe it is a good idea to invest in the following asset class - Hedge 
funds. 
,788     
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I believe it is a good idea to invest in the following asset class - High yield 
bonds. 
,790     
I believe it is a good idea to invest in the following asset class - Real estate 
(Funds). 
  ,511   
I believe it is a good idea to invest in the following asset class -
Shares/stocks. 
  ,507   
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Table 53 – Pattern Matrix (factor analysis RQ1-1) 
6.1.4. Discriminant analysis 2 – investment criteria and strategies  
For the second discriminant analysis, with the type of investor as the dependent variable, 
the following independent variables were included: component 1 (Q17_6, Q17_7) of the 
factor analysis for Q17 and all other questions of Q17_1–5, 8, 9, Q18, Q19, Q20, Q24_1 
– Q24_6, Q24_8 –Q24_12. 
 
For the discriminant analysis I, Area 2 (investment criteria, strategies), 40% of the total 
cases can be used. 37% have at least one missing discriminating variable and 22% have 
both a missing group code and at least one missing discriminating variable. The ones with 
a missing group code are the excluded survey participants, as they have never invested in 
the stock market.  
 
As the table below shows, the null hypothesis of equality of group means has to be 
rejected for several independent variables. Since there are many non-significant variables 
and since I cannot examine the exclusion of each single variables separately, (as it was 
possible for segment 1), I have to exclude them and re-conduct the analysis. 
 
 
  
Wilks' 
Lambda F df1 df2 Sig. 
factor:  Q17_6 und Q14_7 ,997 ,447 1 138 ,505 
I believe in investing in the following asset class - 
Corporate bonds. 
,962 5,378 1 138 ,022 
I believe in investing in the following asset class - 
Government bonds. 
1,000 ,009 1 138 ,926 
I believe in investing in the following asset class - Real 
estate (Funds). 
,994 ,831 1 138 ,364 
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I believe in investing in the following asset class - 
Shares/stocks. 
,983 2,420 1 138 ,122 
I believe in investing in the following asset class - 
Commodities (Oil, Wheat, Sugar, Copper...). 
1,000 ,057 1 138 ,812 
I believe in investing in the following asset class – 
Gold. 
,993 ,947 1 138 ,332 
I believe in investing in the following market - 
Australia / New Zealand. 
,998 ,244 1 138 ,622 
I believe in investing in the following market - 
Emerging Markets (China, India, Brazil, etc.). 
,996 ,616 1 138 ,434 
I believe in investing in the following market - Europe 
in general. 
,930 10,463 1 138 ,002 
I believe in investing in the following market – 
Germany. 
,967 4,690 1 138 ,032 
I believe in investing in the following market – 
Switzerland. 
,996 ,622 1 138 ,432 
I believe in investing in the following market – UK. ,913 13,140 1 138 ,000 
I believe in investing in the following market – USA. ,932 10,129 1 138 ,002 
Would you rather invest in Active managed funds or 
in Passive managed funds (Index funds/ETFs). 
,999 ,113 1 138 ,738 
In terms of your financial investments 
(buying/holding/selling shares, bonds, funds, etc.), 
what risk level describes you best. 
,970 4,228 1 138 ,042 
Rank the following investment strategy from 'Very 
poor' to 'Excellent' when their focus is on: - Active 
investing. 
,997 ,371 1 138 ,544 
Rank the following investment strategy from 'Very 
poor' to 'Excellent' when their focus is on: - Asset 
allocation. 
,931 10,175 1 138 ,002 
Rank the following investment strategy from 'Very 
poor' to 'Excellent' when their focus is on: - Buy and 
hold. 
,994 ,883 1 138 ,349 
Rank the following investment strategy from 'Very 
poor' to 'Excellent' when their focus is on: - Dividend 
investing. 
1,000 ,007 1 138 ,935 
Rank the following investment strategy from 'Very 
poor' to 'Excellent' when their focus is on: - 
Fundamental Analysis. 
,982 2,551 1 138 ,112 
Rank the following investment strategy from 'Very 
poor' to 'Excellent' when their focus is on: - Growth 
investing. 
1,000 ,032 1 138 ,858 
Rank the following investment strategy from 'Very 
poor' to 'Excellent' when their focus is on: - Passive 
investing. 
,992 1,105 1 138 ,295 
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Rank the following investment strategy from 'Very 
poor' to 'Excellent' when their focus is on: - Stock 
picking. 
1,000 ,066 1 138 ,798 
Rank the following investment strategy from 'Very 
poor' to 'Excellent' when their focus is on: - Technical 
analysis. 
,989 1,544 1 138 ,216 
Rank the following investment strategy from 'Very 
poor' to 'Excellent' when their focus is on: - Value 
averaging. 
,993 ,949 1 138 ,332 
Rank the following investment strategy from 'Very 
poor' to 'Excellent' when their focus is on: - Value 
investing. 
,953 6,790 1 138 ,010 
Table 54 – Tests of Equality of Group Means (RQ1-2) 
 
The table for ‘Tests of Equality of Group Means’ is shown only once, since all variables 
remaining show significant results (p < .05). Likewise, the Box Test is not significant 
(Box’s M = 47,931, F = 1,258 with p = .138). Therefore, the succeeding interpretations 
discuss the discriminant analysis without the non-significant variables. 
 
As mentioned before in the first element of this analysis, the Eigenvalue of 0.469 is a 
satisfactory value. Though the Eigenvalue unfortunately has changed from 0.469 (without 
deletion) to 0.201 (with deletion), Wilks’ Lambda has changed from 0.681 (without 
deletion) to 0.833 (with deletion). As a consequence, deleting the non-significant 
variables have decreased the statistical relevance of the analysis. 
 
Investor 
Function 
(without deletion) 
Function 
(with deletion) 
Private -,445 -,261 
Professional 1,039 ,761 
Table 55 – Functions at Group Centroids (RQ1-2) 
 
When comparing both analyses (with and without deletion), separating the investor types 
becomes less obvious, but it is still possible. The following coefficients only include the 
analysis with deletion. 
 
I believe it is a good idea to invest in the following markets – Germany. -,120 
I believe it is a good idea to invest in the following markets – USA. -,030 
I believe it is a good idea to invest in the following markets - Europe in general. ,265 
Rank the following investment strategies from 'Very poor' to 'Excellent' when their 
focus is on - Value investing. 
,278 
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I believe it is a good idea to invest in the following asset classes - Corporate bonds ,285 
In terms of your financial investments (buying/holding/selling shares, bonds, 
funds, etc.), what risk profile describes you best. 
,313 
Rank the following investment strategies from 'Very poor' to 'Excellent' when their 
focus is on - Asset allocation. 
,321 
I believe it is a good idea to invest in the following markets – UK. ,543 
Table 56 – Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients (RQ1-2) 
 
With values of -0.120 and -0.030, for investors considering investing in the German or 
US market, this has only a minor effect in predicting a partaker as a private investor, 
whereas investing in the UK market (0.543) leads to a strong categorization as a 
professional investor. Also, the more someone is a ‘risk taker’ (Q20), the more s/he 
believes in investing in Europe and in corporate bonds, and the more someone rates the 
investment strategies focusing on value investing and asset allocation as excellent, the 
more this participant is categorized as a professional investor.  
 
In conclusion, the table below shows that 66% of private and 67% of professional 
investors can be predicted accurately with only the independent variables taken into 
account. This result is again validated by the measure Phi that is significant at a value of 
0.285 and shows that there is a slight agreement between the investor type and the 
independent variables. 
 
 
Investor Predicted Group 
Membership 
Total 
Private Professional 
Original 
Count 
Private 109 57 166 
Professional 19 38 57 
% 
Private 65,7 34,3 100,0 
Professional 33,3 66,7 100,0 
Table 57 – Classification Results (RQ1-2) 
6.1.5. Discriminant analysis 3 – Area 2, investment criteria and strategies 
For this third discriminant analysis, with the type of investor as the dependent variable, 
the following independent variables were included: Q21, Q22, Q25, Q27 - Q30, Q31, 
Q32. 
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For the discriminant analysis of Area 2, (investment criteria, strategies) 24% of the total 
cases can be used. 54% have at least one missing discriminating variable and 22% have 
both a missing group code and at least one missing discriminating variable. The ones with 
a missing group code are the excluded survey participants, as they have never invested in 
the stock market. 
 
The test of equality of group means displays a significant difference between private and 
professional investors only for the question regarding the importance whether the stock 
is from a ‘large-cap company’ (large enterprise), the importance of the choice of asset 
classes and the current purchasing price.  
 
As previously, it is not possible to remove single variables to test if the new model could 
be improved as in Area 1 (knowledge, expertise), so we have to exclude all non-
significant variables from the analysis. 
 
 
  
Wilks' 
Lambda F df1 df2 Sig. 
How long is your investment horizon? ,995 ,701 1 129 ,404 
How much of your savings is invested in shares, bonds, 
funds, etc.? 
,982 2,318 1 129 ,130 
In how many products (shares, managed funds, bonds, 
ETFs, etc.) are you invested in (e.g. 1 share, 1 ETF, 1 fund, 
etc. equals 1 product)? 
,982 2,318 1 129 ,130 
What is your tolerance for loss in a bad year on the stock 
market (e.g. bear market year)? 
,993 ,968 1 129 ,327 
How do you usually make your investment decisions 
(buying/selling shares, bonds, funds, etc.)? 
,992 1,096 1 129 ,297 
A bank is managing my financial investments 
(Shares/bonds/funds, etc.). I would - given the quality 
and products are the same - change to an Online-Asset 
Manager if I could save 25% of the usual annual asset 
management fee. 
,995 ,704 1 129 ,403 
I would change to an Online-Asset Manager if I - given 
the quality and products are the same - could save 50% 
of the usual annual asset management fee. 
,999 ,080 1 129 ,778 
If you buy shares/stocks, bonds, funds, etc., how 
important for your decisions is the following criterion -
Company is a Large-Cap (Large Enterprise). 
,963 4,893 1 129 ,029 
If you buy shares/stocks, bonds, funds, etc., how 
important for your decisions is the following criterion -
Company is a Swiss company. 
,976 3,131 1 129 ,079 
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If you buy shares/stocks, bonds, funds, etc., how 
important for your decisions is the following criterion -
Ethical aspects like sustainability or green investing. 
,973 3,547 1 129 ,062 
If you buy shares/stocks, bonds, funds, etc., how 
important for your decisions is the following criterion -
Expected dividend rate. 
,996 ,526 1 129 ,470 
If you buy shares/stocks, bonds, funds, etc., how 
important for your decisions is the following criterion - 
My knowledge of the company. 
,999 ,139 1 129 ,709 
If you buy shares/stocks, bonds, funds, etc., how 
important for your decisions is the following criterion -
Past performance (profit/loss over years). 
,990 1,319 1 129 ,253 
If you buy shares/stocks, bonds, funds, etc., how 
important for your decisions is the following criterion -
Share/stock has a low P/E ratio. 
,999 ,073 1 129 ,787 
If you buy shares/stocks, bonds, funds, etc., how 
important for your decisions is the following criterion -
The industry the company is in. 
,998 ,243 1 129 ,623 
If you buy shares/stocks, bonds, funds, etc., how 
important for your decisions is the following criterion -
Product is an active managed fund. 
,978 2,870 1 129 ,093 
If you buy shares/stocks, bonds, funds, etc., how 
important for your decisions is the following criterion -
Product is an Index fund or an ETF. 
,999 ,184 1 129 ,669 
How important is the following factor for an investor’s 
outperformance - Rebalancing (active portfolio 
management). 
,997 ,363 1 129 ,548 
How important is the following factor for an investor’s 
outperformance - Reducing/eliminating Retrocessions 
(Kick-backs) to the bank/asset manager. 
,993 ,885 1 129 ,349 
How important is the following factor for an investor’s 
outperformance - Reinvesting dividends/coupons. 
,989 1,462 1 129 ,229 
How important is the following factor for an investor’s 
outperformance - The choice of active or passive 
managed funds. 
,998 ,214 1 129 ,644 
How important is the following factor for an investor’s 
outperformance - The choice of asset classes. 
,922 10,934 1 129 ,001 
How important is the following factor for an investor’s 
outperformance - The choice of products (shares, bonds, 
funds, etc.). 
1,000 ,034 1 129 ,853 
How important is the following factor for an investor’s 
outperformance - The choice of the bank holding your 
portfolio (share, type of bond, type of fund, etc.). 
,983 2,186 1 129 ,142 
How important is the following factor for an investor’s 
outperformance - The current purchasing price. 
,965 4,610 1 129 ,034 
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How important is the following factor for an investor’s 
outperformance - The duration of my investment. 
1,000 ,061 1 129 ,806 
How important is the following factor for an investor’s 
outperformance - Total Expense Ratio (TER). 
,997 ,416 1 129 ,520 
How important is the following factor for an investor’s 
outperformance - The financial institution issuing ETFs. 
,979 2,701 1 129 ,103 
Table 58 – Tests of Equality of Group Means (RQ1-3) 
 
The Eigenvalue of 0.138 (without deletion, 0.417) is unfortunately no longer an 
acceptable value and shows that there is only little information in the independent 
variables for the prediction of the investor type. The Wilks’ Lambda test indicates a weak 
statistical relevance of the responses to the questions related in the prediction of an 
investor type with 0.879 and p < .001 (without deletion Wilks’ Lambda was 0.706 with p 
= .065, thus there would not have been a significant model). 
 
Investor 
Function 
(without deletion) 
Function 
(with deletion) 
Private ,395 -,197 
Professional -1,041 ,696 
Table 59 – Functions at Group Centroids (RQ1-3)  
 
Without deletion, a negative group centroid was obtained for the group of professional 
investors, but the ‘deleted version’ implicates negative group centroids for private 
investors again. As within the preceding analysis, the difference in group centroids is 
smaller in the new model but that is no problem for the analysis itself. 
 
 
 
Function 
1 
If you buy shares/stocks, bonds, funds, etc., how important for your 
decision is the following criterion - Company is a Large-Cap (Large 
Enterprise). 
-,410 
How important is the following factor for an investor’s outperformance - 
The current purchasing price. 
-,230 
How important is the following factor for an investors outperformance - 
The choice of asset classes. 
,928 
Table 60 – Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients (RQ1-3)  
 
The table above shows the results of the analysis. The more important the choice of asset 
classes is for a participant, the more strongly s/he is categorized as a professional investor. 
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The more important it is for a participant that a company s/he buys the stock from, is a 
large enterprise, and the more important the current purchasing price is, the more a 
respondent is categorized as private investor.  
 
Comparing the predicted group membership of the investor type, 65% of all private 
investors and 72% of all professional investors can be predicted accurately. This result is 
validated by the measure Phi which is significant at a value of 0.310 and shows that there 
is an agreement between the investor type and the independent variables. 
 
  
Investor Predicted Group 
Membership 
Total 
  Private Professional 
Original 
Count 
Private 156 84 240 
Professional 19 49 68 
% 
Private 65,0 35,0 100,0 
Professional 27,9 72,1 100,0 
Table 61 – Classification Results (RQ1-3)  
6.2. Discussion of the results for RQ1 – Statistical analysis 
The following discussion concerns the analysis regarding my initial research question:  
‘How do private and professional investors differ (if at all) in terms of their knowledge, 
experience, and investment approaches (investigating the first Dreyfus related 
categories)’. 
 
My hypothesis is that the more knowledgeable and experienced an investor is, the better 
and more cautiously s/he will invest. This, in my opinion, means passively, applying a 
buy-and-hold strategy with periodical rebalancing, appropriately diversified, cost-
efficient and for the long-term.  
 
In the previous descriptive analysis and discussion, I had further differentiated the 
professional investors between asset managers and institutional investors. Although, not 
pertinent to answer this research question, I would estimate, in accord with the Dreyfus 
model, that the private investors are either ‘novice’ or potentially ‘advanced beginners’, 
that asset managers are to be found in the range of ‘competent’ and ‘proficient’ and the 
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institutional investors within ‘proficient’ and ‘expertise’. This, however, could not be 
evidenced within this statistical analysis.  
 
By applying the discriminant analyses, the canonical correlation analysis in relation to 
the three groups or two types (private or professional investors), it was possible to cluster 
every single respondent (the ones who completed all questions), into either private or 
professional investors. The classification results illustrated that between 65% private 
investors and 84% professional investors, depending on the analysis, can be accurately 
predicted with only the independent variable considered. These effects were validated by 
the measure Phi. 
6.2.1. Effect of increased knowledge on investment decisions 
The analysis further showed that professional investors could also be determined by the 
level of agreement, that their increasing knowledge and expertise over time influences 
the investment decisions. 
 
This is in line with Dreyfus (2004), and I would therefore assume that investor’s 
knowledge and expertise evolve over time, depending on the material interest one holds 
for investing and on the quantity of practical influence one experiences. If increasing 
knowledge and expertise would not have an impact on investment decisions, an investor 
could not progress along Dreyfus’ 5-stage learning model.  
6.2.2. Risk profile and investment duration 
The canonical correlation analysis also suggests that the more one invests for the short-
term, the more one is a private investor. On the other hand, the more one’s risk profile is 
that of a risk taker (willing to accept higher levels of risk for higher returns), the more 
that investor is classified as a professional investor. The descriptive analysis confirms 
these outcomes, as the private investors showed the largest percentage of short-term 
investors (25%); and the professional investors the highest percentage of risk takers - 69% 
for the asset managers, 53% for the institutional investors, against 47% for the private 
investors. 
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Concerning the private investors favor of short-term investments, if one does not require 
the funds in the near future, an investor ought to have a long-term view, as the short-term 
is more volatile. This means, if one buys a share today and holds it, for example, for one 
to six months or a year, the risk that the price will eventually be lower at the point of 
redemption is higher, than if the same investor would want to hold the product over a 
period of e.g. three to ten years. Thus, the volatility is lower and the chance to sell with a 
profit is higher. This is also the judgement of i.e. Natale (2000), Siegel (2014), Stanyer 
(2010) or Stammers (2015).  
 
In regard to the professional investors accepting higher risks and therefore higher 
volatility, I would assume that they are more aware of the risk/return profiles of their 
investments, hence the asset classes and products as i.e. Schelauske (2000), Ibbotson & 
Kaplan (2000), Ferri (2006) or Siegel (2014) described, or the effect of diversification as 
Markowitz (1952) or Stammers (2015) illustrated. In conclusion, the private investors 
maybe not be as well informed as the professionals.  
 
This would be in accordance with not only my hypothesis that the professional investors 
are more knowledgeable and experienced, but also with the Dreyfus adult acquisition 
model itself. I initially supposed the private investors to be found within the first or second 
stage (novice or advanced beginners) and the professional investors within the third to 
the fifth stage (competent, proficient and expert), which is weakly supported here.  
6.2.3. Futures and structured products vs. PE/Ratio and Coupons 
Additional significant results from the canonical correlation analysis distinguishing the 
professional investors were the ability to explain the mechanics of futures and structured 
products. Conversely, being better able to explain the PE/Ratio and coupons distinguished 
the private investors.  
 
It seems that professional investors are more able to explain rather technical investment 
vehicles such as futures or structured products, maybe due to their daily dealings with 
such products. This is not surprising, especially since the prior descriptive analysis 
showed the same; hence, for futures i.e. 93% of the asset managers, 84% of the 
institutional investors and only 80% of the private investors could explain it well. The 
numbers for structured products were 95%, 86% and 65%.  
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What is rather surprising is that, according to the canonical correlation analysis, the more 
a respondent can explain the PE/ratio or a coupon, the more s/he is seen as a private 
investor. The corresponding frequency analysis however, exhibited professional investors 
being more capable of explaining these investment topics. Therefore, I could only assume 
that both the P/E ratio and coupons (with many investors holding government bonds) are 
themes that private investors are generally more knowledgeable about. Other investment 
matters, such as the ability to explain e.g. asset classes or stock options were not of 
statistical relevance, thus could not be used to predict the investor type.  
6.2.4. Understanding rebalancing and fee structures of products 
The canonical correlation analysis showed the highest coefficient of 0.583 to be found 
for Q15_6, followed by 0.424 for the factor for Q16. These demonstrate that the more 
participants could explain rebalancing and the more they could explain the fee structure 
of active managed funds, passive managed funds and shares, the more likely they are to 
be categorized as professional investors.  
 
This is in line with the prior descriptive analysis, which showed that the majority of 
professional investors (88% asset managers, 89% institutional investors) could explain 
the notion of rebalancing well, but only half as many private investors (45%) felt 
confident about it. This is significant, since rebalancing too (83% asset managers, 56% 
institutional investors, 56% private investors) was found to be a significant factor 
contributing to a positive and sustainable portfolio return. The literature too holds that 
portfolios, especially within a buy-and hold investment strategy, require adjustment of 
the asset class ratios (products) according to the investor’s risk profile. Otherwise, the 
asset classes will overtime drift away from the desired levels of risk and proportion 
(Steven & Wimer, 1999; Ellis 2002; Swensen, 2005; Ferri, 2006; Goldie & Murray, 2010; 
Stammers, 2015).  
 
Professional investors, in this research, are more capable understand and explain the fee 
structure of active and passive funds, as well as for ordinary shares, than the private 
investors. I found the same in the earlier analysis, where especially the fees for passive 
funds could only be explained by 49% of the private investors; for active managed funds, 
half of all private investors comprehended it (vs. around 90% for the professional 
investors).  
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The literature holds that the way the investment products are structured in terms of their 
fees requires consideration (Malkiel, 1973; Ibbotson & Kaplan, 2000; Darst, 2003; The 
CFA Institute, 2010; Goldie & Murray, 2010; Siegel, 2014; Stammers, 2015). A mutual 
fund (active managed fund) can quickly cost 2 to 4% of the total assets per annum, which 
translates to that the respective fund manager must at least perform 2 to 4% better than 
the market average. The passive counterpart usually costs 0.2 – 0.6%, thus 6 to 10 times 
less (Ellis, 2002; Swensen, 2005).  
 
The previous analysis further illustrated that reducing fees, thus the total expense ratio 
(TER) was for all investor groups amongst the most significant contributors to achieve a 
portfolio performance that is higher and more sustainable than the market average.   
6.2.5. Investing in various markets 
The canonical correlation analysis showed that private investors could also be identified 
by their investments in the German or American market, whereas the professional 
investors have a strong tendency towards the UK and the general European market. These 
results are only partly in accordance with the previous frequency analysis as i.e. 93% of 
the private investors vs. 76% institutional investors preferred investing in Germany, but 
only 39% private investors vs. 67% institutional investors would invest in the USA. For 
the UK and the European market, the results showed the same effects: 33% vs. 8% (UK) 
and 68% vs. 60%.  
 
Both the frequency analysis and the discriminant analysis should be interpreted with 
caution as there were not only participants living in Switzerland within the 317 valid 
respondents but also around 50 respondents from 12 other countries with the majority 
living in Germany, followed by Australia and the UK (and country of origin/residence 
may be significant here).  
 
Likewise, the literature states that investors ought to invest the largest portion of their 
assets in their home currency, and for diversification effects, the remainder in foreign 
currencies. If investors do the opposite, the portfolio could face a significant currency 
(exchange rate) risk (Ellis, 2002), Ibbotson & Kaplan, 2000). Conversely, Birchler, 
Volkart, Ettlin, and Hegglin (2010) indicated that the majority of Swiss stockholders only 
invest in the Swiss market, signifying a home bias.  
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6.2.6. Investing in single stock vs. funds  
The statistical analysis also showed that the more an investor favours single stocks over 
funds, the more these participants are categorized as private investors. It follows that 
professional investors favour mutual or passive funds over single shares. The descriptive 
analysis confirmed these results as the private investors showed the largest percentage of 
single shares investment advocates.  
 
Brinson, Hood & Beebower (1986) as well as Ibbotson & Kaplan (2000) state that the 
choice of investment products, any fund or single stocks, does not matter as much as the 
asset allocation mix, as the allocation across asset classes explains around 90% of the 
variation within a typical portfolio over time. Others, like the CFA Institute (2008) or 
Stammers (2015) identify investing in single stocks as one of the common mistakes that 
investors should avoid.  
 
On the other hand, Natale (2000) and O’Neil (2009) believe that stock picking is the most 
promising investment strategy. Peter Lynch (1993) agrees and claims that one should not 
hold more than 5 stocks in a portfolio. He states that he would rather spend all his time 
fundamentally analysing only a handful of companies to the extent that he understands 
them exceptionally well, than holding many stocks or funds from companies he cannot 
learn enough about. Similarly, advocates of technical analysis, i.e. Bensignor (2000) or 
Faith (2007) would also rather invest in single stocks.  
6.2.7. Investing in the asset class corporate bonds 
The analysis also shows that professional investors could be predicted by their interest to 
invest in the corporate bonds asset class. This result is also in line with the prior frequency 
analysis, as corporate bonds were, after shares/stocks, the second most favoured asset 
class with 85% asset managers, 80% institutional investors and 60% private investors 
voting for it.  
 
Other asset classes such as real estate, gold, high-yield bonds or hedge funds (factor 3) 
showed no significant statistical relevance in predicting the investor type. As mentioned 
earlier, the literature is divergent concerning the use of corporate bonds. While they could 
be seen as an attractive investment that often delivers high coupons (stable and 
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predictable income stream), and since they move inversely with interest rates, becoming 
less attractive when interest rates rise, and more attractive when interest rates fall (Green, 
2008), they also bear risks of which some investors may not be aware of (Swensen, 2005).  
6.2.8. Further criteria for outperforming the benchmark indices 
As with the asset allocation results as an important investment strategy / application 
described above, the canonical correlation analysis also determined that ‘the choice of the 
asset classes contributing to a positive portfolio return that is higher than the benchmark’, 
ranked highest, and identified the professional investors. The earlier frequency analysis 
revealed 100% for the asset managers, 85% for the institutional investors and just 63% 
for the private investors.  
 
On the contrary, the more important it is for a participant that a company of which s/he 
buys the stock is a large enterprise (-0.410), and the more important the current 
purchasing price (-0.230), the more a respondent is categorized as a private investor. 
Here, the frequency analysis showed choice of a large-capitalization company as an 
investment criterion was more important for the private investors (53%), than for the asset 
managers (31%) and for the institutional investors (48%). The same is true for the 
purchasing price as 68% private investors, 69% of the institutional investors but only 57% 
of all asset managers found it important or very important.  
 
For the investments in large enterprises (vs. i.e. small caps), the literature shows that this 
criterion is relevant for a multiple of investment strategies, especially if it serves as a 
diversification function (Ferri, 2006; Goldie & Murray, 2010). The purchasing price on 
the other hand is immaterial for long-term investors (Ibbotson & Kaplan, 2000; Swensen, 
2005; Stanyer, (2010). However, this result confirms the discussion above, where the 
canonical correlation analysis revealed that the private investors are more focused on the 
short-term.  
 
In any case, the longer one wants to invest, the more irrelevant the current purchasing 
price becomes; or as Malkiel (1973) and Schelauske (2001) propose: a practical solution 
to mitigate purchasing prices is to split the investment into different stages in order to 
flatten the average buying price, similar to the value averaging strategy (Edleson, 1991; 
Marshall, 2000).  
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6.2.9. Investment strategies: value investing and asset allocation  
Additional strong prediction could be derived from the notions of value investing and 
asset allocation. The canonical correlation analysis revealed that the more one agrees that 
those are superior investment strategies, the more one was categorized as a professional 
investor. Among 11 possible investment strategies, the frequency analysis too showed the 
strongest support for asset allocation and value investing (Table 39 - combined value for 
and against it: 198%, 170% vs. -9%, -47% for the two least favoured strategies). 
 
The literature regarding the most promising investment strategy is highly diverse. As 
previously illustrated, there is, however, an agreement that asset allocation is a superior 
method of investing (Brinson, Hood & Beebower, 1986; Surz, Stevens & Wimer, 1999; 
Ibbotson & Kaplan 2000 or Darst, (2003). Many investment experts would probably also 
agree, arguing that value investing has been one of the most successful investment 
strategies in the past (Graham, 1949; Town, 2007; Marks, 2011; Sander, 2012). In 
addition, the history evidences that there were and still are many practitioners, e.g. Kahn, 
Carret, Templeton, Buffet, Dreman, Neff or Grantham, who trust in value investing and 
built their companies and wealth based on its principles (Bernstein, 2005; Town, 2007; 
Lowenstein, 2008; Rediff, 2010).  
 
Other investors and writers like Fisher (1958, 2003), Hakansson (1971) and Hunt (2005) 
would trust that growth investing is the most promising investment strategy. On the 
opposite spectrum are the technical analysts e.g. Bensignor (2000), Faith (2007) and 
O’Neil (2009), who believe in the value of ‘market and investor emotions’, trying to 
anticipate the directions of securities by analysing statistics, such as past prices, trading 
volumes, buying and selling behaviours or trend analysis.  
 
The general literature holds that retail investors should probably not engage in technical 
analysis nor in hedge fund investing as Amenc, Martellini & Vaissie (2003), Ineichern 
(2007) and Schwager (2014) advocate, since the risks of miss-timing the market or 
choosing the wrong hedge funds are too high (Sharp, 1991; Ellis, 2002; Swensen, 2005).  
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6.3. Summary of Research Question 1  
The canonical correlation analysis exemplified that the level of knowledge and agreement 
of specific investment matters (independent variables) leads to categorizing survey 
respondents into either private or professional investors.  
 
The private investors tend to show the following characteristics in terms of investment 
approaches / behavior, they: invest for the short-term and in single stocks rather than in 
funds; have the ability to explain the mechanics of coupons and the notion of the 
PE/Ratio; favour investing in the German and the US market as well as in large 
corporations; trust that the purchase price is an important investment criterion.  
 
The characteristics of professional investors are that they (compared to private investors): 
demonstrate that increasing investment knowledge and experience influences investment 
decisions; understand that diversification is vital; have the ability to explain the notion of 
asset classes, and the mechanics of futures, structured products and stock options; can 
explain the important concept of rebalancing as well as the fee structure of shares, active 
managed funds and passive managed funds; portray a willingness to accept higher risks 
for potential higher returns and prefer to invest in corporate bonds; favour investing in 
the UK and the general European market; favour asset allocation and value investing as 
superior investment strategies (applications); understand that the right selection of asset 
classes supports higher portfolio returns.  
As stated earlier, the test of equality of group means evidenced that private and 
professional investors can be differentiated by knowledge regarding asset classes, 
coupons, futures, PE/Ratio or structured products. However, the Wilks’ Lambda test 
showed a slightly different result. The indicator almost fully agreed with the test of 
equality group means but displayed a weak correlation with the notion of the options. 
This leads to the conclusion that both, private and professional investors have a similar 
understanding regarding this financial topic. The same is true for changing the money 
manager because of loss of trust/ investing in ‘own’ products, as well as for the notion of 
diversification. Hence, according to Wilks’ Lambda, it is statistically not possible that 
these variables can predict the type of investor.  
 
Nevertheless, for the investment topics listed above, the prior frequency analysis exposed 
the same effects as the canonical correlations analysis, except for the questions regarding 
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the markets in which one would want to invest. This discrepancy may be attributed to the 
origin of the participants, as the country the respondents are living in would most likely 
influence the base currency of one’s portfolios.  
 
One question sought to determine whether investors increasingly invested without letting 
emotions influence their investment decisions. I was of the opinion that especially the 
professional investors would leave emotions aside when investing but the analysis 
revealed that 42% of the asset managers, 37% institutional investors and 56% of all 
private investors’ investment decisions (incl. neutrals) were influenced by their emotions. 
Omitting neutrals, the least emotional group was the institutional investors with 9% vs. 
26% and 24% for the other two groups. On the positive side, almost two-thirds of the 
professional investors agreed or strongly agreed that emotions should be suppressed when 
investing in the stock market.  
 
Two other questions focused on the participant’s self-rating of financial investment 
knowledge and how many years’ experience they possessed in stock market investing.  
 
The descriptive analysis showed that when considering the self-rating of knowledge at 1 
to 3 years’ experience by private investors only, nearly 30% displayed an average or good 
investment knowledge, which could lead to the conclusion that they either overestimate 
themselves (Darst, 2003) or that even with little actual experience, investors can obtain 
the necessary knowledge to actively influence positive investment outcomes. When 
contrasting 1-10 years’ experience, the level of knowledge was roughly evenly distributed 
amongst the three investor groups, but looking at greater than 10 years’ experience, the 
results showed a direct and positive correlation between years of experience and self-
rating of financial investment knowledge.  
 
It follows, in-line with the Dreyfus skill acquisition model, that investors with a longer 
experience in investing, most probably have superior knowledge regarding the topic at 
hand.  
 
When asked about the factors that contribute to a higher and more sustainable portfolio 
performance, the next two criteria (after the choice of asset classes and the investment 
duration) were the choice of products and reducing the TER (total expense ratio).  
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The three least important criteria were the institutions issuing ETFs or holding one’s 
portfolio, as well as reducing retrocessions.  
 
Many authors i.e. Ellis (2002), Swensen (2005), Stanyer (2010) or Stammers (2015) 
evidence that ‘cost control’ is eminent in a positive and sustainable performance. 
Therefore, as this analysis demonstrated, reducing the total expense ratio (TER) seems to 
be a crucial and rewarding concept for any investor. On the contrary, reducing 
retrocessions did not seem to be as important, which supports my assumption that there 
are money managers who still favour selling products for which they receive 
commissions, even though this practice was abolished (at least in Switzerland) in 2012 
(Giroud & Nadelhofer, 2015). 
 
In accordance with the above, the descriptive analysis further revealed that 41% of the 
asset managers, 56% institutional investors and 55% all private investors would change 
to an online asset manager if they could save 25% of the management fee (given that the 
products and the quality of services are the same). For the group that disagreed, the saving 
rate in question was increased from 25% to 50%, and subsequently another 52% of the 
asset managers, 57% institutional investors and 55% additional private investors would 
contemplate a change. It appears that, for most investors, there is an obvious awareness 
of the impact of fees on investment return, hence reducing the TER.  
 
Concerning the long-lasting and on-going debate regarding active and passive managed 
funds, the descriptive analysis showed that for the ‘importance as an investment criterion’ 
a slight plus (26.5% - negative answers subtracted from the positive ones) for investing 
in passive managed funds but a minus (-3.9%) for their active counterparts. Merely 38% 
of the asset managers, 31% of the institutional investors and 25% of the private investors 
voted for active managed funds.  
 
This is in line with the literature, as many academics and experts like Ellis (2002), 
Swensen (2005), Zweig (2006), Bogle (2010), Goldie and Murray (2010) or Stammers 
(2015), have statistically demonstrated (within rather small and selective samples) that 
only a very limited number of fund managers, if any, actually beat the market in the long-
run.  
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Within the asset classes themselves (as opposed to the criteria that contribute to a more 
sustainable portfolio performance described above), the canonical correlation analysis 
discovered that professional investors favour investing in corporate bonds. The 
descriptive analysis on the other hand revealed that shares/stocks, corporate bonds and 
real estate were the most favoured ones; high yield bonds, government bonds and hedge 
funds the least favoured. The largest discrepancies between the investor groups were with 
hedge funds, high yield bonds and corporate bonds. In all cases, there were one-fifth  
fewer private investors trusting in those asset classes. As established by others - Ibbotson 
and Kaplan (2000) or Darst (2003), and as Markowitz (1995) already concluded - an 
appropriate mix of asset classes is a deciding factor for the success of a portfolio.  
 
When re-investing dividends to achieve a performance that is higher and more sustainable 
than the market average, the statistical analysis showed that 70% of the asset managers 
found it important, while only 50% of the institutional and 48% of the private investors 
saw it the same way. These were rather unexpected results (but in-line with the 
descriptives), as re-investing dividends (or coupons) evidently leads to higher profit over 
the years as every additional incremental investment into ones’ portfolio has the chance 
to earn profits (Gwilym, et al.,2009; Swensen, 2005; Bogle, 2007), particularly so if one 
considers the notion and advantages of compounding interest (Bogle, 2007; Gwilym, et 
al., 2009; Clare, Seaton and Thomas, 2009). 
 
Regarding investment strategies, the canonical analysis showed that the professional 
investors can be identified by their aspiration for asset allocation and value investing. 
Fundamental analysis was third in the top three (out of 11 strategies) and dividend 
investing was ranked fourth – according to the descriptive analysis. The most unfavoured 
strategies were passive investing, technical analysis and value averaging. The biggest 
discrepancies between the investors groups were found in asset allocation as a strategy / 
application (+ 25% for the professional investors), fundamental analysis (+ 13%) and 
stock picking, which the private investors favoured more by 14%. The descriptive 
analysis showed the same effect regarding stock picking (stocks over funds) and asset 
allocation.  
 
The most surprising result was that value averaging ranked last. There is unfortunately 
little literature about value averaging available, thus, one could believe that many private 
and professional investors are unaware of it.  
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Finally, the descriptive analysis showed the difference between both the investors’ 
expected return and their tolerance for loss. Around 70% of the asset managers, 69% of 
the institutional investors and 49% of all private investors expected an average portfolio 
return of 4-8%. 10% of all asset managers and 8% private investors, but none of the 
institutional investors were eager to achieve 12 to ≥ 30%. On the contrary, 29% asset 
managers, 37% institutional investors and 27% private investors were willing to lose 5-
10% in a bad year. Interestingly, some investors (5%, 17% and 11%) were prepared to 
lose 50% or more in an unfortunate investment year.  
 
The descriptive and canonical correlation analysis, its discussions and the corresponding 
literature, clearly show how private and professional investors differ in terms of their 
knowledge, experience, and investment approaches – my RQ1.  
 
On the other hand, my first hypothesis, that the more knowledgeable and experienced an 
investor is, the more cautiously and with greater superiority s/he will invest, could not be 
fully confirmed. However, there are strong indicators within both the descriptive and the 
canonical correlation analysis that informed and experienced investors would rather 
invest passively and choose asset allocation or value investing over technical analysis or 
stock picking. They further believe in the notion of rebalancing portfolios and in keeping 
the total expense ratio (TER) as small as possible. However, as it is not fully supported, 
the null hypothesis must be rejected. 
 
The analysis also exposed that from a knowledge and expertise point of view, with 45% 
of the available summary score for better (more appropriate) answers, the institutional 
investors are the leading investor group, followed by the asset managers with 39% and 
the private investors with 14%. Compared to the Dreyfus skill acquisition model, it 
confirms my assumption that private investors are either ‘novice’ or potentially ‘advanced 
beginners’, that asset managers are rather within the range of ‘competent’ and ‘proficient’ 
and institutional investors within ‘proficient’ and ‘expert’.  
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7. Distinguishing experts from informed and uninformed investors  
7.1. Chapter overview – Research question 2 
This chapter provides an explanation of my reasons and motives for profiling the survey 
respondents into three alternative investor groups. Here, the focus is on the five Dreyfus-
related categories, rather than the investor types (private investor, asset manager, 
institutional investor). The chapter details the process and the various steps to do this. 
The evidence presented here seeks to answer RQ2:  
 
Is it possible to determine probable differences in the investment approaches 
discernible between those now characterized as investment experts and those 
characterized as informed or uninformed investors (examining the second Dreyfus 
related categories)? 
 
As with RQ1, my null hypothesis is that the more knowledgeable and experienced an 
investor is, the more cautiously s/he will invest and the superior their level of portfolio 
diversification, their investment criteria and their strategies.   
 
In relation to the Dreyfus model, I would thus (a priori) expect that the uninformed 
investors (UNIs) are either ‘novice’ or potentially ‘advanced beginners’, that informed 
investors (INIs) are to be rather found in the area of ‘competent’ and ‘proficient’ and the 
experts (EXPs) within ‘proficient’ and ‘expertise’. It follows, of course, that the 
expectation is that these categories might map onto the three original investor types, 
related to the size of their investment portfolios and investment experience.  
 
Where percentages are displayed in the following sections, they are always in order from 
‘uninformed investors’, to ‘informed investors’ to ‘experts’. 
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7.2. Profiling investors  
7.2.1. Motives for profiling the investors 
The previous chapter details how private and professional investors’ knowledge and 
expertise differ and how these differences affect their investment decisions. Also 
identified and characterized were individuals who might be expert investors; this permits 
their investment behaviours to be analysed, to assist investors more widely. This final 
step of identification and characterization would find answers to RQ2 and RQ3. 
 
I hypothesized that the professional investors, including asset managers and the 
institutional investors, understood how financial investments (stock markets) work better 
than the private investors. Ultimately, this is their profession and to get there they most 
likely had to undergo some variety of formal or informal investment education or training 
and/or possess a certain expertise. 
 
However, after working with my data extensively, I came to understand that this 
differentiation (based solely on the initial investor groups/types) was not accurate enough. 
There were individuals within the private investor group who were potentially more 
knowledgeable and astute investors than the asset managers or the institutional investors.  
 
As a consequence, I needed to establish a method to profile the participants in order to 
determine to which of the Dreyfus categories they might be assigned, in terms of their 
investment acumen (knowledge, criteria, strategies, etc.) and experience. Therefore, in 
addition to the initial investor types (private investors, asset managers, institutional 
investors), I established three further investor expertise groups: the uniformed investors 
(UNI), the informed investors (INI) and the experts (EXP), based on collapsing the full 
range of Dreyfus categories to map onto a further set of three groups of investors.  
 
The primary goal then became to understand both the investment expertise and behaviour 
of the expert group and the possible differences in the investment approaches known 
between those characterized as investment experts and those characterized as informed 
or uninformed investors. As for my initial research question (RQ1), I again seek to relate 
these additional investor groups to the Dreyfus skill acquisition model and the various 
stages of skill attainment.  
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My aim is to understand: 
 
▪ The differences among the three groups in regard to what qualifies some as 
experts. 
▪ How participants were educated and qualified and what expertise they possess. 
▪ What their mind-set was towards diversification, investment vehicles, asset 
classes, markets, or how any other factors concerning a sustainable above-market 
performance affected their approach. 
▪ What investment criteria they used and which investment strategies they applied. 
• How the experts compared amongst themselves in relation to the profiling and 
survey questions. 
• The spread and presence of the experts within the original three types of investor 
(asset managers, private investors and institutional investors). 
• If, and how experts’ investment acumen and behaviour differed between global 
investors and Swiss investors. 
7.2.2. Approach to profiling the investors 
The method for profiling the investors into expertise groups was a five-step process: 
 
1. The identification of relevant profiling questions to cluster investors into the new 
groups, inferring from the analysis and results of Research Question 1. 
2. The development of a uniform scoring system that allocates 0 - 5 scores to the 
various profiling questions. 
3. A method to account for missing answers/values. 
4. A method to apply a maximum score to identify the uniformed investors and a 
minimum score to identify the experts, by this means also identifying the 
informed investors. 
5. The actual assessment of the investor expertise groups by running the profiling 
questions (answers) against the scoring system in order to allocate all 
participants to one of the three investor expertise groups. 
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7.2.3. Identifying profiling questions to cluster investors  
32 blocks of questions, with a total of 88 questions and sub-questions, were posed to the 
respondents. 24 of the questions were single answer choice questions while eight blocks 
of questions each consisted of up to 11 sub-questions each. In order to profile the 
participants (along the Dreyfus model) into the three relevant investor groups (UNI, INI, 
EXP), I analysed the 88 questions in relation to education, qualification, experience and 
the ability to explain various investment terms, investment criteria and investment 
strategies.  
 
A first examination revealed 16 profiling questions with a total number of 83 possible 
answers. I then ran the scoring system against the profiling questions and started to 
conduct a first analysis. However, I recognized that some of the questions I used were not 
entirely designed with this process in mind, and that I may have omitted some questions 
that were of significance for profiling.    
 
I screened my battery of questions again. This led to the inclusion of a further three 
questions, giving 21 profiling questions with a new total number of 126 possible answers. 
These included questions (see table below) were selected as significant, as I was able to 
affirm their concerns and importance as substantiated by the results and answers in 
response to RQ1 (literature, descriptive and discriminant analysis of the questionnaire).   
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7.2.4. Profiling questions  
 
Table 62 – 21 Selected profiling questions 
7.2.5. Method for allocating scores to profiling questions 
After identifying the profiling questions, I developed a scoring system that allocated a 
score from 0 to 5 for all 21 profiling questions and their 126 answer choices.  
 
For instance, if someone stated 1 to 3 years’ experience in investing in the stock market, 
one would score 1; 3 to 6 years’ experience scored a 2; 6 to 10 experience scored a 3 etc. 
Or, if the investor strongly agreed that they could confidently explain i.e. asset classes, 
coupons or the P/E ratio, they would score the maximum, a 5; if the opposite was the case 
only a 1. Likewise, if a participant strongly agreed with the notion that reducing TER or 
retrocessions was important to achieve above market returns, they would score a 5 vs. a 
score of 1 if a they were of the opposite belief.  
Q9 How many years’ experience do you have investing in the stock market
Q10 How do you rate your financial investment knowledge
Q14_1 I now pay more attention to diversification of my financial investments 
Q14_2 I now invest for the long run as the short time is uncertain
Q14_4 I now invest without emotions influencing my investment decisions 
Q15_1 I can explain what an asset class is 
Q15_2 I can explain what a coupon is
Q15_3 I can explain what a futures is
Q15_4 I can explain what an option is
Q15_5 I can explain what the P/E Ratio is
Q15_6 I can explain what rebalancing is
Q15_7 I can explain what a structured product is
Q16_1 I can explain what fees are incurred from trading active managed funds 
Q16_2 I can explain what fees are incurred from trading passive managed funds 
Q16_3 I can explain what fees are incurred from trading shares/stocks
Q32_1 For above market return, how important is the rebalancing process
Q32_2 For above market return, how important is it to reduce retrocessions
Q32_3 For above market return, how important is it to re-invest dividends
Q32_5 For above market return, how important is the choice of asset classes
Q32_9 For above market return, how important is the duration of my investment
Q32_10 For above market return, how important is the total expense ratio (TER)
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7.2.6. Method for accounting for missing answers  
Once I had defined the 21 profiling questions and the scoring table, I ran the answers of 
the questionnaire against all 550 participants. This procedure left 426 participants for 
further analysis, as 124 of the initial 550 respondents had never invested in shares, bonds, 
funds, or other investment vehicles and could therefore be excluded.  
 
Among the remaining 426 respondents, not all of them had answered all of the questions 
or they had (sometimes) indicated ‘I don’t know’. This was expected as participants were 
not forced to answer a question before they could go on to the next one. The reason for 
this decision was that if a respondent were unable to answer a given question, I would 
rather have him/her move on to the next one, instead of the system forcing an answer that 
could have resulted in this person terminating the survey altogether, or in a haphazard 
answer that would generate erroneous data. 
 
In total, 330 out of the 426 participants replied to every single profiling question. Thus, 
my primary intuitive idea was to use those 330 to differentiate between the EXPs, the 
INIs and the UNIs. Some of the part respondents had, however, only missed one or a few 
answers. In fact, 18 participants replied to 20 out of 21 questions, 2 to 19, another 2 to 18 
questions and finally 22 to 15 investor profiling questions.   
 
As a consequence of seeking only ‘100% responses’, this might have excluded some 
investors from analysis who could have qualified potentially as experts, solely because 
they had not answered one or a few profiling questions. Therefore, a minimum threshold 
of 15 profiling questions answered became the cut-off for a participant to be included in 
the analysis. This increased the total to 374 participants to be analysed. To take those with 
missing values into consideration, the method of substitution by the mean for missing 
values was used, to enable inclusion in the examination.  
 
Accordingly, as all profiling questions received the same answer values, therefore the 
same minimum and maximum scores, the calculated arithmetic mean scores from all the 
complete answered profiling questions (330 respondents) was then applied to substitute 
for a given respondent’s missing values/answers. As a result, 9 partial respondents 
relocated from the uniformed investor to the informed investor group, and 5 participants 
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relocated to the expert category. All other partial respondents (30) remained in their 
preliminary group, before substitution of mean values. 
 
The answers, which could be considered an indication of the investment acumen of these 
participants, could now offer valuable information for the remaining research questions 
and therefore contribute to the outcome of this thesis.  
 
Participants 
Without 
averages 
Investor 
group 
With 
averages 
Investor 
group 
R_1Y48xMG22bdUdYF 40 UNI 44 UNI 
R_4TId1vBldJMW5ff 41 UNI 43 UNI 
R_7258QMAx3isZAYB 52 UNI 57 INI 
R_ctDwWoRsLlvamVL 47 UNI 49 UNI 
R_5zoCaRvc8x8pelL 68 INI 71 INI 
R_8BTq5olx8fmpafj 79 INI 83 INI 
R_b2fwWooZ8uDY1rT 69 INI 72 INI 
R_5bUFEgG22zWRVxr 56 INI 65 INI 
R_bDSr7gYaZwKboJ7 79 INI 83 INI 
R_79EOUnmVRUyy9BH 61 INI 64 INI 
R_d0ZlGgoe4I2DE0d 57 INI 60 INI 
R_9EtEdhKMO38gPWt 68 INI 71 INI 
R_1zxuGxap4eeXsEJ 53 UNI 56 INI 
R_egqNXaDnFi5M5YF 67 INI 78 INI 
R_8kxfEPuZNRJw5Fz 61 INI 64 INI 
R_cw1kg3JfISQ3Oe1 89 INI 93 INI 
R_6K9U8CBR4bQwx4V 87 INI 91 INI 
R_d5NRrnACWxex3bD 83 INI 87 INI 
R_51pazvZiPP6ysVD 63 INI 63 INI 
R_6xOsEJG7CudWBWR 68 INI 71 INI 
R_6gNaVc8eeZCDCLj 72 INI 76 INI 
R_0SNYry7JTVb8q0t 90 INI 95 EXP 
R_9zRplKmhyl5lwaN 58 INI 81 INI 
R_2i7VsLxLQIMDgFv 57 INI 80 INI 
R_3kOUzri4hLhOdJr 58 INI 81 INI 
R_5tq6QUNIxEoqeRn 58 INI 81 INI 
R_9SJHgLDfVzEu4cJ 57 INI 80 INI 
R_ex2O1HXKenZPFaJ 67 INI 94 EXP 
R_cZ6viNZrzfdyZFj 53 UNI 74 INI 
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R_cXTpBXm1rGK8R2B 50 UNI 70 INI 
R_cAv3Q9sMMGxaKVv 58 INI 81 INI 
R_4PoaA8BFdvYQ9Jb 53 UNI 74 INI 
R_9QWFl1vC51yE2JD 51 UNI 71 INI 
R_ePDfqZN8aS9NjJr 25 UNI 35 UNI 
R_6opSJBEn6YjBSE5 44 UNI 62 INI 
R_6hd5pIpMRNRYgGp 36 UNI 50 UNI 
R_8G1Eu5nU2JNu9AV 51 UNI 71 INI 
R_eYaISOr7Z3RIOkB 58 INI 81 INI 
R_d0EJhIatacvwj5z 70 INI 98 EXP 
R_9nujuUxRWj9XJVX 65 INI 91 INI 
R_207bLQtAWEXV52J 68 INI 95 EXP 
R_eDrV5Ff8W8OgoYd 69 INI 97 EXP 
R_7W1R1m9yttbqLk1 39 UNI 55 INI 
R_6DrcYdIYTCDtLbD 28 UNI 39 UNI 
Table 63 – Scoring results with/without applying averages for missing values 
7.2.7. Method for applying scores to define the level of expertise 
With the particular interested in the experts’ investment acumen and philosophies about 
investing, an appropriate method needed to be capable of distinguishing between 
uniformed investors, informed investors and experts. 
 
As previously stated, most of the survey questions, and in particular the profiling 
questions, allowed for a score from 0 to 5, i.e. a ‘strongly disagree’ scored 1, ‘disagree’ 
2, ‘neutral’ 3, ‘agree’ 4 and ‘strongly agree’ 5. ‘I don’t know’ answers received a 0.  
 
In order to evaluate the uninformed investors, it would have been logical (in the extreme) 
to have only allowed the answers that scored a 1 to be included, and conversely, a 5 for 
the experts. After testing of this idea, I realized that no participants would be in either one 
of these two groups, as no person scored the minimum or maximum marks (21 or 105).  
 
The solution seemed to permit a range of responses to define each category (uniformed, 
informed and expert). Opting for a central value as a marker, this led to a maximum score 
of 2.5 across all profiling questions for the uniformed investor group, therefore the 
answers ranging between ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘neutral’; and a minimum score of 4.5 
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for the expert group, hence answers ranged between ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’. It 
follows that the scores between 2.6 and 4.4 bracketed the informed investor group (see 
table below).  
 
By applying these maximum and minimum scores, a small group of experts (EXPs) was 
obtained for further analysis and discussion, and a group of investors that did not exhibit 
extensive knowledge or expertise (UNIs).  
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Nr. Scoring table for uninformed investors and experts Score Max UNI Min EXP
1 How  many years’ experience do you have investing in the stock market 1 - 3 1
How  many years’ experience do you have investing in the stock market 3 - 6 2
How  many years’ experience do you have investing in the stock market 6 - 10 3
How  many years’ experience do you have investing in the stock market 10 - 15 4
How  many years’ experience do you have investing in the stock market 15 - 20+ 5
How  many years’ experience do you have investing in the stock market None 0
2 How  do you rate your f inancial investment know ledge No know ledge 1
How  do you rate your f inancial investment know ledge Basic know ledge 2
How  do you rate your f inancial investment know ledge Average know ledge 3
How  do you rate your f inancial investment know ledge Good know ledge 4
How  do you rate your f inancial investment know ledge Excellent know ledge 5
How  do you rate your f inancial investment know ledge I don't know 0
3 I now  pay more attention to diversif ication of my f inancial investments Strongly disagree 1
I now  pay more attention to diversif ication of my f inancial investments Disagree 2
I now  pay more attention to diversif ication of my f inancial investments Neutral 3
I now  pay more attention to diversif ication of my f inancial investments Agree 4
I now  pay more attention to diversif ication of my f inancial investments Strongly agree 5
I now  pay more attention to diversif ication of my f inancial investments I don't know 0
4 I now  invest for the long run as the short time is uncertain Strongly disagree 1
I now  invest for the long run as the short time is uncertain Disagree 2
I now  invest for the long run as the short time is uncertain Neutral 3
I now  invest for the long run as the short time is uncertain Agree 4
I now  invest for the long run as the short time is uncertain Strongly agree 5
I now  invest for the long run as the short time is uncertain I don't know 0
5 I now  invest w ithout emotions influencing my investment decisions Strongly disagree 1
I now  invest w ithout emotions influencing my investment decisions Disagree 2
I now  invest w ithout emotions influencing my investment decisions Neutral 3
I now  invest w ithout emotions influencing my investment decisions Agree 4
I now  invest w ithout emotions influencing my investment decisions Strongly agree 5
I now  invest w ithout emotions influencing my investment decisions I don't know 0
6 I can explain w hat an asset class is Strongly disagree 1
I can explain w hat an asset class is Disagree 2
I can explain w hat an asset class is Neutral 3
I can explain w hat an asset class is Agree 4
I can explain w hat an asset class is Strongly agree 5
I can explain w hat an asset class is I don't know 0
7 I can explain w hat a coupon is Strongly disagree 1
I can explain w hat a coupon is Disagree 2
I can explain w hat a coupon is Neutral 3
I can explain w hat a coupon is Agree 4
I can explain w hat a coupon is Strongly agree 5
I can explain w hat a coupon is I don't know 0
4.52.5
4.52.5
4.52.5
4.52.5
4.52.5
4.52.5
4.52.5
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Nr. Scoring table for uninformed investors and experts Score Max UNI Min EXP
8 I can explain w hat futures are Strongly disagree 1
I can explain w hat futures are Disagree 2
I can explain w hat futures are Neutral 3
I can explain w hat futures are Agree 4
I can explain w hat futures are Strongly agree 5
I can explain w hat futures are I don't know 0
9 I can explain w hat options are Strongly disagree 1
I can explain w hat options are Disagree 2
I can explain w hat options are Neutral 3
I can explain w hat options are Agree 4
I can explain w hat options are Strongly agree 5
I can explain w hat options are I don't know 0
10 I can explain w hat the P/E Ratio is Strongly disagree 1
I can explain w hat the P/E Ratio is Disagree 2
I can explain w hat the P/E Ratio is Neutral 3
I can explain w hat the P/E Ratio is Agree 4
I can explain w hat the P/E Ratio is Strongly agree 5
I can explain w hat the P/E Ratio is I don't know 0
11 I can explain w hat rebalancing is Strongly disagree 1
I can explain w hat rebalancing is Disagree 2
I can explain w hat rebalancing is Neutral 3
I can explain w hat rebalancing is Agree 4
I can explain w hat rebalancing is Strongly agree 5
I can explain w hat rebalancing is I don't know 0
12 I can explain w hat structured products are Strongly disagree 1
I can explain w hat structured products are Disagree 2
I can explain w hat structured products are Neutral 3
I can explain w hat structured products are Agree 4
I can explain w hat structured products are Strongly agree 5
I can explain w hat structured products are I don't know 0
13 I can explain the fees incurred for trading active funds Strongly disagree 1
I can explain the fees incurred for trading active funds Disagree 2
I can explain the fees incurred for trading active funds Neutral 3
I can explain the fees incurred for trading active funds Agree 4
I can explain the fees incurred for trading active funds Strongly agree 5
I can explain the fees incurred for trading active funds I don't know 0
14 I can explain the fees incurred for trading passive funds Strongly disagree 1
I can explain the fees incurred for trading passive funds Disagree 2
I can explain the fees incurred for trading passive funds Neutral 3
I can explain the fees incurred for trading passive funds Agree 4
I can explain the fees incurred for trading passive funds Strongly agree 5
I can explain the fees incurred for trading passive funds I don't know 0
4.52.5
4.52.5
4.52.5
2.5
4.52.5
4.52.5
4.52.5
4.5
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Table 64 – Scoring table to apply a maximum/minimum score for UNIs/EXPs 
 
Nr. Scoring table for uninformed investors and experts Score Max UNI Min EXP
15 I can explain the fees incurred for trading shares/stocks Strongly disagree 1
I can explain the fees incurred for trading shares/stocks Disagree 2
I can explain the fees incurred for trading shares/stocks Neutral 3
I can explain the fees incurred for trading shares/stocks Agree 4
I can explain the fees incurred for trading shares/stocks Strongly agree 5
I can explain the fees incurred for trading shares/stocks I don't know 0
16 For above market return, the rebalancing process is Very unimportant 1
For above market return, the rebalancing process is Unimportant 2
For above market return, the rebalancing process is Neutral 3
For above market return, the rebalancing process is Important 4
For above market return, the rebalancing process is Very important 5
For above market return, the rebalancing process is I don't know 0
17 For above market return, reducing retrocessions is Very unimportant 1
For above market return, reducing retrocessions is Unimportant 2
For above market return, reducing retrocessions is Neutral 3
For above market return, reducing retrocessions is Important 4
For above market return, reducing retrocessions is Very important 5
For above market return, reducing retrocessions is I don't know 0
18 For above market return, re-invest dividends is Very unimportant 1
For above market return, re-invest dividends is Unimportant 2
For above market return, re-invest dividends is Neutral 3
For above market return, re-invest dividends is Important 4
For above market return, re-invest dividends is Very important 5
For above market return, re-invest dividends is I don't know 0
19 For above market return, the choice of asset classes is Very unimportant 1
For above market return, the choice of asset classes is Unimportant 2
For above market return, the choice of asset classes is Neutral 3
For above market return, the choice of asset classes is Important 4
For above market return, the choice of asset classes is Very important 5
For above market return, the choice of asset classes is I don't know 0
20 For above market return, the investment duration is Very unimportant 1
For above market return, the investment duration is Unimportant 2
For above market return, the investment duration is Neutral 3
For above market return, the investment duration is Important 4
For above market return, the investment duration is Very important 5
For above market return, the investment duration is I don't know 0
21 For above market return, the total expense ratio is Very unimportant 1
For above market return, the total expense ratio is Unimportant 2
For above market return, the total expense ratio is Neutral 3
For above market return, the total expense ratio is Important 4
For above market return, the total expense ratio is Very important 5
For above market return, the total expense ratio is I don't know 0
53 94
4.52.5
4.52.5
4.52.5
4.52.5
4.52.5
4.52.5
4.52.5
Minimum score to be an expert / Maximum score to be an uninformed investor 
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7.2.8. Running the profiling questions against the participants’ answers 
After defining the profiling questions and allocating the score boundaries between the 
three groups (Expert, Informed, Uninformed), taking those who have at least answered 
15+ of the profiling questions, and after accounting for missing values, I ran the profiling 
questions and answers across these remaining 374 investors (see addendum). 
 
As a result, the participants who scored between 23 and 53 were the ‘uninformed’ 
investors (orange) with 9.36%, while 80.75% scored 54 to 93 points and were therefore 
categorized as ‘informed’ investors (blue), with the remaining 9.89%, who scored 
between 94 and 103 points, classified as the experts (green).  
 
 
Figure 47 – Distribution of participants’ scores across UNIs, INIs, EXPs 
The pie chart below shows that of the 374 included respondents, who qualified for the 
final analysis, 35 were uninformed investors, 302 were informed investors and 37 
participants were categorized as experts. 
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Figure 48 – Participants’ distribution across the supplementary investor groups 
The focus was essentially on the differences in investment acumen and behaviour 
amongst the UNIs, INIs and EXPs for the second research question, and predominantly 
on the ‘experts’ to answer the third research question, regarding the characteristics and 
investment conduct of experts.  
 
The probable reason why there were only around 9% uninformed investors identified 
within the 374 participants could be found in the initial target respondents to this survey. 
Hence, the primary target individuals most likely did not represent the uninformed 
investor, as the survey was addressed to former and current work colleagues, as well as 
to members of the social media and business platforms XING and LinkedIn. Moreover, 
specifically targeted were asset managers working independently for banks or for 
institutional investors (professional investors), rather than private investors. Certainly, if 
a greater maximum score were applied as the upper limit for the ‘uniformed investors,’ a 
much larger group of UNIs than the 35 participants included would be generated. Further 
thoughts on the classification of respondents using their scores appears below. 
7.2.9. Alternative means for distinguishing UNIs, INIs and EXPs 
To distinguish the three investor groups, alternatively a mean score could be used and 1 
or 2 standard deviations as boundaries. In essence, by applying one standard deviation, 
the mean score was 63, with a maximum score of 42 for the uniformed investors and a 
minimum score of 84 for the experts, resulting in 16 UNIs, 229 INIs and 129 EXPs. 
35
302
37
Participant's distribution accross UNIs, INIs and EXP  
Uninformed investors
Informed investors
Experts
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Applying two standard deviations would have yielded a maximum score of 33 for the 
uninformed investors and a minimum score of 93 for the experts, and resulted in only 5 
UNIs, 325 INIs and 44 EXPs. 
 
This was rejected, as by applying one standard deviation, more than one third of all 
respondents would be ‘experts’. This proportion seemed too great; it would have resulted 
in a less refined analysis of the ‘most expert’ participants’ investment behaviour. By 
applying two standard deviations there would be an appropriate number of experts, but 
only a handful of uninformed investors. Again, the ability to adequately discriminate at 
the other end of the spectrum would be lost.  
 
The non-normal distribution of the data is significant. Any alternative to the procedure 
used, such as ChiMerge (Kerber, 1992) or Holte’s (1993) 1R algorithm, which are both 
supervised methods for the partitioning of data, also require judgmental input. More 
recent algorithms are better suited to very large data-sets and data mining applications 
(see Dougherty, Kohavi and Sahami, 1995). 
 
Garcıa, Luengo, Saez, Lopez, and Herrera (2013) provide a current and comprehensive 
overview of available methods and their effectiveness. They report that of the 30 methods 
studied ‘many classic discretizers are usually the best performing ones’. This is the case 
of ChiMerge, MDLP, Zeta, Distance, and Chi2’ (p. 744). The categorization 
(discretization) procedure applied here, given the nature (distribution, number of cases 
and skewness, lack of training data) of the original data set, conforms to their principle 
of finding the most suitable discretizer taking into consideration some basic characteristic 
of the data sets’ (p. 747). 
7.3. Research method 
Because the entire analysis compares the three different profiles ‘uninformed investors’, 
‘informed investors’ and ‘experts’, calculation of bivariate statistics for all the questions 
of interest was facilitated. Furthermore, for most questions and because of the ordinal 
characteristics of the data, Cramer’s V could also be computed and interpreted (Fisher, 
1925). By applying the Pearson-χ2-Test (Pearson, 1900), evaluation of how likely it is 
that any observed difference between the investor groups arose by chance, is made. 
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Therefore, the computation and interpretation of the observed vs. the expected 
frequencies follows. The difference between both frequencies resembles the total error of 
this statistical model.  
 
 Investor Profile  
Highest Education Experts 
Informed 
Investors 
Uninformed 
Investors 
Total 
Bachelor (BA/BS) 1 28 9 38 
Compulsory 
school 
0 2 0 2 
Doctorate 
(PHD/DBA) 
4 19 2 25 
Total 5 49 11 65 
Table 65 – Bivariate example for observed frequency  
       modelij  = 
𝑟𝑜𝑤 𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑖  ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑛 𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑗
𝑛
 
 
The table below illustrates the expected frequency for this example. For holders of a 
bachelor degree within the experts’ category, the computed result was 2.92. 
 
 Investor Profile  
Highest Education Experts 
Informed 
Investors 
Uninformed 
Investors 
Total 
Bachelor (BA/BS) 2.92 28.65 6.43 38 
Compulsory 
school 
0.15 1.51 0.34 2 
Doctorate 
(PHD/DBA) 
1.92 18.85 4.23 25 
Total 5 49 11 65 
Table 66 – Bivariate example for expected frequency  
The value for 𝜒2 is then calculated as follows:  
 
 
The computed value (expected frequency) for 𝜒2 can then be tested against the critical 
value for 𝜒2 for a certain level of significance.  
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Field (2009) explains that such a statistic is only an approximative measure, as its 
reliability depends on the size of the sample, hence with large sample sizes, the χ2-Test is 
straightforward. Small sample sized however (below 5 responses in each cell), results in 
inaccurate estimations. This has been considered within this analysis by either the use of 
the Fisher-Exact-Test or the Likelihood Ratio (LR) method, as suggested for χ2 (Field, 
2009).  
 
 
Because a χ2-Result and its significance on its own are no indicators for the strength or 
direction of its relationship, the statistical correlations measures such as ϕ (-1 to +1) or 
‘Cramer’s V (only positive values for the strength of a relationship, i.e. 0.2 very week, 
0.4 week, 0.6 middle, 0.8 strong and 1 very strong) can be applied.  
 
 
It follows that in the interpretation of a bivariate statistic is only noteworthy if the test of 
significance shows a p value < 0.5. Thus, if there is no significant relationship for my 
survey questions/answers observed then this answer/result has no statistical value. In that 
case, a meaningful relationship could not be established. For this research questions, here 
the comparison is of the three different investor groups, the column percentages are /the 
relevant ones. However, the row percentages are also presented for completeness.   
7.4. Analysis and discussion for Research Question 2 
For the following analysis, a bivariate table is presented for every question or block of 
question that shows the computed χ2 value and, when feasible, the values of the Fisher 
Exact test and the Likelihood Ratio method. The discussion refers the analysis as well as 
to the prior research question. 
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7.4.1. Education 
Label χ2 p (Chi) 
Fisher 
Exact 
p(L-Chi2) Cramer V 
What is the highest level of 
education you have completed? 
24.535 0.078  
 
0.181 
Table 67 – Statistical analysis - Education  
With a P-value of 0.078 and a Cramer’s V of 0.181, the analysis could not reveal a 
significant relationship regarding the highest level of education within the three investor 
groups. Thus, an investor with a PhD does not necessarily show superior investment 
acumen. There is no significant relationship between the level of education and the 
expertise of uniformed investors, the informed investors and the experts. 
 
However, when looking at the bivariate analysis, it is interesting to see that only 3% of 
the experts indicated a bachelor degree as their highest education level, while the number 
increased to 9% for the informed investors and to 26% (> 8 times more) for the 
uninformed investors. Conversely, the number of PhDs/DBAs was twice as high for the 
EXPs when compared to the INIs, and 70% higher in relation to the UNIs. Similar, were 
the results when the highest level of education was a university or master degree: 49% 
for the experts, 43% for the informed investors and merely 23% for the uninformed 
investors. There seems to be a (but not statistically significant) relationship between the 
level of education and membership of a given investor group, which could be indicated 
by the respective p-value and the Cramer’s V. 
7.4.2. Qualifications 
Since the χ2-analysis for multiple answers was not possible within SPSS, Stata software 
(14.2) was used. As there was no obvious correlation between the answer categories, 
Cramer’s V could not be computed for this question.  
 
Label χ2 p (Chi) 
Fisher 
Exact 
p(L- χ2) 
Cramer 
V 
Qualifications 44.378 0.001  0.002  
Table 68 – Statistical analysis – Financial qualification 
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With a p-value of 0.001, the p(L-χ2) of 0.002, these results are significant.  
 
The analysis clearly displays a rather big discrepancy regarding the level of qualification 
between the experts and the informed investors. The uninformed investors (save one) do 
not hold any of the finance or investment management related credentials. When looking 
at the (presumably) most prestigious designation in the field (Jaffe, 2010), 143% more 
EXP vs. the INIs hold a CFA. Inversely, the EXP showed the smallest number of ‘non-
qualification’ too (45%).  
 
 
Table 69 – Financial qualification  
 
To focus more on the analysis and discussion, I moved the presentation of the remaining 
computed results (> 60 tables) to the appendix.   
 
 
 
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 6 20 0 26
Row % 23.10% 76.90% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 15.80% 6.50% 0.00%
Count 2 4 0 6
Row % 33.30% 66.70% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 5.30% 1.30% 0.00%
Count 8 49 1 58
Row % 13.80% 84.50% 1.70% 100.00%
Col % 21.10% 15.90% 2.90%
Count 3 3 0 6
Row % 50.00% 50.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 7.90% 1.00% 0.00%
Count 17 217 34 268
Row % 6.30% 81.00% 12.70% 100.00%
Col % 44.70% 70.20% 97.10%
Count 2 16 0 18
Row % 11.10% 88.90% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 5.30% 5.20% 0.00%
Count 38 309 35 382Total
Profile
Total
Qualifi-
cations
Chartered 
Financial 
Analyst (CFA)
Certified 
Financial 
Planner (CFP)
Master of 
Finance (or 
similar)
Master of 
Investment 
Management 
(or similar)
None of the 
above
Professionall
y Qualified 
Accountant 
(e.g. CPA)
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7.4.3. Income, experience and knowledge  
For the questions regarding annual income, years of experience in investing and the self-
rating of investment knowledge, the analysis shows significant results, with weak to 
medium associations between the variables. 
 
Label 
χ2 p (Chi) 
Fisher 
Exact 
p(L- χ2) Cramer V 
Indicate your annual income 
range in CHF / US$ 
51.059 0.000   0.261 
Years’ experience 60.782 0.000   0.285 
Investment knowledge 253.652 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.585 
Table 70 – Statistical analysis – Income, experience, knowledge 
The results show that the experts overall achieve the highest income levels, with no clear 
indication of difference between the other two investor groups. Years of experience, on 
the other hand, shows increasing levels from UNIs to INIs to EXPs. While the uninformed 
investors indicated 0 to 3 years investment experience, 58% of the informed investors and 
89% of the experts are managing money for more than 10 years; 43% of the experts even 
more than 20 years (vs. 18% and 0% for the other groups).  
 
These results serve to confirm the initial assumption that the UNIs are rather found within 
the Dreyfus categories ‘novice’ or ‘advanced beginners’, the INIs in the area of 
‘competent’ and ‘proficient’ and the EXPs within ‘proficient’ and ‘expertise’. This is also 
in-line with individuals’ self-rating of investment knowledge, which ‘matches’ with the 
categories. Experts affirm themselves as having good to excellent knowledge, informed 
investors estimate their knowledge as average or good and the uniformed investors as 
basic or non-existent. Of course, such self-ratings must be treated with caution, as the 
response is subject to status bias, and people tend to overestimate their investment 
knowledge (Darst, 2003; Pompian, 2006). 
7.4.4. Proportion of savings invested  
This question probed what proportion of an individual’s disposable income (money not 
needed for current expenditure) is vested in investment products such as shares, bonds, 
funds, commodities and other asset classes. 
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Label χ2 p (χ2) 
Fisher 
Exact 
p(L- χ2) 
Cramer 
V 
How much of your savings is 
invested in shares, bonds, funds, etc. 
66.210 0.000  
 
0.311 
Table 71 – Statistical analysis – Proportion of savings invested 
This result is significant and shows a week to medium correlation amongst the variables. 
It can therefore be concluded that the experts tend to invest more of their disposable 
income than the other two groups.  
 
In fact, 72% of the EXPs invested more than half of their funds vs. 44% for the INIs and 
14% for the UNIs. 58% the experts (vs. 30% and 3%) invested more than 60%, and still 
half of all EXP more than 70% (vs. 21% and 0%). Even at the 80% investment level, 
more than 30% EXP are to be found vs. 12% UNIs.  
 
Interestingly, between the investor groups previously considered, the canonical 
correlations analysis did not show significant levels (p-value 0.982, Cramer’s V 0.130). 
That would indicate that the professional investors do not tend to invest more of their 
available funds than the private investors do. Yet the weighting amongst the current three 
investor expertise groups is different, hence the different effect.  
7.4.5. Investment duration 
The time to an investor’s ‘investment horizon’ is considered significant by many, with a 
long-term perspective being seen as preferable to a short time horizon (though, of course, 
some contest this view).  
 
Label 
χ2 p (χ2) 
Fisher 
Exact 
p(L- χ2) 
Cramer 
V 
How long is your investment horizon? 19.796 0.071   0.164 
Table 72 – Statistical analysis – Investment duration 
The analysis shows a p value of 0.071 and is therefore not significant. Nonetheless, the 
largest portion of both informed investors (24%) and the uninformed investors would 
invest for 7-10 years (35%), while the largest group among the experts choose 10 – 15 
years (28%).  
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Interestingly, 45% of the EXPs, 20% of the UNIs and 26% of the INIs show an investment 
horizons of more than 10 years; at the other end of the scale, 11%, of UNIs 12% of INIs 
and  9% EXPs would only invest for maximum two years.  
7.4.6. Annual expected return and tolerance for loss  
These questions asked about desires for rates of return to one’s investment portfolio and 
the inventors’ tolerance for loss in an unfortunate stock market year. At their heart is a 
view of acceptable levels of risk for investors. 
 
Label χ2 p (χ2) 
Fisher 
Exact 
p(L- 
χ2) 
Cramer 
V 
What is the annual return you expect 
on your financial investments 
22.527 0.429  
 
0.183 
What is your tolerance for loss in a 
bad year on the stock market 
7.148 0.929  0.976 0.105 
Table 73 – Statistical analysis – Expected return and tolerance for loss 
Neither question showed a significant relationship relating to the profiles. However, the 
absolute numbers reveal that 66% of the experts and 56% of the informed investors expect 
a return of 4-8%, which is line-line with the long-term average (Pictet, 2015; Stammers, 
2015). The uninformed investors are more cautious. When it comes to risk tolerance, the 
results are contrary: all three investor groups show a high tolerance for loss - 29% of the 
EXPs, 30% of the INIs and 38% of the UNIs tolerate a portfolio loss of up to 10% in a 
bad year. 44%, 48% and 33% are willing to accept 15-25% loss and even 12%, 5% and 
5% would tolerate losing 25-50% in an unlucky period. This is greater than data relating 
to expectations of returns would suggest. Most commentators would argue that the risk 
of losses on the scale investors in general said they would tolerate, would only occur in 
higher rate of return (risky) investments. 
7.4.7. Development of an investor’s risk profile   
This question examined whether the respondents have developed a risk profile, either by 
themselves, by a third party, or not at all.  
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Label χ2 p (χ2) 
Fisher 
Exact 
p(L- χ2) 
Cramer 
V 
Who has ever developed a risk 
profile for you?  
26.825 0.001   0.193 
Table 74 – Statistical analysis – Development of a risk profile 
The result is significant but shows only a weak association amongst the variables. 
However, it can be said that amongst all three groups, either the investor him/herself has 
developed their own risk profile or not at all.  
 
Only the experts show a clear tendency, as compared to the other two groups: they have, 
more usually, developed a risk profile for themselves (43% vs. 26% and 6%). It is perhaps 
surprising that 66% of the uniformed investors, 30% of the informed investors and 31% 
of the experts have never worried about their risk profile.  
7.4.8. Ability to explain investment concepts and products 
Participants’ ability to understand and explain seven important investment concepts and 
products form the area of interest here; the supposition was that experts would be better 
able to explain the more complex/esoteric terms. 
 
Label χ2 p (χ2) Fisher 
Exact 
p(L- χ2) Cramer V 
I can explain asset class 214.081 0.000   0.536 
I can explain coupons 131.291 0.000   0.421 
I can explain futures 157.286 0.000   0.459 
I can explain options (calls/puts) 128.264 0.000   0.415 
I can explain the P/E Ratio 163.717 0.000   0.468 
I can explain rebalancing 180.701 0.000   0.493 
I can explain structured products 176.798 0.000   0.487 
Table 75 – Statistical analysis – Ability to explain investment concepts 
All of these results are significant with medium associations among the variables. The 
results throughout this set of questions are the same: the experts agree or strongly agree 
whether they are able to explain the investment topic, whereas the other two investor 
groups answers were generally between ‘I cannot explain’ and ‘neutral’.  
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100% of the experts strongly agree that they can explain asset classes but only 37% of 
the informed investors and 3% of the uninformed investors agree at the same level. 
Analysis associated with RQ1 (canonical correlation analysis) previously showed a 
similar effect, as the more a respondent was able to explain the notion of asset classes the 
more, s/he was classified as a professional investor. Taken together, the results of both 
analyses suggest the initial supposition is correct. Again, the previous examination (RQ1) 
showed that the professional investors comprehend rebalancing very well, and in this 
current analysis 95% of the EXPs (vs. 23% INIs, 0% UNIs) are able to explain this 
concept, providing further support for the supposition.  
 
Furthermore, the previous canonical correlation analysis showed that the more one could 
explain coupons or the P/E ratio, the more one was classified as a private investor. This 
is odd, as it might be imagined that professional investors would be able to explain these 
basic concepts very well. More in line with expectations, though, the more one could 
explain rather technical terms like options, futures and structured products, the more a 
respondent was likely to be categorized as a professional investor. Clearly, this second 
three-type respondent analysis shows that the experts did display a superior understanding 
of the investment topics and products in question, compared to the other two investor 
groups.  
7.4.9. Ability to explain the fee structures of vehicles 
As fees can have a major impact on investment performance, this topic was subject to 
specific investigation. 
 
Label χ2 p (χ2) Fisher 
Exact 
p(L- χ2) Cramer 
V 
I can explain the fee structure of active managed funds 234.968 0.000   0.560 
I can explain the fee structure of passive mang. funds 228.914 0.000   0.553 
I can explain the fee structure of shares/stocks 182.142 0.000   0.494 
Table 76 – Statistical analysis – Ability to explain fee structures 
All three analyses are significant with a medium correlation among the variables. 100% 
of the experts agree or strongly agree that they can explain the fee structure of all 
investment vehicles in question. Nonetheless, it is interesting to see that the informed 
investors are also quite knowledgeable in this regard, as 45% understand the fee structure 
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of active managed funds, 59% of passive managed funds and 83% of shares/stocks. The 
UNIs only positive result is 28% with shares/stocks.  
 
One could assume that the fee composition of active managed funds is indeed difficult to 
comprehend, especially since many funds, even though they publish their total expense 
ratio (TER), are still secretive about other charges, not included in the TER, i.e. front-end 
load fees (purchase or entry fee) or exit fee (back-end load) at the point of redemption.  
7.4.10. Significant investment perceptions 
Five questions addressed the importance of selected investment topics that have a (more 
or less) vital role when investing.  
 
Label χ2 p (χ2) 
Fisher 
Exact 
p(L- χ2) 
Cramer 
V 
I pay more attention to diversification of my 
financial investments 
24.670 0.002   0.183 
I rather invest for long-term as the short-term is 
uncertain 
6.810 0.339 0.308 0.237 0.106 
I rather invest in single stocks/shares than in 
Funds 
18.214 0.020   0.158 
I rather invest without emotions influencing 
my investment decisions 
22.421 0.004 0.003  0.175 
I changed my bank/Investment manage 
because I lost trust in them/him/her 
12.769 0.120 0.085 0.102 0.134 
Table 77 – Statistical analysis – Significant investment perceptions 
Overall, three (diversification, funds over shares, omit emotions) of the five criteria tested 
showed significant but weak correlations. The investment duration (0.339) and the change 
of asset manager or bank (0.120) are statistically irrelevant.  
 
76% of the experts agree or strongly agree that spreading the assets over different asset 
classes or products is an important investment concept. It is satisfactory to see that two 
thirds of the informed investors (65%) but also almost half of the uniformed investors 
trust in the notion of diversification.  
 
When looking at investments in funds vs. single shares/stocks, 51% of the experts agree 
that funds are the more sensible means (vs. 37% INIs and 28% UNIs). Similarly, results 
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in relation to the initial research question revealed the same as the canonical correlation 
analysis, showing that the more one invests in funds over shares, the more one is 
categorized as a professional investor.  
 
78% of the EXPs but only 45% of the INIs and 39% of the UNIs aspire to invest without 
being influenced by their emotions. Pompian (2006), the CFA Institute (2008), Stanyer 
(2010), Robbins (2014), Siegel (2014) or Stammers (2015) established that one should 
always suppress emotions when investing, which was also identified within the previous 
research question.  
 
The χ2-Test could not demonstrate statistical significance regarding investment duration.  
However, it may be noteworthy that the majority of the experts (62%) and half of the 
informed investors preferred investing for the long-term, rather than the short-term as it 
is more volatile. The previous two-group canonical correlation analysis revealed the 
same: professional investors are more focused on the long-term than private investors.  
7.4.11. Investments in various asset classes 
These nine questions asked the investors if they would invest in certain asset classes, 
which covered a spectrum of associated risks.  
 
Label χ2 p (χ2) Fisher 
Exact 
p(L- χ2) Cramer 
V 
I would invest in - Cash 13.081 0.109 0.117 0.165 0.134 
I would invest in - Commodities (Oil, Wheat etc.) 4.191 0.840 0.879 0.846 0.077 
I would invest in - Corporate bonds 21.167 0.007 0.012 0.016 0.172 
I would invest in - Gold 13.609 0.093 0.102 0.095 0.137 
I would invest in - Government bonds 20.286 0.009   0.168 
I would invest in - Hedge funds 25.268 0.001   0.191 
I would invest in - High yield bonds 42.982 0.000   0.247 
I would invest in - Real estate (Funds) 17.760 0.023 0.018 0.018 0.157 
I would invest in - Shares/stocks 46.759 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.255 
Table 78 – Statistical analysis – Investment in various asset classes 
Corporate bonds, government bonds, hedge funds, high yield bonds, real estate and 
shares/stocks show significant results with rather weak Cramer’s V.  
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The experts (97%) and the informed investors (88%) but also the uninformed investors 
(68%) showed a high agreement to invest in shares/stocks. I would assume that regarding 
the UNIs, this is the asset class of which these investors are most aware. For the corporate 
bonds, the EXPs and the INIs agreed to a significant extent (77%, 65%), while the 
different groups all agree to a similar extent in real estate investments (59%, 61% and 
67%).  
 
The results for commodities and government bonds are also equally distributed amongst 
the three investors groups, while government bonds are more favoured by the UNIs (55%) 
rather than by the INIs (45%) and the EXPs (36%).  
7.4.12. Factors that contribute to an outperformance of market benchmarks 
The quest for higher but sustainable performance that out-performs the market 
benchmarks in the various asset classes is a major goal for investing. Nine questions 
examined aspects of market performance and investment approach. 
 
Label χ2 p (χ2) 
Fisher 
Exact 
p(L- χ2) 
Cramer 
V 
Rebalancing  25,751 0,001 0,003 0,005 0,203 
Reducing/eliminating Retrocessions (Kick-backs)  13,896 0,085 0,089 0,103 0,149 
Reinvesting dividends/coupons 18,052 0,021 0,044 0,040 0,167 
The choice of active or passive managed funds 22,084 0,005 0,016 0,005 0,188 
The choice of asset classes 33,443 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,230 
The choice of products (shares, bonds, funds, etc.) 9,145 0,330 0,221 0,466 0,118 
The current purchasing price 16,084 0,041 0,180 0,301 0,155 
The duration of my investment 17,184 0,028 0,054 0,066 0,160 
Total Expense Ratio (TER) 39,078 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,251 
Table 79 – Statistical analysis – Benchmark outperformance factors 
Statistically significant results were computed for portfolio rebalancing, the choice of 
asset classes and the total expense ratio (TER). 
 
The total expense ratio with a p-value of 0.000 and a Cramer’s V of 0.251 found the 
stronger support with the experts, followed by the choice of asset classes with a p-value 
of 0.000 and a Cramer’s V of 0.230, and rebalancing with a p-value of 0.001 and a 
Cramer’s V of 0.203.  
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Similarly, the experts classified the choice of active or passive managed funds and re-
investing dividends as important contributors to achieving superior returns.  
 
The two other investor groups support these notions to a lesser degree. These results are 
largely in-line with relevant literature (i.e. Brinson, Hood, & Beebower, 1986; Surz, 
Stevens, & Wimer, 1999; Ibbotson & Kaplan 2000; Swensen, 2005; Goldie and Murray, 
2010; Stammers, 2015) and the previous analysis regarding the knowledge and expertise 
differences between professional investors and private investors.   
 
Interestingly, the uninformed investors (and not the experts) were the strongest advocates 
(70%) for reducing retrocessions, while, controversially, reducing TER was important or 
very important for 91% of the experts. One could conclude that reducing the overall cost 
seems to be imperative, but not necessarily on the back of the retrocessions (fees).  
The same was also evidenced before with the professional investors rather supporting the 
reduction of TER than foregoing commissions when selling third party investment 
products (authors assumption).  
 
Another noticeable result was that the choice between active and passive managed funds 
was also important in achieving a higher and sustainable return than the market average. 
The EXPs and the INIs in particular understand the additional cost active management 
demands, and that active fund managers may find it challenging to achieve superior to 
market average returns, as many academics and practitioners evidenced (Ellis, 2002; 
Swensen, 2005; Zweig, 2006; Bogle, 2007; Goldie and Murray, 2010 or Stammers, 
2015). 
 
The product choice itself was not of statistical significance, but when looking at the 
absolute numbers or computed percentages, it achieved amongst the highest results for a 
sustainable outperformance.  
7.4.13. Importance of various investment criteria 
Nine questions concerned the importance of major investment criteria potentially of 
relevance to respondents. The criteria were selected from a range found in the literature, 
which were believed to be significant.  
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Label χ2 p (χ2) 
Fisher 
Exact 
p(L- 
χ2) 
Cramer 
V 
Company is a Swiss company 6.668 0.573 0.672 0.538 0.098 
Ethical aspects like sustainability or green investing 15.636 0.048 0.044 0.037 0.149 
Importance decisions-Expected dividend rate 5.780 0.672 0.519 0.798 0.091 
My knowledge of the company 13.514 0.095 0.124 0.178 0.139 
Past performance (profit/loss over years) 25.578 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.191 
Share/stock has a low P/E ratio 12.715 0.122 0.111 0.080 0.140 
The industry the company is in 9.702 0.287 0.304 0.184 0.118 
Product is an active managed fund 13.308 0.102 0.061 0.091 0.144 
Product is an Index fund or an ETF 17.709 0.024 0.028 0.077 0.165 
Table 80 – Statistical analysis – Importance of various investment criteria 
The analysis exposed statistically significant results for ethical investment criteria such 
as sustainability or green investing, for past performance and for the choice of the product 
being an index fund or an exchange traded fund (ETF. Informed investors viewed ethical 
aspects as highly relevant (82% vs. 0% for the EXPs) while the uninformed investors 
classified past performance (price movements) of investment products as very important 
(40% vs. 9% for the EXPs). The experts, on the other hand, trust that selecting an index / 
ETF as an investment vehicle is vital (24%), vs. the actively managed counterpart (35%). 
 
The next three criteria the experts favour more than the other two groups are knowledge 
of the company (40%), the industry the company is in (28%) and the dividend rate (24%).  
 
Past performance, even though statistically significant (81% UNIs) should not be of 
concern to investors with a long investment horizon (i.e. Ibbotson & Kaplan, 2000; Ellis, 
2002). However, if one for instance believes in stock picking or technical analysis, then 
this criterion becomes a vital deciding factor.  
7.4.14. Importance of various investment strategies  
These questions evaluated the importance of various investment strategies. 
 
Label Chi2 p (Chi) 
Fisher 
Exact 
p(L-
Chi2) 
Cramer 
V 
Active investing 9.990 0.266 0.231 0.234 0.129 
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Asset allocation 43.146 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.280 
Buy and hold 10.971 0.203 0.273 0.362 0.134 
Dividend investing 7.568 0.477 0.427 0.412 0.111 
Fundamental analysis 16.778 0.033 0.176 0.094 0.177 
Growth investing 9.575 0.296 0.413 0.459 0.130 
Passive investing 28.004 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.224 
Stock picking 11.957 0.153 0.124 0.165 0.138 
Technical analysis 16.877 0.031 0.012 0.047 0.176 
Value averaging 16.739 0.033 0.043 0.078 0.199 
Value investing 17.471 0.026 0.154 0.159 0.185 
Table 81 – Statistical analysis – Importance of various investment strategies 
Significant results between investment strategies / applications and the profiles were 
established for asset allocation, fundamental analysis, passive investing, technical 
analysis, value averaging and value investing. However, the association within the 
variables is weak. 
 
Asset allocation (0.000; 0.280), especially for the experts, has proven to be the most 
valuable investment strategy / applications. The INIs classified it as good and the UNIs 
as ‘satisfactory’. This is in line with the previous analysis (RQ1), where the professional 
investors ranked asset allocation as the most favoured. Positively, the experts view 
passive investing (0.000; 0.224) as the superior strategy to implement and manage an 
investment portfolio, vs. active investing which did not show satisfactory significance 
levels.  
 
Most experts and informed investors view fundamental analysis as ‘excellent’ and ‘good’, 
while the majority of the uniformed investors have also selected ‘good’. The latter should 
be treated with caution as only a few UNIs answered this question. The prior analysis also 
showed that fundamental analysis is amongst the top ranked investment strategies.   
 
The literature shows that fundamental analysis (determining the health and performance 
of an underlying company or industry) is the root for succeeding in investment strategies 
such as value or growth investing. Fundamental analysis is often contrasted with technical 
analysis, which within the prior research question did not find merit but was classified 
here as relevant with a p-value of 0.031 and a Cramer’s V of 0.176 (weak).  
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Value investing, as expected and also evidenced within the first canonical correlation 
analysis, was also ranked amongst to superior investment strategies (0.026; 0.185), while 
growth investing, as a sort of counterpart to value investing, did not show significant 
results.  
 
The last significant investment strategy was that of value averaging (0.033, 0.199), which 
is in contrast with the prior analysis (RQ1), where neither the asset managers, nor the 
institutional investors or the private investors classified it as an important. This leads to 
the conclusion that there are indeed investment experts that are knowledgeable about it. 
The descriptive analysis could not reveal the same.  
7.5. Summary of Research Question 2 
The initial part of this chapter described my motivation to profile all asset managers, 
institutional asset managers and private investors into the three additional skills-related 
investor groups: uniformed investors, informed investors and experts.  
 
It illustrated the five-step profiling process from: the identification of relevant profiling 
questions to cluster/categorize investors; the development of a scoring system; methods 
to account for missing values and to select a maximum score to identify the uniformed 
investors and a minimum score to identify the experts; to apply the scores for the investor 
types to then categorize them running the profiling questions.  
 
As a result, from the original 550 survey respondents, 374 participants qualified for the 
final analysis; 35 were uninformed investors (UNIs), 302 were informed investors (INIs) 
and 37 participants were classified as experts (EXP). 
 
The EXPs are better educated as, for instance, the number of PhDs is twice as high as 
with the INIs and 70% higher in relation to the UNIs. The same is true when comparing 
a university degree as the highest level of education.  
 
When looking at qualifications, the UNIs do not hold any of the professional credentials 
featured in questions, whereas more than half of the EXPs have either passed the CFA, 
Master of Finance, Investment Management or other relevant qualification.  
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Experience in investing  also showed statistically significant results and increasing levels 
from uninformed investors to informed investors to the experts. Almost 90% of the 
experts have managed wealth for more than 10 years, and over 40% for more than 20 
years.  
 
In the self-rating of participants own investment knowledge, the EXPs affirm themselves 
with good (proficient) to excellent knowledge (expertise), while the informed investors 
estimate their knowledge as average (advanced beginner) or good (competent) and the 
uniformed investors saw themselves as basic (novice) or non-existent.  
 
The experts tend to have more of their disposable income invested than the other two 
groups, as almost three-quarters have invested more than half of their funds; a third of 
EXPs indeed have more than 80% of disposable income invested, compared with only 
13% of the informed investors. Also, even though the above analysis did not identify the 
investment duration as statistically relevant, the major groups of the EXPs (28%) invest 
for 10-15 years, with 45% for more than 15 years.  
 
The experts can also statistically be classified by their ability to explain important 
investment topics such as asset classes, coupons, futures, options, the P/E ratio, 
rebalancing or structured products. The same is true for understanding and explaining the 
fee structure of active managed funds, passive managed funds and shares. The INIs and 
UNIs answered these question between ‘I cannot explain’ and ‘neutral’, showing major 
differences here.  
 
As established within for RQ1, this analysis also illustrated (76% EXP, 65% INIs and 
65% UNIs) the importance of the concept of diversification (spreading the investments 
throughout appropriate asset classes and products). Investing in funds rather than shares 
is favoured by half of the expert investors, while three-quarters of them (compared to 
45% of INIs and 39% of  UNIs) are trying to negate emotions when investing. 
 
For investment duration, the majority of the experts and half of the informed investors 
focus on the long-term contrasting with lower duration for UNIs; this shows a tendency, 
but not one that reaches statistically significant levels. On the other hand, statistically 
significant results were derived for different asset classes, i.e. corporate bonds, 
government bonds, hedge funds, high yield bonds, real estate and shares/stocks.  
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The latter was favoured by almost all EXPs, many INIs and two-thirds of the UNIs. The 
outcomes for the other asset classes were similar, with the experts showing the highest 
levels of agreement; they were always more cohesive than the informed investors and the 
uniformed investors.  
 
When the investors were asked about important factors that contribute to a higher and 
more sustainable outperformance than market benchmarks, the analysis revealed 
significant results for portfolio rebalancing, re-investing dividends and coupons, the 
choice between active or passive managed funds, the choice of asset classes, the choice 
of products, the current purchasing price and the duration of the investment.  
 
The analysis further exposed statistically significant results for the ethical investment 
criteria such as sustainability or green investing, which was especially true for the 
informed investors (82% vs. 0% for the experts).  
 
The most valuable investment strategies / applications identified by the experts were asset 
allocation, fundamental analysis, passive and value investing; this was also the outcome 
of the prior analysis for RQ1. However, it is  surprising that, contrary to the out-turn for  
RQ1, value averaging was found to have statistical significance – despite.  
 
In contrast to RQ1, my null hypothesis for RQ2 is supported, since statistical evidence 
shows that the experts more than the informed or uninformed investors, with increasing 
knowledge and experience, did indeed exhibit superior investment acumen. The EXPs 
choose to invest diversely in passive instruments and for the long-term, while applying a 
cost-effective form of a buy-and hold strategy. 
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8. The characteristics and investment behaviours of experts  
8.1. Chapter overview – Research question 3 
This chapter presents the results and analyses to answer RQ3: 
 
How to characterize the investment experts and their investment behaviours, 
criteria and strategies in an attempt to examine the Dreyfus model category 
concerning expertise?  
 
My hypothesis is that the experts would show preferences for passive investing and re- 
investing (dividends, coupons, disposable income), maintaining appropriately diversified 
portfolios, cost-efficiency awareness and a long-term perspective. 
8.2. Analysis and discussion focusing on the experts 
The discussion topics here draw on evidence presented in the analyses for RQ1 and RQ2.  
Additional or particularly relevant literature only will be cited to support arguments 
relating specifically to the 37 identified ‘experts’.  
8.2.1. Gender distribution within profiled investors 
Of the 374 participants, 62 investors were female and 312 were male; a ratio of around 1 
to 5. However, only 2 females (3.2% of the sample) were classified into the expert group, 
while males numbered 35 (11.2%,). Within the informed investors, the female to male 
ratio was about 1 to 5 and 1 to 3 amongst the uninformed investors. Given the small 
absolute numbers in the more extreme groups, no particular inference can be drawn from 
this, though it might reflect a male gender bias in terms of both seniority and longevity in 
the industry. 
 
 
Table 82 – Gender distribution within profiled investors 
Gender All investors Experts only in %
Female 62 2 3.2%
Male 312 35 11.2%
Total 374 37 9.9%
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Figure 49 – Gender distribution within the profiled investors 
8.2.2. Original investor types within the profiled investors 
As expected, almost all uniformed investors (UNIs) were private investors. However, 
there was also one institutional investor who qualified as uninformed. The more 
surprising aspect is that a quarter of all experts were in fact private investors. This group 
were now vital for answering the third research question. The initial assumption was that 
professional investors would only be found within the experts; experts would come from 
asset managers and institutional investors.  
 
Likewise, it was interesting to realize that 49 professional investors (almost two-thirds of 
the asset managers and institutional investors) only ‘qualified’ as informed investors.  
 
 
Figure 50 – Original investor types within the profiled investors 
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8.2.3. The experts by age groups 
Around half of all the experts were between 35 and 44 years old, and over three-quarters 
were between 35 and 54. The average expert investor was 42.7 years old. 
 
 
Figure 51 – The age distribution amongst the experts 
8.2.4. The experts’ level of education 
As assumed, almost half of all experts held a university degree, followed by those holding 
degrees either from universities of applied sciences or from the Swiss federal 
organization. A further four experts had completed a doctoral degree. Almost all (33 of 
37) experts were highly educated.  
 
 
Figure 52 – The experts’ highest level of education completed 
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8.2.5. The experts’ level of qualification  
A reasonable expectation might be that almost all experts held some of the qualifications 
included in the survey. The list could not contain all existing possibilities, but definitely 
the most likely ones, as drawn from Jaffe (2010). Furthermore, the questions had the 
ending ‘or similar’ attached. Hence, the participants would have chosen the qualification 
that was closest to the ones they held. For this reason, it was surprising that almost half 
of all experts did not possess a significant financial or investment related qualification.  
 
Assuming that most of those without relevant qualifications were private investors, it was 
a surprise that the analysis showed, that over half of them had actually undertaken 
relevant postgraduate courses. In fact, it was the asset manager group that showed the 
highest number of non-qualifications, as 3 out of 5 did not own any designation. Within 
the institutional investors, the ratio was 1 out of 5.  
 
It was also an asset manager who qualified as an expert, but with only secondary school 
as the highest level of education and with no financial or investment management related 
qualification. This asset manager is male, from Germany, between 45 and 54 years old, 
with more than 20 years’ experience in investing, who would rather invest in active 
managed funds than in passive ones. He holds between 16 to 20 products in his portfolio 
and desires an annual return of 6 to 8%. This perspective, given in detail here, shows a 
marked deviation from the hypothesized preference of investment experts in general, a 
priori. 
 
One of the most notable findings was that the highest proportion of CFA holders (which 
as Jaffe (2010) observes, is one of the most difficult and prestigious designations to 
achieve), was found not only within the professional investor groups. While almost half 
of all institutional experts held a CFA, twice the proportion of private experts than asset 
manager experts held the same. This again confirms the previous statement that there was 
obviously an undervaluation of the private investors in relation to the notion of financial 
investing. 
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Figure 53 – The 37 experts’ qualifications  
 
Figure 54 – The 19 asset managers experts’ qualifications  
 
Figure 55 – The 9 institutional investors experts’ qualifications  
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Figure 56 – The 9 private investors experts’ qualifications  
8.2.6. The experts’ level of income 
The experts seemed to be working in well paid positions, as 30 were generating an income 
of more than CHF 140,000 (£112,000). The average salary amid the experts amounted to 
> CHF 202,702 (£165,000). The average Swiss salary was CHF 77,124 (£61,000) in 2014 
(BSF Admin, 2016).  
 
 
Figure 57 – The experts’ annual income  
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8.2.7. The experts’ level of experience 
As expected, the experts also distinguished themselves by their number of years’ 
experience in investing as none of them exhibited less than 6, while 23 exhibited  
more than 15 years. The average experience was > 16 years.  
 
 
Figure 58 – The experts’ experience in investing (years)  
8.2.8. The experts’ opinion of the importance of diversification 
More than three quarters of all experts (28) stipulated that investing in a diversified 
portfolio was imperative, but 3 disagreed or strongly disagreed. These investors in 
disagreement were probably ‘stock pickers’, with a short investment horizon (given that 
they were categorized as experts).  
 
 
Figure 59 – The experts’ opinion of the importance of diversification 
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Further analysis confirmed that most investors who did assert that diversification is 
‘unimportant’ were indeed ‘stock pickers’ (five, including neutrals) but contrary to 
expectation, they had an investment horizon of four years or more (which is not 
necessarily seen as ‘short term’).  
 
 
Figure 60 – The experts’ opinion of diversification vs. stock picking 
8.2.9. The experts’ opinion of investing for the long-term 
26 of all experts would prefer to invest for the long-term; only 7 (around a fifth) disagreed 
and exhibited a short(er)-term investment horizon. This again may have been because 
they were stock pickers, or are trying to time the market, or believe in technical analysis, 
or they simply needed the funds in the near future. However, no expert strongly disagreed 
with the notion of long-term investment horizons.  
 
1
13
Importance of diversification vs. investment strategy stock picking
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neutral
256 
 
 
Figure 61 – The experts’ opinion of investing for the long-term 
8.2.10. The experts’ opinion of investing in single shares over funds  
This question revealed that more than half of all experts prefer investing in funds over 
single shares, with over a third of the reverse belief. Again, it may be that the latter are 
‘stock-pickers’.  
 
 
Figure 62 – The experts’ opinion of investing in single shares over funds 
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Another 6 were neutral about this. On the other hand, there were (fortunately, from the 
prior expectation) 29 experts (four-fifths) who were, like the CFA Institute (2008) or 
Stammers (2015), of the opinion that emotions had no place when it comes to investing. 
 
 
Figure 63 – The experts’ opinion of investing without emotions  
8.2.12. The experts’ opinion of active vs. passive managed funds 
The prior assumption was that the experts would favour passive managed funds, but it 
was surprising that the number doing this was almost double (21 vs. 11) those who did 
not. It seems that, even though half of the experts were asset managers who would 
probably support active fund management due to their ‘commission-based’ business 
model, when it came down to what truly works best in relation to their own investments, 
passive managed funds such as ETFs are their first choice.  
 
This is in stark contrast to the initial analysis (RQ1) where the asset managers were 
equally fond of both approaches and the institutional investors and the private investors 
only somewhat (+8%, +18%) in favour of passive funds. What also was surprising was 
that five experts (being the experts) did not have a firm opinion on it. 
 
 
1 1
6
18
11
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree
Importance of investing without emotions 
258 
 
 
Figure 64 – The experts’ opinion of active vs. passive managed funds 
8.2.13. The experts’ investment duration 
As expected, and in line with the previous questions regarding the importance to invest 
for the long-term, 25 (almost three-quarters) of the 36 experts invested for more than 7 
years, 16 (almost a half) for over 10 years and 6 (a fifth) for more than 15 years. Applying 
17.5 years for the group over 15 years, the average investment duration was 9.5 years. 
 
 
Figure 65 – The experts’ investment duration 
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8.2.14. The experts’ proportion of savings invested 
26 experts had more than 50% of their disposable money invested, half more than 70%, 
a third over 80% and 6 more than 90%. The average was 59%. 
 
Figure 66 – The experts’ proportion of savings invested 
8.2.15. The experts’ development of a risk profile 
25 of all experts had either developed a risk profile themselves or through a third party, 
supporting this essential notion when investing. One third had never worried about it. 
 
 
Figure 67 – The experts’ development of a risk profile 
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8.2.16. The experts’ product diversification  
Experts were well diversified as more than two-thirds invested in more than 8 products, 
20 in over 12, and 5 managed 16 to 20 products within their portfolio. It is thought-
provoking to see that 8 experts (a quarter) hold more than 20 products.  
 
Also interesting is that nine experts were content to only hold seven or fewer products 
within their portfolios, probably trusting in stock picking or single shares. The average 
was 13.4, which if chosen across the relevant asset classes, is probably a ‘fair distribution’ 
of funds. 
 
 
Figure 68 – The experts’ product diversification 
8.2.17. The experts’ expected annual return 
The experts portrayed a realistic view regarding the annual return they desired to achieve 
from their investments. Three were happy with a 1 to 4% return but two thirds of the 
experts wanted to generate 4 to 8%, and another seven between 8% and 10%. The average 
anticipated return was 7.2%, which was in line with the long-term average on equity 
investment (Pictet, 2015; Stammers, 2015).  
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Figure 69 – The experts’ expected annual return 
8.2.18. The experts’ readiness to change to an online asset manager 
20 out of 35 of the experts would change to an online asset manager if they could save 
25% of the management fee, given that the quality and products were the same as their 
current provider. Omitting the experts who already agreed, another four would change, if 
savings of 50% could be achieved, while the number of experts who disagreed at 25% 
savings reduced.  
 
It seems there is an evident understanding amongst the experts, that any kind of fees, 
when too high, lower the return to an investor’s portfolio, especially considering the effect 
of compounding interest. Therefore, the lower the TER (for the same products/quality), 
the more profitable the investments.  
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Figure 70 – Change to an online asset manager for a 25% fee reduction 
 
Figure 71 – Change to an online asset manager for a 50% fee reduction 
8.2.19. The experts’ view on investing in various asset classes  
The asset class ‘shares/stocks (equities)’ enjoyed the greatest investment support amongst 
the experts (34), followed by corporate bonds (27), commodities (22), high yield bonds 
(20), real estate (20) and gold (18). The preliminary analysis of the Asset Managers, 
Institutional Investors and Private Investors showed both real estate and gold with higher 
priorities.   
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Government bonds were less important than cash, as the environment for them is 
consistently unfavourable (low coupons, high potential for interest rates hikes and 
therefore principal losses – as of 2017). Equally not surprising is that nearly two thirds of 
the experts stayed away from hedge funds, as they are extremely costly, and most often 
do not deliver positive returns.  
 
 
Table 83 – The experts’ view of various asset classes 
8.2.20. The experts’ view on investing in various markets  
Most investors (31) lived in Switzerland and therefore had a natural tendency towards 
Swiss companies and their base currency. However, emerging countries and the USA 
seemed to be equally important markets (31). It is interesting that the experts placed more 
faith in them than in Germany (27), Europe in general (25) or the UK (18).  
 
 
Table 84 – The experts’ view on various markets (36/37 participants) 
8.2.21. The experts’ outperformance criteria 
For the 33 experts that answered these questions, the asset allocation (31), the products 
(30), the investment duration (30) and the total expense ratio (TER; 29) were the most 
Asset classes Agree Strongly Agree Total Percent
Shares/stocks 6 28 34 91.9%
Corporate bonds 14 13 27 73.0%
Commodities 15 7 22 61.1%
High yield bonds 6 14 20 55.6%
Real estate 10 10 20 55.6%
Gold 10 8 18 50.0%
Cash 7 10 17 45.9%
Hedge funds 8 6 14 38.9%
Government bonds 6 7 13 35.1%
Investment markets Agree Strongly Agree Total Percent
Switzerland 15 16 31 83.8%
Emerging markets 12 19 31 83.8%
USA 16 15 31 83.8%
Germany 11 16 27 75.0%
Europe in general 17 8 25 67.6%
UK 11 7 18 48.6%
Australia / New Zealand 11 7 18 48.6%
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significant contributors for a performance - that is, higher and more sustainable than the 
market average.  
 
Looking at the highest ‘strongly agree’ numbers, asset allocation and investment duration, 
as well as TER, were the clear leaders. The experts also understood and appreciated the 
notion and importance of rebalancing (27), in order to constantly monitor / keep in check 
the asset class ratios within their portfolio.  
 
Two-thirds of all the experts classified re-investing dividends and the choice between an 
active managed fund and its passive counterpart as significant. The latter is most likely 
linked to reducing TER, but accords also with their general recognition that active 
managed funds are suboptimal investment vehicles.  
 
Reducing retrocessions only found support from two-thirds of the experts. As already 
exemplified in responses to RQ2, they welcome minimizing overall cost (TER, 33) but 
not on the basis of reduced retrocessions.  
 
A subsequent analysis by initial investor types revealed, that it was the institutional 
investors who did not worry too much about retrocessions. Five even argued it to be 
unimportant. The experts within the private investors and the asset manager group were 
more sanguine about it.  
 
More than half of the experts considered the purchasing price as important, while the 
particular firm issuing an ETF, as well as the bank holding the portfolio, were rated last.  
 
 
Table 85 – The experts’ outperformance criteria 
Outperformance criteria Agree Strongly Agree Total Percent
Asset class choice 9 22 31 93.9%
Poduct choice 17 13 30 90.9%
Investment duration 13 17 30 90.9%
Total expense ratio 13 16 29 87.9%
Rebalancing 12 15 27 81.8%
Active/passive funds 11 11 22 66.7%
Re-Investing dividends 13 9 22 66.7%
Reducing retrocessions 9 11 20 60.6%
Purchasing price 11 8 19 57.6%
ETF issuer 6 4 10 30.3%
Choice of bank 5 2 7 21.2%
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Figure 72 – The experts’ outperformance criteria 
 
Figure 73 – The experts’ outperformance criteria – Asset managers 
 
Figure 74 – The experts’ outperformance criteria – Institutional investors 
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Figure 75 – The experts’ outperformance criteria – Private investors 
8.2.22. The experts’ investment criteria 
It is thought provoking to see that the majority of the 33 experts (who answered these 
questions) invested in companies they knew (27). Likewise, the industry the company is 
in (21) seems to play an important role for an investor’s investment decision.  
 
Equally important is the size of the company, the expected dividend rate and the P/E ratio 
(20). It is surprising though, that half of the experts (17) considered the historical 
performance of a share price to be an important or very important investment criterion. 
As evidenced previously, passive managed funds outweighed active managed funds. Yet, 
when only taking the ‘strongly agreed’ answers into consideration, then passive managed 
funds became the third most important investment criterion and active managed funds the 
second last.  
 
The company being Swiss was only important for 12 of the 37 experts. Yet, if neglecting 
the non-Swiss experts (UK and Germany who might exhibit a tendency to their home 
companies), the number increased to 15, and when including the experts who were neutral 
about it, to 25. However, there were 8 for whom ‘Swissness’ is insignificant. Ethical 
characteristics (such as green investing and sustainability) were the least favoured 
investment criterion.  
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Table 86 – The experts’ investment criteria 
 
Figure 76 – The experts’ investment criteria 
 
Figure 77 – The Swiss experts’ investment criteria: company is Swiss  
Investment criteria Agree Strongly Agree Total Percent
Company knowlege 14 13 27 81.8%
The industry 12 9 21 63.6%
Large-cap 18 2 20 60.6%
Expected dividend 12 8 20 60.6%
Low P/E ratio 18 2 20 60.6%
Past performance 14 3 17 51.5%
Passive fund 8 8 16 48.5%
Active fund 12 1 13 39.4%
Swiss company 11 1 12 36.4%
Ethical aspects 5 0 5 15.2%
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8.2.23. The experts’ investment strategies 
The 35 experts’ (only 34 on two questions) top three investment strategies / applications 
were asset allocation (in fact rather an investment policy; 27), value investing (25) and 
fundamental analysis (25). Thereafter, came dividend investing, growth investing and buy 
and hold, with 21 or 22 experts in favour.  
 
Passive investing and active investing found the same support, but when solely looking 
at those rating the two strategies as  excellent, passive investing became the second ranked 
investment strategy. The approaches that do not play significant roles were stock picking 
(14), technical analysis (12) and value averaging (10). 
 
 
Table 87 – The experts’ investment strategies 
 
 
Figure 78 – The experts’ investment strategies 
Investment strategies Good Excellent Total Percent
Asset allocation 9 18 27 77.1%
Value investing 17 8 25 71.4%
Fundamental analyis 16 9 25 71.4%
Dividend investing 16 6 22 62.9%
Growth investing 17 4 21 61.8%
Buy and hold 16 5 21 60.0%
Passive investing 7 10 17 50.0%
Active investing 12 5 17 48.6%
Stock picking 10 4 14 41.2%
Technical analysis 10 2 12 34.3%
Value averaging 9 1 10 28.6%
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8.3. Characteristics of the experts 
The following summary displays the experts’ profile and investment acumen and 
therefore answers the first part of  RQ3, characterizing the experts.  
 
 
 Table 88 – The experts’ characteristics / investment behaviour 
Characteristics / investment behaviour Results
Age On average 42,7 years old; 78% between 35 and 54 years
Education
86% are highly educated (university, university of applied science, Swiss 
federal diploma)
Qualification
56% engaged in finance related courses; asset managers showed he lowest 
numbers, institutional investors with 80% the highest 
Income
On average CHF 202'000; > 80% earn above CHF 140'000; 50% more than CHF 
200'000
Experience On average 16 years; 62% more than 15 years
View on diversification 76% stipulate that investing in a diversified portfolio is paramount
Diversification
The average portofolio contains 13 products; 72% invest in more than 8 
products; 63% in more than 12 and 41% in 16 to 20+ products 
View on investment duration 70% invest for the long-run 
Investment duration
On avgearage 9.5 years; 70% invest for more than 7 years; 45% for over 10 
years
View on funds vs. single shares 51% prefer investments in funds 
View on active vs. passive investing 57% prefer passive manged funds; only 32% active manged funds
View on emotions 78% state that emotions have no place when it comes to investing
Change to an online asset manager
Given the quallity and products are the same, 57% would change at 25% 
savings (management fee); another 20% at 50% savings
Risk profile 70% have either developed a risk profile themselves or through a third party
Savings invested
On average 59%. 72% have more than 50% of their disposible income 
invested; 50% more than 70% and 30% more than 80%
Expected return
On average 7.2%; 66% expect an annual return between 4 and 8%; 20% 
between 8 and 10%
Asset classes (top five)
Shares (92%); corporate bonds (73%); commoditites (61%); high yield bonds 
(56%); Real estate (56%)
Market preference (top five)
Switzerland (84%); Emerging markets (84%); USA (84%), Germany (75%); 
Europe in general (68%)
Outperformance criteria (top five) 
Asset class choice (94%); product choice (91%); ); investment duration (91%);  
TER (88%); rebalacing (82%)
Investment criteria (top five)
Knowledge of company (82%); the industry (64%); large-cap (61%); expected 
dividend (61%); low P/E ratio (61%)
Investment strategies (top five)
Asset allocation (77%); value investing (71%); fundamental analysis (71%); 
dividend investing (63%); growth investing (62%)
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8.4. Summary of Research Question 3  
Almost a quarter of the private investors were classified as experts, while more than half 
of the asset managers and institutional investors only qualified as informed investors.  
 
The investment experts were mostly male, on average 43 years old, highly educated 
(University degree, Swiss Federal Diploma, PhD/DBA), with more than 16 years of 
investment experience and an income of over CHF 202,000 (£165,000). 
 
More than half of the private investors also held a finance or investment related 
qualification, while the asset managers formed the group with the least number of such 
credentials; but as expected, the institutional investors had the highest proportion (4/5). 
The analysis revealed that if you were to work as an, or for an institutional investor, 
mastering the CFA would most likely be beneficial (half of the experts hold a CFA).  
 
Most of the experts had either developed a risk profile themselves or by a third party. 
They desire an average return on their portfolio of 4 to 8%, while they would tolerate up 
to 25% loss in an unfortunate investment year (such as 2008). 26 of the experts had more 
than 50% of their disposable money invested, and 11 more than 80%.  
 
The important notion of diversification, of spreading the funds and risk over various asset 
classes, products and currencies, was supported by more than three quarters of the experts 
as two thirds of the experts were invested in more than 12 products. The same was true 
for the investment duration as not only 25 of the experts prefer to invest for the long-term 
(> 7 years) but also since the average investment duration was almost 10 years.  
 
Furthermore, the analysis revealed that more than half of the experts favour investing in 
funds over single shares/stocks, while the debate concerning whether to invest in active 
or passive manged funds was clearly answered by the experts, as two thirds were in favour 
of passive vehicles. Similarly, the overall cost for investing, hence the total expense ratio 
(TER), seems to be a vital factor for the experts as almost 20 of the experts would change 
to an online asset manager if they could save 25% to 50% of the management fee.  
 
There was no clear tendency as to which markets investors prefer since all (Switzerland, 
Emerging Markets, USA, Germany etc.) were almost equally as important.  
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Only the UK and Australia / New Zealand were not ranked as high. This may also be a 
part of an expert’s diversification strategy. Regarding the asset classes on the other hand, 
the experts favoured shares/stocks, corporate bonds, commodities, high yield bonds and 
real estate. Government bonds were seen as less important than cash and two thirds of the 
experts do not view hedge funds as a viable asset class. 
 
When the experts were asked about the most important factors that contribute to a 
performance that is higher and more sustainable than the market average, asset allocation, 
the investment duration and the total expense ratio ranked in the first three places. 
Furthermore, the choice between active and passive manged funds and re-investing 
dividends were also significant. Conversely, reducing retrocessions was ranked low, 
which contrasts to the prior argument about the importance of reducing the TER. 
Obviously, there is a discrepancy between these two criteria, most probably due to the 
commission models from which the professional investors benefit. 
 
The question about the important investment criteria exposed that, besides the industry 
the company is in, investing in large organizations and re-investing dividends, the experts 
viewed their stock/company knowledge as most important. Half of the experts held that 
the past performance of a stock, fund, bond, etc. is also important.  
 
Lastly, the experts favour asset allocation asset, value investing and fundamental analysis 
as the leading three investment strategies / applications. Yet, when only looking at the 
investment strategies that were classified as being excellent, passive investing ranked 
second after asset allocation, while active fund management was graded in the lower part 
of the table. The approaches that could be neglected were stock picking, technical analysis 
and value averaging.  
 
RQ3 described the characteristics of the investment experts and their appropriate 
investment behaviours, criteria and strategies in relation to the Dreyfus related category 
– expertise.  
 
The base hypothesis was confirmed, as the experts demonstrate preferences for passive 
investing and re-investing (dividends, coupons, disposable income), while maintaining 
appropriately diversified portfolios, and having a cost-efficiency awareness with a long-
term investment perspective. 
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9. Completion of the thesis 
9.1. Chapter Overview 
This chapter offers detailed conclusions drawing on the literature on investing and the 
discussion of the three research questions. It seeks to illustrate how general investors can 
advance their investment behaviours and further their personal development utilizing 
Dreyfus’ five-stage model of adult skill acquisition. It offers recommendations for 
investors which they can follow, if they decide the ideas to be feasible in their investment 
situation. It also illustrates a practical investment process as a possible guideline for any 
interested investor. By offering these insights, it provides contributions to both theory and 
practice and suggests areas for further research. 
9.2. Conclusion 
The primary aim of this thesis was to investigate the levels of expertise of both private 
(retail) and professional investors to see if and how they differ in their investment acumen 
and investment criteria and strategies. This was done against the background of Dreyfus’ 
level of ‘expertise’, in order to determine if experts (once identified) possess knowledge 
and experience that enables them to construct superior and enduring investment 
portfolios. Given that there was no prior classification of expertise amongst investors, 
save that derived from the various qualifications in the area, one particular aim was to 
identify those who might be classified as ‘investment experts’. This would permit the 
characterization of their investment behaviours and enable recommendations for the 
larger investing community.  
 
The motivation to undertake this research originated in the notion that stock market 
investing is an overwhelming challenge for many people. Choosing securities from the 
global marketplace and then analysing, evaluating and purchasing investment products 
for a well-diversified portfolio, with a view to tracking and rebalancing those securities, 
is not something most non-professional investors are capable of or willing to do for 
themselves. As a result, many retail investors either try to invest directly themselves, 
without being able to investigate all potential markets, or they entrust their money to a 
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bank or to an asset management company, believing that these organizations will know 
better and will work solely in their interest.  
 
This study showed that, while there are undoubtedly financial institutions that do act for 
the benefit of their customers, some do not. Many investors are willing to change their 
money manager for various reasons, e.g. investments into the bank’s own funds, or third-
party products to receive retrocessions or other forms of commission. Similarly, private 
investors who either want to invest themselves or who are not eligible for the services of 
private banks will also often lose money in the long term. This is, as initially assumed, 
due to private individuals: lack of investment knowledge; overestimation of their own 
talents; not knowing ‘who they are’ (risk tolerance/ability); following the herd, or their 
desire to achieve ‘unrealistic returns’.  
 
From the literature on adult learning and expertise came the adult skill acquisition model, 
developed by Hubert L. and Stuart E. Dreyfus. This model describes the stages one passes 
through (novice, advanced beginner, competent, proficiency, expertise) on the journey to 
gain knowledge and experience and consequently become an expert. The model was used 
to firstly ‘locate’ the five stages with the three initial investor groups: the asset managers 
(AMs), the institutional investors (IIs) and the private investors (PIs). This reflected a 
view that, increased wealth under management, increased experience and a higher level 
of professional qualification would be found successively – PI, AM, II -  in these groups. 
Secondly, the Dreyfus model’s framework was applied to the subsequent three investor 
groups: the uninformed investors (UNIs), the informed investors (INIs) and the experts 
(EXPs), who were identified following initial analysis.  
 
It was clear from the literature review that not only is ‘expertise’ in general an under-
researched field, but that this lack is even more marked in the domain of investment and 
asset management. This study shows that private investors are generally not experts, since 
most of them do not hold any of the available credentials, nor do they work in the 
investment field (a marker for expertise implicated by the Dreyfus model), or as shown 
very clearly by an EU study of the consumer market for investment products. Also this 
research shows that professional ‘experts’ do not always act in an expert manner as they 
frequently do not construct sustainable portfolios that reflect their clients’ best interests.  
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The initial overarching hypothesis was that professional investors, such as asset managers 
and institutional investors, possess superior investment knowledge and expertise 
compared to private investors. They might well have greater experience, given the sums 
invested for which they have responsibility. They should therefore be better informed and 
act cautiously and, as experts, could be perceived as a paragon for private or general 
investors. The assumption was that within the group of professional investors, the 
institutional investors will exhibit greater investment knowledge and expertise (given that 
their portfolios are likely to be of greater value) than the asset managers.  
 
In terms of the Dreyfus model, thus (a priori) the estimate was that the private investors 
are either ‘novice’ or potentially ‘advanced beginners’, that asset managers are rather to 
be found in the range of ‘competent’ and ‘proficient’ and the institutional investors within 
‘proficient’ and ‘expertise’.  
 
The aim of the research, therefore, was (i) to examine investment practices for the general 
investor, enabling them to invest more knowledgably and effectively, according to 
research and experience from expert investors, and (ii) to test if there are differences 
between investors characterized as experts and those characterized as less informed (or 
uninformed) investors and (iii) to test the Dreyfus model through its explicit utilization 
in this particular field.  
9.2.1. Research Question 1 Answered 
RQ1 - How do private and professional investors differ (if at all) in terms of their 
knowledge, experience, and investment approaches (examining the first Dreyfus 
related categories)? 
 
It was possible to identify that the level of knowledge and agreement on specific 
investment matters enabled categorizing survey respondents into either private or 
professional investors. 
 
The descriptive statistics and canonical correlation analysis, the corresponding literature 
and its review, clearly show how the private and professional investor differ in terms of 
their knowledge, experience, and investment approaches.  
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However, the initial supposition that the more knowledgeable and experienced an 
investor is, the greater the superiority and caution with which s/he will invest, could not 
be fully confirmed.  
 
Private investors (in this study) for example, prefer to invest for the short-term, in single 
stocks rather than funds, in the Swiss, German or US markets and preferably in larger 
corporations. They are able to explain the notion and mechanics of coupons as well as the 
PE/Ratio and believe that the purchasing price is an important investment criterion. These 
characteristics would generally not distinguish them as ‘informed’ (at any advanced level) 
in this field. 
 
On the other hand, professional investors distinguish themselves by utilizing the vital 
concept of diversification, by their ability to explain the notion of asset classes or other, 
rather technical products such as futures, stock options or structured products. 
Furthermore, professional investor can be classified as such by their capacity to describe 
the important concept of rebalancing, as well as the fee structures of shares, active 
managed funds and passive managed funds. They are further willing to accept higher risks 
for potential higher returns, and favour investing in corporate bonds, the UK or general 
European market. Professional investors see asset allocation as paramount and favour 
value investing and prefer cost-effective ETFs or index funds over actively managed 
funds. They could also be identified by their concern for the overall expenditures for 
investing (TER). These abilities distinguished them from private investors.  
 
In line with the Dreyfus skill acquisition model, my assumption was confirmed that the 
private investors are either ‘novice’ or potentially ‘advanced beginners’, that asset 
managers are rather to be found in the range of ‘competent’ and ‘proficiency’ and the 
institutional investors within ‘proficiency’ and ‘expertise’. This initial investigation 
supported the Dreyfus model, at least as far as three clusters of respondents were 
concerned. The clusters showed increasing expertise, but it was not evident that the 
model’s apparent linear and monotonic (smooth, regular, increasing) transition from stage 
to stage was readily apparent. No isomorphic mapping between the available evidence 
and the model was possible. 
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9.2.2. Research Question 2 Answered 
RQ2 - Is it possible to determine probable differences in the investment approaches 
discernible between those now characterized as investment experts and those 
characterized as informed or uninformed investors (examining the second Dreyfus 
related categories)? 
 
In order to refine the three identified clusters (or put another way, achieve greater 
discrimination) to map onto the Dreyfus categories, a method to profile the participants 
to discover the more distinguished investors in terms of their investment acumen 
(knowledge, criteria, strategies, etc.) and experience was developed. Therefore, to 
supplement the existing investor categories, which hinged on employment (private 
investors, asset managers, institutional investors), three expertise-based investor groups 
were developed: the uniformed investors (UNIs), the informed investors (INIs) and the 
experts (EXPs). These groups should, theoretically, map more precisely onto Dreyfus 
stages. 
 
The primary goals then became to understand both the investment expertise and 
behaviour of the experts who were now distinguished from the other categories, and the 
possible difference in the investment approaches between those characterized as experts 
and those characterized as informed or uninformed investors. These additional investor 
groups were again related to the Dreyfus skill acquisition model and the various stages of 
skill attainment.  
 
The research data generated, when subjected to descriptive and analytical statistical 
analysis, yielded answers for RQ2. This determined possible differences in the investment 
approaches known between those characterized as investment experts and those 
characterized as informed or uninformed investors (the second Dreyfus related 
categories). It further confirmed the hypothesis that the more knowledgeable and 
experienced an investor is, the greater the superiority of their approach and the more 
cautiously they invest. 
 
One main finding was that the experts (EXPs) are clearly better educated than the other 
two groups.  
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For both doctorates (where the proportion is twice as high as with the INIs and 70% higher 
in relation to the UNIs) and other university degrees as the highest level of education, 
clear patterns of higher achievement were evident.  
 
When looking at field-specific qualifications, the UNIs do not hold any of the professional 
credentials in question, whereas more than half of the EXPs have either passed the CFA, 
Master of Finance, Investment Management or another relevant designation. The number 
of years of experience in investing showed statistically significant results and increasing 
levels from uninformed investors, to informed investors to the experts. This is also in 
accordance with the Dreyfus model. This suggests that the model, offering as it does a 
picture of adult learning moving through stages, is supported to the extent that the stages 
are seen as having ‘fuzzy’ boundaries, rather than being clear cut. 
 
The experts tend to have more of their disposable income invested than the INIs and UNIs 
and prefer a lengthier investment duration (almost half - 45% - for more than 15 years). 
They can further be classified by their ability to explain important investment topics, such 
as asset classes, coupons, futures, options, the P/E ratio, rebalancing or structured 
products. Experts are also more likely to have the ability to understand and explain the 
fee structure of active managed funds, passive managed funds and shares. These 
characteristics accord with much of the available literature on investing, though it must 
be acknowledged that the literature is partial and often written to advocate a particular 
position. Looking at the academic literature alone suggests that the partial evidence 
available may support this view, but there is research specifically oriented to technical 
aspects flowing from different initial positions (concerned, for example, with timing, high 
intensity trading or trend analysis) that cannot be adduced in support.  
 
Additionally, the experts comprehend the important concept of diversification more than 
the other two groups; they favour investing in funds over shares (in contrast with the other 
investor groups), and they forgo emotions when investing.  
 
The most valuable investment strategies / applications selected by the experts are value 
investing, fundamental analysis, asset allocation and passive investing. The INIs in 
contrast have a stronger preference for active investing and stock picking (which are 
techniques more amenable to technical analysis using extant data, than to be found in 
academic literature).  
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Contrary to the assumption of the first research question, value averaging was also found 
to be statistically significant in discriminating knowledge of the groups here. 
 
The outcome of this analysis matched the phases of the Dreyfus skill acquisition model 
used to form the initial hypotheses, as the UNIs could be categorized within the ‘novice’ 
or ‘advanced beginners’ categories, the INIs rather within the range of ‘competence’ and 
‘proficiency’ and the EXPs within ‘proficiency’ and ‘expertise’, using the  distinguishing 
features suggested by the Dreyfus framework.  
9.2.3. Research Question 3 Answered  
RQ3 – How to characterize the investment experts and their investment behaviours, 
criteria and strategies in an attempt to examine the Dreyfus model category 
concerning expertise?  
 
The initial hypothesis was confirmed, as the experts would rather invest and keep 
investing (dividends, coupons, disposable income) passively, in an appropriately 
diversified, cost-efficient way and for the long-term.  
 
The majority of the experts comprehend their risk profile, are eager to reduce cost (TER), 
expect an average return on their portfolio of 4 to 8%, and have more than 50% of their 
disposable money invested (a third have more than 80% invested). 
  
The important notion of diversification was supported by more than three quarters of the 
experts; two-thirds of the experts were invested in more than 12 products. As for the 
investment duration, 70% of the experts prefer to invest for the long-term, with the 
average investment duration of almost 10 years. Furthermore, the analysis revealed (as 
for RQ2) that more than half of the experts favoured investing in funds more than in single 
shares/stocks; and the earlier described debate whether to invest in active or passive 
manged funds was answered clearly by the experts as two thirds were in favour of passive 
vehicles.  
 
In terms of the investment markets, there was no clear tendency as to which markets 
investors preferred. Yet there were clear favourites in favoured asset classes: 
shares/stocks, corporate bonds, commodities, high yield bonds and real estate.  
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Two thirds of the experts do not view hedge funds as a viable asset class, perhaps due to 
the high cost and lack of transparency of such funds.  
 
The question about the most important investment criteria exposed that, in addition to the 
industry the company is in, the experts viewed investing in large organizations and re-
investing the dividends as significant, alongside their stock/company knowledge. In terms 
of the experts favoured investment strategies and applications, they, as in responses to the 
prior research questions, favoured asset allocation strategies the most, followed by value 
investing, fundamental analysis and passive fund management. The approaches that can 
be neglected were stock picking and technical analysis (which are much more short-term, 
high turnover approaches). 
 
The analysis revealed that, contrary to initial assumptions (that experts are to be found 
solely within the professional investor group), almost 25% of the private investors were 
classified as experts, while more than 60% of the asset managers and institutional 
investors only qualified as informed investors, based on their exhibited knowledge and 
reported actions.  
 
Interestingly, more than half of the private investors also held a finance or investment 
related qualification, while the asset managers formed the group with the least number of 
such credentials but, as expected, the institutional investors were the highest (4 out of 5). 
So, it seems, based on this sample, that it is not possible to use simple credentialism to 
identify ‘experts’. The Dreyfus model has an inherent bias in this direction, as the 
examples used to support the arguments for the model imply ‘progression through the 
ranks’, e.g. in respect of chess. What is clear is that achieving ‘rank’ through acquiring 
specific credentials does not demonstrate ‘mastery’, to retain the chess analogy.   
9.2.4. Expertise 
The approach used sought to align the knowledge and experiences within the initial 
investor groups (asset managers, institutional and private investors) with the 
corresponding Dreyfus’ five-stage model of adult skill acquisition.  
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For RQ1, the private investors were in the area of ‘novice’ to ‘advanced beginners’, the 
asset managers rather between ‘competence’ and ‘proficiency’ and the institutional 
investors between ‘proficiency’ and ‘expertise’.  
 
Likewise, for RQ2, the profiled investor groups (uninformed investors, informed 
investors and experts) could also be associated with the model.  
 
The UNIs are found within the ‘novice’ or ‘advanced beginners’ stages, the INIs rather 
showed ‘competence’ to ‘proficiency’ and the EXPs reached ‘proficiency’ or ‘expertise’. 
Layering the Dreyfus model with the two differently-defined investment groups from 
both research questions is a unique approach: most studies rely on a single set of 
categories. The method could be exploited further by other researchers, as it was shown 
here to reveal subtle differences that a singular division into groups might not. 
 
Investors can obtain a certain level of knowledge through education and qualifications 
alone, but expertise assuredly requires experience. This coincides with the Dreyfus 
model, as both the initial investor groups and the profiled investor groups map onto the 
respective Dreyfus categories.  
 
Dreyfus (2004) holds that within the first stage, the ‘novice’ investors would be given 
rules and instructions to determine his/her actions, mostly context-fee and without 
requiring having the necessary skills. After a thorough analysis and discussion of the 
findings from the uninformed investors, this study confirms this first stage requirement 
for the most part. However, unless in a professional environment (within employment in 
an investment related environment), such investors would usually act and invest without 
having much guidance, hence rules would only exist from a technical point of view (for 
example, those of an online trading platform).  
 
‘Advanced beginners’ start to develop an understanding of the relevant context; thus s/he 
starts to note distinct examples of meaningful aspects in the investment domain. The 
learner starts to recognize these aspects based on experience but still in a rather detached 
and analytic frame of mind as s/he follows instructions and is given examples. Translating 
these characteristics to the level of expertise amongst investors, many would find the 
‘uninformed’ investor group to be within this Dreyfus stage, as well as some of the better-
informed investors (the least knowledgeable shared with the informed investors).  
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This again reinforces the view that the Dreyfus stage boundaries should be seen as fuzzy, 
rather than clear-cut. Yet, it is still difficult to see how these particular investors would 
be gaining knowledge through a set of given rules. To my understanding and experience, 
most novice investors would commence investing because of self-interest using the 
advice of others, rather than by specified guidelines or rules. It might be that by joining 
an ‘investment club’, novices gain insight, but there is a general lack of prescriptive rules 
available, unless a novice investor follows the strictures of a particular investment ‘guru’, 
of whom there are a number. 
 
In the Dreyfus model, the learner with more experience and the knowledge of potentially 
relevant elements and procedures will move forward to the level of ‘competence’. In this 
phase, the practitioners seem (Dreyfus suggests) to become overwhelmed, as they acquire 
a sense of what is important and also learn that particular knowledge for the many 
situations to which they are introduced is missing. Dreyfus’ model supposes that, to 
combat this notion and to achieve competence, investors (adult learners) must develop a 
plan to learn about the relevant features and aspects within the investment domain.  
 
It is maybe within this Dreyfus stage, that the informed investors commence to realize 
that for successful investing they ought to intensively learn about the core concepts and 
themes of investing, or to mandate a third-party asset manager to handle their affairs. It 
is also this stage where the learner should become emotionally involved with the topic at 
hand or s/he will not develop further. Dreyfus illustrates that the learner should become 
emotional about the topic at hand (investing/learning) but act coldly detached and rational 
in his or her practice (executing investments).  
 
In relation to the Dreyfus model, some informed investors and some experts would be 
found within the ‘proficiency’ stage as the competent performer becomes more and more 
emotionally involved and knowledgeable in the task. Dreyfus holds that if the detached 
attitude of the novice and advanced beginner is substituted by involvement and the learner 
accepts the anxiety of choice, s/he is set for further skill advancement. The practitioners 
gradually learn to discriminate about the various situations. The experienced performer 
sees goals and salient aspects but not exactly what has to be done to achieve these goals, 
mainly because s/he has not yet had enough experience of the outcomes of all possible 
situations.  
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This study finds that most experts are to be found within the fifth Dreyfus stage 
‘expertise’. At this level, the professional has obtained superior knowledge, skill and 
sufficient experience of the wide variety of possible responses to each of the situations, 
so that s/he can now discriminate automatically. S/he immediately sees what there is to 
do and how to achieve the goal. Dreyfus states that the ability to make more subtle and 
refined discriminations is what distinguishes the (investment) expert from the proficient 
performer (the informed investor). 
 
Many academics and practitioners point out that most active managed funds are only 
successful for one or a few years but almost never over a long period of time. They state 
that the initial success of these fund managers is more a matter of luck than of skill. In 
the light of the Dreyfus model, it could be that a fund manager has actually to reach the 
level of ‘expertise’ in order to successfully manage that fund sustainably. Alternatively, 
many (most?) of the unfruitful fund managers might be only at the level of ‘informed 
investor’ and therefore lack superior knowledge, skills and expertise.  
 
Since it is difficult for a novice to obtain a rule or a specific rulebook to make the first 
steps in investing, an alternative could be that one sets-up a ‘test-trading portfolio’ that 
s/he implements and manages as well as possible over many months or years, or until s/he 
achieves at least ‘competence’ or ‘proficiency’ level. This, though, needs a deep 
understanding (and acceptance) of this complex topic and discipline. Given that, as has 
been established, time is of major significance in determining investment outcomes, it 
seems counter-intuitive to opt to run a dummy portfolio over an extended period. Perhaps 
it would be possible to develop training scenarios using historical data that could be run 
‘off line’ 
 
To conclude, while I trust that the described and applied Dreyfus adult skill acquisition 
model was sufficient to categorize the survey respondents into the relevant investor 
groups, the model shows a discontinuity between the lower levels and ‘expertise’. 
Contrary to what the model would propose, the evidence suggests that the latter 
(expertise) seems to be qualitatively different and, at the highest standard, the attainment 
of ‘expertise’ in investment does not support the idea that expertise increases linearly 
with rising knowledge and experience. In my view, the challenge with investing is that 
one needs to achieve ‘expertise’ level to be really investing money both effectively and 
profitably.  
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Therefore, for the private (retail) investor, knowledge and experience attainment to 
advance within the Dreyfus model seems to be a key aspect to invest money successfully 
and sustainably. As a start, individuals might develop a personal profile to learn about 
themselves, study relevant literature and only then invest oneself, or evaluate a third-party 
asset management expert to manage your funds. 
9.2.5. Education and qualifications  
As Dreyfus (2004), Melton & Mackey (2010), Schwanfelder (2012) and Robbins (2014) 
would agree, educating oneself in combination with experience leads to a better 
understanding – in this case of investment and to more informed investment decisions 
with potentially superior outcomes. Moreover, if individuals did not want to invest for 
themselves, any knowledge they attained would allow them to better evaluate and qualify 
external investment advisers. Knowledgeable investors would be better placed to judge 
the quality and notions of their investment advisers’ actions, as well as judge the merits 
of the performance (portfolio return) during the period of any advisory mandate. This is 
particularly important for people who must manage their own pension money after 
retirement, or even before, as is the case in some jurisdictions (Nox, 2016). 
 
As the analysis of various job vacancies exposed, qualifications such as the CFA or a 
Master of Investment Management, as described by Jaffe (2010), will most probably be 
beneficial for investment professionals who desire to advance in their career (or to start 
one). In line with Dreyfus’ adult skill acquisition model it seems evident that the more 
experienced and knowledgeable investor will, due to continued learning and repetition, 
most probably ascend to higher levels within the model. Yet, the data here shows that the 
learning effect is not linear, but follows a less than predictable pattern and is highly 
individual. Hence it seems to differ from person to person, from investor to investor – at 
least in terms of this particular study.  
 
The supposition is that financial investing, as described in this thesis, ought to become 
part of any student’s learning curriculum; we spend years finding out how to earn a living 
and how to build a future, but we possibly neglect to study the notion of managing wealth 
and sustaining (or even increasing) it. By providing an initial educational platform 
individuals would be better placed to progress through the earlier Dreyfus stages before 
committing real wealth to the process of investment. 
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9.2.6. Investment strategies and their application 
Overall, the initial investor groups (asset managers, institutional investors and private 
investors) as well as the profiled investor groups (uninformed investors, informed 
investors and experts) favoured value investing, fundamental analysis, growth investing 
or a strategy that focuses on dividends. The strategies that they all neglect were technical 
analysis and stock picking.  
 
If one is a particularly knowledgeable, skilled and experienced investor, such as Phil 
Carret, John Bogle, Peter Lynch, Curtis Faith, Warren Buffet, Davin Dreman, John Neff 
or Jeremy Grantham, many of the investment strategies surveyed can be advantageous. 
For the private investor however, investment strategies such as active fund investing, 
stock picking or technical analysis are most likely no sensible ways to manage their 
money because of their cost, but even more so due to their inherent risks, and therefore 
the possibility that losses could be too high.  
 
Asset allocation as an investment strategy or application (implementation of one’s 
portfolio) found most support within both the literature and this study. The same is true 
for passive investing vs. active fund management, especially amongst the experts. 
 
It is important for the general investor to understand that asset allocation is not simply an 
‘investment criterion or strategy,’ but more an investment policy or application. The 
choice and combination of asset classes to be included in a portfolio seems undeniably 
paramount and much more significant than the actual product selection. Whether an 
investor trusts more in value, dividend or growth investing, is not the most important 
aspect as long as they understand how each investment strategy differs: invest into the 
right asset classes and stay away from stock picking, market-timing or technical analysis. 
In my opinion and those of the experts here, the latter do not have much to do with 
sustainable and profitable investing, but everything to do with speculation. A buy and 
hold strategy, however, is definitely practicable, as long as the asset allocation is well-
thought out and the ratios within the asset classes are rebalanced as necessary over time.  
 
As a consequence, passive investing out-performs active investing in regard to the 
implementation of one’s asset classes and investment portfolio. There is wide acceptance 
that the performance of active managed funds (essentially the performance of their 
285 
 
managers) is lesser in the long-run and that their respective fees are far too high (Ellis, 
2002; Swensen, 2005; Zweig, 2006; Bogle, 2007; Fama and French, 2010, Stammers, 
2015). There are many reasons why active fund managers do not beat the benchmarks 
(index) systematically over the long-term but cost is surely one of the key contributors.  
Thus, active managed funds should not play any role in an investor’s portfolio, especially 
in light of the fact that such products are ‘not bought by the investing clientele’ but ‘sold 
by the banks and asset managers’.  
9.2.7. The important notion of value averaging  
Value averaging as a technique did not find broad support amongst the surveyed investor 
groups, but it was significant in discriminating opinions from a statistical point of view.  
 
This may be because, as a technique, it is a not widely known and it remains an under-
researched concept. For this reason, few investors know of it, yet its importance is seen 
as significant by those who do know. It seemed that some of the experts displayed a sound 
understanding and appreciation of the advantages it offers - adding incremental 
investments of disposable income, coupons or dividends, according to the value of the 
present portfolio vs. a benchmark value (Edleson, 1991).  
 
A recommendation from this research for any investor would be to study the notion of 
value averaging and to implement this interesting concept if feasible. By doing so, one 
would keep investing according to the value of the portfolio to flatten the purchasing 
price, to mirror market movements and to increase the chance of overall higher returns. 
Certainly, the amount and frequency of additional investments needs to be considered 
carefully so that the strategy can be executed over the whole investment duration with the 
lowest possible effect (fees) on the portfolio return. Also, interested investors or learners 
should consider Simon (2013) who holds that value averaging is an inefficient investment 
strategy as it assumes that investors make a cognitive error in trusting that the strategy’s 
attractive internal rate of return (IRR) implies greater expected terminal wealth. 
9.2.8. The cost of investing  
Most informed investors and especially the experts agree that the total cost for investing 
requires continuous attention.  
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This was evidenced in that more than two-thirds of the experts would change to an online 
asset manager if they could save 25% to 50% of the management fee. Thus, according to 
the literature and this study, reducing the total expense ratio (TER) whenever and 
wherever possible is significant.  
 
This again speaks for the use of passive managed funds, such as ETFs, but also against 
expensive (and complex/risky) investment vehicles such as hedge-funds, funds-of hedge-
funds or structured products.  
 
Investors need to be aware that one of the main reasons why these products are in the 
market is not for the benefit of the investor but for the profit of the banks and asset 
managers who market them. Their success lies in the commissions they receive from 
selling these products. This study evidenced that while reducing TER found substantial 
support within the investor groups, reducing retrocessions did not. Thus, professional 
investors welcome any cost reduction, but not reductions on their commissions or 
retrocessions.  
 
In 2012, a Swiss court ruled that retrocessions belong to the investing customer. 
Unfortunately, it did not take long for many Swiss banks and asset managers to adjust 
their business model and develop alternative forms of charges to replace their forgone 
profits. It would be interesting to identify which products professional investors would 
sell, e.g. active managed funds or passive managed funds, if they were to receive the exact 
same commissions. As a conclusion, reducing retrocessions, commissions, management 
and other fees (TER) greatly contribute to higher returns and therefore to the success of 
one’s investment portfolio, even more so when compounding interest is also taken into 
consideration.  
9.2.9. The important notion of rebalancing 
The study revealed that rebalancing plays a vital role in investing. The concept is simple 
but powerful as it assures that the investment portfolio always reflects the risk profile of 
the investor.  
 
Investors need to make sure that the asset classes (or the chosen products) keep the same 
proportions to each other, by selling off products that have performed well and buying 
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the ones that have underperformed. In doing so, they would not only keep the portfolio 
ratios in check but also act in a contrarian fashion, against the market (i.e. selling products 
that could be over-inflated). 
 
In conclusion, a simple buy and hold strategy can be a feasible investment strategy but 
whether it is executed with active or passive funds, single stocks or any other products, 
the portfolio still needs to be rebalanced if the ratio of the assets in question deviate too 
much from the desired risk profile (which would increase the overall portfolio risk).  
9.2.10. Investment duration / staying invested 
The literature and this study evidenced that the duration of one’s investment is an 
important factor for a successful investment portfolio, required to outperform investment 
benchmarks. This evidence from experts in this study and from the literature suggests that 
one should always invest with a long-term focus and stay invested, if the funds are not 
needed for short-term purchases. 
9.2.11. Overcoming emotions while investing 
The philosopher and pragmatist John Dewey (1925) established that differences in 
feelings of acts, when employed as indications of acts performed and to be performed and 
as signs of their consequences, mean something. Therefore, it is understandable but not 
necessarily appropriate that feelings from both good and bad investment experiences are 
taken into consideration when investing in the stock market. The literature and this 
research show that sound investing (measured in financial terms) should have nothing to 
do with emotions, but everything to do with a thorough, well established and sensibly 
executed investment process.  
9.2.12. Other investment criteria 
The relevant literature and this research revealed that diversification is imperative when 
it comes to investing money. The experts’ investment portfolio typically consisted of 
around 12 products; if one or other value decreases then relatively differently correlated 
assets might increase.  
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Diversification can further be achieved by investing in ETFs with a different currencies, 
and certainly by choosing products that represent various global markets. 
 
Furthermore, in line with the literature and the findings of this study, the suggestion is 
that most of one’s funds that are not required for short or mid-term purchases should be 
invested. Inflation may be low at present, but it does play a vital role in eating away 
wealth and can therefore damage one’s financial health dramatically if not considered. 
An average inflation of 2% will reduce the worth of any cash position by 45% over 30 
years.  
 
Likewise, any investor should develop his/her own risk profile in order to identify the risk 
they are capable to take gauged against the risk they are willing to take (risk tolerance vs. 
risk capacity). In doing so, investors achieve a clear understanding of who they are and 
how best to invest.  
 
Investors should consider their favoured asset classes thoroughly. The literature is very 
diverse in this regard, since the products or asset classes chosen depend to a great extent 
on one’s investment philosophy or strategy. However, this study showed that, generally, 
investors favour equities (shares), corporate bonds, commodities, high yield bonds and 
real estate. Government bonds were seen as less important than cash, which could be due 
to the low coupons and high potential for interest rates hikes.   
 
A suggestion is to critically analyse each asset class, in order to understand its advantages 
and shortcomings. Even asset classes that seem promising, such as corporate bonds and 
high yield bonds, on a closer examination, often fail to provide positive portfolio returns.  
 
This study and the literature further hold that other investment criteria, such as the 
purchasing price of a product, have not much merit within sustainable and passive long-
term investing and the application of value averaging. Likewise, one’s knowledge of a 
particular company or its size does not determine much of value, since no one can obtain 
enough intelligence about any company to accurately foresee its future and thus the 
development of its share price. As Graham already in 1949 concluded, even if you were 
to know everything possible, obvious physical growth (expansion, merger, acquisition, 
revenue) does not automatically translate into profits for investors, especially when 
earnings are not in-line with analysts’ expectations. 
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9.3. Recommendations for the general investor arising from this thesis 
1. Consider educating yourself to become an informed investor or an expert.  
 
We attend primary and secondary school for over a decade and we study for many more 
years at universities or learn a profession or acquire a trade (apprenticeship). Then many 
undertake additional higher education courses or continue professional development. 
Many do these things in order to make a living, to earn money to buy the things we desire 
and to help support a family. We invest years and years of understanding to find out how 
we can earn money but we usually invest little or no time finding out how to preserve or 
even sustainably invest our hard-earned money. I believe, that this second concern should 
be part of our educational curriculum, at least from secondary school onwards.  
 
Furthermore, learning about ‘financial investing’ is no different from any other aspect in 
life, as there are countless studies, books and financial and economic newspapers 
available (many of the more important ones can be found in the citations here). If 
investors were to read only a selection of them with a receptive mind-set and then discuss 
the topics more widely, they would quickly develop a better understanding of important 
investment concepts. If individuals want to enhance their knowledge further and ascend 
along the Dreyfus model, they might then think about investment related courses, as Jaffe 
(2010) also suggested.  
 
 
2. Be circumspect about selecting a bank or investment adviser – consult a third party 
for a portfolio check.  
 
This study revealed widespread willingness to change advisers, predicated on a view of 
where their interest lay in respect of commissions. The European Union report (Charter, 
Huck, & Inderst, 2010) and the literature confirm that retail and private banks do not 
generally work in our interest as their main goal is to make profit to satisfy their 
owners/shareholders. As Hechler (2013) observed, investment products are not bought 
but sold.  
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An investment adviser (banker) will first and foremost sell either their own products or 
third-party products (active managed funds, hedge funds, structured products, etc.) for 
which they will earn commissions. 
 
The salary and bonus of any investment adviser (whether tied or independent) are 
(probably) partly based on achieving financial targets; selling as many high commission 
products as possible may well be in the nature of their job and their monetary interest. 
Investors should ask whether advisers would suggest buying/holding active managed 
funds or ETFs if they were to earn exactly the same commission on each.  
 
 
3. Ask the right questions when dealing with banks/asset managers. 
 
Use some or all the profiling questions (education, qualification, years’ experience, 
explanation of asset allocation, rebalancing, fee structure of investment products, 
fundamental and technical analysis, value investing, value averaging, etc.) to evaluate if 
the potential professional adviser (asset manager, institutional investor) really has the 
required expertise to support an investor with their investments.  
 
 
4. Be completely emotionless when investing. 
 
Warren Buffet says that the enemies of your portfolio are ‘excitement and expense’. Four 
out of five experts were of the opinion that emotions have no place when it comes to 
investing. The consensus concerns ‘market sentiment’, the tide of current feelings that 
moves markets. The difficulty is that many investors are ‘swept up’ by the ruling 
sentiment so become too ‘greedy’ during a bull market, trusting that share prices will 
increase even more. At other times they ‘stick’ with a company that has lost market value, 
perhaps falling prey to the thought that they cannot sell now, only once the share price is 
up again.  
 
Thus, they hold on to something that may never see the light of day again; in fact, to 
something the overall market has a fundamentally different view about.  
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A falling or low share price usually mirrors the overall opinion of the market (all 
investors). Share prices are not low or do not fall for no reason. ‘Being emotionless’ is 
therefore not a stipulation that  emotions must be set aside when investing, but a caveat 
that investors need to reflect on their emotions concerning investments and be aware of 
being led by emotion when analysis would be more profitable. 
 
 
5. If feasible, invest for longer than 7 years. 
 
 More than two-thirds of the experts invested for more than 7 years, almost half of them 
for over 10 years, while the average investment duration was 9.5 years. Investing for the 
long-term pays, as the short-term is far more volatile and uncertain. Investments can thus 
be made in equities, since the proportion of equity is the main profit driver within a 
portfolio. Certainly, equities bear higher risks than i.e. government bonds, but also greater 
rewards. Besides, the longer the investment duration, the less important is the purchasing 
price. Likewise, dividends paid and re-invested will not only increase the overall portfolio 
value but, because of compounding interest, they will deliver substantial financial 
benefits over the years.  
 
Even investor near or in retirement should not need to invest for the short-term if they do 
not require their funds, as their assets will one day be handed-over to children, relatives, 
friends, non-profit organizations or any other beneficiaries, provided they make 
provisions or laws in their jurisdiction allow for this. 
 
 
6. A well-diversified portfolio is paramount. 
 
 Three-quarters of the experts stipulated that an investment portfolio must be well-
diversified. In fact, the average portfolio across the relevant asset classes held around 12 
products. Investors should not just buy a few shares, that (perhaps) even closely correlate 
with each other, i.e. shares in an umbrella producer and a raincoat manufacturer. At the 
simplest level, balance requires shares in an umbrella company as well as shares in a 
company that produces sun cream.  
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7. Expect realistic returns.  
 
As several studies over various investment periods have shown, the long-term average on 
equities is around 7%. Even though past performance is no indication for future 
performance, it is fair to say that the near- and long-term average will not be much more 
than this level of 7%. Therefore, investors should invest wisely and rather expect 3 to 5% 
per annum than trying to achieve 10, 20, 30, 50 or even greater percentage returns. 
Assuredly, such returns are possible, but only if one invests extremely risky. Usually, 
such speculative investment will not be successful in the long-run. 
 
 
8. Be aware of the cost, the total expense ratio (TER) and ‘do the maths’. 
 
Every basis point (BPS; equivalent of 0.01%) not paid for management fees, trading fees, 
retrocessions or other forms of kick-backs goes straight into overall return. It will amount 
to a substantial sum over time – due to the power of compounding interest.  
 
If one would invest CHF 100,000 in ETFs for 10 years and averages 6% return (lower 
end of long-term average of equities), he/r will achieve around CHF 179,000. The same 
amount of money invested in active managed funds, which are around 1.5%+ more 
expensive (TER), therefore returning only 4.5% per annum, will result in CHF 155,000. 
 
 
9. Develop a risk-profile.  
 
If investors ‘do not know who they are’, there is a good chance that their investments 
keep them awake at night. There are numerous ways of developing an individual risk 
profile, using the services of one’s ‘house-bank’, an asset manager or online tools. 
Whatever method is used, investors need to find out how risk averse they are and 
therefore, how cautious or ambitious their investments can be.  
 
A person who is truly wealthy could probably afford to own a portfolio with 50% equities 
and 50% government bonds. But a particular wealthy investor may not feel comfortable 
about such a portfolio, as this portfolio mix can be very volatile. In this case they would 
be better off with 20% shares and 80% low risk products, such as government bonds. 
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Likewise, an investor who has only a small amount of income to invest might be quite 
risk tolerant, therefore enjoying a higher equity loaded portfolio.  
 
 
10. Do not stock pick - invest in funds and not in single shares.  
 
More than half of the experts do not invest in single companies but in funds. Picking 
single shares will result in a loss over time as the general investor in almost all cases bets 
against the ‘best and the brightest’ analysts and investors who are highly educated, 
qualified, experienced and have real-time access to Bloomberg and Reuters.  
 
Furthermore, such ‘professionals’ are in continuous dialogue with the company’s 
management. Therefore, stock picking is primarily a ‘fortuitous game’ and not based on 
skill. At best, an ordinary investor will have a likely ‘win-ratio’ of  50%. One bet will 
pay-off, but the next one loses money, as well as the fees to be paid – it is a loss.  
 
 
11. Invest in ETFs - avoid active managed funds all together. 
 
It is difficult, if not impossible, for any qualified investor to find a fund manager that 
outperforms the respective index (market) sustainably amongst the ten thousands of 
active fund managers. It is even less likely that the general investor would succeed 
systematically. In addition, if any investor were to find that individual fund manager, they 
would need to make sure that s/he is still in that company managing that fund.  
 
These are some of the reasons why twice as many experts prefer passive to active 
managed funds. Consequently, within investors’ asset classes, they should invest in low 
cost index funds or ETFs that mirror whole markets. Investors should neglect active 
managed funds as they cost much more and almost always do not deliver on their 
promises in the long run.  
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12. Select the superior asset classes. 
 
The experts’ most favoured asset classes were equities (shares), corporate bonds, 
commodities, high yield bonds, real estate and gold. While it is true that equities are the 
main driver for portfolio returns, investors need to be cautious that they do not invest all 
their funds into equities (only about 10 to 50%, depending on their risk profile) and that 
they choose the right markets.  
 
Similarly, investments in corporate bonds offer higher returns than government bonds, 
but they also bear higher risks. In essence, corporate bonds show similar characteristics 
to shares, so they should be part of the primary 10 to 50% equity portion mentioned above.  
Commodities or real estate are vital for diversification reasons. However, there are doubts 
when it comes to investments in high yield bonds (which are frequently issued in more 
volatile economies), as they not only bear higher risks but also because their underlying 
currencies can fluctuate a great deal in price on non-domestic exchanges and make such 
investments even more unpredictable. There are good reasons why such bonds pay higher 
premiums and why rating agencies classify them as hazardous (junk bonds).  
 
 
13. Invest in the right markets.  
 
For diversification purposes, the general investor must not only focus on their home 
market but also select ETFs that mirror American and European indices (or other 
developed markets) as well as emerging markets. They will therefore achieve further 
diversification effects through different currencies. This kind of currency diversification 
is sensible, as whole markets are in play rather than badly-rated high yield bonds. 
Avoiding highly volatile markets, such as the Middle East or Africa, where their political 
systems and the economic situations are too unstable and risky, is also a cautious policy. 
 
 
14. Rebalance when required.  
 
Once investors have made their asset allocation and invested their funds according to their 
risk profile, primarily in ETFs or index products, they need to monitor their portfolio and 
rebalance when the ratios within their asset classes deviate away from their ideal profile. 
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In doing so, they will sell portions of their best achieving titles while buying more of 
those that underperformed. In other words, they will be acting as a contrarian (against the 
herd), selling the overheated holdings when most other investors are still jumping in, and 
buying the quality investments that have been falling. 
 
 
15. Stay invested at all times.  
 
Investors should decide carefully what portion of their disposable income they want to 
invest for the long-term, then choose asset classes, firstly markets and then ETFs, and 
finally stay invested.  
 
Do not jump in and out of investments, as this just enables the banks to earn more money 
(trading cost) and also damages portfolio return. Also, keep liquidity under review as 
money lying around in cash will cost money, as inflation continuously reduces that value 
every day. For the past few years, inflation in Switzerland (and in some other developed 
economies) has been minimal (i.e. 2005 to 2015, on average 0.23%) but that will change 
again. As a rule of thumb, an average inflation of 2% will reduce the worth of any cash 
position by 45% over 30 years.  
 
 
16. Keep investing.  
 
Rebalancing portfolios and re-investing dividends or coupons paid and adding surplus 
disposable funds periodically, applying the concept of value averaging (Edleson, 1991; 
Marshall, 2000) contributes to long-term growth. In doing so, investors not only have the 
chance to achieve long-term positive market return but also to continuously increase the 
value of the portfolio, while flattening the average purchasing prices, therefore 
resembling the long-term market average.  
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9.4. Proposition for a feasible investment process  
This checklist offers a process guideline for anyone who desires to invest in the stock 
market, based on the literature and the outcomes of the research in this study.  
 
a) Define your financial/investment goals and how much of your disposable income 
you can comfortably invest. 
b) Decide on the investment duration. Unless you plan to use your funds for a certain 
near-term purchase, focus on investing for more than 7 years; the longer the better. 
c) Develop your risk profile to evaluate your risk tolerance (how much risk should 
you take; ability and willingness to withstand swings in the markets) and your risk 
capacity (how much risk you can take to achieve a particular financial goal). 
d) Choose the asset classes that offer both the chance of positive returns at a certain 
and calculable level of risk and having low correlations with one another, i.e. 
shares, government bonds, real estate, commodities and gold.  
e) Decide on the markets you want to invest in (mature and emerging markets), i.e. 
Switzerland, EU, USA, Australia / NZ, possibly South East Asia, South Africa. 
f) In conjunction with the markets, achieve a further diversification effect by the 
means of different currencies, i.e. CHF, €, £, US$, AUD 
g) Evaluate the superior ETFs to invest in; physical replication of an index (vs. 
synthetic), reputable issuer, and lowest cost. 
h) Choose the custodian bank holding your portfolio. A low cost online bank with a 
sound business model, good rating and reputation. 
i) Implement your portfolio and monitor/manage it. In general, on a monthly basis, 
or when unexpected hefty market disruptions occur. 
j) Rebalance your portfolio if required. Keep the ratios within your asset classes the 
same, in order to stay within your risk profile. 
k) According to the concept of value averaging, set a periodical growth target and 
invest (i.e. monthly, quarterly, depending on the cost to purchase ETFs) additional 
disposable income (incl. coupons and dividends). In doing so you are building 
wealth and acting as a contrarian, as you buy further shares, bonds, funds, etc. 
when prices are falling and less when they are rising. You are also averaging your 
purchasing prices and mirroring market movements over the long run. 
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9.5. Contribution to knowledge  
There are a number of different areas where this research adds to the existing body of 
knowledge, in both the academic and the professional world.  
9.5.1. Contribution to theory 
One core topic of this thesis was, what constitutes the knowledge and experiences that 
lead to more informed and superior investment decisions. Therefore, the valuable five-
stage adult skill acquisition model originally developed by Hubert L. Dreyfus and 
enhanced by Stuart E. Dreyfus (2004) was utilized.  
 
While the application of this model, through associating different types of investor groups 
with the model stages to investment management, was original, it also showed some 
model short-comings, against my expectations: the learning process is not linear, nor does 
the model detail the necessary steps one requires to master in order to ascend from one 
category, e.g. from ‘advanced beginner’ to ‘competence’.  
 
It was clear also that the fuzzy nature of the boundaries between model stages (at least in 
this field of application) requires emphasis. The stages in the model are, by implication, 
also of equal duration, save for the open-ended nature of expertise. Evidence here 
suggests that this might not be the case; individuals show different ‘dwell times’ in the 
various stages and may indeed not ‘progress’. It may also be possible to query the inherent 
‘progressive’ nature of movement through the stages. Given that individuals with similar 
qualifications and similar length of experience appear in more than one category, suggests 
that additional factors may be at work in showing expertise. One may surmise that the 
reasons for this are to be found in an individual’s characteristics or predispositions, or 
talent. Whatever the source, this is an area worthy of detailed investigation. 
 
The development of a conceptual model and associated scoring system to categorize the 
survey participants into the various investor groups adds an essential dimension to a new 
body of knowledge. The scoring system itself allowed for a score to identify/categorize 
the uninformed investors and for a score to separate the experts, with the informed 
investors scoring in between. This type of approach seems to be unique to this study, at 
least in relation to investigation of the Dreyfus model.  
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What is evident is that a means of categorizing individuals to stages is needed in many 
areas of adult learning, as it may be that (following Dreyfus, 2004) different ‘pedagogical’ 
methods relate more successfully to each stage. In other fields, that, like investment, lack 
clear hierarchical outcomes with which to categorize individuals skill, using a clustering 
approach on data generated from appropriately designed surveys, offers a method to 
determine skill level amongst a population. 
 
This research reinforces the general impression that there is no general theory of 
investing. There are theories, chiefly developed in economics, that consider technical 
questions in limited circumstances (see, for example, Bolton, Cheng and Wang: ‘A 
Unified Theory of Tobin’s q, Corporate Investment, Financing and Risk Management’, 
2011). Such papers typically model a limited set of variables for specific situations. The 
pattern of variables selected usually covers themes most relevant for firms, rather than 
private individuals, or those investing on their behalf.  
 
As was evident in the literature review, there are a number of prescriptive lists to guide 
individual investors, which hardly constitute theories. Indeed, in this area one eminent 
contribution is ‘Dilbert’s Unified Theory of Everything Financial’ in ‘Dilbert and the 
Way of the Weasels’  (Adams, 2003). As the title suggests, this is a light-hearted look at 
financial planning and investment – and, crucially, it contains many of the same snippets 
of advice that feature in less humorous publications. Most of the lists are based on the 
experience of the individual authors. While it is appropriate to acknowledge that some 
authors are well-versed in the field, the basis for the works might largely be viewed as 
anecdotal. In these circumstances, the evidence garnered here constitute a more 
empirically grounded framework; the framework has the merit that it tends to reinforce 
the experientially generated advice, but can be clearly located in the views of experts. 
9.5.2. Contribution to investment practice 
To my understanding, there has not been any research undertaken where expert 
knowledge from both professional investors and private investors was accumulated and 
analysed, particularly not in Switzerland. Undoubtedly, numerous studies have focused 
on many of the existing investment strategies, on the on-going debate regarding active 
vs. passive fund management, or on the argument as to whether fundamental or technical 
analysis is the more rewarding approach for investors.  
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Nonetheless, most of the literature is rather fragmented and does not describe how private 
and professional investors differ in terms of their experiences, knowledge and investment 
approaches or what the characteristics of the experts are and how retail investors can 
benefit from an understanding of their investment behaviour.  
 
In addition, as previous research and applied science has predominantly focused on 
determining an investor’s risk profile (risk tolerance vs. risk capacity), little besides the 
obvious factors relating to qualifications has been used to provide a selection basis for 
investment advisers. The set of profiling questions applied within this thesis can now be 
used to either educate oneself about the most significant investment matters and concepts 
or to verify whether the existing investment adviser, or the one yet to be appointed, 
possesses the required knowledge and experience to prudently advise the general 
investor. 
 
This thesis further contributes to applied knowledge as it provides an overview of the 
characteristics that actually constitute an investment expert. Next to the above-described 
profiling questions, these characteristics can also be used to qualify potential investment 
consultants working for banks, institutional investors or asset managers.  
9.6. Recommendations for further research 
The Dreyfus adult skill acquisition model was sufficient to categorize the research 
participants into the relevant investor groups, but in my opinion, it does not yield insights 
into the mechanism of the development of expertise.  
 
The challenge with investing is that one could quickly lose some of his/her funds if s/he 
is not very cautious and does not invest in an expert manner. Therefore, since the 
attainment of knowledge and experience according to the evidence here using the Dreyfus 
model is not linear, the theoretical framework could be further enhanced. This would 
enable the necessary steps and mechanics to be understood and specified so that one (not 
only in the field of investing) can reach ‘expertise’ status through a process that is more 
clearly specified and understood.  
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The research also highlighted a number of features of the state of knowledge among 
investors. The most significant example concerned the notion of value averaging, a 
concept that allows the investor to define a certain periodical growth target and to 
therefore periodically purchase different quantities of additional shares, bonds, funds, etc. 
depending on the performance of the portfolio. The goal thereby is to buy more assets 
when prices are falling and less when they are rising. By doing this, the investors’ 
portfolios will quite closely resemble average market returns while levelling the 
purchasing prices.  
 
This idea clearly has merit (as evidence generally suggests) since long-term returns that 
outpace the market are not generally to be found. On the other hand, interested researchers 
(and learners/investors) should also consider Simon (2013) who holds that value 
averaging is an inefficient investment strategy as it assumes that investors make a 
cognitive error in trusting that the strategy’s attractive internal rate of return (IRR) implies 
greater expected terminal wealth. 
 
This study shows that there is a stark disconnection between value averaging and the 
knowledge and mechanics of it as both professional investors (asset managers and 
institutional investors) and private investors ranked it as the least favoured investment 
strategy (lagging even behind technical analysis). This suggests that many investors 
probably have no comprehension of this interesting and rewarding investment concept. 
Therefore, researchers should focus on further developing the notion of value averaging 
in the context of a sustainable investment method.  
9.7. Summary of this chapter 
This chapter presented a comprehensive conclusion drawing on the literature on investing 
and the discussions of my three research questions.  
 
It summarized how general investors can apply Dreyfus’ five-stage skill acquisition 
model to develop their investment expertise and acumen, recapitulated significant 
investment criteria, investment strategies and their applications, and pointed out precious 
investment concepts like rebalancing or value averaging.  
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Further, this section offered various recommendations for investors that they can apply, 
acknowledging these concepts to be practicable within their investment circumstances.  
 
Lastly, a pragmatic investment guideline was laid out and contributions to both theory 
and practice as well as suggestions for further research were uncovered.  
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10. Appendix  
10.1. Definition of key terms 
Asset classes 
Asset classes are groups of investments that display similar characteristics and behave 
similarly in the marketplace, and are subject to the same law and regulations. The main 
asset classes are shares (stocks, equities), fixed income i.e. government bonds, cash, real 
estate, commodities.  
Buy and hold 
Buy and hold is a passive investment strategy whereby an investor buys shares, bonds, 
funds, etc. and holds them for a long period of time. Such investors typically do not worry 
about short-term price movements (volatility) but rather focus, after a careful selection, 
on long-term profitability.  
Correlation coefficient 
The correlation coefficient measures the difference of how asset classes move in relation 
to each other, by the measures, -1 (perfect negative correlation) and +1 (perfect positive 
correlation). Hence, one variable increases while the other decreases and vice versa. The 
notion of correlation is used to balance investment portfolios, i.e. commodities are known 
to move in the opposite direction of equities, allowing the investor to diversify and to 
therefore spread the risk of the portfolio. 
Commodities 
Commodities are an important asset class in order to diversify an investor’s portfolio 
beyond shares and bonds. Commodities exist in many different forms but are generally 
raw material used to produce innumerable goods. Examples of commodities are industrial 
metals like copper, lead, zinc, aluminium or tin; precious metals like gold, silver, platinum 
or palladium; energy commodities like oil, natural gas, and heating oil or agricultural 
products like wheat, cocoa, sugar, oat or soybean but also livestock like cattle or hogs.  
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Corporate bonds  
Corporate bonds are debt obligations whereby investors are lending money to the 
companies issuing the bonds. Corporations usually sell bonds to raise funds for all kind 
of strategic or operational activities. They typically come as investment grade or high 
yield bonds that differ in the percentage of the coupons paid to investors, and 
consequently, in the risk inherent in that bond/company. Corporate bond prices move 
inversely with interest rates, as they become less attractive when interest rates rise, and 
more attractive when interest rates fall.  
Coupon  
A coupon is a payment of interest for lending money i.e. to the government (government 
bonds) or companies (corporate bonds). It is a feature of a bond that denotes the amount 
of interest due and the date that the payment will be made. 
Dividend investing 
Dividend investing describes an investment strategy that focuses on yields of dividends 
and its re-investments. Dividend investors value the advantage of receiving steady 
payments from companies they invested in and the prospect to re-invest those payments 
to purchase additional shares. Such companies usually enjoy the reputation of being 
financially healthy and stable. 
Exchange traded funds (ETFs) 
ETFs are the counter product to an active managed fund. They offer a cost-effective way 
to pool money into a fund that invests in shares, bonds and other asset classes. They are 
marketable securities that track i.e. indices of bonds, commodities, or equities (i.e. the 
Swiss Market Index, Swiss Performance Index, FTSE 100, Standard and Poor’s 500, Dax 
International 100. Unlike active managed funds (mutual funds), ETFs trade like common 
investment products on stock exchanges, experiencing price changes throughout the 
market day, while enjoying higher liquidity and lower fees, making them an attractive 
and economical alternative for both professional and private investors.  
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Fundamental analysis 
Fundamental investors determine the health and performance of an underlying company, 
industry or market they want to invest in by looking at key numbers and economic 
indicators. On a company level, there are essential questions that require answers 
concerning growth potential, whether it actually generates profits or if its position is so 
strong that it can outperform competitors in the long run. On a broader scope, important 
aspects are the direction an entire industry is taking, the innovation power of that industry 
and on an even larger scale, if certain markets as a whole are worth investing (maturity, 
political stability/turmoil, growth potential, risk and reward, etc.). 
Futures  
Futures are investment vehicles that were invented in 1840 for farmers (who would sell) 
and dealers (who would buy) to commit to future exchanges of grain for cash. These deals 
worked for both, as the farmers knew in advance how much they would get paid and the 
dealers what cost would be incurred. At a later stage, these contracts were sold off to other 
parties if a dealer did not want that grain anymore or if a farmer did not want to deliver 
anymore. The prices would therefore rise and fall depending on the supply and demand 
within the wheat market. Today, most buyers and sellers of commodities have no 
intention of producing or selling the actual product, instead they speculate, hoping to buy 
low and sell high.  
Government bonds  
Government bonds are debt obligations where investors are lending money to a 
government, municipality, or a federal agency known as the issuer. In return for the loan, 
the issuer promises to pay investors a specified rate of interest (coupon) during the life of 
the bond and to repay the face value of the bond (the principal) when it matures, or is due. 
In contrast to shareholders, bondholders do not own a part of the institution that is issuing 
the bond.  
Growth investing  
Growth investors, often contrasted with value investors, focus on investing in companies 
with a higher than market average potential for growth.  
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Compared to value investors, growth investors would still buy shares of a company, even 
if they appear expensive in terms of measures such as the P/E or P/B ratio (price to book 
ratio).  
Hedge funds 
Hedge funds are funds that pool investors’ money to apply flexible investment strategies, 
like borrowing to increase investment exposure and therefore risk, short-selling and other 
speculative investment practices, in an effort to achieve extraordinary returns. There is 
significant consensus that hedge funds are a positive influence on the diversification 
effect of investment portfolios, as they show low correlation with most other asset classes. 
High yield bonds  
High yield bonds are a type of corporate bonds that offer a higher rate of interest because 
of its higher risk of default. When companies with a greater estimated default risk issue 
bonds, they may be unable to obtain an investment-grade bond credit rating. As a result, 
they typically issue bonds with higher interest rates in order to entice investors and 
compensate them for the higher risk; they are also called junk or below-investment grade 
bonds.  
Investment portfolio  
An investment portfolio describes the holding of equities, bonds, funds, commodities, 
real estate and other investments by an individual, a bank, an asset manager or an 
institutional investor. 
Modern portfolio theory (MPT)  
The modern portfolio theory, developed by Harry Markowitz in 1952, laid the basis for 
many investment perceptions and guidelines still exiting. The notion of MPT is that it is 
possible for investors to construct an efficient frontier of an optimal portfolio that offers 
the maximum expected return for a given level of risk. Markowitz proposed, that it is not 
sufficient to only look at the expected risk and return of one particular stock but it is also 
about selecting the accurate mixture of stocks (correlation coefficient for diversification). 
An important part of the modern portfolio theory is two different risk components.  
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Systematic risk, which is market risks that exist and cannot be diversified away and 
unsystematic risk, which displays specific risks inherent in individual equities that can be 
diversified away.  
Options 
Options are contracts giving the consumer the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell 
a security at a fixed price within a specific period of time. An option is considered a put 
option when the buyer takes out a contract to sell a stock and as a call option, if the buyer 
takes out a contract to buy a stock - at an agreed-on price or before a specific date. 
Passive investing  
Passive investing, in contrast to active investment management, describes investments in 
funds that typically achieve around the same return as a particular market index, such as 
the Swiss Market Index (SMI), the Euro Stoxx 50 or the Standard & Poor’s 500. It is an 
investment strategy based on buy-and-hold, therefore with the intention of owing 
securities for many years, at low cost. The underlying basic assumption is that markets 
generally provide positive returns over long periods of time. Hence, passive investing 
does not aim on achieving fast gains but rather on building slow, steady wealth over time. 
Index certificates or exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are typical passive investment 
vehicles. 
P/E ratio  
The price / earnings ratio (P/E ratio) is a model to measure the worth of a market or an 
industry, or whether a certain share price is high or low compared to the past or other 
companies. The ratio of a share for example is calculated by dividing the current share 
price by the current earnings per share. Companies that are not profitable pose a challenge 
in regard to measuring their P/E, as some analysts and investor would calculate a negative 
P/E; others apply a P/E of 0, while most just say a P/E does not exist.  
Quantitative analysis  
Quantitative analysis and investment strategies attempt to understand and predict the 
behaviour of stock market events by applying mathematical measurements and 
calculations and statistical models.  
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Real estate  
Real estate is an asset class that comprises investments in rental apartments, office 
locations, retail stores, logistics properties, senior residences, hotels, etc., usually through 
either a managed fund or an exchange traded fund (ETF). One of the main benefits of real 
estates is the low correlation with other asset classes like shares or bonds. Another benefit 
of real estate trusts (REITs) in particular is that 90% of the profits generated every year 
have to be paid out as dividends to the investors. They also act as a hedge against inflation.  
Rebalancing 
Rebalancing is an important portfolio management concept that supports long-term 
investment strategies. At the core of rebalancing is the notion that asset classes or 
investment products are stringently related to an investor’s risk profile, thus rebalancing 
is the method to keep the quotas of the relevant asset classes in check. If no rebalancing 
within a buy and hold strategy occurs, investors will find their portfolios out of balance 
with an increased (or decreased) weighting of some asset classes over others.  
 
In other words, if investors fail to counter market moves by making rebalancing trades, a 
passive drift away from the desired risk profiles follows. Therefore, an investor could end 
up with, for example, less exposure to government bonds but instead with a larger, 
undesired portion of assets invested in shares. This way, the share quota rises above target 
level and consequently increases the overall risk of the portfolio (and vice versa). Thus, 
the initially identified risk-return profile of a portfolio starts to deviate, which could easily 
be managed if rebalancing, selling the top performers while buying the underperformers, 
takes place. 
Retrocessions  
Retrocessions are kickbacks, finder’s fees and other forms of commissions paid to asset 
managers, banks and other financial institutions. There is a long-lasting controversy about 
retrocessions as such payments stem from clients’ money and are thus the clients’ 
property. However, many banks and asset managers do not disclose them and keep them 
as additional commissions for their services; many even deny their existence.  
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Shares/stocks    
Shares (or stocks or equities) are an investment instrument (and the dominant asset class), 
offering the investor the chance for profit if the share price increases. Shares also pose 
the possibility of receiving dividends that add to the overall return of an investment when 
re-invested. Furthermore, shareholders may obtain the right to have a say (voting right) 
in that company, which for many is a good enough reason for a direct investment.  
Stock picking 
Stock picking is an investment strategy by which investors, mostly based on a systematic 
approach of analysis, select stocks (shares/equities) displaying specific fundamental 
characteristics. Stock picking can be a challenging process as there is no indisputable way 
to determine the future direction of a share-price.  
Structured products 
Structured products are investment vehicles that are designed to facilitate highly customized 
risk-return objectives. They are a complex type of investment created by varying the amount 
of exposure to risky investments and often include the use of various derivatives (swaps, 
forwards, futures, options). Often, investors and investment advisers do not fully understand 
the mechanics or estimate the risks inherent in structured products, which is why many 
governing bodies have recently called for more transparency of such products.   
Technical analysis 
While fundamental analysis focuses on the real characteristics (industries, businesses, 
management, products/services, R&D, potential to innovate, financials, etc.) of a 
company to evaluate what they are worth at present and in the future, technical analysis, 
on the other hand, is concerned with the emotions of the market and tries to anticipate the 
directions of securities by analysing statistics, such as past prices, trading volumes, 
buying and selling behaviours, trends and so forth. Technical analysts use charts, and 
numerous other tools, to detect patterns that should reveal future directions of securities.  
Total expense ratio (TER)  
The total expense ratio is a measure of the aggregate cost associated with managing and 
operating an actively managed fund (mutual fund), a hedge fund, a structured product and 
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other investment vehicles. For mutual funds for instance, the cost consists primarily of 
management fees and additional expenses, such as trading, legal and auditor fees and 
other operational expenditures. To cover these costs, mutual fund managers often charge 
a management fee of 1.5 to 2.5% per annum, and frequently up to 20% performance fee. 
In addition, investors commonly pay a front-end load fee (purchase or entry fee) of 3.5 to 
5% and often another redemption or exit fee (back-end load) at the point of redemption.  
Value averaging 
Value averaging is a method and investment strategy by which investors define a certain 
periodical growth target, therefore sporadically purchasing different quantities of 
additional shares, bonds, funds, etc. depending on the performance of the portfolio. It 
works similarly to the dollar cost averaging strategy (DCA) but with periodical 
adjustments instead of steady purchases. The main goal of value averaging is to buy more 
shares, bonds, funds, etc. when prices are falling and fewer when they are rising. By doing 
this, an investor’s portfolio will quite closely resemble average market returns.  
Value investing    
Value investing is an investment strategy that describes the core of numerous renowned 
investors. It is, compared with other investment strategies, easy to understand as it does 
not require extensive financial or investment experience nor, for example, the knowledge 
and techniques required for analysing and interpreting charts and data. The goal is to 
identify investments that are undervalued and can therefore be bought at a bargain price. 
Buying shares at a price lower than their intrinsic value increases the investor’s chance 
of earning profits later when they are sold and it makes them less likely to lose money (or 
a substantial amount of value) if they don’t perform as anticipated.  
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10.2. Additional literature 
The following revised and described literature (as most investment management related 
literature in general) requires to be treated with some caution as conclusions and 
suggestions often resemble only a narrow range of selective examples, the prescriptions 
of what seem to be plausible ‘common-sense’ rules. 
 
In other words, the literature consists to a large extend of narratives, versus tested 
hypothesizes and extensive statistically analyzed data, with which readers in this field 
become familiar. This may be guided by some analysis, but the whole position relies more 
on an expression of faith than empirical analysis – which is problematic.  
 
Thus, the overall illustrated ‘investment characteristics’ accord with much of the 
available literature on investing, though it must be acknowledged that the literature is 
partial and often written to advocate a particular position.  
10.2.1. The emergence of investment theory  
‘It is mentioned in short sound bites among radio broadcasts. It is discussed at length in 
the highly news. We are barraged by updates on how the Dow or NASDAQ or S&P 500 
is faring on a given day; the fingers of the media do not slip, even for a moment, from the 
pulse of the market. As long as there have been financial markets, there have been 
commentators eager to interpret even their short-term movements – movements that are 
sometimes muted, sometimes violent, but rarely predictable’ Reamer and Downing 
(2016) illustrate that this all leads to one central question: how does an investor make 
sense of the movements of the markets? This is the task of the investors, achieved by the 
methods of valuation - to uncover areas with exploitable opportunities. They state that 
investing has always been more an art than a science but during the last 100 plus years, 
there has been a burgeoning field of investment science that has profoundly shaped and 
guided the way practitioners approach the art.  
 
Reamer and Downing describe that efforts to develop investment science have provided 
a toolbox with three drawers: a) the theory of asset pricing (the core of valuation); b) the 
formalization of risk in the context of managing a portfolio of investments and c) 
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measuring and evaluating the performance of investment managers (how well the 
professionals perform valuation to exploit investable opportunities).  
 
a) 1st domain - asset pricing 
The first drawer centers on the notions of valuation and discusses what determines the 
appropriate price of an assets. As Reamer and Downing (2016) state, mathematical 
finance emerged largely out of Louise Bacheliers work at the turn of the twentieth 
century. The French academic published the 'Theory of Speculation', which became the 
first investment theory that focused on understanding how the market determines asset 
valuation.  
 
In it, he described how to value complicated French derivatives using advanced 
mathematics; it predated the similar work by Black and Scholes many years later. He used 
a form of what is called Brownian motion, named after Robert Brown who studied the 
random motions of pollen in water. Einstein would describe this same phenomenon in 
one of his famous papers in 1905. The mathematical underpinnings (stochastic processes, 
random walks) can not only be applied to small particles but also to the movements of 
markets. ‘Bachelier, though not as lauded as he may have deserved to be among the 
financial community of his day, was as of Reamer and Downing the father of modern 
mathematical finance.’ Since then, many investment valuation models evolved, each with 
merits and shortcomings.  
 
Whereas Bachelier employed advanced mathematics to think about the price of a 
derivative, Irving Fisher used mathematics in an approach to a more fundamental 
question: how does one value the price of the underlying asset (that is, an asset that is not 
a derivative)? Reamer and Downing state that Fisher was a prolific American economist 
who made contributions to indexing theory as it pertains to measuring quantities like 
inflation, the differentiation between real and nominal interest rates and improved the 
quantity theory of money.  
 
His primary influence to investment theory was the development of a metric to assess 
which income stream represents the optimal investment: ‘rate of return over cost’, a 
concept related to what we today refer to as the net present value (NPV). The formula is 
simple but powerful: one can assess the soundness of an investment project by finding 
the net present value of its future cash flows.  
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i) Discounted cash flow model 
Fisher initiated the theory of discounted cash flow for any asset; John Burr Williams then 
advanced this theory significantly. Williams’s dissertation showed that a stock was worth 
the value of all future dividends discounted to the present. If a company currently would 
not pay any dividend, then its value was the expected dividend distribution when the 
reinvested earnings eventually became dividends. Reamer and Downing (2016) hold that 
Williams had invented what today is referred to as the dividend discount model of stock 
valuation. Interestingly, Williams further trusted that market fluctuations were due to the 
role of speculators who were failing to heed the proper valuation method and were rather 
interested in forecasting the price at which they could sell the security later.   
 
ii)   The effect on capital structure on asset pricing 
Modigliani and Miller analysed a rather different question related to asset pricing. How 
does the capital structure (debt and equity) affect the value of a firm?’ Reamer and 
Downing explain that Modigliani and Miller were both lecturing at Carnegie Mellon and 
were supposed to teach a class in corporate finance. The challenge for them was that 
neither of them were particularly familiar with the topic. Therefore, they started to 
prudently study the material themselves, to finally decide that earlier work was rife with 
inconsistencies and ambiguity. Their new work was published in 1958 with a paper titled 
‘The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment’. This was the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem.  
 
Samuelson worked on derivatives pricing with a paper on warrants in 1965 and another 
one jointly with Merton that was published in 1969. He is considered an intermediary in 
calling attention to the subfield of derivate pricing, even if the cornerstone of the most 
famous final theory was not his own.  
 
In 1973, Black and Scholes published the revolutionary work ‘The Pricing of Options and 
Corporate Liabilities’. Their mathematical model, as of Ryan, Scapens and Theobald 
(2002) was based on Boness (1964) and calculated the value of European-style options 
by applying current stock prices, expected dividends, the options’ strike price, expected 
interest rates, the time to expiration and the expected volatility. 
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2nd domain - the assessment of risk 
Reamer and Downing (2016) elaborate that most of us know where we fall on the 
spectrum of risk appetite and how close to the edge we care to venture. Some of us are 
risk lovers, from the gamblers to the entrepreneurs; others are risk adverse, preferring 
routine, stability and predictability.   
 
i) The beginning of diversification 
As of Reamer and Downing, diversification across truly unrelated assets forms the heart 
of risk management in investment; hence practically all investors would be well-served 
to adhere this concept. 
 
They comment that although the notion of diversification has existed for some time, it 
was not until Markowitz that the mathematical mechanics of diversification were worked 
out. Markowitz concluded that the theory of risk was not captured by the concepts of net 
present value by Fisher or within the discounted model of John Burr Williams, and thus 
that the theory of asset pricing was incomplete without a corresponding theory of risk. 
He reasoned that one can indeed perform a calculation of dividends but that those future 
payments are uncertain.  
 
Markowitz offered a technical solution that involved plotting all available assets on a 
graph where the left axis is the expected return and the horizontal axes is volatility. The 
investment approach is to consider the trade-off between return and volatility; lower 
volatility comes at the cost of lower expected returns and vice versa. A calculated curve 
marks the efficient frontier and represents those assets with the highest possible expected 
returns for a given level of volatility (risk). 
 
Reamer and Downing continue that in 1958, Tobin enhanced the value of Markowitz’ 
portfolio theory by integrating the role of risk-free assets (government bonds), which is 
plotted on the left axis and identified as having no excess volatility. Tobin invented the 
famous separation theorem that holds that all investors should hold an identically 
comprised portfolio of risky assets combined with some risk-free assets or cash. A 
conservative investor would therefore hold a higher percentage of government bonds or 
cash but would have the same basket of risk investments in his portfolio as a more 
ambitious investor. 
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Reamer and Downing (2016) also illustrate some of the criticisms of Markowitz’ 
approach. For example, some economists have pointed out that volatility may not be 
sufficiently described by the standard deviation of the returns, or that it is difficult to 
forecast expected returns and volatilities. However, Markowitz’ concept was a radical 
rethinking of portfolio design and paved the way for the next revolution in the intellectual 
theory of investing: the capital asset pricing model.  
 
As of Reamer and Downing Sharp in 1964 and Lintner in 1965 proposed the capital 
pricing model (CAPM), an extension to Markowitz’ portfolio theory. It assumes that 
investors are in agreement about the expected returns and variances of assets in the 
opportunity at hand. Further, that capital for investments can be borrowed and lent at a 
risk-free interest rate. The notion of ‘beta’ is central in CAPM and displays a measure of 
how responsive an asset is to a change in the value of a benchmark. A result of 1 implies 
that the value of an asset moves approximately in lockstep with the benchmark, whereas 
a beta of zero means that the asset moves in a manner that is unrelated to the benchmark. 
Asset managers use this formula – E(Ri) = Rf + βi[E(Rm) - Rf] - to consider whether to 
add an asset to the portfolio. CAPM creates a condition on the minimum expected return, 
given the beta of the asset to the portfolio; the asset should not be added if its beta is 
below this value.  
 
A radical implication of CAPM that almost universally proves uncomfortable is that 
sometimes it is in the interest of the asset manager to add an asset with a negative expected 
return in order to increase the total variance of the portfolio. CAPM suggests the 
practitioners that a portfolio analysis involves more than just looking on a bundle of 
individual attractive assets, it involves rather, a decision of the blended whole.  
 
The capital asset pricing model further proves useful for a firm in determining whether to 
invest in a project. A company has a certain cost of capital that can be measured quite 
simply by beta. If a project shows a rate of return on a given investment of capital that is 
less than the minimum return prescribed by the CAPM, the company should vote against 
that project, as the deployment of funds would not be efficient. Given this, one of the 
most difficult aspect of CAPM is to compute the actual forward beta, like the forecasting 
challenges (expected returns and volatility) within the Markowitz model. The most 
common way is to use the most recent historical beta as a proxy.  
 
336 
 
In 1992 then, Fama and French published an influential paper entitled “The ‘Cross-
Section' of Expected Stock Returns”. They stated that beta alone is insufficient to capture 
the risk/return trade-off and introduced two additional factors - size (market 
capitalization) and value (book-to-market equity ratio). They found that value firms 
(firms with a low price-to-book value as compared with growth firms) have higher 
expected returns in the aggregate but also possess higher risk. They concluded that there 
is generally a premium to be earned by holding value and small capitalization stocks. This 
three-factor model was found to significantly enhance the explanatory capacity of the 
model when compared to the pure CAPM.  
 
3rd domain – the performance of investment professionals  
Reamer and Downing (2016) assess and compare the methods and challenges both 
investors and asset managers face in terms of measuring actual performance, and the 
investment professional’s potential to achieve returns greater than the respective 
benchmarks. This third domain delivers tools that help not only evaluate portfolio 
performance per se, but also for the retail investor to evaluate the outcomes of decisions 
made by their money managers. 
 
i) Cowles and the analysis of investment forecasts 
Alfred Cowles’ III path-breaking research was published in 1933, when he analysed two 
different groups: those who issued forecasts for particular securities and those who 
forecasted the direction of the stock market as a whole. For the securities group, he 
analysed four and a half years of data (1928 to 1931) from 16 financial firms and 24 fire 
insurance firms that forecasted on particular stocks. For the second group, he studied the 
projections from 24 financial publications on the general direction of the market from 
1928 to 1931.  
 
In both cases, Cowles found that not only were their forecasts incorrect most of the time, 
but their predictions were, in aggregate, even worse than random chance, as the groups 
underperformed the market by 1.2% (financial service firms) and 1.43% (fire insurance). 
In regard to the overall market predictions, the practitioners underperformed random 
chance by 4%. He concluded that an investor is better of rolling a dice than trusting the 
finance experts. Reamer and Downing state that although his analysis was too narrow 
overall, Cowles made the first important step toward rigorously questioning the value 
added by professional money managers. 
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The application of beta to the formulation of alpha 
As of Reamer and Downing (2016), few decades later, Jensen’s took Cowles’ work a step 
further as he formulated what is today called the Jensen’s alpha, which allows for a more 
accurate measure of money makers’ performances. He created a metric for portfolio 
performance to determine if mutual fund managers were, in fact, adding value with their 
touted skills of stock selection. To do this, one has to first use the concept of beta in the 
CAPM, calculating the beta of the portfolio compared to a relevant benchmark, secondly 
to do a straightforward calculation using the beta and the total return to extract the 
measure of alpha, representing excess or abnormal returns. ‘The excess return is Jensen’s 
alpha. If positive, the alpha means that the manager has beaten the benchmark on a risk-
adjusted basis. Negative alpha, on the other hand, suggests that an investor would be 
better off purely investing in the benchmark (fees aside). Thus, the manager who earns 
negative alpha has failed to add value from a portfolio performance perspective’ (Reamer 
and Downing, 2016, p. 249).  
 
Reamer and Downing state that Jensen’s’ initial study of mutual funds over a period of 
20 years (1945 to 1964) revealed that very few managers had effectively produced a 
greater return than one would expect, given their ‘expert level’ and the level of risk of the 
portfolio. They further hold that the question of whether managers can successfully and 
sustainably add alpha remains a consistent and contentious debate in the academic 
literature. There are many who believe that money managers cannot consistently add 
value over the long term because markets are efficient.  
 
Formalization of the efficient market hypothesis  
Eugene Fama was one of the theorists behind the efficient market hypothesis. In his paper, 
entitled ‘Efficient Capital markets: a Review of Theory and Empirical Work’ that was 
published in 1970, Fama effectively defined three levels of market efficiency. The first is 
a weak form of efficiency (current information is not sufficient to forecast accurately), 
the second variety is a semi strong-form of efficiency (share prices reflect all publicly 
available information) and the third form is the strong-form efficiency (both public and 
private information are all available). The critical implication of the efficient market 
hypothesis is that the market cannot be beaten if it is truly efficient. Hence, one of his 
conclusions is that if general speculators make gains with trading shares, it has little to do 
with skills but more with luck.  
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Nonetheless, some do outperform the market by random chance or aberration, which may 
explain the huge success of some funds or some asset managers. 
 
To better understand the efficient market hypothesis, Reamer and Downing (2016) 
discuss one of its staunchest opponents, the school of value investing that began with the 
area of Graham and Dodd and the publication ‘Security Analysis’ in 1934. Graham and 
Dodd evidenced that one could, in fact, outperform the market by focusing on value 
stocks; stocks that could be bought with a margin of safety or were protected by a 
fundamental valuation that exceeded the markets’ valuation. They focused on finding 
stocks that traded with a relatively low price-to-book value or even sold at a discount to 
net tangible assets. ‘The stock market, they believed, was irrational enough to push stocks 
out of favor and drive the price away from what it was actually worth based on an analysis 
of fundamentals’ (Reamer and Downing, 2016, p. 255).  
 
Many decades later, Graham withdrew from this position and gave up most of what he 
previously championed, saying that the market was no longer as exploitable as it had been 
when he wrote the book: he was no longer an advocate of elaborate techniques of security 
analysis in order to find superior value opportunities. He stated that he agreed instead 
with those who believed the market had practically always priced securities correctly. ‘To 
that very limited extent I am on the side of the ‘efficient market’ school of thought now 
generally accepted by the professors’ (Reamer and Downing, 2016, p. 250).  
 
Reamer and Downing continue, whereas Graham has given up on his work, many 
supporters of the philosophy of value investing have not. One may consider Warren 
Buffet’s primary objection to the efficient market theory. His (and that of many other 
supporters) response was that given the number of money managers in the market, 
statistically some will seem to outperform the market.  
 
Behavioural Finance  
 
Beyond Buffest’ more anecdotal approach, there has been a rich debate amongst efficient 
market supporters and the other school of thoughts over the last few decades. In particular, 
a large body of literature has evolved regarding the notion of behavioural finance, which 
attempts to explain empirical anomalies and deviations from the classical risk models, 
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comprising the efficient market hypothesis. Instead of considering market participants as 
hyper rational agents obeying arguably overly well-designed utility functions, they are 
thought of as possessing biases, prejudices, and tendencies that have material and 
measurable effects on markets and financial transactions.   
 
Reamer and Downing (216, p. 251) refer to Kahneman and Twersky’s paper outlining 
what they call prospect theory. It describes individuals’ optimization outside the classical 
‘expected utility’ framework. Their paper showed many of the known behaviours that 
represent aberrations from expected utility theory, such as lottery issues (tending to 
choose an upfront payment over a larger amount or zero when flipping a coin) and 
probabilistic insurance, which is an insurance policy involving a small probability that 
the consumer will not be reimbursed. Survey data suggest that people dislike probabilistic 
insurance and demand more than a 20% reduction in the premium to compensate for a 
1% default risk (Wakker, Thaler, & Tversky, 1979). Prospect theory holds that 
individuals’ choices are more centered on changes in utility or wealth, rather than absolute 
end values. It also suggest that most people exhibit loss aversion in which losses cause 
more harm to one’s wellbeing than the benefit from happiness one receives from gaining 
the same amount of reward.  
 
Since Kahnemann and Twersky, additional work has made many connections to markets, 
for instance, the equity premium puzzle, described in a 1985 paper by Mehra and Prescott. 
The central puzzle is that while investors should be compensated more for holding the 
risk-free security (Treasury bills), the amount by which they are compensated appears 
excessive, historically. In other words, it seems as if equity holders have been overpaid 
to take on this risk (Reamer and Downing (2016). Benartzi and Thaler (1995), suggested 
‘myopic loss aversion,’ a notion that borrows heavily from the concepts developed in 
prospect theory, including the fact that individuals tend to display loss aversion and that 
they care about changes in wealth more strongly than about absolute levels of wealth.  
 
Investors who look more frequently at portfolios, say every day or every week at the value 
of their portfolio moving up and down, will experience more disutility on average, given 
that they develop greater pain from losses than pleasure from the same magnitude of 
gains. Over long-periods of time, where market movements enjoy a general upward trend, 
the feeling of loss aversion is reduced because equities tend to appreciate over time, so it 
is more palatable to hold on to equities.  
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The boom and bust nature of markets 
 
Retail or professional investors who have been in the markets for a generation or longer 
have experienced many phases of stock markets rallies and bursts of bubbles. The classic 
inducement of investors to make easy money faster is by leveraging through debt or 
securities that are structured in a leveraging manner. Adding the notion of periodic 
overconfidence and speculation, the result is investment volatility (Christiano, Ilut, 
Motto, & Rostagno, 2007). 
 
A recent catastrophic example of this phenomenon was the US housing market, which 
became vastly overvalued, driven by hyper leveraging in the aggressive use of derivative 
financial products. These were regarded by professional asset managers and regulators as 
low-risk investments – because they were based on mortgage lending, historically a low-
risk area of finance. These mortgage-based securities spread the risk of mortgages (many 
of which were highly speculative, as the mortgages had been granted to individuals who 
were not well placed to pay them) past the normal providers of mortgage finance 
unknowingly to the everyday investors and finally to the taxpayer. With that, these 
instruments created a gigantic market risk that not many fully comprehended and that 
resulted in the housing bubble of 2004 to 2006, with its bust that accelerated the financial 
crisis in 2008. In the aftermath of the subprime market crisis that damaged hundreds of 
banks and insurance companies, governments have enforced stricter regulations for 
financial institutions susceptible to swings in market confidence and liquidity (Rapp, 
2015). 
 
Fraud, market manipulation, and insider trading  
 
Some investment risks stem from market participant’s wrongdoing such as market 
manipulations or insider trading.  
 
Lowenstein (2000) recounts the rise and then shocking collapse of Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) in 1998. LTCM was one of the most successful hedge fund firms. 
Lowenstein suggests that ego, the ‘Wall Street’ herd mentality, and greed created a crisis 
that engendered a global financial collapse, unseen since the Great Depression. He 
concludes that, unfortunately, little has changed since the nadir of LTCM.  
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One of the main problems as of Lowenstein was that Wall Street never polices itself in 
good times. To Meriwether, the founder of LTCM and his traders, money management 
was less an art requiring a series of judgements, than it was a science that could be 
accurately quantified. The Long-Term Capital Management collapse evidenced that the 
system of disclosure that has worked so well with traditional securities, has not worked 
for derivative contracts.  
 
Lowenstein (2000) illustrates that LTCM, with its expertise and better financing, reached 
a point where its investment experts were certain that they could predict the odds of a loss 
and that they had compensated for all likelihoods. In essence, they trusted that they had 
eliminated risk altogether. Their models presumed that markets were indeed efficient and 
rational at all times, and always correct themselves. Lowenstein determined that by 
putting themselves at the mercy of short-term volatility, the LTCM partners had 
abandoned whatever advantage lay in their presumingly precise mathematical models. 
 
Trading frauds are a further substantial category of investment risks. Examples of this 
include the infamous Leeson of Barings Bank, who engaged in rogue trading 
(unauthorized speculative, false bookkeeping, non-existent client trades) in the 1990s. 
Likewise, many banks were part of the LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) scandal, 
in which interest rates to price the bank's loans were manipulated. The fraud began in 
2005 and went on for 7 years; many banks paid hefty fines.  
 
New clients and new investments  
 
The public can now invest their money in relatively new instruments, such as index 
certificates and exchange-traded funds (ETFs). They are passive investments that 
replicate whole markets or sectors and are substantially less costly than their active 
counterparts (Reamer & Downing, 2016).  
 
Reamer & Downing list similar investments in alternative instruments such as hedge 
funds, private equity, real estate, venture capital, commodities, or infrastructure that grew 
in the early 2000s and are attractive for asset managers as they provide diversification 
and do not follow the same movements as the general markets.  
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However, they state that these are sophisticated financial products that offer appealing 
rewards but conversely substantial risks of which investors need to be aware.  
 
Hedge funds for example, as Reamer & Downing (2016) explain, benefit from slacker 
transparency and reporting regulations. Thus, they are able to indulge in secretive and 
sophisticated investment strategies. One of their main distinguishing characteristics is 
their fee structure, the notion of charging fees to their clients retrospectively. Such funds 
accumulate a mix of fees from the total asset base, such as a management fee of 1% to 
2%, plus an additional performance fee, which is a percentage of 10% to 20% on the 
funds return. The hedge fund industry itself grew to $2.5 trillion in assets in 2014. Media 
often write and present great success stories of hedge funds that excel extremely well, but 
the reality is that high returns after fees are difficult to maintain in the long run. Especially 
in terms of hedge funds reporting their results, the story changes as the ones losing and 
fail often quietly vanish.  
 
Venture capital is another interesting means of investing; financiers provide capital to 
start-up companies that have the potential of superior long-term growth. Typical sectors 
are medicine and health care delivery, internet-technology, data analysis and processing 
or electronics. The nature of such investments differs from equity investing as the investor 
gets a seat on the company's board to actively influence the strategic and operational 
direction of the start-up and therefore participating directly from profits or losses (Reamer 
& Downing, 2016).  
10.2.2. Context information 
Roberge and Moigne (2005) revisit the notion of tactical asset allocation (TAA) to 
estimate which bonds or shares will perform better in the future. In general, TAA centres 
around exploiting short-term opportunities in order to achieve superior investment return, 
as opposed to strategic asset allocation (SCA), which focuses on defining asset classes 
for the long-term. Roberge and Moigne explain that the objective of TAA is to enhance 
portfolio return by switching funds from the asset class expected to be weak to those asset 
classes expected to be strong. Ellis (2002) and Swensen (2005) would disagree, as they 
view this kind of investment strategy as market timing - trying to pick winners over losers.  
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This, Swensen suggests, can only work in the short run if you are fortunate, but in the 
long run, only causes diminished returns, especially if trading and management fees are 
considered.  
 
Roberge and Moigne’s (2005) proposition is that it is generally agreed that stocks and 
bond returns are to some extent predictable. To underline this, they quote the pioneering 
work of Shiller (1988), Fama and French (1989) and others. Roberge and Moigne further 
say that for TAA to prove profitable, you have to apply reliable forecasting models. 
Regressions of all types (linear or logistic) are compared and critiqued as giving rise to 
errors when applied, as opposed to non-parametric models, which allow for a flexible 
data structure. In their work, a dichotomic method is explained and applied over the 1976 
to 2003 period. This model successfully demonstrates which US bonds or stocks are going 
to perform best over the following month.  
 
Swensen (2005) argues that timing the market fails to make an important contribution to 
portfolio results, due to the inconsistence inherent in making a speculative short-term bet 
against a carefully crafted long-term target portfolio. He compares the market-timing 
alternative to the largely reasonable behaviour of sticking to long-term asset allocation 
targets, as Brinson, Hood, and Beebower (1986), Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000), or Ferri 
(2006) have described. If an investor follows an exclusive strategy of day trading shares, 
investment results for the portfolio would have nothing to do with asset allocation and 
everything to do with market timing and luck.  
 
Alongside Ellis (2002), Swensen also illustrates that perhaps the most frequent form of 
market timing derives from a passive drift away from the desired risk profiles, as investors 
fail to counter market moves by making rebalance trades. For instance, if shares show a 
superior performance relative to bonds, the share portion of that portfolio rises above 
target level as the bond part falls below. 
 
Thus, the return/risk profile of a portfolio, which was initially identified, starts to deviate. 
This could easily be managed if investors rebalance, selling the top performers whilst 
buying the underperformers. 
 
Swensen writes in detail about individual asset classes and describes their advantages and 
shortcomings.  
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He suggests that many investors purchase corporate bonds, hoping to earn an incremental 
return over that available from government bonds. If investors were to receive a generous 
premium to compensate for credit risk, illiquidity and callability, then corporate bonds 
might earn a place in investor portfolios. He concludes that unfortunately these factors 
work against the holder of corporate obligations, often providing less return than 
traditional government bonds. Swensen (2005) also discusses rating agencies such as 
Morningstar and demonstrates their inaccurate and misleading system of rating managed 
funds. Furthermore, he also believes that fund managers fail to achieve superior returns 
relative to index funds over a longer period. He therefore recommends that individuals 
invest in index funds or ETFs respectively.  
 
Block (2006) is an advocate for investing in ‘real-estate investment trusts’ (REITS) and 
illustrates that such investments offer both low risk and low volatility and high returns. 
In addition, REITs provide an ideal hedge against equity market losses and inflation. He 
states that commonly return from REITs beat the returns of the S&P 500 index and when 
compared with stocks they are superior due to lower volatility. In addition, real-estate 
investment trusts are adding real and measurable value to a diversified investment 
portfolio as they correlate (moving in different direction) contrarily to most other asset 
classes.  
 
Ehlern (2006) does not discuss investment strategies, but rather analyses private wealth 
management and family office (institutional investors) services for ultra-high net worth 
individuals (UHNWIs). He shows the different disciplines a private wealth management 
or family office might be confronted with. He suggests that such asset managers pursue 
interest’s other than simply generating wealth by using type of investment strategy. 
Typically, the spectrum of services offered within a family office could have a wide 
range, including advisory services, life-cycle and lifestyle planning, trust services, (which 
are also key in private wealth management), estate, inheritance and wealth planning, 
succession planning in family businesses and tax planning or asset protection planning. 
Therefore, the way wealth can be preserved seems to be much more a focus for such 
offices than the practice of increasing wealth. In any case, it seems that investment 
knowledge and expertise play a vital role for large investors.  
 
Ferri (2006) explains that asset classes are broad categories of investments, such as cash, 
bonds, shares and real estate.  
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Each asset class can be further broken into more detailed categories. For instance, bonds 
can be categorized into taxable bonds and tax-free bonds. Shares can be divided into 
European shares and US shares. These categories can be further categorized by 
investment style and sectors, e.g. growth and value shares, large and small capitalizations, 
investment-grade bonds and non-investment-grade bonds. Sectors can be interpreted in 
many ways, whether by geographic region and industry sector (such as real estate) or 
based on issuers, such as corporate or government bonds. Ferri (2006) concludes that a 
well-diversified portfolio will hold all asset classes, many asset-class styles, and several 
asset-class sectors. However, he does not explain, how and in which ‘frequency’ these 
categories come into play. In any case, asset classes reflect different risk and return 
investment characteristics, and will perform differently in any given market environment 
– an issue with which Ferri does not deal.  
 
Ferri further asserts that successful investing requires design, implementation, and 
maintenance of a long-term investment strategy based on clients’ distinctive desires. 
Asset allocation, as also evidenced by Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000), plays a central part 
of this investment strategy. The goal shifts from trying to pick winners and timing the 
market or day trading, to being diversified in many different investments at all times. No 
one knows what will happen in the financial markets tomorrow, next week, next month 
or next year. According to Ferri, asset allocation resolves a problem that both private and 
professional investors face, namely, how to manage assets without knowing the future. 
Asset Allocation eliminates the need to predict the future direction of the markets and 
eliminates the risk of being in the wrong market at the wrong time.  
 
Zweig (2006) provides an updated version of the intelligent investor by Benjamin Graham 
(1949). He lists major financial developments, such as the sudden decrease of thousands 
of Internet companies at the beginning of this millennium, or the bankruptcies of ‘world 
leading’ corporations like WorldCom, Enron or Arthur Anderson. He concludes that 
innumerable investors have lost money due to lack of knowledge and overconfidence.  
 
The latest release of the Intelligent Investor further re-illustrated the fundamental 
principles of value investing and how Graham literally taught Warren Buffet how to 
invest. Investors generally fall into two general categories. The enterprising investors, 
who treat their investments as they would treat any other business, they engage in.  
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Yet, since most investors do not have the time nor the knowledge to treat their investment 
like a business, they ought to adopt a defensive investment strategy, like buying funds 
that track indices or the market. Defensive investors are more likely to succeed in the 
long-term, as there is no evidence that market forecasting and timing the market produce 
acceptable results. Graham (1949) further believed that value investors should pay more 
attention to the dividends and operating performance of the companies, they own that to 
stock price movements.  
 
Malkiel (2007) studied various investment methods such as fundamental analysis or 
technical analysis and noted imperative shortcomings in both approaches. He determined 
that for most investors, following these methods will produce mediocre results compared 
to passive investment strategies. Technical wisdom, for instance, suggests that if the price 
of a stock rose yesterday it is more likely to rise today but in fact, it turned out that the 
correlation of past price movements with present and future price movements is close to 
zero.  
 
One of the main problems in regard with technical analysis are the cost for trading stocks, 
which in turn makes it very difficult for investors to outperform the market. Even if 
buying and selling stocks were not of great cost impact, Malkiel rejects the main premise 
of technical analysis, which is that there are repeatable and reliable patterns in stock 
movements. He argues that cycles in stock charts are no more true cycles than the runs of 
good fortune or misfortune of the everyday gambler in a casino. He stated that technical 
analysis is just a superficial way for brokers to sell stocks.  
 
He further analysed the concepts and performances of active fund managers and arrived 
at similar conclusions. They usually underperformed the market in the years following 
any prior success, henceforth regressing towards the mean. In line with many other 
mentioned researchers, i.e. Swensen (2005), Green (2008), Hechler (2013) or Siegel 
(2014), Malkiel proposed that given the distribution of fund performance, it is statistically 
highly improbable that an ordinary investor would happen to choose those few mutual 
funds that will actually outperform their benchmark index over the long term.  
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He summarized the basic rules of investing (Malkiel, 2007, p. 37-167) 
▪ Save first, as it does not matter if you make 3% or 5% on your investment if you 
have nothing to invest. 
▪ Invest regularly so that you flatten the average purchasing price – no one should 
try to time the market. 
▪ Diversify investments over various asset classes and in the world’s countries. 
▪ Rebalance periodically to stay within your defined quotas. 
▪ Keep cost low and stay away from active managed funds as there is very little 
persistence from year to year. 
▪ Avoid chasing hot funds and high turnover of your portfolio as this often results 
in poor performance. 
▪ Stay invested for the long-run.  
 
The Black Swan, written by Nassim Taleb (2007) is an informative investment guide, 
based on the earlier work by the philosopher Karl Popper (1952). Taleb explains the 
notion of a black swan, which is a highly improbable and unforeseen event that carries a 
gigantic impact, in reference to past and recent happenings. The First World War, the 
demise of the Soviet bloc, the stock market crash of 1987, the invention of the World 
Wide Web, 9/11, the rise/success of Google or Apple’s iPhone are examples of such black 
swans.  
 
He is asking and debating the question why we and science only worry about black swans 
after they occur? Taleb concludes that humans are hardwired to learn specifics, when they 
better would focus on generalities. We focus on things we already know and neglect what 
we don’t know. As Popper stated, before the discovery of Australia, people in the other 
parts of the world were of the indisputable belief that all swans are white, which was back 
then completely confirmed by empirical evidence. The observation of one single black 
bird invalidated a general truth derived from millennia of confirmatory sightings of 
millions of white swans.  
 
Weber (2007) offers two key opinions: not to trust anyone who claims to know how a 
share or a market will develop, and that one does not require to be a financial mastermind 
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or stock market prophet to invest systematically and successfully. He holds that any 
plausible explanation for happenings on the stock market in the past has no value to 
predict the future direction of the same. He too believes in the careful assessment of the 
investors’ risk and return profile and in a diversified portfolio – ‘only when choosing a 
life-time partner, diversification can be neglected’ (Weber, 2007, p.21). Hence, he 
concludes that diversification through stocks and the various asset classes over the whole 
life-cycle (long-term investing) are the essential steps for sustainable investing. 
 
Often, analytical and reasoned stock market projections produce inferior results than 
naive and haphazard guesses. Consequently, Weber continues, once we fully comprehend 
that stock markets forecasts are only smoke and mirrors and that we are not talented 
enough to beat the ‘homo economicus’ (the market) methodically, then we should take 
our time, invest intelligently, rebalance occasionally and avoid engaging in pointless 
trading. He explains that the strategy of most investors would improve dramatically, if 
they would only buy one single exchange traded fund (ETF). Yet, many listen to untrue 
and misleading wisdom, i.e. that the equity portion of your portfolio should be 100 minus 
your age. Investing, as for instance Ellis (2002) or Swensen (2005) evidenced, has no 
actual termination date, as funds are often carried over to the next of kin, to a trust or to 
somebody else who is an inheritance beneficiary.   
 
Balling, Gnan and Lubochinsky (2008) looked at the investment process as a three-legged 
stool supported evenly by securities research, portfolio management and securities 
trading. They advocate technical analysis measuring deviations of PE/Ratios of similar 
shares and are convinced that many arbitrage possibilities exist for active management. 
They suggest that modern financial technology permits the separation of risk exposure, 
selection and management, from physical investment choices, capital expenditure plans, 
ownership and governance of assets. As such, they view risk as a separate dimension of 
asset management decisions.  
 
Merton, cited in Balling, Gnan and Lubochinsky, points out that asset management could 
be differentiated between the two investment strategies - ‘alpha’ and ‘beta’. An asset 
manager produces alpha if he achieves performance per unit of risk over and above the 
performance a client could achieve without support. Beta strategies in turn, rely on well-
diversified and efficient coverage. The question then arises as to how an asset manager 
best achieves a positive return that is superior to what a ‘non-professional’ investor could 
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accomplish. Merton also assessed the importance of asset allocation in regard to 
sovereign wealth funds. He argues that you cannot discern the most favourable asset 
allocation strategy outside of the context of a country’s other assets and liabilities. He 
refers to pension fund managers and the movement away from defined-benefit pension 
plans towards defined-contribution plans that forces savers to manage their pension 
money themselves without having the necessary qualification.  
 
Loistl and Zellner, also cited in Balling, Gnan and Lubochinsky (2008), are convinced 
that the proposition of the efficient market theory has no value any longer as the 
advantage of active sophisticated portfolio management is beyond any doubt. Academics, 
as well as professionals, such as Bogle (2007) or Swensen (2005), who trust in ‘indexing’, 
would most probably disagree. Likewise, promoters of the efficient market theory, like 
Fama (1970) or Schiller (2003), would oppose this strategy and provide evidence that 
markets are indeed efficient as there are no ‘information advantages’ that are exploitable.  
 
Bogle (2007) also debates the importance of index funds, as he believes that such 
instruments eliminate the risk of trying to pick the right share, the risk inherent in various 
market sectors or the risk in searching for the best fund managers. The only risk left is 
the market risk that can be managed by investing in different asset classes, diversifying 
portfolios, a long investment horizon and by sticking to the defined investment policy. 
As did Gwilym et al., (2009), Bogle points out that one of most advantageous elements 
in investing is compound interest, hence re-investing dividends yielded from investments 
in ETFs.  
 
He further lists the 10 best US fund managers in the three-year period from 1997 to 1999 
and compares them with the following three-year period from 2000 to 2003. The result 
shows that every single fund, out of the initially best 10 funds, falls within the worst 60 
funds. In other words, none of the previous top 10 funds were ranked within the first 790 
funds in the second period. For instance, Rydes OTC fund, which achieved the best results 
in 1997 to 1999, was ranked 841 in the following three-year period; RS Emerging Growth 
that ranked 2, became 832 and Morgan Stanley Capital Op, which was 3, became 845.  
 
Bogle seems to illustrate several valid arguments as to why index funds perform in a 
superior fashion to managed funds over the long run. 
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Yet, investors should not ignore that Bogle is the founder of the Vanguard Group, which 
is one of the three leading ETF issuers and therefore might exhibit a certain bias.   
 
Another interesting way of looking at investing money is that of Assogbavi and Fagnissè 
(2009), who support option trading as an alternative investment strategy. In an empirical 
study, they found option pricing (under different assumptions) and its application to be 
superior to other types of securities that have been extensively researched in the financial 
literature. Nonetheless, little examination effort has been devoted to analysing the impact 
option trading has on the price-volume relationship.  
 
Assogbavi and Fagnissè base their work on studies by Jennifer, Hameed, and Niden 
(1994) and indicate that strategies that take volume into account are reliably 
outperforming strategies that are only based on price. They then apply Zellner’s 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method showing that, on average, the trading 
volume of option-eligible shares is less sensitive to price changes than the volume of 
shares without options. In other words, price changes have a greater effect on trading 
volumes when shares have options attached.  
 
A direct consequence of Assogbavi and Fagnissè’ effort is that investors, who use both 
volume and price changes to make inferences for investment decisions, have to 
incorporate, at least when dealing with an option-eligible share, both share and option 
markets into their analysis. Furthermore, it seems that investors may be more motivated 
to turn to the option market itself rather than acting directly on shares in order to carry 
out their different investment strategies. 
 
The University of Zurich, cited in the Beobachter (2009), measures banking customers’ 
satisfaction and their willingness to move on to another bank. The survey established that, 
even after banks generally and in Switzerland particularly, suffered greatly in the 
subprime and financial crises, by regulators as well as by the banking community (since 
they often charge highly exaggerated fees or unlawful kick-backs or retrocessions), 
banking customers refused to move their assets to another institution. In fact, 80% would 
not change their bank, even though they receive average but expensive banking services 
or they fear that their bank could one-day collapse or they have lost money on their 
investments. An impressive 75% of those surveyed stated that they would not even 
change their bank if they were guaranteed to receive a better package with another 
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institution. I could conclude that lack of investment knowledge and expertise might be a 
reason for this conduct.  
 
To the contrary, a survey by Birchler, Volkart, Ettlin and Hegglin (2010) that was 
completed only two years later, after the financial crisis had unfolded even more, 
concluded that many (especially the younger clientele as well as the wealthier clients) did 
indeed change their bank because of the financial institutions wrongdoings and the 
turmoil of the whole industry. In 2008, the Swiss bank UBS for instance, was the main 
financial institute for 28% of the Swiss banking clients, by 2010 this number decreased 
to 21%.  
 
Birchler et al., in their study ‘Aktienbesitz in der Schweiz’, further investigate how people 
in Switzerland invest their money. As this survey was conducted every two years during 
the prior decade, it also illustrates how investment behaviour has changed over time. The 
methodology used was that of a ‘Quotaverfahren’, which in this case was a series of 
interviews conducted by telephone. More than 2000 participants answered questions 
regarding demographic data, wealth, shareholding and shares, information phase, 
decision phase, trading phase, performance measuring and corporate governance. The 
survey mainly concerned differences between age groups, gender and wealth categories, 
but took other criteria into consideration too. 
 
One of the main findings was that only 17% of the participants hold shares compared to 
30% in 2000. The reasons for this over 46% decrease are manifold. First of all, Birchler 
et. al. explain that we were just coming out of a rather volatile decade with the ending of 
the technology boom and the happenings on 9/11. Then, after the markets recovered, the 
world experienced first the subprime and then the financial crises. Secondly, private 
investors decreased their direct share/fund holdings due to the institutionalization of the 
Swiss pension systems, as also noted by Reamer and Downing (2016) referring to the 
pension system in the USA. Employees older than 25 years and with an earning above 
CHF 20,880 have to invest a minimum of 5% (increases with age), of their monthly 
salary. 
 
The pension funds have to pay a 1.75% minimum interest rate by law (as of January 2014) 
and either a one-time payment or a monthly life-long payment is guaranteed after 
achievement of regular retirement age.  
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During the last decade, private investors have become increasingly risk averse and many, 
as the study showed, chose to inject their excess money into the government regulated 
pension funds, in addition to their regular salary pension payments.  
 
Birchler et al. (2010) also investigated the duration of the participants’ investments. They 
conclude that the 30 to 39 age group displays the longest investment duration, whereas 
the 18 to 29 age group and the 60 to 74 age group invest with shorter timeframes. Yet, of 
these, more than 25% still participate for longer than 8 years.  
 
In their study, Ashby, Williams, and Stinson (2010) do not suggest an ideal investment 
strategy for asset allocation, but illustrate the prospective benefits of tax-optimized 
portfolios, especially in light of uncertain income tax rates after retirement. For the US, 
today’s tax rate structure is reasonably low but upon retirement, investors could face 
higher taxes even though the retiree’s income is only 60-80% of the wage prior to 
retirement. Ashby et al. therefore recommend US investors to not only diversify portfolios 
by investing in different asset classes but also by tax diversification. They state that, to 
minimize tax in retirement, investors ought to include a mix of taxable, tax-deferred and 
tax-free accounts. Ashby et al. further discuss investment possibilities such as Roth 
Individual Retirement Accounts and more recently Roth 401k plans to minimize tax 
burdens over the long run for US taxpayers.  
 
Goldie and Murray (2010) assert that the majority of investors are taking unnecessary 
risks. Investors do not diversify their portfolio properly and consequently pay too much 
in fees and taxes, leading to poor investments results with too little return and too much 
risk. They argue that for sustainable and successful investing, an investor needs to make 
five decisions:  
 
▪ The do-it-yourself decision – trying to invest yourself or seeking support from an 
investment professional. 
▪ The asset allocation decision – how to allocate your funds among different asset 
classes such as equities, bonds, real estate and cash. 
▪ The diversification decision – which specific asset classes to include in your 
portfolio and in what proportions. 
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▪ The active vs. passive decision – favouring active managed funds trying to 
outsmart the market or a passive approach that delivers market-like-returns. 
▪ The rebalancing decision – when to sell certain assets and when to buy more.  
 
Kunnanatt (2010) studied the investment strategy orientation of nonurban investors in 
developing countries, with particular focus on investment goals, risk attitudes, and return 
expectations of investors. In particular, he researches how reliable these investors are as 
a steady source of capital for driving the economy forward in order to contribute to a 
sustainable flow of funds into investment markets. He also examines whether there are 
irrational speculators who could damage the investment health of a nation. Interestingly, 
Kunnanatt establishes that the investors in the study possess a strong affinity for growth, 
which he defines as the accumulation of wealth over time, rather than any steady flow of 
current income.  
 
This affinity was established by the means of questionnaires but also by further 
exploration during interviews. He concludes that this phenomenon is a reflection of the 
confidence that investors hold regarding their perceived ability to engage in profitable 
investment and trading activities. This (over)confidence, as Kunnanatt states, often stems 
from fortuitous experiences of stock or commodity trading without much understanding 
of the scientific principles, complexities and risk involved. Zweig (2006) identified the 
same for ‘developed world investors’, when he discussed how the Internet bubble led 
private investors to believe that they were skilled investors. Kunnanatt further determines 
that this overconfidence, next to other factors he measured, could potentially lead to 
damaging the capital mobilization prospects of a country. Another consequence of the 
overconfidence described by Zweig and Kunnanatt quite often leads to incorrect 
expectations about potential stock markets and portfolio return.  
 
Lewis (2010) summarizes the causes, happenings, and consequences of the damaging 
financial crisis that fully unfolded in 2008. He believes that greed and ignorance of the 
main banks, their traders, and quantitative analysts were the root of the disaster, when 
they tried to make money from a situation they did not fully understand. There were 
however, a (very) few experts who were wondering and who questioned the system, the 
overinflated real-estate markets and the doubtful stock market vehicles CDS (collateral 
debt swaps).  
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Lewis (2010) explains that these experts did also question the existing risk models and 
subsequently started to understand that this apparently thriving business would not be 
sustainable.    
 
Lewis (ibid.) continues to illustrate that by 2005, Wall Street firms were heavily betting 
on the ambiguous subprime market. This was a marketplace where borrowers with 
doubtful or limited credit history obtained desired money for buying or building their 
homes, for artificially high values and which they essentially could hardly afford. These, 
as Lewis calls them, ‘toxic mortgages’ were mainly hidden in credit default swaps 
(CDSs), credit default obligations (CDOs) or similar products, that resulted in money 
managers holding rather risky portfolios. In late 2006, home prices started to fall but no 
one really reacted to it. ‘In the murky and curious period from early February to June 
2007, the subprime mortgage market resembled a giant helium balloon, bound to earth 
by a dozen or so big Wall Street firms’ (Lewis, 2010, p. 250). Lewis states that, from the 
social point of view, the slow and possibly fraudulent unravelling of the multi-trillion-
dollar US bond market was a catastrophe, yet from the hedge fund trading point of view 
it was the opportunity of a lifetime. Lewis therefore calls the CDO market a credit 
laundering service for residents of lower middleclass America but for Wall Street, a 
machine that turned lead into gold.  
 
Melton and Mackey (2010) studied student managed funds. SMFs are a type of 
investment that has evolved to form part of university finance curriculums over the last 
three decades. As of Melton and Mackay (ibid.) Many business schools endorse ‘real 
world’ education, and many now educate finance students using real money and real 
portfolios in a structured and didactic way. The benefits of such schooling are that 
students gain hands-on money management experience and become visible to potential 
employers. SMF also act as a ‘recruitment tool’ for future employment after graduation. 
 
In their paper, Melton and Mackey cited Neely and Cooley (2004) who found that 57 of 
61 SMF respondents were permitted to invest in equity only, with just four investing in 
bonds. Moreover, 17 of the 57 were defined as equity funds and could only invest in US 
securities. These results are surprising because much evidence exists to show that 
balanced and sustainable portfolios should not invest in only the ‘home market’ or 
equities and bonds.  
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Melton and Mackey’s (2010) work also points out that the majority of universities focus 
on an active management strategy versus a buy and hold approach. However, they state 
that fundamental analysis factors, such as beta, price on equity ratio, dividend yield, 
earnings per share, 52-week price volatility, return on asset ratio and technical analysis 
are also necessary learning objects for students.  
 
In an essay about the importance of investment feasibility analysis, Oprea (2010) looks 
at as specific asset class, the significance of real estate investment. She explains that real 
estate investments can be explained as the commitment of funds by an individual with a 
view to preserving and increasing capital and earning a profit. Such investments also 
represent the foregoing of some immediate comforts in anticipation of future benefits.  
 
Oprea like previously Block (2006) explains that generally real estate investment has 
offered an above-average rate of return while acting as an effective hedge against 
inflation. It further allows investors to use other peoples’ money through leverage. 
However, Oprea also concludes that other motivations and advantages, such as pride in 
ownership, personal control, self-use and occupancy, estate building, security of capital, 
high operating yield, tax shelter, portfolio diversification, etc. should also be evaluated. 
She illustrates the importance of a viability analysis and details issues of legal, physical, 
financial matters.  
 
Stanyer (2010) on the other hand, analyses the mistakes individual and institutional 
investors have made in order to learn from that past. He further predicts that due to 
inflation, markets will be less favourable in the 21st century and that consequently the 
investing landscape will be different to what is was in the 20th century. In order to adapt 
to these changes, investors in particular should consider inflation-linked bonds, which 
ought to be included within their portfolios.  
 
Stanyer additionally exemplifies how sustainable investment strategies evolve; the shape 
of the strategies (keeping it simple), the concept of the time horizon, or the individual’s 
investment behaviour. He is of the opinion that even though many investors have 
substantial business expertise and experience in specific capital markets, such knowledge 
is not sufficient. Investment success requires an integrated and holistic view of the 
investment problem and the full array of investment products available.  
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He therefore summarizes the latest thinking in a concise and comprehensible manner and 
arrives at a practicable approach to long-term investment, drawing on historical data, the 
latest academic studies, and best practices among institutional investors.  
 
Stanyer (2010) lists key elements of which investors need to be aware. E.g. one of the 
oldest and trivial sayings, ‘if it looks too good to be true, it probably is’, remains still one 
of the most valuable pieces of investment advice anyone can give, according to Stanyer. 
Furthermore, return in excess of the return offered by government bonds can only be 
achieved by taking risk; and that risk is most obvious when an investment is volatile but 
least obvious when a risky investment hast not yet shown much volatility. He further asks 
for caution when dealing with investment managers. Whatever your adviser says, make 
sure that your investments are well diversified and be suspicious if an investment manager 
tries to talk you out of something you believe is worth investing in. Likewise, social status 
might not be a reliable indicator of knowledge and honesty. Another piece of advice is 
that sound due diligence on investment advisers / managers is the key to minimizing 
exposure to risk of faulty recommendations or fraud.  
 
Stanyer also stresses that portfolios should have a portion allocated to international 
stocks. For the advanced investor, he suggests hedging international bonds while leaving 
international shares un-hedged. He further illustrates how investors can truly diversify 
portfolios with hedge funds, funds of hedge funds and discusses how to achieve and 
appreciate a comfort zone, when dealing with long-term investing, while understanding 
their tolerance for risk. 
 
Woods and Urwin (2010) consider the way pension funds are invested as problematic. 
The most recent financial crisis has given cause to consider the suitability of their 
investment strategies and the adequacy of their governance techniques. While even the 
most skilled experts cannot provide investment solutions that certainly yield positive 
returns, the crisis did reveal some deficiencies as to how pension funds invest their 
clients’ money. For example, Woods and Urwin emphasize the danger of becoming 
beholden to herd culture, whereby prudence is judged in reference to convention – we do 
what other investors do.  
 
For those pension funds that have chosen to reconsider their investment strategy, Woods 
and Urwin present a framework, offering actual guidance for successful implementation 
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of a sustainable investment strategy. They recommend incorporating specialized funds 
with green themes such as clean water, renewable energy or a combination of these. 
However, they do not state what portion of a portfolio should be invested in green themes 
or how this strategy would impact the overall performance of a portfolio.  
 
Additionally, the crisis exposed pension funds exhibiting a constant focus on short-term 
performance, which may distract from large, latent longer-term risk and hazards. Ellis 
(2002) would agree as he proved that the asset allocation and portfolios of many pension 
investors point to a short, 3 to 5 year, investment horizon. This contradicts the nature of 
pension fund investments as being for the very long term. 
 
Schwanfelder (2012) provides knowledge rather than advice; how to generate positive 
portfolio returns with socially responsible investing (SRI). He elaborates on the various 
means of sustainable investing and how an investor can assemble such a portfolio but also 
on the restriction of this investment style.  
 
He starts off with discussing the history of sustainable investing and appreciates that this 
form of investing continues to gain popularity among the investment community. He also, 
like many other authors, i.e. Green (2008); Lewis (2010); Schwanfelder (2012), debates 
the possibility that many investors have lost trust in their banking institutions or in their 
asset managers and recommends investors become more educated, in order to take 
responsibility of their investments. However, Schwanfelder names some financial 
institutions such the GLS, KD or Triodos that operate largely on a core of socially 
responsible investing. As a guideline, he recommends investors take the time to acquire 
the necessary knowledge about SRI, to detail exactly which companies/sectors 
(investments) they want to feature, e.g. water, forest, health or micro finance, and which 
ones not, e.g. oil, weapon, nuclear plants.  
 
One important question is, according to Schwanfelder, whether investors want to invest 
according to the (greatly debated) best-in-class approach or filter potential investments 
with greater granularity. As most other investment experts, he too states that any SRI 
investment needs to reflect investors individual risk/return profile and points out that there 
are many exchange traded funds (ETFs) available.  
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Buffett & Cunningham (2013) provide an investment guide that comprises mostly Warren 
Buffett’s letter to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway. They specify fundamental 
topics that make for good investments, i.e. rather than focusing on the market, one should 
identify sound businesses, attempt to buy them at good prices, and hold on to them for a 
very long time.  
 
They disagree with the contemporary finance theory that holds that market prices 
efficiently express the value of a business and argue that the market sets prices in a manic-
depressive manner. A superior investor knows to insulate himself from the market 
emotions and to make a distinction between market price and intrinsic value. These 
investors are not bothered by ‘such nonsense as high beta’ – a measure of volatility 
academic theorists use as a risk factor warning – but long for stock price volatility, as it 
provides investment opportunities. 
 
Buffett & Cunningham further describe the financial crisis (2007-2008) with the housing 
bubble at the core of that crisis. They examine its continuing implications for investors 
and society, the debt and derivatives excesses that fueled the crisis. They go on to consider 
how to control risks, the role of oversight in heavy regulated industries, and the 
investment possibilities of today.  
 
Robbins (2014) calls himself a peak performance strategist who explains that investing 
requires learning, knowledge, and discipline. He collects views and wisdom from 50 
leading investment experts and presents a seven steps investment strategy to save and 
invest money successfully.  
 
▪ Step 1: Take control of your money by saving steadily. The power of compounded 
interest is one of the financial world’s most powerful tools.  
▪ Step 2: Know the rules. It is a myth that your banker or investment adviser works 
on behalf of your best interest and that the fees on funds are immaterial. The exact 
opposite is true. It is a fact that 96% of active mutual fund managers fail to beat 
the performance of a simple index funds over a longer period of time but your 
bank of course will never tell you. The impact on fees over time on the overall 
performance of your portfolio is tremendous. A difference of annual fees of 1%, 
2% and 3% on one million dollars, over a 30-year period, with an average 8% 
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return, results in $7.6 million for the investor at 1%, in $5.7 million at 2% and at 
only $4.3 million at 3%.  
▪ Step 3: Know the price of your dreams. Calculate your future monthly expenses 
and the inevitabilities and luxuries you desire to have during retirement, define 
how much you can earn and save, and set realistic return on investment goals.  
▪ Step 4: Practice risk management and asset allocation. Asset allocation and 
diversification are the key elements in investing. According to your risk profile, 
you must split your investments amongst the most secure asset classes, i.e. stocks, 
bonds, real estate, commodities, to build a weatherproof portfolio, to achieve a 
well-diversified portfolio respectively.  
▪ Step 5: Cut the downside, expand the upside. Robbins 2004) refers to Ray Dalio 
of Bridgewater, one of the most successful investors who concluded that inflation, 
deflation, and declines or gains in economic growth drive prices in all asset 
classes. He suggests exposure to 30% stocks, 15% in intermediate bonds, 40% in 
long-term bonds, 7.5% in gold, and 7.5% in commodities. These ratios need to be 
rebalanced annually so that the quotas remain the same and reflect your risk/return 
profile.  
▪ Step six: The expert advice. Some of the recommendations by the 50 expert 
investors are to avoid losing money, to stay focused on minimizing the downside, 
to seek small investments that produce large returns, learn to make informed 
investment decisions with limited information, keep earning, working, and giving.  
▪ Step seven: Share the wealth. Money on its own does not make people happy. 
Focus on your own particular goals and take action that empower you. Recognize 
and break negative behavioural patterns, learn new skills and use your spare time 
to follow your interests. Strive to live a balanced and healthy lifestyle, build strong 
relationships, and take pleasure in meeting your needs and those of the people you 
care for. Becoming rich means to create a better quality of life your yourself, and 
for others, including supporting good causes. In the end, ‘you truly become 
wealthy’. 
 
The Swiss private bank Pictet (2015) has analysed returns, the performance of shares and 
bonds, every year since 1925.  
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The survey shows nominal returns for equities of 9.79% per annum and for bonds of 
4.49% from 1925 to 2014. The real returns were 7.6% and 2.43% respectively. The largest 
decrease for shares (in real terms) was 37.83% in 1974 and for bonds was 10.9% in 1973. 
Conversely, the biggest increase for shares was 56.24% in 1985 and 14.87% for bonds in 
1976. (These figures I will incorporate in my research questionnaire and use them for the 
analysis and discussion part, to understand and compare the private and professionals’ 
profit (and loss) expectations).     
10.3. Research question 1: further results and analysis 
Important concepts to achieve higher than market average returns 
 
To achieve higher than average market returns, rebalancing seemed to be much more 
important to the asset managers (83%) than to the institutional investors (56%) or to the 
private investors (57%). For 8%, 16% and 6.%, rebalancing was not an essential concept.  
 
When asked about the need to reduce the total expense ratio (TER), the results showed 
the asset managers at 83%, 65% for the institutional investors and 63% for the private 
investors. However, the significance to reduce retrocessions was only seen as important 
by 50% of all asset managers by 41% of the institutional investors and by 50% of the 
private investors. 
 
When it came to re-investing dividends to achieve higher than market average returns, 
almost none of the asset managers found it unimportant but 9% of the institutional 
investors and 14% of the private investors did. Likewise, 70% of the asset managers found 
it important but only 50% of the institutional and 48% private investors did so.  
 
The choice of investing in active or passive managed funds was answered varyingly. 63% 
of the asset managers and institutional investors as well as 49% of all private investors 
found it important or very important. On the other hand, 10% of the asset managers, 3% 
institutional investors and 7% of all private investors disagreed. Furthermore, 6% of the 
institutional investors and 13% of the private investors did not seem to understand the 
difference between active and passive managed funds (fees structure, underperformance 
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of most active managed funds), at least when considering higher then market average 
returns. Yet, this question did not ask for the preference between these two vehicle types.  
The notion to achieve sustainable above market average returns by the means of asset 
allocation seemed to be widely acknowledged by all asset managers; 100% found it 
important or very important. The same was true for 88% of all institutional investors and 
63% of the private investors. The latter group showed 24% who were neutral or negative 
about asset allocation.  
 
For the professional investors (90%, 74%), the product selection was less important than 
the asset allocation but more essential for the private investors (79%). On the contrary, 
10% of the institutional investors, only 3% of the private investors and none of the asset 
managers found it to be unimportant.  
 
The choice of the bank holding an investor’s portfolio was seen by both professional 
investor groups as rather unimportant (40%, 41%) whereas many more private investors 
were of the opposite belief (35% vs. 26%).  
 
The same was true when asked about the importance of the organization issuing ETFs. 
40% of the asset managers and 41% institutional investors found it unimportant but as 
with the previous question, 30% of all private investors voted for and 21% against it.  
 
58% of the asset managers, 69% of the institutional investors and 68% of the private 
investors found the purchasing price of an investment product important or very 
important. On the other hand, 20% asset managers, 13% institutional investors and 8% 
private investors classified the buying price as insignificant. 
 
When asked about the investment duration, the results were strong as 95% of the asset 
manager claimed that the investment duration was of importance, as well as 81% of the 
institutional investors and 79% of the private investors. However, 16% of the intuitional 
investors but only 3% of all asset managers and 2% private investors were of the opposite 
belief.  
 
Overall, matching the important and very important answers, the results showed that the 
asset class allocation and the investment duration followed by the product choice were 
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the most important factors that contributed to a higher and more sustainable profit than 
the market average.  
 
The second most important group of factors consisted of reducing TER, rebalancing, the 
choice between active managed funds and passive managed funds, the purchasing prices 
of vehicles, followed by re-investing dividends and reducing retrocessions. The most 
unimportant factors were the bank holding the investor’s portfolio and the institution 
issuing the ETFs.  
 
Importance of rebalancing to achieve a higher 
than market average returns 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
I don't know 0,0% 3,1% 12,9% 
Very unimportant 2,5% 0,0% 1,4% 
Unimportant 5,0% 15,6% 4,7% 
Neutral 10,0% 25,0% 24,5% 
Important 45,0% 21,9% 45,0% 
Very important 37,5% 34,4% 11,5% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 89 – The importance of rebalancing for higher returns 
 
Figure 79 – The importance of rebalancing for higher returns 
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Importance of reducing retrocessions for 
higher than the market average returns 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
I don't know 0,0% 6,3% 12,9% 
Very unimportant 5,0% 3,1% 2,9% 
Unimportant 12,5% 18,8% 8,9% 
Neutral 32,5% 31,3% 25,4% 
Important 30,0% 21,9% 36,8% 
Very important 20,0% 18,8% 13,2% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 90 – The importance of reducing retrocessions for higher returns 
 
Figure 80 – The importance of reducing retrocessions for higher returns 
Importance of reducing TER to achieve higher 
than market average returns 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
I don't know 0,0% 3,2% 14,0% 
Very unimportant 2,5% 0,0% 1,4% 
Unimportant 2,5% 12,9% 1,8% 
Neutral 12,5% 19,4% 20,1% 
Important 47,5% 41,9% 43,9% 
Very important 35,0% 22,6% 18,7% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 91 – The importance of reducing TER for higher returns 
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Figure 81 – The importance of reducing TER for higher returns 
Importance of re-investing dividends to 
achieve higher than market average returns  
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
I don't know 0,0% 3,1% 10,4% 
Very unimportant 0,0% 3,1% 2,5% 
Unimportant 2,5% 6,3% 11,1% 
Neutral 27,5% 37,5% 27,9% 
Important 55,0% 28,1% 41,4% 
Very important 15,0% 21,9% 6,8% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 92 – The importance of re-investing dividends for higher returns 
 
Figure 82 – The importance of re-investing dividends for higher returns 
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Importance of choosing active vs. passive 
funds for higher than market average returns 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
I don't know 0,0% 6,3% 12,9% 
Very unimportant 5,0% 0,0% 1,1% 
Unimportant 5,0% 3,1% 5,4% 
Neutral 27,5% 28,1% 31,8% 
Important 37,5% 43,8% 38,9% 
Very important 25,0% 18,8% 10,0% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 93 – The importance of active vs. passive funds for higher returns 
 
 
Figure 83 – The importance of active vs. passive funds for higher returns 
Importance of the asset class choice to 
achieve higher than market average returns 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
I don't know 0,0% 3,1% 12,9% 
Very unimportant 0,0% 0,0% 1,1% 
Unimportant 0,0% 0,0% 3,6% 
Neutral 0,0% 9,4% 19,6% 
Important 32,5% 43,8% 41,8% 
Very important 67,5% 43,8% 21,1% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 94 – The importance of the asset class choice for higher returns 
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Figure 84 – The importance of the asset class choice for higher returns 
Importance of the product choice to achieve 
higher than market average returns 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
I don't know 0,0% 0,0% 6,8% 
Very unimportant 0,0% 0,0% 1,4% 
Unimportant 0,0% 9,7% 1,1% 
Neutral 10,0% 16,1% 12,2% 
Important 40,0% 58,1% 47,0% 
Very important 50,0% 16,1% 31,5% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 95 – The importance of the product choice for higher returns 
 
Figure 85 – The importance of the product choice for higher returns 
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Importance of the bank choice to achieve 
higher than market average returns 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
I don't know 0,0% 3,1% 7,5% 
Very unimportant 7,5% 3,1% 5,0% 
Unimportant 32,5% 37,5% 21,1% 
Neutral 22,5% 31,3% 31,2% 
Important 27,5% 15,6% 24,7% 
Very important 10,0% 9,4% 10,4% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 96 – The importance of the bank choice for higher returns 
 
Figure 86 – The importance of the bank choice for higher returns 
Importance of the ETF issuer to achieve 
higher than market average returns 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut.  
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
I don't know 2,5% 3,1% 16,5% 
Very unimportant 12,5% 12,5% 5,4% 
Unimportant 27,5% 28,1% 15,1% 
Neutral 37,5% 34,4% 33,0% 
Important 10,0% 21,9% 23,7% 
Very important 10,0% 0,0% 6,5% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 97 – The importance of the ETF issuer choice for higher returns 
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Figure 87 – The importance of the ETF issuer choice for higher returns 
Importance of current buying price to achieve 
higher than market average returns 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
I don't know 0,0% 3,1% 6,1% 
Very unimportant 0,0% 0,0% 1,8% 
Unimportant 20,0% 12,5% 6,5% 
Neutral 22,5% 15,6% 17,6% 
Important 40,0% 43,8% 40,9% 
Very important 17,5% 25,0% 27,2% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 98 – The importance of the current buying price for higher returns 
 
Figure 88 – The importance of the current purchasing price for higher returns 
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Importance of the investment duration to 
achieve higher than market average returns 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
I don't know 0,0% 3,1% 6,1% 
Very unimportant 0,0% 0,0% 0,7% 
Unimportant 2,5% 15,6% 1,4% 
Neutral 2,5% 0,0% 13,2% 
Important 50,0% 53,1% 44,6% 
Very important 45,0% 28,1% 33,9% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 99 – The importance of the investment duration for higher returns 
 
Figure 89 – The importance of the investment duration for higher returns 
Change to an online asset manager to save cost and maximize return 
 
41% of the asset managers, 31% of the institutional asset managers and 28% of the private 
investors would not change to an online asset management firm if, assuming the products 
and quality of service were the same, they could save 25% of the annual management fee. 
On the contrary, 41% of the asset managers, 56% of the institutional investors and 55% 
of the private investors would change for a lower annual fee.  
 
When, for the group that disagreed, the saving rate was increased from 25% to 50%, 
another 52% of the asset managers, 57% institutional investors and 55% additional 
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private investors, would change to an online asset manager. It appears, that for most 
investors there was a clear awareness of the impact of fees on investment return.  
 
I would change to an online asset manager to 
save 25% of the annual management fee 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 12,8% 12,5% 7,8% 
Disagree 28,2% 18,8% 19,7% 
Neutral 17,9% 12,5% 17,1% 
Agree 20,5% 28,1% 26,8% 
Strongly Agree 20,5% 28,1% 28,6% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 100 – Change to an online asset manager to save 25% of the management fee 
 
Figure 90 – Change to an online asset manager to save 25% of the management fee 
I would change to an online asset manager to 
save 50% of the annual management fee 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 3,4% 14,3% 8,8% 
Disagree 13,8% 9,5% 19,1% 
Neutral 31,0% 19,0% 17,5% 
Agree 44,8% 38,1% 37,1% 
Strongly agree 6,9% 19,0% 17,5% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 101 – Change to an online asset manager to save 50% of the management fee 
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Figure 91 – Change to an online asset manager to save 50% of the management fee 
View on diversification, investment duration, single stocks vs. funds 
Diversification, in order to spread the risk of an investor’s portfolio, was seen as 
imperative by 75% of the asset managers, 77% of the institutional investors and by 62% 
of the private investors. However, still more than 26%, 23% and 38%, respectively, are 
neutral or disagree about it.  
 
72% asset managers, 62% of all institutional investors and 56% of the private investors 
disagreed with the statement that they are investing for the short-term, as the long-term 
is uncertain. Yet, 19%, 15% and 25% rather focus on the short-term.  
 
When asked about investing in single stocks versus funds, the proportions of answers 
were more or less evenly split amongst the three investor types. 33% of the asset 
managers, 26% of the institutional investors and 43% of all private investors focus on 
single share investments (stock picking); 47%, 43% and 36% on funds.  
 
42% of the asset managers, 37% of the institutional investors and 56% of all private 
investors’ investment decisions (incl. neutrals) were influenced by emotions.  
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I pay more attention to diversification of my 
financial investments 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 4,7% 0,0% 5,1% 
Disagree 9,3% 17,1% 11,3% 
Neutral 11,6% 5,7% 21,9% 
Agree 32,6% 45,7% 41,8% 
Strongly agree 41,9% 31,4% 19,9% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 102 – I pay more attention to diversification  
 
Figure 92 – I pay more attention to diversification  
I rather invest for the short-time as the long-
term is uncertain 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 25,6% 17,6% 15,5% 
Disagree 46,5% 44,1% 40,9% 
Neutral 9,3% 23,5% 18,9% 
Agree 16,3% 11,8% 18,9% 
Strongly agree 2,3% 2,9% 5,8% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 103 – I invest for the short-time as the long-run is uncertain 
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Figure 93 – I rather invest for the short-time as the long-run is uncertain 
I rather invest in single stocks/shares than in 
Funds 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 25,6% 20,0% 9,7% 
Disagree 20,9% 22,9% 26,6% 
Neutral 20,9% 31,4% 20,7% 
Agree 25,6% 14,3% 24,5% 
Strongly agree 7,0% 11,4% 18,6% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 104 – I rather invest in single stocks/shares than in funds 
 
Figure 94 – I rather invest in single stocks/shares than in funds 
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I rather invest without letting emotions 
influencing my investment decisions 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 7,0% 2,9% 2,8% 
Disagree 18,6% 5,7% 20,8% 
Neutral 16,3% 28,6% 32,5% 
Agree 39,5% 45,7% 32,2% 
Strongly agree 18,6% 17,1% 11,8% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 105 – I invest without emotions influencing my decisions 
 
Figure 95 – I invest without emotions influencing my decisions 
 
Considerations of investments in various asset classes  
 
56%, respectively 57% of the professional investors and 401% of the private investors 
trusted that cash was currently a vital asset class.  
 
When it comes to investments in commodities, the opinions are more varied. Asset 
managers (62%) much more than institutional investors (46%) and private investors 
(52%) trusted in commodities. When asked about favoring an investment in real estate, 
the survey revealed 49% for the asset managers, 68% for the institutional investors and 
61% for the private investors.  
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For corporate bonds that have similar characteristics as shares, around 80% of the 
professional investors and 59% of all private investors considered them as a good 
investment. With gold, investors seemed to be more cautious. 63% of the asset managers 
and 47% of the private investors, but only 37% of the institutional investors, see gold as 
a valuable asset class.  
 
38.4% of the asset managers, 44% of the institutional investors and 48% of the private 
investors disagreed with the statement that hedge funds were a plausible investment. Only 
20% of all private investors, 20% of the institutional investors, and 41% of the asset 
manager believed in this asset class. 
 
In terms of high yield bonds, 51% of the asset managers, 38% of the institutional investors 
and 32% of all private investors placed faith in this asset class, whereas government bonds 
were the second least favorable asset class as less than 41% of the professional investors 
and 47% of the private investors would consider an investment.  
 
Shares/stocks (next to corporate bonds) were the dominant asset class overall. 91% of the 
asset managers, 91% of all institutional investors and 86% of the private investors  
believed in these investment vehicles. 
 
I believe in investing in the asset class cash 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 7,3% 11,4% 7,9% 
Disagree 12,2% 8,6% 25,9% 
Neutral 24,4% 22,9% 25,5% 
Agree 26,8% 42,9% 28,3% 
Strongly agree 29,3% 14,3% 12,4% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 106 – I believe in investing in the asset class cash 
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Figure 96 – I believe in investing in the asset class cash 
 I believe in investing in the asset class real 
estate  
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 4,9% 0,0% 2,5% 
Disagree 9,8% 11,8% 11,9% 
Neutral 36,6% 20,6% 24,2% 
Agree 34,1% 29,4% 42,5% 
Strongly agree 14,6% 38,2% 18,9% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 107 – I believe in investing in the asset class real estate 
 
Figure 97 – I believe in investing in the asset class real estate 
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I believe in investing in the asset class 
commodities (oil, wheat, sugar…) 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 7,1% 0,0% 6,0% 
Disagree 11,9% 17,1% 13,1% 
Neutral 19,0% 37,1% 28,7% 
Agree 42,9% 22,9% 39,7% 
Strongly agree 19,0% 22,9% 12,4% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 108 – I believe in investing in the asset class commodities  
 
Figure 98 – I believe in investing in the asset class commodities 
I believe in investing in the asset class 
corporate bonds 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 0,0% 0,0% 0,7% 
Disagree 4,8% 11,8% 10,6% 
Neutral 11,9% 8,8% 29,2% 
Agree 52,4% 47,1% 46,8% 
Strongly agree 31,0% 32,4% 12,7% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 109 – I believe in investing in the asset class corporate bonds 
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Figure 99 – I believe in investing in the asset class corporate bonds 
I believe in investing in the asset class gold 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 7,3% 8,6% 2,1% 
Disagree 4,9% 14,3% 15,0% 
Neutral 24,4% 40,0% 35,5% 
Agree 24,4% 22,9% 36,2% 
Strongly agree 39,0% 14,3% 11,1% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 110 – I believe in investing in the asset class gold 
 
Figure 100 – I believe in investing in the asset class gold 
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I believe in investing in the asset class hedge 
funds 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 17,9% 11,8% 14,5% 
Disagree 20,5% 32,4% 33,3% 
Neutral 20,5% 35,3% 32,6% 
Agree 30,8% 11,8% 15,9% 
Strongly agree 10,3% 8,8% 3,6% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 111 – I believe in investing in the asset class hedge funds 
 
Figure 101 – I believe in investing in the asset class hedge funds 
I believe in investing in the asset class high 
yield bonds 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 4,9% 8,8% 11,4% 
Disagree 14,6% 23,5% 21,8% 
Neutral 29,3% 29,4% 35,0% 
Agree 24,4% 20,6% 24,3% 
Strongly agree 26,8% 17,6% 7,5% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 112 – I believe in investing in the asset class high yield bonds 
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Figure 102 – I believe in investing in the asset class high yield bonds 
I believe in investing in the asset class 
government bonds 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 16,7% 8,6% 4,2% 
Disagree 28,6% 20,0% 17,5% 
Neutral 14,3% 31,4% 31,6% 
Agree 26,2% 22,9% 36,5% 
Strongly agree 14,3% 17,1% 10,2% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 113 – I believe in investing in the asset class government bonds 
 
Figure 103 – I believe in investing in the asset class government bonds 
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I believe in investing in the asset class 
shares/stocks 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 0,0% 0,0% 1,4% 
Disagree 4,8% 2,9% 2,1% 
Neutral 4,8% 5,9% 10,5% 
Agree 31,0% 35,3% 50,2% 
Strongly agree 59,5% 55,9% 35,8% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 114 – I believe in investing in the asset class shares/stocks 
 
Figure 104 – I believe in investing in the asset class shares/stocks 
The preference for active or passive managed funds 
 
When asked about the preference for investing either in active managed funds or in 
passive managed funds, the answers showed that 47% of the asset managers would prefer 
either, whereas more institutional investors (49% v. 40%) and more private investors 
(45% v. 27%) were in favour of a passive investing. Yet, 7%, 11% and 28% were neutral. 
 
The preference for investing in active or in 
passive managed funds (Index funds/ETFs) 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Active managed funds 46.5% 40.0% 26.9% 
Passive managed funds 46.5% 48.6% 44.8% 
I don't know 7.0% 11.4% 28.3% 
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Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 115 – The preference for investing in active or passive managed funds 
 
Figure 105 – The preference for investing in active or passive managed funds  
Considerations of investments in various markets  
Most investors were neutral about investing in the Australian / New Zealand market but 
still, the majority voted for it with the private investors as the smallest group (49%, 42% 
and 37%). Investing in the general European markets (63%, 58% and 46%) enjoyed a 
higher preference.  
 
The picture looked completely different when it came to the emerging markets. 90% of 
the asset managers, 82% of all institutional investors and 82% of the private investors 
were fond of investing in developing markets like China, India, Brazil, etc. The same was 
true for the Swiss market with 83%, 85% and 81%.  
 
Germany was also of interest for investors with 68% asset managers, 72% of the 
institutional investors and 57% of all private investors voting for it. The figures were 
similar for the US markets with 76% of the asset managers, 66% of the institutional 
investors and 52.4% of the private investors.  
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When it came to the UK market, investors were more sceptical. Professional investors 
still showed some interest in investing in this market (most of them were neutral) whereas 
more private investors (27% v. 26%) did not support this idea.  
 
I believe in investing in the Australian / New 
Zealand markets 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 4,9% 3,0% 2,4% 
Disagree 7,3% 3,0% 11,6% 
Neutral 39,0% 51,5% 48,8% 
Agree 36,6% 30,3% 28,0% 
Strongly agree 12,2% 12,1% 9,2% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 116 – I believe in investing in the Australian / NZ markets 
 
Figure 106 – I believe in investing in the Australian / NZ market 
I believe in investing in the overall European 
market 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 0,0% 2,9% 1,8% 
Disagree 4,9% 5,9% 17,4% 
Neutral 31,7% 23,5% 35,1% 
Agree 46,3% 50,0% 37,9% 
Strongly agree 17,1% 17,6% 7,8% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 117 – I believe in investing in the overall European market 
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Figure 107 – I believe in investing in the general European market 
I believe in investing in emerging markets 
(China, India, Brazil, etc.) 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 0,0% 0,0% 1,1% 
Disagree 0,0% 3,0% 3,2% 
Neutral 9,8% 15,2% 14,0% 
Agree 46,3% 45,5% 59,1% 
Strongly agree 43,9% 36,4% 22,6% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 118 – I believe in investing in Emerging markets  
 
Figure 108 – I believe in investing in Emerging markets 
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I believe in investing in the Swiss market 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 0,0% 0,0% 1,1% 
Disagree 2,4% 3,0% 2,9% 
Neutral 14,6% 12,1% 14,6% 
Agree 43,9% 48,5% 57,5% 
Strongly agree 39,0% 36,4% 23,9% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 119 – I believe in investing in the Swiss market 
 
Figure 109 – I believe in investing in the Swiss market 
I believe in investing in the German market 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 0,0% 0,0% 1,5% 
Disagree 7,5% 2,9% 8,8% 
Neutral 25,0% 25,7% 33,2% 
Agree 37,5% 48,6% 46,7% 
Strongly agree 30,0% 22,9% 9,9% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 120 – I believe in investing in the German market 
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Figure 110 – I believe in investing in the German market 
I believe in investing in the US market 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly Disagree 0,0% 2,9% 4,3% 
Disagree 9,8% 2,9% 11,0% 
Neutral 14,6% 28,6% 32,3% 
Agree 51,2% 45,7% 41,1% 
Strongly agree 24,4% 20,0% 11,3% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 121 – I believe in investing in the US market 
 
Figure 111 – I believe in investing in the US market 
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I believe in investing in the UK market 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Strongly disagree 0,0% 3,0% 2,6% 
Disagree 12,5% 6,1% 24,0% 
Neutral 42,5% 39,4% 48,0% 
Agree 37,5% 36,4% 22,9% 
Strongly agree 7,5% 15,2% 2,6% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 122 – I believe in investing in the UK market 
 
Figure 112 – I believe in investing in the UK market 
Importance of various investment criteria   
 
Only 31% of the asset managers but 49% of the institutional investors and 53% of all 
private investors’ emphasis was on large capitalised companies when it came to their 
investments. The majority of the professional investors did not put any weight on this 
criterion (neutral). The same was true when asked about the importance of the company 
to invest in being Swiss, with the difference that more asset managers (43% v. 30%) 
underweighted this criterion.  
 
Only a minority of investors from the private investor category supported ethical aspects 
like green investing or sustainability as an investment criterion.  
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Most respondents were neutral, but clearly, the professional investors found other 
investment criteria more important.  
 
The dividend rate on the other hand was crucial for most investors, as 63% of the asset 
managers, 69% of the institutional investors and 67% of all private investors trusted it to 
be important or very important. However, there were still around 25% who were neutral 
and for about 10% the dividend rate was insignificant. 
 
75% of the asset managers, 84% institutional investors and 83% of all private investors 
confirmed that their knowledge about the company they wanted to invest in was 
important. On the other hand, the numbers were 13%, 6% and only 3% respectively with 
the private investors. 
 
Past performance played an important part for most private investors (75%) whereas only 
68% of the asset managers and 56% institutional investors trusted that past performance 
was an indicator of future performance.  
 
The P/E ratio seemed important too but most investors (43% asset managers, 42% 
institutional investors and 45% of all private investors) were neutral about it; only very 
few found it unimportant. It was interesting to see that when asked about the industry a 
company was in, only 36% of the asset managers found it important. However, that 
number more than doubles to 75% with the institutional investors and 58% for private 
investors. 
 
The participants were relatively neutral when asked whether a vehicle was an active or a 
passive managed fund. Regarding active managed funds, 39% of the asset managers, 31% 
of all institutional investors and 25% of the private investors found it important. For 
passive managed funds, the numbers were 33%, 30% and 33% respectively.  
 
The biggest discrepancy lay with the institutional investors, as 44% and 56% respectively 
were neutral about it. In summary, more professional investors trusted that the decision 
for investments in active managed funds was more important than it was for passive 
products (39%, 31% vs. 33%, 30%). It was the opposite for private investors (25% vs. 
33%). 
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How important for your investment decision 
is it that company is a Large-Cap 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Very unimportant 10.3% 0.0% 1.8% 
Unimportant 17.9% 9.7% 12.7% 
Neutral 41.0% 41.9% 32.2% 
Important 25.6% 45.2% 44.6% 
Very important 5.1% 3.2% 8.7% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 123 – The importance of large-cap companies for the investment decision  
 
Figure 113 – The importance of large-cap companies for the investment decision  
How important for your investment decision 
is it that company is a Swiss company 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Very unimportant 7.5% 3.1% 5.0% 
Unimportant 35.0% 18.8% 19.4% 
Neutral 27.5% 40.6% 34.2% 
Important 27.5% 28.1% 30.9% 
Very important 2.5% 9.4% 10.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 124 – The importance of a company being Swiss for the investment decision  
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Figure 114 – The importance of a company being Swiss for the investment decision 
How important for your investment decisions 
are ethical aspects i.e. sustainability  
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Very unimportant 12.5% 9.4% 6.5% 
Unimportant 27.5% 28.1% 17.3% 
Neutral 32.5% 46.9% 37.1% 
Important 27.5% 9.4% 32.0% 
Very important 0.0% 6.3% 7.2% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 125 – The importance of ethical aspects for the investment decision  
 
Figure 115 – The importance of ethical aspects for the investment decision 
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How important for your investment decision 
is the expected dividend rate 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Very unimportant 5.0% 3.1% 3.3% 
Unimportant 5.0% 6.3% 3.6% 
Neutral 27.5% 21.9% 26.4% 
Important 47.5% 53.1% 50.4% 
Very important 15.0% 15.6% 16.3% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 126 – The importance of the dividend rate for the investment decision  
 
Figure 116 – The importance of the dividend rate for the investment decision 
How important for your investment decision 
is your knowledge of the company 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Very unimportant 2.5% 0.0% 0.4% 
Unimportant 10.0% 6.3% 2.2% 
Neutral 12.5% 9.4% 14.9% 
Important 42.5% 53.1% 52.2% 
Very important 32.5% 31.3% 30.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 127 – The importance of company knowledge for the investment decision  
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Figure 117 – The importance of company knowledge for the investment decision 
How important for your investment decisions 
is the past performance 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Very unimportant 2.5% 3.1% 1.1% 
Unimportant 17.5% 15.6% 6.5% 
Neutral 22.5% 25.0% 17.3% 
Important 42.5% 43.8% 50.5% 
Very important 15.0% 12.5% 24.5% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 128 – The importance of the past performance for the investment decision  
 
Figure 118 – The importance of the past performance for the investment decision 
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How important for your investment decision 
is a low P/E ratio 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Very unimportant 2.5% 0.0% 2.0% 
Unimportant 5.0% 6.5% 7.5% 
Neutral 42.5% 41.9% 44.8% 
Important 40.0% 45.2% 35.7% 
Very important 10.0% 6.5% 9.9% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 129 – The importance of a low P/E ratio for the investment decision  
 
Figure 119 – The importance of a low P/E ratio for the investment decision  
How important for your investment decision 
is the industry the company is in 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Very unimportant 2.6% 3.1% 1.1% 
Very important 30.8% 12.5% 27.6% 
Neutral 30.8% 9.4% 13.1% 
Important 33.3% 68.8% 51.6% 
Unimportant 2.6% 6.3% 6.5% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 130 – The importance of the company’s industry for the investment decision  
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Figure 120 – The importance of the company’s industry for the investment decision 
How important for your investment decision 
is it that product is an active managed fund 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Very unimportant 5.1% 6.3% 12.3% 
Unimportant 30.8% 18.8% 25.0% 
Neutral 25.6% 43.8% 38.1% 
Important 30.8% 28.1% 19.8% 
Very important 7.7% 3.1% 4.8% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 131 – The importance of active funds for the investment decision  
 
Figure 121 – The importance of active funds for the investment decision 
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How important for your investment decision 
is it that the product is an Index fund/ETF 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Very unimportant 7.5% 6.7% 6.3% 
Unimportant 25.0% 6.7% 17.3% 
Neutral 35.0% 56.7% 43.1% 
Important 22.5% 26.7% 24.7% 
Very important 10.0% 3.3% 8.6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 132 – The importance of passive funds for the investment decision  
 
Figure 122 – The importance of passive managed funds for the investment decision 
 
 
What investment strategies were applied  
 
Interestingly, 50% of the asset managers, 53% institutional investors and 64% of the 
private investors believed in stock picking as a viable investment strategy and only 16%, 
22% and 14% thought otherwise. There was similar support for growth investing, 56%, 
53% and 64% but with fewer investors, 8%, 10% and 10% voted against it. The buy and 
hold strategy was an equally feasible investment strategy with 49% of the asset managers, 
52% institutional investors and 58% of all private investors believing in it.  
 
The numbers increased to 66%, 76% and 63% respectively when asked whether 
fundamental analysis was a superior strategy. Only 9%, 10% and 11% were in 
contradiction of it.  
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The numbers for dividend investing were similar, with 59% of the asset managers, 66% 
of the institutional investors and 66% of the private investors supporting this strategy. 
Technical analysis on the other hand was seen as a poor, or at most, satisfactory 
investment strategy as the majority of professional investors voted against it (36%, 38%). 
The private investors were exactly even in regards of the technical analysis.  
 
Value averaging on the other hand was the least favourable investment strategy as only 
13% asset managers, 20% institutional investors and 18% of all private investors 
supported it. The majority of investors were neutral about it and 25.9%, 40% and 32% 
respectively concluded that it was a poor or very poor way to invest money.  
 
As anticipated, value investing next to fundamental analysis drew the most attention with 
69% of all asset managers, 72% institutional investors and 53% of the private investors 
in favour of it. Value investing also showed the lowest number in opposition (6%, 7% 
and 12%). When it comes to investing in active managed funds, the support was not as 
strong as anticipated. Only 59% asset managers, 58% institutional investors and 52% 
private investors cared for it whilst 16%, 18% and 19% respectively were against it.  
 
When asked about asset allocation, the numbers were very high. 87% of all asset 
managers, 71% of the institutional investors and 61% private investors were in favour of 
it, while only very few were against it and 11%, 16% and 34% were neutral.  
 
Unexpectedly, only 51% of the asset managers, 55% institutional investors and 40% of 
the private investors believed in passive investing (ETFs, Index funds) with 27%, 7%  
and 21% voting against it. 
 
The importance of stock picking as an 
investment strategy 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Very poor 2.6% 0.0% 2.9% 
Poor 13.2% 21.9% 11.0% 
Satisfactory 34.2% 25.0% 22.4% 
Good 39.5% 28.1% 43.3% 
Excellent 10.5% 25.0% 20.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 133 – The importance of stock picking as an investment strategy 
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Figure 123 – The importance of stock picking as an investment strategy 
The importance of growth investing as an 
investment strategy 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Very poor 2.8% 3.3% 1.4% 
Poor 5.6% 6.7% 8.3% 
Satisfactory 36.1% 36.7% 26.7% 
Good 44.4% 46.7% 53.9% 
Excellent 11.1% 6.7% 9.7% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 134 – The importance of growth investing as an investment strategy 
 
Figure 124 – The importance of growth investing as an investment strategy 
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The importance of buy and hold as an 
investment strategy 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Very poor 2.7% 0.0% 1.7% 
Poor 24.3% 12.9% 9.2% 
Satisfactory 24.3% 35.5% 31.4% 
Good 35.1% 38.7% 51.5% 
Excellent 13.5% 12.9% 6.3% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Table 135 – The importance of buy and hold as an investment strategy 
 
Figure 125 – The importance of buy and hold as an investment strategy 
The importance of fundamental analysis as an 
investment strategy  
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Very poor 0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 
Poor 8.6% 10.3% 7.8% 
Satisfactory 25.7% 13.8% 25.9% 
Good 45.7% 62.1% 49.3% 
Excellent 20.0% 13.8% 14.1% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 136 – The importance of fundamental analysis as an investment strategy 
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399 
 
 
Figure 126 – The importance of fundamental analysis as an investment strategy 
The importance of dividend investing as an 
investment strategy 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Very poor 2.7% 3.1% 1.7% 
Poor 8.1% 3.1% 8.4% 
Satisfactory 29.7% 28.1% 24.1% 
Good 37.8% 59.4% 50.2% 
Excellent 21.6% 6.3% 15.6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 137 – The importance of dividend investing as an investment strategy 
 
Figure 127 – The importance of dividend investing as an investment strategy 
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The importance of technical analysis as an 
investment strategy 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Very poor 13.9% 10.3% 7.2% 
Poor 22.2% 27.6% 23.6% 
Satisfactory 33.3% 27.6% 38.5% 
Good 22.2% 27.6% 23.6% 
Excellent 8.3% 6.9% 7.2% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 138 – The importance of technical analysis as an investment strategy 
 
Figure 128 – The importance of technical analysis as an investment strategy 
The importance of value averaging as an 
investment strategy 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Very poor 6.5% 4.0% 3.8% 
Poor 19.4% 36.0% 28.2% 
Satisfactory 61.3% 40.0% 50.0% 
Good 9.7% 20.0% 15.4% 
Excellent 3.2% 0.0% 2.6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 139 – The importance of value averaging as an investment strategy 
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Figure 129 – The importance of value averaging as an investment strategy 
The importance of value investing as an 
investment strategy 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Very poor 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 
Poor 5.7% 6.9% 9.9% 
Satisfactory 25.7% 20.7% 34.6% 
Good 48.6% 51.7% 40.8% 
Excellent 20.0% 20.7% 12.6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 140 – The importance of value investing as an investment strategy 
 
Figure 130 – The importance of value investing as an investment strategy 
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The importance of investing in active 
managed funds as an investment strategy 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Very poor 2.7% 6.1% 3.0% 
Poor 13.5% 12.1% 16.1% 
Satisfactory 24.3% 24.2% 29.1% 
Good 43.2% 48.5% 44.8% 
Excellent 16.2% 9.1% 7.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 141 – The importance of active investing as an investment strategy 
 
Figure 131 – The importance of active investing as an investment strategy 
The importance of asset allocation as an 
investment strategy 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Very poor 2.6% 3.2% 2.4% 
Poor 0.0% 9.7% 2.4% 
Satisfactory 10.5% 16.1% 34.3% 
Good 39.5% 38.7% 47.8% 
Excellent 47.4% 32.3% 13.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 142 – The importance of asset allocation as an investment strategy / application 
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Figure 132 – The importance of asset allocation as an investment strategy 
The importance of investing in passive managed 
funds as an investment strategy 
Asset 
Manager 
Institut. 
Investor 
Private 
Investor 
Very poor 16.2% 0.0% 0.9% 
Poor 10.8% 6.9% 20.6% 
Satisfactory 21.6% 37.9% 38.3% 
Good 35.1% 48.3% 31.3% 
Excellent 16.2% 6.9% 8.9% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 143 – The importance of passive investing as an investment strategy 
 
Figure 133 – The importance of passive investing as an investment strategy  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Very poor Poor Satisfactory Good Excellent
The importance of asset allocation as an investment strategy
Asset Manager Institut. Investor Private Investor
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Very poor Poor Satisfactory Good Excellent
The importance of passive investing as an investment strategy
Asset Manager Institut. Investor Private Investor
404 
 
10.3.1. Research question 2: further results and analysis 
 
 
Table 144 – Income distribution 
 
 
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 0 16 0 16
Row % 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 5.30% 0.00% 4.30%
Count 1 6 3 10
Row % 10.00% 60.00% 30.00% 100.00%
Col % 2.70% 2.00% 8.60% 2.70%
Count 3 24 8 35
Row % 8.60% 68.60% 22.90% 100.00%
Col % 8.10% 7.90% 22.90% 9.40%
Count 2 26 5 33
Row % 6.10% 78.80% 15.20% 100.00%
Col % 5.40% 8.60% 14.30% 8.80%
Count 1 40 9 50
Row % 2.00% 80.00% 18.00% 100.00%
Col % 2.70% 13.20% 25.70% 13.40%
Count 5 43 6 54
Row % 9.30% 79.60% 11.10% 100.00%
Col % 13.50% 14.20% 17.10% 14.40%
Count 3 32 1 36
Row % 8.30% 88.90% 2.80% 100.00%
Col % 8.10% 10.60% 2.90% 9.60%
Count 3 29 0 32
Row % 9.40% 90.60% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 8.10% 9.60% 0.00% 8.60%
Count 7 16 1 24
Row % 29.20% 66.70% 4.20% 100.00%
Col % 18.90% 5.30% 2.90% 6.40%
Count 0 12 1 13
Row % 0.00% 92.30% 7.70% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 4.00% 2.90% 3.50%
Count 12 58 1 71
Row % 16.90% 81.70% 1.40% 100.00%
Col % 32.40% 19.20% 2.90% 19.00%
Count 37 302 35 374
Row % 9.90% 80.70% 9.40% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
160'001 - 
180'000
180'001 - 
200'000
200'001 - 
220'000
220'001 - 
240'000
> 240'000
Total
Indicate your 
annual 
income range 
in CHF / US$
Profile
Total
bis 60'000
60'001 - 
80'000
80'001 - 
100'000
100'001 - 
120'000
120'001 - 
140'000
140'001 - 
160'000
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Table 145 – Years’ experience by the second class of investor groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 0 8 6 14
Row % 0.00% 57.10% 42.90% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 2.60% 17.10% 3.70%
Count 0 21 8 29
Row % 0.00% 72.40% 27.60% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 7.00% 22.90% 7.80%
Count 0 37 6 43
Row % 0.00% 86.00% 14.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 12.30% 17.10% 11.50%
Count 4 62 7 73
Row % 5.50% 84.90% 9.60% 100.00%
Col % 10.80% 20.50% 20.00% 19.50%
Count 10 72 4 86
Row % 11.60% 83.70% 4.70% 100.00%
Col % 27.00% 23.80% 11.40% 23.00%
Count 7 47 4 58
Row % 12.10% 81.00% 6.90% 100.00%
Col % 18.90% 15.60% 11.40% 15.50%
Count 16 55 0 71
Row % 22.50% 77.50% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 43.20% 18.20% 0.00% 19.00%
Count 37 302 35 374
Row % 9.90% 80.70% 9.40% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
> 20
Total
Profile
Total
How many 
years 
experience 
do you have 
investing in 
the stock 
market
None
1 - 3 
3 - 6 
6 - 10 
10 - 15
15 - 20
406 
 
  
 
Table 146 – Self-rating of financial investment knowledge  
 
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 0 1 6 7
Row % 0.00% 14.30% 85.70% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 0.30% 17.10% 1.90%
Count 0 56 26 82
Row % 0.00% 68.30% 31.70% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 18.70% 74.30% 22.10%
Count 0 101 2 103
Row % 0.00% 98.10% 1.90% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 33.80% 5.70% 27.80%
Count 9 119 1 129
Row % 7.00% 92.20% 0.80% 100.00%
Col % 24.30% 39.80% 2.90% 34.80%
Count 28 22 0 50
Row % 56.00% 44.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 75.70% 7.40% 0.00% 13.50%
Count 37 299 35 371
Row % 10.00% 80.60% 9.40% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Profile
Total
How do you 
rate your 
financial 
investment 
knowledge 
No 
knowledge
Basic 
knowledge
Average 
knowledge
Good 
knowledge
Excellent 
knowledge
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Table 147 – How much disposable income is invested 
 
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 3 35 15 53
Row % 5.70% 66.00% 28.30% 100.00%
Col % 8.30% 12.60% 51.70% 15.50%
Count 0 40 6 46
Row % 0.00% 87.00% 13.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 14.40% 20.70% 13.40%
Count 5 45 4 54
Row % 9.30% 83.30% 7.40% 100.00%
Col % 13.90% 16.20% 13.80% 15.70%
Count 2 35 0 37
Row % 5.40% 94.60% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 5.60% 12.60% 0.00% 10.80%
Count 5 40 3 48
Row % 10.40% 83.30% 6.30% 100.00%
Col % 13.90% 14.40% 10.30% 14.00%
Count 3 25 1 29
Row % 10.30% 86.20% 3.40% 100.00%
Col % 8.30% 9.00% 3.40% 8.50%
Count 7 23 0 30
Row % 23.30% 76.70% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 19.40% 8.30% 0.00% 8.70%
Count 5 23 0 28
Row % 17.90% 82.10% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 13.90% 8.30% 0.00% 8.20%
Count 6 9 0 15
Row % 40.00% 60.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 16.70% 3.20% 0.00% 4.40%
Count 0 3 0 3
Row % 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 1.10% 0.00% 0.90%
Count 36 278 29 343
Row % 10.50% 81.00% 8.50% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Total
Profile
Total
How much of 
your savings is 
invested in 
shares, bonds, 
funds, etc.
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
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Table 148 – Investment duration 
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 2 10 2 14
Row % 14.30% 71.40% 14.30% 100.00%
Col % 5.60% 3.40% 5.90% 3.80%
Count 2 25 1 28
Row % 7.10% 89.30% 3.60% 100.00%
Col % 5.60% 8.40% 2.90% 7.70%
Count 3 76 8 87
Row % 3.40% 87.40% 9.20% 100.00%
Col % 8.30% 25.70% 23.50% 23.80%
Count 4 54 2 60
Row % 6.70% 90.00% 3.30% 100.00%
Col % 11.10% 18.20% 5.90% 16.40%
Count 9 71 12 92
Row % 9.80% 77.20% 13.00% 100.00%
Col % 25.00% 24.00% 35.30% 25.10%
Count 10 37 5 52
Row % 19.20% 71.20% 9.60% 100.00%
Col % 27.80% 12.50% 14.70% 14.20%
Count 6 23 4 33
Row % 18.20% 69.70% 12.10% 100.00%
Col % 16.70% 7.80% 11.80% 9.00%
Count 36 296 34 366
Row % 9.80% 80.90% 9.30% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
> 15 years
Total
Profile
Total
How long  is 
your 
investment 
horizon
< 1 year
1 - 2 years
2 - 4 years
4 - 7 years
7 - 10 years
10 - 15 years
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Table 149 – Expected annual return 
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 2 6 1 9
Row % 22.20% 66.70% 11.10% 100.00%
Col % 5.70% 2.20% 4.20% 2.70%
Count 1 42 7 50
Row % 2.00% 84.00% 14.00% 100.00%
Col % 2.90% 15.10% 29.20% 14.80%
Count 12 90 8 110
Row % 10.90% 81.80% 7.30% 100.00%
Col % 34.30% 32.30% 33.30% 32.50%
Count 11 57 3 71
Row % 15.50% 80.30% 4.20% 100.00%
Col % 31.40% 20.40% 12.50% 21.00%
Count 7 42 2 51
Row % 13.70% 82.40% 3.90% 100.00%
Col % 20.00% 15.10% 8.30% 15.10%
Count 0 20 1 21
Row % 0.00% 95.20% 4.80% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 7.20% 4.20% 6.20%
Count 1 3 1 5
Row % 20.00% 60.00% 20.00% 100.00%
Col % 2.90% 1.10% 4.20% 1.50%
Count 0 6 1 7
Row % 0.00% 85.70% 14.30% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 2.20% 4.20% 2.10%
Count 0 5 0 5
Row % 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 1.80% 0.00% 1.50%
Count 0 4 0 4
Row % 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 1.40% 0.00% 1.20%
Count 0 2 0 2
Row % 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 0.70% 0.00% 0.60%
Count 1 2 0 3
Row % 33.30% 66.70% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 2.90% 0.70% 0.00% 0.90%
Count 35 279 24 338
Row % 10.40% 82.50% 7.10% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
 
Profile
Total
What is the annual return you expect on your 
financial investments
1 - 2%
2 - 4%
4 - 6%
6 - 8%
8 - 10%
10 - 12%
Total
12 - 14%
14 - 16%
18 - 20%
20 - 25%
25 -  30%
> 30%
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Table 150 – Tolerance for loss 
 
 
Table 151 – Risk profile development 
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 1 6 1 8
Row % 12.50% 75.00% 12.50% 100.00%
Col % 2.90% 2.20% 4.80% 2.50%
Count 4 26 3 33
Row % 12.10% 78.80% 9.10% 100.00%
Col % 11.80% 9.60% 14.30% 10.20%
Count 5 50 4 59
Row % 8.50% 84.70% 6.80% 100.00%
Col % 14.70% 18.50% 19.00% 18.20%
Count 4 32 3 39
Row % 10.30% 82.10% 7.70% 100.00%
Col % 11.80% 11.90% 14.30% 12.00%
Count 7 71 5 83
Row % 8.40% 85.50% 6.00% 100.00%
Col % 20.60% 26.30% 23.80% 25.50%
Count 8 59 2 69
Row % 11.60% 85.50% 2.90% 100.00%
Col % 23.50% 21.90% 9.50% 21.20%
Count 4 13 1 18
Row % 22.20% 72.20% 5.60% 100.00%
Col % 11.80% 4.80% 4.80% 5.50%
Count 1 13 2 16
Row % 6.30% 81.30% 12.50% 100.00%
Col % 2.90% 4.80% 9.50% 4.90%
Count 34 270 21 325
Row % 10.50% 83.10% 6.50% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
What is your tolerance for loss in a bad year 
on the stock market (i.e. 2008)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.5
> 50%
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 1 25 2 28
Row % 3.60% 89.30% 7.10% 100.00%
Col % 2.90% 8.70% 5.70% 7.80%
Count 3 64 5 72
Row % 4.20% 88.90% 6.90% 100.00%
Col % 8.60% 22.10% 14.30% 20.10%
Count 5 37 3 45
Row % 11.10% 82.20% 6.70% 100.00%
Col % 14.30% 12.80% 8.60% 12.50%
Count 15 76 2 93
Row % 16.10% 81.70% 2.20% 100.00%
Col % 42.90% 26.30% 5.70% 25.90%
Count 11 87 23 121
Row % 9.10% 71.90% 19.00% 100.00%
Col % 31.40% 30.10% 65.70% 33.70%
Count 35 289 35 359
Row % 9.70% 80.50% 9.70% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Profile
Total
Who has ever 
developed a 
risk profile 
for you
A private 
bank
A retail  bank
An asset 
management 
company
I did it myself
Nobody
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Table 152 – I can explain what an asset class is 
 
 
Table 153 – I can explain what a coupon is 
 
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 0 4 15 19
Row % 0.00% 21.10% 78.90% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 1.30% 42.90% 5.10%
Count 0 18 11 29
Row % 0.00% 62.10% 37.90% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 6.00% 31.40% 7.80%
Count 0 24 4 28
Row % 0.00% 85.70% 14.30% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 8.00% 11.40% 7.50%
Count 0 144 4 148
Row % 0.00% 97.30% 2.70% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 47.80% 11.40% 39.70%
Count 37 111 1 149
Row % 24.80% 74.50% 0.70% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 36.90% 2.90% 39.90%
Count 37 301 35 373
Row % 9.90% 80.70% 9.40% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Can explain-
Asset class
Profile
Total
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 0 5 8 13
Row % 0.00% 38.50% 61.50% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 1.70% 25.00% 3.50%
Count 0 23 10 33
Row % 0.00% 69.70% 30.30% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 7.60% 31.30% 8.90%
Count 0 25 4 29
Row % 0.00% 86.20% 13.80% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 8.30% 12.50% 7.80%
Count 0 135 7 142
Row % 0.00% 95.10% 4.90% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 44.70% 21.90% 38.30%
Count 37 114 3 154
Row % 24.00% 74.00% 1.90% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 37.70% 9.40% 41.50%
Count 37 302 32 371
Row % 10.00% 81.40% 8.60% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Can explain-
Coupon
Profile
Total
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
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Table 154 – I can explain what futures are  
 
 
Table 155 – I can explain what options are  
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 0 2 5 7
Row % 0.00% 28.60% 71.40% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 0.70% 14.70% 1.90%
Count 0 27 14 41
Row % 0.00% 65.90% 34.10% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 8.90% 41.20% 11.00%
Count 1 35 10 46
Row % 2.20% 76.10% 21.70% 100.00%
Col % 2.70% 11.60% 29.40% 12.30%
Count 1 151 5 157
Row % 0.60% 96.20% 3.20% 100.00%
Col % 2.70% 50.00% 14.70% 42.10%
Count 35 87 0 122
Row % 28.70% 71.30% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 94.60% 28.80% 0.00% 32.70%
Count 37 302 34 373
Row % 9.90% 81.00% 9.10% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Can explain-
Futures
Profile
Total
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 0 1 4 5
Row % 0.00% 20.00% 80.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 0.30% 11.40% 1.30%
Count 0 12 9 21
Row % 0.00% 57.10% 42.90% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 4.00% 25.70% 5.60%
Count 0 26 8 34
Row % 0.00% 76.50% 23.50% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 8.60% 22.90% 9.10%
Count 2 159 12 173
Row % 1.20% 91.90% 6.90% 100.00%
Col % 5.40% 52.80% 34.30% 46.40%
Count 35 103 2 140
Row % 25.00% 73.60% 1.40% 100.00%
Col % 94.60% 34.20% 5.70% 37.50%
Count 37 301 35 373
Row % 9.90% 80.70% 9.40% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Can explain-
Options 
(calls/puts)
Profile
Total
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
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Table 156 – I can explain what the P/E ratio is 
 
 
Table 157 – I can explain what rebalancing is 
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 0 10 13 23
Row % 0.00% 43.50% 56.50% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 3.30% 37.10% 6.20%
Count 0 44 15 59
Row % 0.00% 74.60% 25.40% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 14.60% 42.90% 15.80%
Count 0 26 4 30
Row % 0.00% 86.70% 13.30% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 8.60% 11.40% 8.00%
Count 1 127 3 131
Row % 0.80% 96.90% 2.30% 100.00%
Col % 2.70% 42.20% 8.60% 35.10%
Count 36 94 0 130
Row % 27.70% 72.30% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 97.30% 31.20% 0.00% 34.90%
Count 37 301 35 373
Row % 9.90% 80.70% 9.40% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Can explain-
P/E Ratio
Profile
Total
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 0 16 18 34
Row % 0.00% 47.10% 52.90% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 5.30% 51.40% 9.10%
Count 1 80 12 93
Row % 1.10% 86.00% 12.90% 100.00%
Col % 2.70% 26.70% 34.30% 25.00%
Count 1 38 4 43
Row % 2.30% 88.40% 9.30% 100.00%
Col % 2.70% 12.70% 11.40% 11.60%
Count 0 97 1 98
Row % 0.00% 99.00% 1.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 32.30% 2.90% 26.30%
Count 35 69 0 104
Row % 33.70% 66.30% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 94.60% 23.00% 0.00% 28.00%
Count 37 300 35 372
Row % 9.90% 80.60% 9.40% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Can explain-
Rebalancing
Profile
Total
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
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Table 158 – I can explain what structured products are 
 
 
Table 159 – I can explain the fee structure of an active managed fund 
 
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 0 2 10 12
Row % 0.00% 16.70% 83.30% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 0.70% 28.60% 3.20%
Count 0 30 12 42
Row % 0.00% 71.40% 28.60% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 10.00% 34.30% 11.30%
Count 1 48 7 56
Row % 1.80% 85.70% 12.50% 100.00%
Col % 2.70% 16.00% 20.00% 15.10%
Count 3 143 6 152
Row % 2.00% 94.10% 3.90% 100.00%
Col % 8.10% 47.70% 17.10% 40.90%
Count 33 77 0 110
Row % 30.00% 70.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 89.20% 25.70% 0.00% 29.60%
Count 37 300 35 372
Row % 9.90% 80.60% 9.40% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Can explain-
Structured 
products
Profile
Total
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 0 14 15 29
Row % 0.00% 48.30% 51.70% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 4.60% 42.90% 7.80%
Count 0 49 16 65
Row % 0.00% 75.40% 24.60% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 16.20% 45.70% 17.40%
Count 0 59 4 63
Row % 0.00% 93.70% 6.30% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 19.50% 11.40% 16.80%
Count 1 135 0 136
Row % 0.70% 99.30% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 2.70% 44.70% 0.00% 36.40%
Count 36 45 0 81
Row % 44.40% 55.60% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 97.30% 14.90% 0.00% 21.70%
Count 37 302 35 374
Row % 9.90% 80.70% 9.40% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Can explain 
the fee 
structure of 
active 
managed 
funds
Profile
Total
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
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Table 160 – I can explain the fee structure of a passive managed fund 
 
 
Table 161 – I can explain the fee structure of shares/stocks 
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 0 15 15 30
Row % 0.00% 50.00% 50.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 5.00% 42.90% 8.00%
Count 0 50 16 66
Row % 0.00% 75.80% 24.20% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 16.60% 45.70% 17.60%
Count 0 60 4 64
Row % 0.00% 93.80% 6.30% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 19.90% 11.40% 17.10%
Count 1 131 0 132
Row % 0.80% 99.20% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 2.70% 43.40% 0.00% 35.30%
Count 36 46 0 82
Row % 43.90% 56.10% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 97.30% 15.20% 0.00% 21.90%
Count 37 302 35 374
Row % 9.90% 80.70% 9.40% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Can explain 
the fee 
structure of 
passive 
managed 
funds
Profile
Total
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 0 5 12 17
Row % 0.00% 29.40% 70.60% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 1.70% 34.30% 4.60%
Count 0 19 7 26
Row % 0.00% 73.10% 26.90% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 6.30% 20.00% 7.00%
Count 0 27 6 33
Row % 0.00% 81.80% 18.20% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 9.00% 17.10% 8.80%
Count 2 177 10 189
Row % 1.10% 93.70% 5.30% 100.00%
Col % 5.40% 58.80% 28.60% 50.70%
Count 35 73 0 108
Row % 32.40% 67.60% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 94.60% 24.30% 0.00% 29.00%
Count 37 301 35 373
Row % 9.90% 80.70% 9.40% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Can explain 
the fee 
structure of 
Shares/Stocks
Profile
Total
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
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Table 162 – I pay more attention to diversification 
 
 
Table 163 – I invest for the long-term 
 
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 1 14 2 17
Row % 5.90% 82.40% 11.80% 100.00%
Col % 2.70% 4.70% 6.30% 4.60%
Count 2 38 3 43
Row % 4.70% 88.40% 7.00% 100.00%
Col % 5.40% 12.70% 9.40% 11.70%
Count 6 52 12 70
Row % 8.60% 74.30% 17.10% 100.00%
Col % 16.20% 17.30% 37.50% 19.00%
Count 10 129 13 152
Row % 6.60% 84.90% 8.60% 100.00%
Col % 27.00% 43.00% 40.60% 41.20%
Count 18 67 2 87
Row % 20.70% 77.00% 2.30% 100.00%
Col % 48.60% 22.30% 6.30% 23.60%
Count 37 300 32 369
Row % 10.00% 81.30% 8.70% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Profile
Total
I now pay 
more 
attention to 
diversificatio
n of my 
financial 
investement
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 0 17 2 19
Row % 0.00% 89.50% 10.50% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 6.70% 8.30% 6.20%
Count 7 53 6 66
Row % 10.60% 80.30% 9.10% 100.00%
Col % 24.10% 21.00% 25.00% 21.60%
Count 4 55 8 67
Row % 6.00% 82.10% 11.90% 100.00%
Col % 13.80% 21.80% 33.30% 22.00%
Count 18 127 8 153
Row % 11.80% 83.00% 5.20% 100.00%
Col % 62.10% 50.40% 33.30% 50.20%
Count 29 252 24 305
Row % 9.50% 82.60% 7.90% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Profile
Total
I now rather 
invest for 
long-term as 
the short-
time is 
uncertain
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
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Table 164 – I rather invest in single stocks/shares than in funds 
 
 
Table 165 – I invest without emotions influencing my decisions 
 
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 9 33 3 45
Row % 20.00% 73.30% 6.70% 100.00%
Col % 24.30% 11.10% 9.70% 12.30%
Count 10 78 6 94
Row % 10.60% 83.00% 6.40% 100.00%
Col % 27.00% 26.20% 19.40% 25.70%
Count 4 62 14 80
Row % 5.00% 77.50% 17.50% 100.00%
Col % 10.80% 20.80% 45.20% 21.90%
Count 7 74 6 87
Row % 8.00% 85.10% 6.90% 100.00%
Col % 18.90% 24.80% 19.40% 23.80%
Count 7 51 2 60
Row % 11.70% 85.00% 3.30% 100.00%
Col % 18.90% 17.10% 6.50% 16.40%
Count 37 298 31 366
Row % 10.10% 81.40% 8.50% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
I now rather 
invest in 
Single 
Stocks/Share
s than in 
Funds
Profile
Total
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 1 10 0 11
Row % 9.10% 90.90% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 2.70% 3.40% 0.00% 3.00%
Count 1 60 9 70
Row % 1.40% 85.70% 12.90% 100.00%
Col % 2.70% 20.10% 29.00% 19.10%
Count 6 95 10 111
Row % 5.40% 85.60% 9.00% 100.00%
Col % 16.20% 31.90% 32.30% 30.30%
Count 18 98 10 126
Row % 14.30% 77.80% 7.90% 100.00%
Col % 48.60% 32.90% 32.30% 34.40%
Count 11 35 2 48
Row % 22.90% 72.90% 4.20% 100.00%
Col % 29.70% 11.70% 6.50% 13.10%
Count 37 298 31 366
Row % 10.10% 81.40% 8.50% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
I now rather 
invest 
without 
letting 
emotions 
influencing 
my 
investment 
decisions
Profile
Total
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
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Table 166 – Change of bank/asset manager because of loss of trust 
 
 
Table 167 – I believe it’s a good idea to invest in the asset class cash 
 
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 19 99 12 130
Row % 14.60% 76.20% 9.20% 100.00%
Col % 54.30% 34.10% 37.50% 36.40%
Count 8 84 3 95
Row % 8.40% 88.40% 3.20% 100.00%
Col % 22.90% 29.00% 9.40% 26.60%
Count 5 57 9 71
Row % 7.00% 80.30% 12.70% 100.00%
Col % 14.30% 19.70% 28.10% 19.90%
Count 1 32 5 38
Row % 2.60% 84.20% 13.20% 100.00%
Col % 2.90% 11.00% 15.60% 10.60%
Count 2 18 3 23
Row % 8.70% 78.30% 13.00% 100.00%
Col % 5.70% 6.20% 9.40% 6.40%
Count 35 290 32 357
Row % 9.80% 81.20% 9.00% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
I changed my 
bank/Investm
ent manager 
because I 
lost trust in 
them/him
Profile
Total
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 4 21 4 29
Row % 13.80% 72.40% 13.80% 100.00%
Col % 11.40% 7.10% 12.10% 8.00%
Count 5 71 7 83
Row % 6.00% 85.50% 8.40% 100.00%
Col % 14.30% 24.00% 21.20% 22.80%
Count 9 71 12 92
Row % 9.80% 77.20% 13.00% 100.00%
Col % 25.70% 24.00% 36.40% 25.30%
Count 7 93 8 108
Row % 6.50% 86.10% 7.40% 100.00%
Col % 20.00% 31.40% 24.20% 29.70%
Count 10 40 2 52
Row % 19.20% 76.90% 3.80% 100.00%
Col % 28.60% 13.50% 6.10% 14.30%
Count 35 296 33 364
Row % 9.60% 81.30% 9.10% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Good idea to 
invest in 
cash
Profile
Total
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
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Table 168 – I believe it’s a good idea to invest in the asset class commodities 
 
 
Table 169 – I believe it’s a good idea to invest in the asset class corporate bonds 
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 2 16 1 19
Row % 10.50% 84.20% 5.30% 100.00%
Col % 5.70% 5.50% 3.30% 5.30%
Count 4 41 3 48
Row % 8.30% 85.40% 6.30% 100.00%
Col % 11.40% 14.00% 10.00% 13.40%
Count 8 82 12 102
Row % 7.80% 80.40% 11.80% 100.00%
Col % 22.90% 28.10% 40.00% 28.60%
Count 15 110 12 137
Row % 10.90% 80.30% 8.80% 100.00%
Col % 42.90% 37.70% 40.00% 38.40%
Count 6 43 2 51
Row % 11.80% 84.30% 3.90% 100.00%
Col % 17.10% 14.70% 6.70% 14.30%
Count 35 292 30 357
Row % 9.80% 81.80% 8.40% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Good idea to 
invest in 
commodities 
(Oil. Wheat. 
Sugar. 
Copper...)
Profile
Total
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 0 1 0 1
Row % 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 0.30% 0.00% 0.30%
Count 2 32 2 36
Row % 5.60% 88.90% 5.60% 100.00%
Col % 5.70% 11.00% 6.50% 10.10%
Count 6 69 15 90
Row % 6.70% 76.70% 16.70% 100.00%
Col % 17.10% 23.60% 48.40% 25.10%
Count 14 146 11 171
Row % 8.20% 85.40% 6.40% 100.00%
Col % 40.00% 50.00% 35.50% 47.80%
Count 13 44 3 60
Row % 21.70% 73.30% 5.00% 100.00%
Col % 37.10% 15.10% 9.70% 16.80%
Count 35 292 31 358
Row % 9.80% 81.60% 8.70% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Good idea to 
invest in 
corporate 
bonds
Profile
Total
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
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Table 170 – I believe it’s a good idea to invest in the asset class gold 
 
 
Table 171 – I believe it’s a good idea to invest in the asset class government bonds 
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 3 8 0 11
Row % 27.30% 72.70% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 8.60% 2.70% 0.00% 3.00%
Count 6 43 1 50
Row % 12.00% 86.00% 2.00% 100.00%
Col % 17.10% 14.60% 3.20% 13.90%
Count 8 101 16 125
Row % 6.40% 80.80% 12.80% 100.00%
Col % 22.90% 34.20% 51.60% 34.60%
Count 10 102 10 122
Row % 8.20% 83.60% 8.20% 100.00%
Col % 28.60% 34.60% 32.30% 33.80%
Count 8 41 4 53
Row % 15.10% 77.40% 7.50% 100.00%
Col % 22.90% 13.90% 12.90% 14.70%
Count 35 295 31 361
Row % 9.70% 81.70% 8.60% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Good idea to 
invest in gold
Profile
Total
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 5 16 0 21
Row % 23.80% 76.20% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 13.90% 5.50% 0.00% 5.80%
Count 8 60 1 69
Row % 11.60% 87.00% 1.40% 100.00%
Col % 22.20% 20.50% 3.20% 19.20%
Count 10 84 13 107
Row % 9.30% 78.50% 12.10% 100.00%
Col % 27.80% 28.70% 41.90% 29.70%
Count 6 105 11 122
Row % 4.90% 86.10% 9.00% 100.00%
Col % 16.70% 35.80% 35.50% 33.90%
Count 7 28 6 41
Row % 17.10% 68.30% 14.60% 100.00%
Col % 19.40% 9.60% 19.40% 11.40%
Count 36 293 31 360
Row % 10.00% 81.40% 8.60% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Good idea to 
invest in 
government 
bonds
Profile
Total
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
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Table 172 – I believe it’s a good idea to invest in the asset class hedge funds 
 
 
Table 173 – I believe it’s a good idea to invest in the asset class high yield bonds 
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 8 37 4 49
Row % 16.30% 75.50% 8.20% 100.00%
Col % 23.50% 13.10% 13.30% 14.10%
Count 8 95 8 111
Row % 7.20% 85.60% 7.20% 100.00%
Col % 23.50% 33.60% 26.70% 32.00%
Count 5 88 17 110
Row % 4.50% 80.00% 15.50% 100.00%
Col % 14.70% 31.10% 56.70% 31.70%
Count 8 51 1 60
Row % 13.30% 85.00% 1.70% 100.00%
Col % 23.50% 18.00% 3.30% 17.30%
Count 5 12 0 17
Row % 29.40% 70.60% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 14.70% 4.20% 0.00% 4.90%
Count 34 283 30 347
Row % 9.80% 81.60% 8.60% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Good idea to 
invest in 
hedge funds
Profile
Total
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 2 29 4 35
Row % 5.70% 82.90% 11.40% 100.00%
Col % 5.90% 10.00% 13.30% 9.90%
Count 6 65 4 75
Row % 8.00% 86.70% 5.30% 100.00%
Col % 17.60% 22.50% 13.30% 21.20%
Count 6 98 16 120
Row % 5.00% 81.70% 13.30% 100.00%
Col % 17.60% 33.90% 53.30% 34.00%
Count 6 75 4 85
Row % 7.10% 88.20% 4.70% 100.00%
Col % 17.60% 26.00% 13.30% 24.10%
Count 14 22 2 38
Row % 36.80% 57.90% 5.30% 100.00%
Col % 41.20% 7.60% 6.70% 10.80%
Count 34 289 30 353
Row % 9.60% 81.90% 8.50% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Good idea to 
invest in high 
yield bonds
Profile
Total
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
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Table 174 – I believe it’s a good idea to invest in the asset class real estate 
 
 
Table 175 – I believe it’s a good idea to invest in the asset class shares 
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 3 4 1 8
Row % 37.50% 50.00% 12.50% 100.00%
Col % 8.80% 1.40% 3.00% 2.20%
Count 2 40 0 42
Row % 4.80% 95.20% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 5.90% 13.70% 0.00% 11.70%
Count 9 71 10 90
Row % 10.00% 78.90% 11.10% 100.00%
Col % 26.50% 24.40% 30.30% 25.10%
Count 10 122 13 145
Row % 6.90% 84.10% 9.00% 100.00%
Col % 29.40% 41.90% 39.40% 40.50%
Count 10 54 9 73
Row % 13.70% 74.00% 12.30% 100.00%
Col % 29.40% 18.60% 27.30% 20.40%
Count 34 291 33 358
Row % 9.50% 81.30% 9.20% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Good idea to 
invest in real 
estate (funds)
Profile
Total
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
Experts
Informed 
Investors
Uninformed 
Investors
Count 0 3 0 3
Row % 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 1.00% 0.00% 0.80%
Count 1 8 0 9
Row % 11.10% 88.90% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 2.90% 2.70% 0.00% 2.50%
Count 0 24 10 34
Row % 0.00% 70.60% 29.40% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 8.20% 32.30% 9.50%
Count 6 146 15 167
Row % 3.60% 87.40% 9.00% 100.00%
Col % 17.10% 49.80% 48.40% 46.50%
Count 28 112 6 146
Row % 19.20% 76.70% 4.10% 100.00%
Col % 80.00% 38.20% 19.40% 40.70%
Count 35 293 31 359
Row % 9.70% 81.60% 8.60% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Good idea to 
invest in 
shares/stocks
Profile
Total
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly 
agree
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Table 176 – The importance of rebalancing for higher returns 
 
Table 177 – The importance of reducing retrocessions for higher returns 
  
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 0 4 1 5
Row % 0.00% 80.00% 20.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 1.50% 10.00% 1.60%
Count 2 18 0 20
Row % 10.00% 90.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 6.10% 6.70% 0.00% 6.40%
Count 4 73 3 80
Row % 5.00% 91.30% 3.80% 100.00%
Col % 12.10% 27.00% 30.00% 25.60%
Count 12 135 3 150
Row % 8.00% 90.00% 2.00% 100.00%
Col % 36.40% 50.00% 30.00% 47.90%
Count 15 40 3 58
Row % 25.90% 69.00% 5.20% 100.00%
Col % 45.50% 14.80% 30.00% 18.50%
Count 33 270 10 313
Row % 10.50% 86.30% 3.20% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
Rebalancing 
Very unimportant
Unimportant
Neutral
Important
Very important
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 0 10 1 11
Row % 0.00% 90.90% 9.10% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 3.70% 10.00% 3.50%
Count 2 33 1 36
Row % 5.60% 91.70% 2.80% 100.00%
Col % 6.10% 12.20% 10.00% 11.50%
Count 11 82 1 94
Row % 11.70% 87.20% 1.10% 100.00%
Col % 33.30% 30.30% 10.00% 29.90%
Count 9 107 6 122
Row % 7.40% 87.70% 4.90% 100.00%
Col % 27.30% 39.50% 60.00% 38.90%
Count 11 39 1 51
Row % 21.60% 76.50% 2.00% 100.00%
Col % 33.30% 14.40% 10.00% 16.20%
Count 33 271 10 314
Row % 10.50% 86.30% 3.20% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
Reducing retrocessions (kick-
backs)
Very unimportant
Unimportant
Neutral
Important
Very important
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Table 178 – The importance of re-investing dividends/coupons for higher returns 
 
Table 179 – The importance of active vs. passive funds for higher returns 
 
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 0 7 1 8
Row % 0.00% 87.50% 12.50% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 2.50% 10.00% 2.50%
Count 1 32 1 34
Row % 2.90% 94.10% 2.90% 100.00%
Col % 3.00% 11.50% 10.00% 10.60%
Count 10 89 2 101
Row % 9.90% 88.10% 2.00% 100.00%
Col % 30.30% 31.90% 20.00% 31.40%
Count 13 128 6 147
Row % 8.80% 87.10% 4.10% 100.00%
Col % 39.40% 45.90% 60.00% 45.70%
Count 9 23 0 32
Row % 28.10% 71.90% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 27.30% 8.20% 0.00% 9.90%
Count 33 279 10 322
Row % 10.20% 86.60% 3.10% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
Re-investing 
dividends/coupons
Very unimportant
Unimportant
Neutral
Important
Very important
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 0 4 1 5
Row % 0.00% 80.00% 20.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 1.50% 10.00% 1.60%
Count 0 18 0 18
Row % 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 6.60% 0.00% 5.70%
Count 11 92 6 109
Row % 10.10% 84.40% 5.50% 100.00%
Col % 33.30% 33.90% 60.00% 34.70%
Count 11 124 3 138
Row % 8.00% 89.90% 2.20% 100.00%
Col % 33.30% 45.80% 30.00% 43.90%
Count 11 33 0 44
Row % 25.00% 75.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 33.30% 12.20% 0.00% 14.00%
Count 33 271 10 314
Row % 10.50% 86.30% 3.20% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
The choice of active vs. passive 
managed funds
Very unimportant
Unimportant
Neutral
Important
Very important
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Table 180 – The importance of the asset class choice for higher returns 
 
Table 181 – The importance of the product choice for higher returns 
 
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 0 2 1 3
Row % 0.00% 66.70% 33.30% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 0.70% 11.10% 1.00%
Count 0 10 0 10
Row % 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 3.70% 0.00% 3.20%
Count 2 53 3 58
Row % 3.40% 91.40% 5.20% 100.00%
Col % 6.10% 19.40% 33.30% 18.40%
Count 9 131 4 144
Row % 6.30% 91.00% 2.80% 100.00%
Col % 27.30% 48.00% 44.40% 45.70%
Count 22 77 1 100
Row % 22.00% 77.00% 1.00% 100.00%
Col % 66.70% 28.20% 11.10% 31.70%
Count 33 273 9 315
Row % 10.50% 86.70% 2.90% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
The choice of asset classes
Very unimportant
Unimportant
Neutral
Important
Very important
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 0 3 1 4
Row % 0.00% 75.00% 25.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 1.10% 6.30% 1.20%
Count 1 4 1 6
Row % 16.70% 66.70% 16.70% 100.00%
Col % 3.00% 1.40% 6.30% 1.80%
Count 2 38 3 43
Row % 4.70% 88.40% 7.00% 100.00%
Col % 6.10% 13.50% 18.80% 13.00%
Count 17 140 8 165
Row % 10.30% 84.80% 4.80% 100.00%
Col % 51.50% 49.60% 50.00% 49.80%
Count 13 97 3 113
Row % 11.50% 85.80% 2.70% 100.00%
Col % 39.40% 34.40% 18.80% 34.10%
Count 33 282 16 331
Row % 10.00% 85.20% 4.80% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
The choice of products (shares, 
bonds, funds, etc.)
Very unimportant
Unimportant
Neutral
Important
Very important
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Table 182 – The importance of the current purchasing price for higher returns 
 
Table 183 – The importance of the investment duration for higher returns 
 
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 0 3 2 5
Row % 0.00% 60.00% 40.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 1.10% 11.10% 1.50%
Count 5 24 1 30
Row % 16.70% 80.00% 3.30% 100.00%
Col % 15.20% 8.50% 5.60% 9.00%
Count 9 51 3 63
Row % 14.30% 81.00% 4.80% 100.00%
Col % 27.30% 18.10% 16.70% 18.90%
Count 11 126 7 144
Row % 7.60% 87.50% 4.90% 100.00%
Col % 33.30% 44.70% 38.90% 43.20%
Count 8 78 5 91
Row % 8.80% 85.70% 5.50% 100.00%
Col % 24.20% 27.70% 27.80% 27.30%
Count 33 282 18 333
Row % 9.90% 84.70% 5.40% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
The current purchasing price
Very unimportant
Unimportant
Neutral
Important
Very important
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 0 1 1 2
Row % 0.00% 50.00% 50.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 0.40% 5.60% 0.60%
Count 2 8 0 10
Row % 20.00% 80.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 6.10% 2.80% 0.00% 3.00%
Count 1 34 3 38
Row % 2.60% 89.50% 7.90% 100.00%
Col % 3.00% 12.00% 16.70% 11.40%
Count 13 138 11 162
Row % 8.00% 85.20% 6.80% 100.00%
Col % 39.40% 48.80% 61.10% 48.50%
Count 17 102 3 122
Row % 13.90% 83.60% 2.50% 100.00%
Col % 51.50% 36.00% 16.70% 36.50%
Count 33 283 18 334
Row % 9.90% 84.70% 5.40% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
The investment duration
Very unimportant
Unimportant
Neutral
Important
Very important
427 
 
 
Table 184 – The importance of reducing TER for higher returns    
 
Table 185 – The importance of a company being Swiss for the investment decision 
 
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 0 3 2 5
Row % 0.00% 60.00% 40.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 1.10% 20.00% 1.60%
Count 0 10 0 10
Row % 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 3.70% 0.00% 3.20%
Count 3 61 3 67
Row % 4.50% 91.00% 4.50% 100.00%
Col % 9.40% 22.80% 30.00% 21.70%
Count 13 136 5 154
Row % 8.40% 88.30% 3.20% 100.00%
Col % 40.60% 50.90% 50.00% 49.80%
Count 16 57 0 73
Row % 21.90% 78.10% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 50.00% 21.30% 0.00% 23.60%
Count 32 267 10 309
Row % 10.40% 86.40% 3.20% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
Total expense ratio (TER)
Very unimportant
Unimportant
Neutral
Important
Very important
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 1 16 1 18
Row % 5.60% 88.90% 5.60% 100.00%
Col % 3.00% 5.60% 3.30% 5.10%
Count 7 63 4 74
Row % 9.50% 85.10% 5.40% 100.00%
Col % 21.20% 22.00% 13.30% 21.10%
Count 13 94 12 119
Row % 10.90% 79.00% 10.10% 100.00%
Col % 39.40% 32.80% 40.00% 34.00%
Count 11 83 12 106
Row % 10.40% 78.30% 11.30% 100.00%
Col % 33.30% 28.90% 40.00% 30.30%
Count 1 31 1 33
Row % 3.00% 93.90% 3.00% 100.00%
Col % 3.00% 10.80% 3.30% 9.40%
Count 33 287 30 350
Row % 9.40% 82.00% 8.60% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
Company is a Swiss company
Very unimportant
Unimportant
Neutral
Important
Very important
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Table 186 – The importance of ethical aspects for the investment decision  
 
 
Table 187 – The importance of the expected dividend for the investment decision 
 
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 4 21 1 26
Row % 15.40% 80.80% 3.80% 100.00%
Col % 12.10% 7.30% 3.30% 7.40%
Count 7 58 3 68
Row % 10.30% 85.30% 4.40% 100.00%
Col % 21.20% 20.20% 10.00% 19.40%
Count 17 106 8 131
Row % 13.00% 80.90% 6.10% 100.00%
Col % 51.50% 36.90% 26.70% 37.40%
Count 5 84 14 103
Row % 4.90% 81.60% 13.60% 100.00%
Col % 15.20% 29.30% 46.70% 29.40%
Count 0 18 4 22
Row % 0.00% 81.80% 18.20% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 6.30% 13.30% 6.30%
Count 33 287 30 350
Row % 9.40% 82.00% 8.60% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
Ethical aspects l ike sustainability or green 
investing
Very unimportant
Unimportant
Neutral
Important
Very important
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 2 8 2 12
Row % 16.70% 66.70% 16.70% 100.00%
Col % 6.10% 2.80% 6.70% 3.40%
Count 1 12 1 14
Row % 7.10% 85.70% 7.10% 100.00%
Col % 3.00% 4.20% 3.30% 4.00%
Count 10 73 8 91
Row % 11.00% 80.20% 8.80% 100.00%
Col % 30.30% 25.60% 26.70% 26.10%
Count 12 147 16 175
Row % 6.90% 84.00% 9.10% 100.00%
Col % 36.40% 51.60% 53.30% 50.30%
Count 8 45 3 56
Row % 14.30% 80.40% 5.40% 100.00%
Col % 24.20% 15.80% 10.00% 16.10%
Count 33 285 30 348
Row % 9.50% 81.90% 8.60% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
Expected dividend rate
Very unimportant
Unimportant
Neutral
Important
Very important
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Table 188 – The importance of company knowledge for the investment decision 
 
 
Table 189 – The importance of the past performance for the investment decision 
 
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 0 2 0 2
Row % 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 0.70% 0.00% 0.60%
Count 4 7 1 12
Row % 33.30% 58.30% 8.30% 100.00%
Col % 12.10% 2.50% 3.30% 3.40%
Count 2 40 7 49
Row % 4.10% 81.60% 14.30% 100.00%
Col % 6.10% 14.00% 23.30% 14.10%
Count 14 150 14 178
Row % 7.90% 84.30% 7.90% 100.00%
Col % 42.40% 52.60% 46.70% 51.10%
Count 13 86 8 107
Row % 12.10% 80.40% 7.50% 100.00%
Col % 39.40% 30.20% 26.70% 30.70%
Count 33 285 30 348
Row % 9.50% 81.90% 8.60% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
My knowledge of the company
Very unimportant
Unimportant
Neutral
Important
Very important
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 1 3 1 5
Row % 20.00% 60.00% 20.00% 100.00%
Col % 3.00% 1.00% 3.30% 1.40%
Count 9 20 1 30
Row % 30.00% 66.70% 3.30% 100.00%
Col % 27.30% 7.00% 3.30% 8.60%
Count 6 56 3 65
Row % 9.20% 86.20% 4.60% 100.00%
Col % 18.20% 19.60% 10.00% 18.60%
Count 14 144 13 171
Row % 8.20% 84.20% 7.60% 100.00%
Col % 42.40% 50.30% 43.30% 49.00%
Count 3 63 12 78
Row % 3.80% 80.80% 15.40% 100.00%
Col % 9.10% 22.00% 40.00% 22.30%
Count 33 286 30 349
Row % 9.50% 81.90% 8.60% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
Past performance (proft/loss over years)
Very unimportant
Unimportant
Neutral
Important
Very important
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Table 190 – The importance of the P/E ratio for the investment decision 
 
 
Table 191 – The importance of the company’s industry for the investment decision 
 
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 0 5 1 6
Row % 0.00% 83.30% 16.70% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 1.80% 5.30% 1.90%
Count 3 19 1 23
Row % 13.00% 82.60% 4.30% 100.00%
Col % 9.10% 7.00% 5.30% 7.10%
Count 10 120 13 143
Row % 7.00% 83.90% 9.10% 100.00%
Col % 30.30% 44.30% 68.40% 44.30%
Count 18 98 4 120
Row % 15.00% 81.70% 3.30% 100.00%
Col % 54.50% 36.20% 21.10% 37.20%
Count 2 29 0 31
Row % 6.50% 93.50% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 6.10% 10.70% 0.00% 9.60%
Count 33 271 19 323
Row % 10.20% 83.90% 5.90% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
hare/stock has a low P/E ratio
Very unimportant
Unimportant
Neutral
Important
Very important
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 0 5 0 5
Row % 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 1.80% 0.00% 1.40%
Count 3 18 0 21
Row % 14.30% 85.70% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 9.40% 6.30% 0.00% 6.10%
Count 8 36 7 51
Row % 15.70% 70.60% 13.70% 100.00%
Col % 25.00% 12.60% 24.10% 14.70%
Count 12 150 15 177
Row % 6.80% 84.70% 8.50% 100.00%
Col % 37.50% 52.60% 51.70% 51.20%
Count 9 76 7 92
Row % 9.80% 82.60% 7.60% 100.00%
Col % 28.10% 26.70% 24.10% 26.60%
Count 32 285 29 346
Row % 9.20% 82.40% 8.40% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
The industry the company is in
Very unimportant
Unimportant
Neutral
Important
Very important
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Table 192 – The importance of active funds for the investment decision 
 
 
Table 193 – The importance of passive funds for the investment decision 
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 4 27 4 35
Row % 11.40% 77.10% 11.40% 100.00%
Col % 12.10% 10.00% 20.00% 10.80%
Count 11 67 3 81
Row % 13.60% 82.70% 3.70% 100.00%
Col % 33.30% 24.80% 15.00% 25.10%
Count 6 103 11 120
Row % 5.00% 85.80% 9.20% 100.00%
Col % 18.20% 38.10% 55.00% 37.20%
Count 11 59 1 71
Row % 15.50% 83.10% 1.40% 100.00%
Col % 33.30% 21.90% 5.00% 22.00%
Count 1 14 1 16
Row % 6.30% 87.50% 6.30% 100.00%
Col % 3.00% 5.20% 5.00% 5.00%
Count 33 270 20 323
Row % 10.20% 83.60% 6.20% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
Product is an active managed fund
Very unimportant
Unimportant
Neutral
Important
Very important
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 3 16 2 21
Row % 14.30% 76.20% 9.50% 100.00%
Col % 9.10% 5.90% 10.00% 6.50%
Count 6 46 4 56
Row % 10.70% 82.10% 7.10% 100.00%
Col % 18.20% 16.90% 20.00% 17.20%
Count 8 122 11 141
Row % 5.70% 86.50% 7.80% 100.00%
Col % 24.20% 44.90% 55.00% 43.40%
Count 8 70 2 80
Row % 10.00% 87.50% 2.50% 100.00%
Col % 24.20% 25.70% 10.00% 24.60%
Count 8 18 1 27
Row % 29.60% 66.70% 3.70% 100.00%
Col % 24.20% 6.60% 5.00% 8.30%
Count 33 272 20 325
Row % 10.20% 83.70% 6.20% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
Product is an Index fund or an ETF
Very unimportant
Unimportant
Neutral
Important
Very important
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Table 194 – The importance of active investing as an investment strategy  
 
 
Table 195 – The importance of asset allocation as an investment strategy / application 
 
 
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 1 7 1 9
Row % 11.10% 77.80% 11.10% 100.00%
Col % 3.10% 2.70% 9.10% 3.00%
Count 6 40 0 46
Row % 13.00% 87.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 18.80% 15.60% 0.00% 15.40%
Count 8 70 6 84
Row % 9.50% 83.30% 7.10% 100.00%
Col % 25.00% 27.30% 54.50% 28.10%
Count 12 119 4 135
Row % 8.90% 88.10% 3.00% 100.00%
Col % 37.50% 46.50% 36.40% 45.20%
Count 5 20 0 25
Row % 20.00% 80.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 15.60% 7.80% 0.00% 8.40%
Count 32 256 11 299
Row % 10.70% 85.60% 3.70% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
The importance of active investing
Very poor
Poor
Satisfactory
Good
Excellent
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 1 4 1 6
Row % 16.70% 66.70% 16.70% 100.00%
Col % 3.00% 1.70% 33.30% 2.20%
Count 0 8 0 8
Row % 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 3.30% 0.00% 2.90%
Count 5 74 1 80
Row % 6.30% 92.50% 1.30% 100.00%
Col % 15.20% 31.00% 33.30% 29.10%
Count 9 116 1 126
Row % 7.10% 92.10% 0.80% 100.00%
Col % 27.30% 48.50% 33.30% 45.80%
Count 18 37 0 55
Row % 32.70% 67.30% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 54.50% 15.50% 0.00% 20.00%
Count 33 239 3 275
Row % 12.00% 86.90% 1.10% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Total
 
Profile
The importance of asset allocation
Very poor
Poor
Satisfactory
Good
Excellent
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Table 196 – The importance of buy and hold as an investment strategy  
 
 
Table 197 – The importance of dividend investing as an investment strategy  
 
 
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 0 3 1 4
Row % 0.00% 75.00% 25.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 1.10% 9.10% 1.30%
Count 5 28 2 35
Row % 14.30% 80.00% 5.70% 100.00%
Col % 14.70% 10.70% 18.20% 11.40%
Count 8 85 2 95
Row % 8.40% 89.50% 2.10% 100.00%
Col % 23.50% 32.60% 18.20% 31.00%
Count 16 126 6 148
Row % 10.80% 85.10% 4.10% 100.00%
Col % 47.10% 48.30% 54.50% 48.40%
Count 5 19 0 24
Row % 20.80% 79.20% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 14.70% 7.30% 0.00% 7.80%
Count 34 261 11 306
Row % 11.10% 85.30% 3.60% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
The importance of buy and hold
Very poor
Poor
Satisfactory
Good
Excellent
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 1 3 1 5
Row % 20.00% 60.00% 20.00% 100.00%
Col % 2.90% 1.20% 8.30% 1.60%
Count 3 21 0 24
Row % 12.50% 87.50% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 8.80% 8.10% 0.00% 7.90%
Count 8 65 4 77
Row % 10.40% 84.40% 5.20% 100.00%
Col % 23.50% 25.10% 33.30% 25.20%
Count 16 129 7 152
Row % 10.50% 84.90% 4.60% 100.00%
Col % 47.10% 49.80% 58.30% 49.80%
Count 6 41 0 47
Row % 12.80% 87.20% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 17.60% 15.80% 0.00% 15.40%
Count 34 259 12 305
Row % 11.10% 84.90% 3.90% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
The importance of dividend investing
Very poor
Poor
Satisfactory
Good
Excellent
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Table 198 – The importance of fundamental analysis as an investment strategy  
 
 
Table 199 – The importance of growth investing as an investment strategy  
 
 
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 0 4 1 5
Row % 0.00% 80.00% 20.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 1.70% 20.00% 1.90%
Count 2 20 0 22
Row % 9.10% 90.90% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 5.90% 8.70% 0.00% 8.20%
Count 7 59 0 66
Row % 10.60% 89.40% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 20.60% 25.80% 0.00% 24.60%
Count 16 115 4 135
Row % 11.90% 85.20% 3.00% 100.00%
Col % 47.10% 50.20% 80.00% 50.40%
Count 9 31 0 40
Row % 22.50% 77.50% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 26.50% 13.50% 0.00% 14.90%
Count 34 229 5 268
Row % 12.70% 85.40% 1.90% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
The importance of fundamental analysis
Very poor
Poor
Satisfactory
Good
Excellent
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 1 3 1 5
Row % 20.00% 60.00% 20.00% 100.00%
Col % 3.10% 1.20% 12.50% 1.80%
Count 2 20 0 22
Row % 9.10% 90.90% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 6.30% 8.30% 0.00% 7.80%
Count 8 72 1 81
Row % 9.90% 88.90% 1.20% 100.00%
Col % 25.00% 29.80% 12.50% 28.70%
Count 17 124 6 147
Row % 11.60% 84.40% 4.10% 100.00%
Col % 53.10% 51.20% 75.00% 52.10%
Count 4 23 0 27
Row % 14.80% 85.20% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 12.50% 9.50% 0.00% 9.60%
Count 32 242 8 282
Row % 11.30% 85.80% 2.80% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
The importance of growth investing
Very poor
Poor
Satisfactory
Good
Excellent
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Table 200 – The importance of passive investing as an investment strategy  
 
 
Table 201 – The importance of stock picking as an investment strategy  
 
 
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 2 5 1 8
Row % 25.00% 62.50% 12.50% 100.00%
Col % 6.30% 2.10% 16.70% 2.90%
Count 3 45 2 50
Row % 6.00% 90.00% 4.00% 100.00%
Col % 9.40% 18.70% 33.30% 17.90%
Count 10 88 2 100
Row % 10.00% 88.00% 2.00% 100.00%
Col % 31.30% 36.50% 33.30% 35.80%
Count 7 86 1 94
Row % 7.40% 91.50% 1.10% 100.00%
Col % 21.90% 35.70% 16.70% 33.70%
Count 10 17 0 27
Row % 37.00% 63.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 31.30% 7.10% 0.00% 9.70%
Count 32 241 6 279
Row % 11.50% 86.40% 2.20% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
The importance of passive investing
Very poor
Poor
Satisfactory
Good
Excellent
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 1 5 1 7
Row % 14.30% 71.40% 14.30% 100.00%
Col % 3.00% 1.90% 7.70% 2.20%
Count 8 31 0 39
Row % 20.50% 79.50% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 24.20% 11.60% 0.00% 12.40%
Count 10 64 2 76
Row % 13.20% 84.20% 2.60% 100.00%
Col % 30.30% 23.90% 15.40% 24.20%
Count 10 112 8 130
Row % 7.70% 86.20% 6.20% 100.00%
Col % 30.30% 41.80% 61.50% 41.40%
Count 4 56 2 62
Row % 6.50% 90.30% 3.20% 100.00%
Col % 12.10% 20.90% 15.40% 19.70%
Count 33 268 13 314
Row % 10.50% 85.40% 4.10% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
The importance of stock picking
Very poor
Poor
Satisfactory
Good
Excellent
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Table 202 – The importance of technical analysis as an investment strategy  
 
 
Table 203 – The importance of value averaging as an investment strategy  
 
 
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 7 14 1 22
Row % 31.80% 63.60% 4.50% 100.00%
Col % 21.20% 6.00% 20.00% 8.10%
Count 8 57 0 65
Row % 12.30% 87.70% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 24.20% 24.40% 0.00% 23.90%
Count 6 93 1 100
Row % 6.00% 93.00% 1.00% 100.00%
Col % 18.20% 39.70% 20.00% 36.80%
Count 10 53 2 65
Row % 15.40% 81.50% 3.10% 100.00%
Col % 30.30% 22.60% 40.00% 23.90%
Count 2 17 1 20
Row % 10.00% 85.00% 5.00% 100.00%
Col % 6.10% 7.30% 20.00% 7.40%
Count 33 234 5 272
Row % 12.10% 86.00% 1.80% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
The importance of technical analysis
Very poor
Poor
Satisfactory
Good
Excellent
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 1 6 1 8
Row % 12.50% 75.00% 12.50% 100.00%
Col % 3.40% 3.40% 33.30% 3.80%
Count 9 50 0 59
Row % 15.30% 84.70% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 31.00% 27.90% 0.00% 28.00%
Count 9 96 2 107
Row % 8.40% 89.70% 1.90% 100.00%
Col % 31.00% 53.60% 66.70% 50.70%
Count 9 23 0 32
Row % 28.10% 71.90% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 31.00% 12.80% 0.00% 15.20%
Count 1 4 0 5
Row % 20.00% 80.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 3.40% 2.20% 0.00% 2.40%
Count 29 179 3 211
Row % 13.70% 84.80% 1.40% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
The importance of value averaging
Very poor
Poor
Satisfactory
Good
Excellent
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Table 204 – The importance of value investing as an investment strategy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXPs INIs UNIs
Count 0 3 1 4
Row % 0.00% 75.00% 25.00% 100.00%
Col % 0.00% 1.40% 20.00% 1.60%
Count 3 20 0 23
Row % 13.00% 87.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 8.80% 9.30% 0.00% 9.10%
Count 6 72 2 80
Row % 7.50% 90.00% 2.50% 100.00%
Col % 17.60% 33.50% 40.00% 31.50%
Count 17 91 2 110
Row % 15.50% 82.70% 1.80% 100.00%
Col % 50.00% 42.30% 40.00% 43.30%
Count 8 29 0 37
Row % 21.60% 78.40% 0.00% 100.00%
Col % 23.50% 13.50% 0.00% 14.60%
Count 34 215 5 254
Row % 13.40% 84.60% 2.00% 100.00%
Col % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
 
Profile
Total
The importance of value investing
Very poor
Poor
Satisfactory
Good
Excellent
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10.4. Online survey 
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10.5. Survey results illustration 
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10.6. Profiling results ‘Experts’ illustration 
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